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Summary 
With respect to many products the threat to public health and the environment may stem 
from the physical properties of products. However, in recent decades emphasis has 
increasingly been shifted toward a more holistic understanding of the environmental 
impacts of products. Namely, the negative effects may not only relate to the physical 
properties of the end product, but may come, for example, from the emissions during 
the production phase. In other words, the process and production methods (PPMs) 
affects the environmental impacts of products.  
The focus of this book is on the relationship between environmental PPM-criteria 
adopted by EU member states and U.S. states on the one hand and trade law on the 
other hand. In particular, what challenges do PPM-criteria present to established legal 
tests applicable under WTO law, EU free movement law and the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause? In addition, it is examined whether the legal tests reflect efficiency 
as a core value and whether there may be some other values reconciled under legal tests 
in trade law. The research questions are examined against the backdrop of recent and 
emerging cases relating to the renewables sector and more specifically measures such 
as feed-in-tariffs and renewable portfolio standards, support schemes for biofuels and 
sustainability criteria in public procurement. 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Monet tuotteet ovat niiden fyysisten ominaisuuksien johdosta haitallisia 
kansanterveydelle tai ympäristölle. Viimeisten vuosikymmenten aikana on kuitenkin 
kiinnitetty yhä enemmän huomiota tuotteiden ympäristövaikutuksiin 
kokonaisvaltaisemmin. On nimittäin niin, että haitalliset vaikutukset eivät suinkaan 
rajoitu lopputuotteen fyysisiin ominaisuuksiin vaan voivat liittyä myös esimerkiksi 
tuotantoprosessin aikana syntyneisiin päästöihin. Toisin sanoen, tuotantomenetelmillä 
on merkitystä tuotteiden ympäristövaikutuksiin. 
Tässä kirjassa on tutkittu Euroopan unionin jäsenvaltioiden ja Yhdysvaltain 
osavaltioiden asettamia tuotantomenetelmiä koskevia ympäristökriteereitä sekä niiden 
suhdetta vapaakauppasääntöihin. Tarkastelun alla ovat vapaakauppajärjestö WTO:n 
normisto, EU:n vapaan liikkuvuuden periaatteet sekä Yhdysvaltojen perustuslaista 
kumpuavat osavaltioiden välistä kauppaa koskevat säännöt. Millaisia haasteita syntyy, 
kun tuotantomenetelmiä koskeviin kriteereihin sovelletaan niitä samoja vakiintuneita 
oikeudellisia testejä, joita on sovellettu muuhunkin valtiolliseen sääntelyyn? 
Mielenkiinto kohdistuu myös siihen, palvelevatko oikeudelliset testit tehokkuutta 
eräänlaisena keskeisenä arvona ja onko mahdollisesti myös muita arvoja, jotka 
vaikutusta vapaakaupan testien raameissa tehtävään punnintaan. Tutkimuskysymysten 
tarkastelussa käytännön haasteet on pääosin johdettu viimeaikaisista oikeustapauksista 
liittyen uusiutuvan energian kannustinjärjestelmiin. Tällaisia järjestelmiä ovat 
esimerkiksi syöttötariffit, kiintiöt, biopolttoaineiden tukijärjestelmät sekä 
kestävyyskriteerit julkisissa hankinnoissa.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1. Setting the Scene 
1.1.1. The Energy Transition in the EU and the U.S. 
Climate change and its consequences have been and continue to be hot topics. In order 
to tackle the problem both the EU and the U.S. continuously develop their strategies. 
The energy sector has emerged as a focal point due to its importance in today’s 
economy as well as the substantive share of emissions that can be attributed to it. 
Although each method of generating energy will have some negative impacts, there is 
a general consensus in the U.S. and the EU that current use of fossil fuels with their 
high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is unsustainable. Decades of international 
negotiations have, however, come short of effective global action. 
A transformation of the energy sector is still taking place. The EU and the U.S. have 
adopted several legislative initiatives in order to deal with greenhouse gas emission 
levels and to push the transition toward sustainable energy.  For example, the EU has 
developed a policy to promote energy from renewable resources.1 A key objective of 
this strategy is to reduce the dependency on fossil fuel. These efforts can only be 
expected to intensify following the international deal struck at the 21st annual 
Conference of the Parties hosted by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (COP21),2 despite the U.S. threatening to withdraw from the 
agreement in 2020.3 
Countries have reacted to the modest global level progress in tackling climate change 
by introducing their own programs. In both the U.S. and the EU much discretion – and 
responsibility – has been left to the state legislator due to the lack of consensus even on 
federal or union level. The view on necessary measures to encourage sustainable 
development in the energy sector has not been uniform among states. Some U.S. States 
argue for a coal moratorium as cases presented in this book will illustrate, while others 
                                                 
1 Commission Communication, Energy 2020: A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy, 
COM (2010) 639 final; Commission Communication, Energy Roadmap 2050, COM (2011) 885 final; 
Commission Communication, A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 
2030, COM (2014) 15 final. 
2 COP21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 12 Dec. 2015, UNFCCC/CP/2015/L.9. 
3 President Donald J. Trump, Speech at White House Rose Garden (1 June 2017) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3wE7MO1uSw> accessed 9 March 2018. 
1
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are dependent on coal. Similar controversies are present in the EU. Some Member 
States phase-out their nuclear power plants,4 others build new reactors.5 What is more, 
the definition of prioritized renewables, i.e. sustainable energy, varies not only on the 
global arena, but also from state to state. 
1.1.2. Rules on Process and Production Methods 
With respect to many products the threat to public health and the environment may stem 
from the physical properties of products. However, in recent decades emphasis has 
increasingly been shifted toward a more holistic understanding of the environmental 
impacts of products. Namely, the negative effects may not only relate to the physical 
properties of the end product, but may come, for example, from the emissions during 
the consumption or the production phase. In other words, even the process and 
production methods (PPMs) affect the environmental impacts of products. 
PPMs are commonly divided into product-related PPMs and non-product-related 
PPMs.6 Non-product-related PPMs are those that do not affect the physical properties 
of the end product. Electricity generated through various processes forms a good 
example. Product-related PPMs, in turn, cover PPMs that have an effect on the physical 
properties of the end product. The impact can be significant or minimal. The end 
products of different product-related PPMs can thus be anything from almost identical 
to completely different. 
                                                 
4 Decisions to dismantle reactors have been taken in Belgium and Germany. See Moniteur Belge, 
28.02.2003 − Ed. 3, 31 Janvier 2003, Loi sur la sortie progressive de l’e ́nergie nucle ́aire a` des fins de 
production industrielle d’e ́lectricite ́, p. 9879; Kenneth Bruninx et al., Impact of the German nuclear 
phase-out on Europe's electricity generation—A comprehensive study, Energy Policy, 2013, vol. 60, 
issue C, 251-261. Sweden voted for a phase-out in a referendum in 1980 but decided in 2010 to replace 
old reactors with new ones. See Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:139, torsdagen den 17 juni, 
<www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Riksdagens-protokoll-
2009101_GX09139/> accessed 9 March 2018. 
5 Decisions to expand nuclear power include Department of Energy & Climate Change, Application 
12.04.09.04/170c, Decision on development consent, 19 March 2013 (United Kingdom); Décret n° 2007-
534 du 10 avril 2007 autorisant la création de l’installation nucléaire de base dénommée Flamanville 3, 
comportant un réacteur nucléaire de type EPR, sur le site de Flamanville (France); Romanian 
Government Decision No. 643/2007 (decision on units 3 and 4 of the Cernavdoa Power Plant); Decisions 
of the Cabinet of Finland in plenary 6 May 2010, M 4/2010 vp, 
<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Documents/m_4+2010.pdf> > accessed 9 March 2018; Hungarian 
Government Decision No. 1196/2012, 18 June 2012. See also Nemzeti Eenrgiastratgia 2030, Nemzeti 
Fejlesztsi Minisztrium, 2012, 71-75 (Hungary) and Commission Decision on the Aid Measure SA. 34947 
(2013/C) (ex 2013/N) which the United Kingdom is planning to implement for support to the Hinkley 
Point C New Nuclear Power Station, Brussels, 8.10.2014, C(2014) 7142 final cor.  
6 Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on use of PPM- 
based Trade Measures (OCDE/GD(97)137, 1997) 33. 
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The energy sector is one area where the sustainability of PPMs has received a lot of 
attention. Heating and cooling, production of fuel and generating electricity can be 
realised with different methods and from a variety of resources. The PPM is different 
when for example generating electricity with wind turbines as compared to when it is 
generated from fossil fuels even if the final good, electricity, will be identical. The 
choice of PPM will be crucial for the environmental – and sometimes also social – 
impact of the activity.  
Promoting sustainable PPMs in the energy sector will in many cases not have any major 
effect on the properties of the end products on the market. References in this work to 
PPMs will thus generally cover PPMs with the assumption that the effect on the end 
product is non-existent or relatively modest. The focus of this study is in other words 
on non-product-related PPMs and product-related PPMs that affect the end product to 
a fairly limited extent. An example of the latter would be methods to produce biofuel 
from various feedstock.  
This study will examine measures to promote sustainable PPMs and the status of PPM-
criteria under trade law. The energy sector will serve as the primary case study. With 
the objective to tackle environmental problems in mind, states have introduced rules to 
favour some PPMs in the energy sector and disadvantage others. Many states have 
opted to encourage renewables. This is also part of a more general trend of life-cycle 
thinking, where emphasis is put on environmental and social effects linked to not only 
consumption, but also production and end-of-life treatment of products.7  
The views on sustainable development differ among states. Many states appear ready 
to use their domestic legal tools and market power to push forward their own 
sustainability agenda. This is in part carried out by promoting what the state considers 
sustainable and introducing restrictions on unsustainable PPMs. These strategies will 
affect both domestic producers and energy imported from out-of-state producers. It is 
here that conflicts may arise with the rules of trade law. 
                                                 
7 Generally on life-cycle analysis (LCA) see Mary Ann Curran (ed.), Life-Cycle Assessment Handbook 
– A Guide for Environmentally Sustainable Products (Wiley 2012). See also Anoop Singh, Deepak Pant 
and Stig Irving Olsen (eds.), Life Cycle Assessment of Renewable Energy Sources (Springer 2013). 
3
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1.1.3. Measures to Promote Renewables 
The costs of renewable energy are generally higher than for fossil fuels and energy 
prices are expected to increase up until 2030.8 This situation has partly evolved due to 
long-lasting government support for fossil fuels. Consequently, new forms of 
government intervention is needed in order to make renewable energy competitive. 
The energy transition is partly driven by strategies on union (federal) level, and partly 
by actions of individual states.  Notable measures utilized to support renewable energy 
include subsidies and tax incentives. In public procurement sustainability criteria may 
be utilized in order to encourage the use of renewable resources. In addition, emissions 
trading schemes (ETS) have been established in order to penalize PPMs that cause 
extensive pollution.9  
Perhaps the two most prominent forms of schemes designed for the energy sector are, 
however, feed-in-tariffs and renewable energy portfolio standards. A feed-in-tariff 
(FIT) is a fixed price level that is guaranteed for a pre-determined number of years for 
the facilities generating electricity from renewable resources. Electricity suppliers have 
an obligation to purchase the power generated from renewables for that price until the 
FIT expires and a new price level is determined. The price might be expressed either 
directly or as the market price for electricity plus a fixed premium. FITs are fairly 
common throughout Europe. 
A renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS) functions quite differently. It is 
essentially a system in which a quota is set for the amount of energy that needs to come 
from renewable resources. The quota may be directed at either producers or at suppliers 
higher up the value chain, and may also be assigned to importers. Those generating 
energy from renewables receive renewable energy certificates (RECs). The quota can 
                                                 
8 Commission Communication, Energy Roadmap 2050, COM (2011) 885 final 6-7. 
9 The EU has established an emissions trading system (ETS). See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275, 
25.10.2003, 32. In the US, some states in the Northeast have put in place a cap-and-trade system referred 
to as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. See <www.rggi.org> accessed 3 March 2018. In addition, 
California has together with some Canadian provinces linked their cap-and-trade programs under the 
Western Climate Initiative. See <www.westernclimateinitiative.org> accessed 3 March 2018. The 
decision of California to establish a cap-and-trade system has been challenged in court as taxation 
incompatible with the state constitution. See Morning Star Packing Company v. California Air Resource 
Board, No. C075954 (Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District, 2014). 
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be fulfilled either by generating electricity at the company’s own premises of by 
purchasing RECs from other companies that have a surplus. 
Apart from FITs and RPSs there are also guarantees of origin (GO). Both GOs and 
RECs essentially verify that the original recipient of the guarantee or certificate has 
generated energy from renewables. However, unlike RECs, GOs are not usable in order 
to fill any quota. They work instead as labels indicating the PPM for energy generated 
through different methods. The GOs thus indirectly offer in particular end consumers 
some information on the environmental sustainability of the offered good. The GOs 
have been introduced to allow the market to voluntarily direct more demand at preferred 
sustainable options.10  
In different states different forms of renewable energy may qualify for support schemes. 
When it comes to biofuels, the overall environmental performance of biofuels has 
become increasingly disputed.11 Concerns have been raised about the effects that using 
biomass may have on biodiversity, and even the credentials of biomass in mitigating 
climate change have been put into question. Consequently, both the EU and the U.S. 
have developed specific criteria for sustainable biofuels.12  Only sustainable biofuels 
alternatives as defined by specific sustainability criteria are eligible for support.13 The 
                                                 
10 An obligation to establish a system of GOs for renewable electricity can be found in Article 15 of EU 
Renewable Energy Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16). In the new 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) there will be an obligation to award GOs for any energy from 
renewables. See Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 
82, Article 19. 
11 See, e.g., Stewart Fast, Mike Brklacich and Marc Saner, ‘A Geography-based Critique of New U.S. 
Biofuels Regulation’ (2012) GCB Bioenergy 243 (2012); Seita Romppanen, ‘Regulating Better Biofuels 
for the European Union’ (2012) 21 European Energy & Environmental Law Rev. 123, 127–135.  
12 Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. 
Approaches on Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health 
Law 106. 
13 Provisions on biofuels sustainability criteria have been introduced in the Renewable Energy Directive 
of the EU. See Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16; Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82. Comparable criteria have also been adopted in the 
US. See Renewable Fuel Standard 2 (40 C.F.R. 80 subpart M, 2015). See also Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
adopted by California (Assembly Bill 32, 2006 Leg. Regular Session, California 2006, amended Nov. 
2015; California, Governor’s Executive Order S-01-07). For more on these standards see Max. S. Jansson 
and Harri Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. Approaches on 
Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health Law 106. 
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objective with support schemes is to increase the share of biofuels especially in the 
transport sector. 
1.1.4. Climate Change and PPM-Criteria from the Perspective of Different Fields of 
Law 
The use of PPM-criteria in general, and driving forward the energy transition through 
measures promoting renewables in particular, can be approached from various 
perspectives. For example, the actions and inactions of states that have led to severe 
climate change could be assessed under fundamental rights doctrines and in particular 
the right to life. This is, however, a fairly novel approach that is being put to test in the 
near future.14 
Furthermore, measures to promote certain PPMs could be examined through the lens 
of environmental law. This could cover analysis of international environmental 
agreements, which often unfortunately do not include enforceable remedies. Research 
on environmental law could also address the division of competence between state and 
union/federal levels of government in primary law. Moreover, the focus could be on 
sector specific environmental regulation and how it potentially can grant states the right 
to decide on PPM-criteria or even require them to implement such criteria.  
PPM-criteria are perhaps the most controversial, when their application is extended to 
out-of-state production of goods later imported. Under such circumstances questions of 
their compatibility with trade law will arise. In this book the measures have been 
approached from the perspective of trade law. In contrast to the soft and fragmented 
character of international environmental law and energy law,15 international trade law 
has developed its own institutions and dispute settlement system under the WTO. The 
institutionalization has contributed to the dominance of trade law in the international 
field. This does per se not translate into the dominance of free trade values over 
environmental values, but disputes have often become framed in a trade law context. 
                                                 
14 See Juliana v. U.S., No. Case 6:15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or., case filed Sept. 10, 2015). The plaintiffs 
argue that by promoting fossil fuels and later allowing polluting activities to continue the U.S. has 
violated the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
15 E.g. on the fragmented nature on international biofuels law see Max Jansson and Seita Romppanen, 
‘Biofuels’, in Elisa Morgera and Kati Kulovesi (eds.), Handbook on International Law and Natural 
Resources (Edward Elgar 2016). 
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Agreements in the field of environment and energy may still affect the interpretation of 
international trade law. 
The relationship between trade law on the one hand and the energy transition and PPM-
criteria on the other hand, is of particular interest for two reasons. The first relates to 
the potential of new types of legal questions. Trade law is a fairly mature field of law 
with well-established legal tests. Strategies to face environmental problems through 
PPM-criteria and the energy transition have only gained more substantial ground the 
last couple of decades, with increasing intensity in recent years. It is plausible that 
measures including PPM-criteria may challenge some of the traditional wisdoms of 
trade law. The second reason for analysing the energy transition and PPM-criteria from 
the perspective of trade law has to do with the presence of values that often are regarded 
as standing in contradiction. The objectives of free trade and environmental protection 
provide fertile ground for a study on value reconciliation and the role of an efficiency 
rationale. 
1.1.5. Research Questions 
At the core of economic law, including trade law, lies the ideal of an efficient market.16 
Provisions on free trade aim to eliminate for that purpose market obstacles such as 
discrimination. Measures to promote renewables represent interventions to the market. 
They are thus bound to raise questions of compatibility with the rules on free trade. 
Similar tensions may emerge between measures to promote renewables, on the one 
hand, and areas such as public procurement law and law on subsidies, on the other hand. 
In this book a comparative analysis of value reconciliation tests in selected fields of 
economic law is presented. 
With the current trend of diverging sustainability actions on state level, courts will have 
to engage in difficult value reconciliation when drawing the line between prohibited 
protectionism and measures necessary for promoting sustainability in the energy sector. 
                                                 
16 In line with this, U.S. scholars have argued that the dormant Commerce Clause has been shaped to 
deal with protectionist measures in order to strengthen the union and enhance efficiency. See Donald 
Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ 
(1986) 84 Michigan Law Rev. 1091, 1119-1122; Richard B. Collins, ‘Economic Union as a 
Constitutional Value’ (1988) 63 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 43, 63-64; Julian N. Eule, ‘Laying the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to Rest’ (1982) 91 Yale L. J. 425, 434-435; Mark P. Gergen, ‘The Selfish State and 
the Market’ (1988) 66 Texas L. Rev. 1097, 1107. Rejecting efficiency as a principle of the Commerce 
Clause see e.g. Edward P. Lazarus, ‘The Commerce Clause Limitation on the Power to Condemn a 
Relocation’ (1987) 96 Yale L. J. 1343, 1362; Lisa Heinzerling, ‘The Commercial Constitution’ (1995) 
1995 Supreme Court Rev. 217, 220. 
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This is further complicated by the fact that sustainability in itself is a concept that 
includes various, sometimes conflicting, environmental as well as social and economic 
factors. In other words, the transformation of the energy sector and the aspirations to 
develop a sustainable regime will bring value conflicts between various economic, 
environmental and social values to the fore.  
Restrictions on unsustainable PPMs have already long ago raised heated debate in WTO 
law, where the U.S. has defended the implementation of such measures.17 There has 
consequently been quite an intense academic discussion on PPM-criteria in the context 
of WTO law.18 In contrast, there has been much less debate on the relationship between 
PPM-criteria and EU law.19 A rare example of discussion on PPMs and EU free 
movement law arose when one Member State planned to adopt restrictions on 
unsustainable PPMs in the forestry.20 With the growing importance of the energy sector 
and the increased emphasis on sustainability, it can be expected that these types of 
measures will be debated ever more frequently, as more legal cases emerge.21 
The tests that are applied for the reconciliation of values in trade law will be scrutinized. 
Against this background, two main line of research questions will be tackled in this 
book. First, it is of interest what challenges state sustainability criteria in general, and 
PPM-criteria in particular, present to established legal tests in trade law and what 
solutions are available within the broad range of legal tests? The focus will be on the 
relationship between trade law and PPM-criteria in the energy sector. The second main 
research question of this book relates to the values reconciled through legal tests. What 
                                                 
17 See e.g. US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) 
(unadopted); US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 
Oct. 1998. 
18 See e.g. Laura, Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs (Brill 2007); Conrad, Christiane R., Process 
and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law – Interfacing trade and social goals (CUP 2011); Robert 
Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European J. International Law 249; Sanford E. Gaines, 
‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade 
Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental Law 383. 
19 See however Laurens Ankersmit, Green Trade and Fair Trade in and with the EU: Process-Based 
Measures within the EU Legal Order (CUP 2017); Gareth Davies, ‘‘Process and Production Method’ – 
based Trade Restrictions in the EU’, in Catherine Barnard (ed.) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 2007-2008 (Hart Publishing 2008). 
20 Dutch labels on sustainable forestry were disapproved by the Commission. See Jochem Wiers, Trade 
and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 2003) 360-361. 
21 Gareth Davies, ‘‘Process and Production Method’ – based Trade Restrictions in the EU’, in Catherine 
Barnard (ed.) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008 (Hart 2008) 69-73; J. H. H. 
Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, 
the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (OUP 2000) 230. 
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type of values are given relevance in the reconciliation of values through legal tests in 
economic law and might the legal tests reflect efficiency as a core value? This question 
requires an analysis of the detailed elements of various legal tests, how the tests 
function in interplay with other tests and how they advance value reconciliation, here 
in particular with the tensions between free trade and environmental protection in mind. 
The research questions are examined against the backdrop of recent and emerging cases 
relating to the renewables sector and more specifically measures such as FITs, RPSs 
and support schemes for biofuels. Other fields of economic law than trade law are 
covered to the extent that analogies will provide valuable comparison and insight. This 
concerns mainly sustainability criteria in public procurement, but also to a lesser extent 
subsidies and taxation. 
It is important to note that the primary purpose here is not to assess the legality and 
compatibility with trade law of specific measures. Instead, the focus is the lessons 
emerging cases may offer for the legal tests more in general. The legality of any specific 
measure may depend also on other norms of primary or secondary law. That being said, 
the study will unavoidably offer some thoughts on the compliance of various PPM-
criteria with provisions of economic law. 
While the two main research questions were put forward above, the book also to 
varying degrees adds new knowledge through comparative legal methods. The study, 
as a whole, tackles the research questions by utilizing developments taking place under 
WTO, EU and U.S. law. In doing so, the question arises as to whether there is room for 
mutual learning between the jurisdictions. For example, could legal problems detected 
in EU free movement law potentially be dealt with through the introduction of elements 
from similar legal tests applied under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause?  
1.1.6. Key Concepts 
This book is about free trade, value reconciliation and efficiency. It is thus in order to 
clarify these concepts and related terms. 
Before describing value reconciliation, it is necessary to briefly discuss value 
balancing. Values are interests and or ideals that are considered important. Various 
values affect decision-making by courts and the legislature. Sometimes values stand in 
conflict with one another and what is law will depend on how the value conflict is 
resolved. Resolving the value conflict is particularly difficult when the values are 
9
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incommensurable in the sense that there is no obvious common scale.22 For example, 
in evaluating a measure that promotes free trade but limits free speech, it is difficult to 
commensurate the increase in free trade with the loss of free speech because there is a 
lack of common unit. I shall later in this book return to the issue of incommensurability 
and legal tests in trade law.23 
In a value balancing test, the judiciary will weigh values for which it identifies no 
common scale. Value balancing is a holistic exercise characterized by an open weighing 
of all values without strict boundaries. One could argue that it boils down to a decision 
based purely on the feeling of the judge after having taken all factors into account.  
Even critics of judicial value balancing tests accept that it is unavoidable for the 
legislator to balance between different values.24 This balancing of values will result in 
written law. Written law might in turn explicitly or more indirectly, for example 
through principles, include what I refer to as value reconciliation tests. Value 
reconciliation tests as defined in this book do not include the calculation of the net gain 
of a measure that restricts, for example, free trade (a cost) but advances, for example, 
free speech (a benefit). Admittedly, there is no clear-cut line between what is a value 
balancing test and what is a value reconciliation test. Yet, one may think of value 
reconciliation tests as more technical than value balancing tests. A value reconciliation 
test is a structured tool that has been designed by the legislator or has been developed 
through previous case law. In either case the test will often embody a balance of values 
already (largely) determined before the judges apply the test to the case at hand. Of 
interest to this study is what value reconciliation tests are applied and the underlying 
values that they reflect.  
It should be emphasized that the distinction between value balancing and value 
reconciliation is only one way to understand legal tests. The distinction is made here 
merely in an attempt to facilitate the reader in understanding the comparison that is 
made between legal tests portrayed in this book. 
Another concept that is used in this book is non-trade values. With this concept I simply 
refer to other values than free trade. Free trade is about non-discrimination and in some 
                                                 
22 Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford J. Legal Studies 575. 
23 See in particular section 3.1.6.2. 
24 Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford J. Legal Studies 575, 603-
604. 
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jurisdictions potentially also about market access more broadly. Non-trade values are 
values that may be referred to in an attempt to justify restrictions to free trade. Examples 
of non-trade values include public health and environmental protection. There are of 
course also non-trade values that generally do not serve to justify trade restrictions. One 
such example would be the objective of saving local jobs. 
Free trade is a key value in this study together with the non-trade value of environmental 
protection. Both values may be understood in terms of efficiency and may through 
value reconciliation tests be reconciled with reference to this common denominator. 
Free trade is regarded as an efficiency value because an increase in free trade will 
intensify market competition and can be expected to benefit cost-efficient companies 
and consequently reduce prices. This is not to suggest that advancing free trade could 
or would not have, even significant, negative effects. Like free trade, also 
environmental protection is an efficiency value since an increase in environmental 
protection can reduce externalities and benefit companies that are environmentally cost-
efficient. In other words, a change in environmental standards will modify the 
conditions of competition.  
1.1.7. Structure 
This first chapter of the book will provide a background to trade law in the EU, the U.S. 
and the WTO. It will also highlight specific court cases on PPM-criteria in the energy 
sector that have already emerged.  
The second chapter will focus on tests related to defining what kind of discriminatory 
measures may be prima facie prohibited under trade law (law of prohibition). Like the 
rest of the book it will offer different approaches to the relationship between PPM-
criteria and trade law in the form of value reconciliation tests. In particular, the 
relationship between trade law and efficiency will be explored. 
The analysis in subsequent chapters will primarily concern value reconciliation tests 
related to the justification and proportionality of prima facie prohibited measures (law 
of justification). In the third chapter traditional tests applicable for reconciling in 
particular free trade and environmental values in trade law will be analysed. The value 
reconciliation process is examined against the backdrop of efficiency objectives. 
Traditional trade law tests, which normally have been considered well-functioning, will 
be analysed in order to determine how they may adapt to a potential increase in cases 
11
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relating to PPM-criteria and how challenges with respect to the application of tests 
could be tackled. 
The fourth chapter will focus on the details of the design of PPM-criteria in light of the 
proportionality review.  For example, it will be analysed how broad the scope of the 
criteria may be, what particular elements may be included in the criteria and how 
certification of compliance may be organized. The objective of the analysis is to 
identify tests that might be of particular relevance in examining the proportionality of 
specific models of PPM-criteria and thereby also identify the multitude of values 
reconciled in law of justification. The analysis will reveal the relevance of values that 
are primarily not of a free trade or environmental character. Thereafter, in the fifth 
chapter, it is examined what weight administrative costs may be given in the 
proportionality review. This is carried out by examining measures adopted for 
promoting the sustainability of the biofuels industry. 
The idea of other values unrelated to free trade and environmental protection affecting 
the reconciliation of those two values is developed further in the sixth chapter. The 
chapter introduces the concept of extraterritoriality and the challenges it brings to value 
reconciliation in cases on PPM-criteria. The seventh and final chapter presents overall 
conclusions.  
1.2. Theoretical Premises 
1.2.1. My Method  
The analysis of legal value reconciliation tests will provide valuable knowledge on the 
status of PPM-criteria under trade law and on whether specific systems of promoting 
renewables is compatible with the trade law regimes of the EU, the U.S. and the WTO. 
However, the main objective is to evaluate how the legal tests in the various regimes of 
trade law reconcile free trade and environmental values, whether the tests work in a 
PPM-context, whether the tests reflect efficiency and to identify any potential other 
values that may affect the value reconciliation. This approach should contribute to the 
understanding of trade law and unveil the values the law promotes.25 The research falls 
in the grey-zone between normative criticism and unmasking underlying values.26  
                                                 
25 No law is value neutral and unveiling the underlying values is part of legal research. See Rob van 
Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship’ (2014) 20 
European Law Journal 292, 311. 
26 On this greyzone see Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002) 306. 
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The value reconciliation or value balancing tests that are identified in this work will be 
framed against an efficiency ideal in order to shed some light on the suitability of the 
identified legal tests for the reconciliation of free trade and environmental values. It 
must be highlighted that I do not argue efficiency to be the right or only possible criteria 
for analysing value reconciliation in trade law. There is no universal moral and hence 
also no agreement on the fundamentals of good law.27 There is, however, a difference 
between, on the one hand, moral judgment in the form of a claim that certain criteria 
should be chosen because they are ‘right’ and, on the other hand, identifying what 
values or moral aspects are relevant in currently applicable law.28 The approach taken 
in this study is closer to the latter. Admittedly, even if there is no moral judgment here 
that efficiency is the correct criteria, the values of the researcher may affect the 
judgment of which criteria are regarded as relevant in currently applicable law and 
chosen as important for the research.29 The claim that efficiency is relevant under 
current regimes of economic law will be substantiated more in detail in sections below. 
To some degree perhaps typical of an author with a civil law background, law is viewed 
as rules. This does not only refer to law as statutes, but also to a perception of case law 
as a logical pattern of rules, which in turn results in an exercise of organizing case law 
in search for general rules, or in other words fairly well-structured and precise legal 
tests. This approach may be contested when applied to WTO law, U.S. law and even 
EU law because the relevance of general rules – statutory or case law developed legal 
tests – might be weaker than in civil law. That beingd said, a degree of generalization 
and systematization is required, in order to identify the legal test applied in cases 
involving complex case-specific facts. The reasoning in individual cases may be linked 
to a historical context, a chronological evolution or some broad discretionary evaluation 
of justice. Yet, by utilizing case law to identify the mechanics of legal tests, a degree 
of generalization is achieved that enables the identification of broader trends. This 
justifies the approach to case law adopted in this study. 
                                                 
27 Seyla Benhabib, Selbst im Kontext (Suhrkamp 1995). 
28 Julie Dickson, ‘Methodology in Jurisprudence – A Critical Survey’ (2004) 10 Legal Theory 117, 126-
127, 139. 
29 H. L. A. Hart, ‘Comment’, in H. L. A. Hart and Ruth Gavison (eds.) Issues in Contemporary Legal 
Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart (OUP 1987) 39. 
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1.2.2. An Economic Approach to Economic Law 
1.2.2.1. Economic Law 
Trade law, among other fields of law such as competition law, has been regarded as 
part of economic (constitutional) law.30 The content of this book falls within the field 
of economic law. Yet, it does not tackle law that traditionally would be understood to 
regulate the relationship between private actors, such as law on cartels, mergers, and 
intellectual property. Instead it digs into the public domain of economic law, covering 
primarily trade.  
Public international law covers public action of a state regardless of whether it is 
addressed toward private parties or other states. WTO rules on trade, public 
procurement and state aid are all examples of public and economic international law. 
They target the behaviour of one state in order to protect the interests of the other states, 
and often also the underlying private interests in those other states. Similarly, EU free 
movement law and U.S. rules on interstate commerce, as derived from the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, share the fundamental characteristic of creating binding 
rules for states. WTO law binds nation states, EU free movement law limits the action 
of Member States and U.S. constitutional law sets out what the states in the union may 
do. There is thus an obvious parallel between public international economic law, EU 
primary law and U.S. constitutional law, as all three target interstate (economic) 
relations. This book compares these three sets of trade law. 
Another element of this study is formed out of the parallels drawn between value 
reconciliation tests in trade law on the one hand and public procurement law as well as 
law on subsidies on the other hand. Trade law and law on subsidies have made it into 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)31 and WTO agreements. 
In turn, in the U.S. rules on interstate trade have been derived from the constitution, but 
the constitution does not include any significant limitations on state subsidies. Solutions 
already developed in one field of economic law could potentially offer new solutions 
to the difficulties that arise in another field of law. 
However, a word of caution is in order. While trade, subsidy and procurement law are 
closely linked and comparable in many aspects, some significant divergence can be 
                                                 
30 Julio Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement – The Economic Constitutional Law of 
the European Community (Hart 2002) 1. 
31 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, 47. 
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detected. The differences might have affected and continue to affect the applicable legal 
tests, even if they on the surface could appear comparable. It should be noted that 
differences with respect to the level at which rules have been adopted are profound 
when comparing trade law with public procurement law. Unlike trade and subsidy law, 
procurement law has barely been constitutionalized at all in the three jurisdictions. In 
the EU, procurement law has been put into force through legal instruments of secondary 
law. More specifically, rules on public procurement have been codified in the 
procurement directive,32 the utilities directive33 and the directive on concession 
contracts.34 In addition, there are separate remedies directives.35 In turn, international 
procurement law has been codified in the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA)36. The GPA was signed in 1994 and thoroughly revised in 2012. Apart from the 
EU and its 28 Member States37 also 19 other WTO members38 have signed the 
agreement. In mid 2019 nine states39 were negotiating accession and another 23 states40 
had observer status. While the WTO dispute settlement system governs the GPA, very 
few cases have been referred to it. In the U.S. the approach to state measures in the 
                                                 
32 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
33 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing 
Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243. 
34 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. 
35 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 January 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, 14; 
Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply 
and public works contracts, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, 33; Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with 
regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, OJ 
L 335, 20.12.2007, 31. 
36 Agreement on Government Procurement, 1869 U.N.T.S. 508 (Text available at 1915 U.N.T.S. 103), 
with Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government Procurement, Geneva 30.3.2012 (amendments 
entered into force 2014). 
37 Reduced to 27 Member States after the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU. As a consequence of 
Brexit the UK would likely no longer be a party to the GPA until it independently accedes. See Ping 
Wang, ‘Brexit and the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (“GPA”)’ (2017) 26 Public 
Procurement Law Review 34. 
38 Armenia, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Liechtenstein, Moldova, 
Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, United States, Ukraine and 
the Netherlands with respect to Aruba. 
39 Albania, China, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, North Macedonia, Oman, Russia and Tajikistan. 
40 Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Panama, Pakistan, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam. 
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fields of trade and procurement has been even more diverged as U.S. federal law barely 
provides any guidance or restraints on state-level procurement policy. 
1.2.2.2. Law and Economics 
Law and economics represents a movement that links the two fields through the 
application of various methods. One influential stream of law and economics research 
has been empirical.41 Hence, law and economics scholars have at times studied the 
economic effects or consequences of law.42 For some the objective of such studies has 
been to identify efficient laws.43 This could be reconciled with the approach of 
Bentham, who argued for a utilitarian approach to law reform.44 
Posner has been a leading protagonist of law and economics. In accordance with his 
theory there is a certain rationality to efficiency and efficiency in law represent a theory 
on justice.45 The interpretation of economic law is in this book framed against the idea 
of efficiency. Efficiency is an ambiguous concept. It is about achieving an objective 
without the waste of resources. What is then the objective to be achieved? Posner adopts 
utilitarianism as a starting point for social justice. The ultimate objective would then be 
to maximize total happiness. He, however, notes that several challenges arise. Perhaps 
the two most serious are the measurability of happiness and the utility monster. The 
latter refers to the risks that the well-being or even lives of some people are sacrificed 
in the process of maximizing total societal happiness. In addition, the boundaries of 
who should be included are not fully clear. Should one take into account the happiness 
of animals and of foreigners?46 
Due to the problems described above, Posner’s model replaces utility maximization 
with wealth maximization as a goal. Welfare may increase only if there is a willingness 
to pay in order to compensate for the other party’s loss. The scale of wealth is monetary 
and the loss of one can be compensated by the gain of another. The destruction of life 
would under this model normally not increase wealth even when it could increase 
utility. Posner appears to have viewed wealth maximization as the best proxy for utility 
                                                 
41 Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate 2003) 38. 
42 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Strahan & Cadell 1776); 
Alexis Jacquemin and Guy Schrans, Le Droit Economique (Presses Universitaires de France 1982) 90. 
43 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (1988) 1-10. 
44 Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Clarendon 1907, first published 1789). 
45 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1981) 2-6. 
46 Id. 48-54, 79. See also J. J. C. Smart, ‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’, in J. J. C. Smart 
and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1967) 16. 
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maximization and the function of law would be to align incentives with this model.47 It 
may offer happiness as well as protection of rights, and redistribution is justifiable to 
the extent it creates wealth. 
Various theories on law and efficiency compete with other theories on justice. Legal 
positivists in international law have been criticized for putting too much emphasis on 
economic interests at the expense of these other theories of justice. For example, 
Dworkin was highly critical of Posner’s model and proclaimed wealth not even to be a 
component of social value.48 Perspectives on moral and social justice may denounce 
any form of efficiency as a goal. 
Mathis has pointed out that Posner’s wealth maximization model merely introduces a 
wealth monster, favouring the utility of the wealthy, who possess ability to pay.49 One 
may add to this critique that at times utility and wealth may stand in conflict. Take the 
example of the non-discrimination principle in trade law. The prohibition of 
discrimination will improve conditions for competition and can thus be expected to 
increase wealth. The approach appears well aligned with wealth maximization. 
However, it would not take into account the utility loss experienced by those who prefer 
to favour the local economy. In case large groups of people have developed a strong 
preference for in-state goods utility might be reduced despite wealth being maximized. 
Utility and wealth maximization must thus be regarded to some extent as competing 
efficiency ideals. Non-discrimination would in other words not promote value neutral 
efficiency, but one of many alternative efficiency goals. 
Law cannot be economically neutral. This applies even to constitutions.50 They will 
reflect a certain economic system, which in turn rests on a set of values. Even within 
the framework of an efficiency analysis, already in itself a contested approach, 
competing arguments will arise. In an analysis of trade law that in part reflects on 
whether the applicable legal tests promote efficiency or not, one ought to be conscious 
about the ambiguity of the term and should also be sensitive to the exact nature of the 
efficiency rationale in legal regimes. It shall be illustrated in subsequent chapters of this 
                                                 
47 Richard A. Posner, ‘Wealth Maximization Revisited’ (1985) 2 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and 
Public Policy 85, 98. 
48 Ronald M. Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (1980) 9 J. Legal Studies 191, 194-200. 
49 Klaus Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice? (Springer 2009) (translation by Deborah Shannon) 183. 
50 Julio Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement – The Economic Constitutional Law of 
the European Community (Hart 2002) 36-37, 76-80. Contrary see dissent by Justice Holmes in Lochner 
198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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work that the ambiguity of the term contributes to the fact that efficiency as an ideal 
may not always provide for only one possible solution.  
After the works of Posner there has been some discussion on whether law and 
economics is a method or a legal theory.51 Law and economics is not limited to the 
economic analysis of law but may also present itself as a branch of philosophy and a 
method to evaluate the interplay between efficiency and other values.52  Law and 
economics is thus not any single method. Whatever the method in law and economics, 
it does not strive to replace legal dogmatics, but to complement it.53 Furthermore, law 
and economics is here not perceived as a theory that would equate efficiency with 
justice or good law. Instead, law and economics is more of an overarching perspective, 
with a focus on the relationship between law and economic theories, including those on 
efficiency. 
Several methodological and theoretical branches of law and economics appear to share 
a common interest in efficiency. One could therefore intuitively expect the relationship 
between the law and economics movement and economic law to be rather harmonious. 
Namely, there is a certain efficiency rationale underlying fields of economic law. 
Economic integration and trade law rests on the idea of comparative advantages and 
efficiency gains.54 Equally, international and EU public procurement law serve the 
objective of geographically broader and more efficient markets. Moreover, state aid 
rules have been introduced to limit efficiency-reducing distortions on these open 
markets. The fact that economic law often proclaims to reflect an underlying economic 
rationale justifies a more detailed examination of whether it really adheres to an 
efficiency ideal and what form of efficiency it then may be. The law and economics 
approach offers a tool of self-reflection and potential criticism in economic law.  
Law and economics as an approach may be applied to illustrate how economics, and in 
particular efficiency, can be relevant for solving legal issues, but also that economics 
can be applied to explain law.55 It is here submitted that these two aspects are separable. 
                                                 
51 Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate 2003) 108. 
52 Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice (West 
1990) 2-12. 
53 Edward L. Rubin, ‘Law and the Methodology of Law’ (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 521, 553. 
54 Stephen Kim Park, ‘Bridging the Global Governance Gap; Reforming the Law of Trade Adjustment’ 
(2012) 43 Georgia J. International Law 797, 803; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘The Death of the Trade Regime’ 
(1999) 10 European J. International Law 733, 752. 
55 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1981) 2-6. 
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The former considers efficiency as a valuable guiding light for the legislature in the 
process of legislating or judges in the process of interpreting. The efficiency rationale 
would here be adopted by the legislature or the judges as a conscious choice. In turn, 
the latter use of law and economics concerns the possibility to trace an efficiency 
rationale in existing law, regardless of whether or not the law has been shaped on the 
basis of efficiency considerations. When adopting the existing law legislature might 
have considered efficiency explicitly. However, existing law will also develop through 
case law and, as Posner points out,56 that case law might reflect an efficiency rationale 
even if judges have not intentionally gone down such path. What follows from the 
above, is that the analysis of whether value reconciliation tests reflect an efficiency 
objective is not the same as an argument that efficiency should guide judges in the 
application of legal tests. The research conducted here strives to adhere to the former 
approach.  
It should be emphasized that the approach adopted in this study does not equate with 
the application of economic arguments in the interpretation of statutes. The reliance on 
economic arguments in the interpretation of statutes is possible if, for example, 
efficiency is denoted as a so called ‘real argument’.57 In some jurisdictions, and under 
some economic approaches to law, efficiency is recognized as a valid method of 
interpretation in court proceedings. The real argument could be recognized as an 
independent rule of interpretation that may be utilized for any legal problem within the 
legal system. It is probably more common, however, that real arguments gain their force 
as legal arguments more indirectly. For example, the purpose of some legislation may 
be to promote some idea of efficiency. In economic law efficiency is often part of the 
purpose. In this particular situation efficiency could provide arguments in cases before 
the court because the purpose of the legislation is a widely accepted rule of 
interpretation that the efficiency argument may rely on. 
In practice, cost-benefit analysis and economic argumentation has been applied by 
courts, albeit restrictively.58 Common law jurisdictions have appeared more open to 
complementing their reasoning with such real arguments than civil law courts and that 
may be a reason behind the hypothesis that common law more than civil law moves 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002) 158. 
58 Edward L. Rubin, ‘Law and the Methodology of Law’ (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 521, 559-561; 
Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
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toward an efficiency ideal.59 The primary purpose of this study is, however, neither to 
advocate economic argumentation nor to identify explicit use of it by courts in 
interpretation. The interest lies instead with how values are reconciled through the 
application of legal tests and how the applicable tests relate to efficiency, even when 
efficiency arguments might not have been explicitly relied upon by courts. It should 
further be emphasized that this study on value reconciliation tests and efficiency is 
different from a study on whether the existence of rules or tests as such makes the 
functioning of society more efficient. 
Bearing in mind the criticism directed at law and economics, it should be pointed out 
that no theory is perfect and complete. Despite criticism, efficiency could still be 
regarded as one among many ingredients of justice. This study will illustrate how an 
efficiency rationale can be traced in the (implicit) underlying rationale of the tests 
applied in trade law but at the same time how it on its own would leave the system not 
only incomplete, but even deficient. Although a lot can be explained in terms of 
efficiency, some applicable legal tests will be difficult to explain in those terms. The 
weaknesses that the efficiency perspective will reveal allows for a form of criticism of 
efficiency ‘from within’ and subsequently leads to a view on the development of a more 
inclusive theory on trade law. 
1.2.2.3. Externalities and Efficiency 
Many commercial operations cause externalities.60 Negative externalities arise in a 
society when the economic activity of one or many members causes costly harm to 
other members of the society who have no relation to the economic activity. A classic 
example is the pollution from a factory that affects the health of all in the region even 
if many do not operate the factory, work there or engage in transactions with the 
polluting company. These negative externalities are costly for the society as a whole 
while the company simultaneously can increase profits by disregarding the effects of 
pollution. The pollution may continue because what would be collectively rational does 
not correspond with what is individually rational.61 The state might decide to force the 
                                                 
59 Francesco Parisi, ‘Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics’ (2004) 18 
European Journal of Law and Economics 259, 264. 
60 For more on externalities see James M. Buchanan and William Craig Stubblebine, ‘Externality’ (1962) 
29 Economica 371. For a discussion on environmental externalities see Horst Siebert, Economics of the 
Environment – Theory and Policy (7th ed., Springer 2008). 
61 Klaus Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice? (Springer 2009) (translation by Deborah Shannon) 97-
100. 
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polluters to internalize the negative externalities because the society, or the people, 
would otherwise bear a significant share of the burden. 
Regulation that forces the polluter to take into account the societal costs of the pollution 
is said to cause an internalization of externalities. Internalization ensures that polluters 
cannot free ride and gain profits at the expense of public health. Instead, the polluters 
must take into account broader costs of their activities and thus gain an incentive to 
reduce the costs. Internalization can be regarded as reasonable.62 
In some models, like for example an emissions trading (cap-and-trade) system, 
externalities are internalized through market pricing. Other alternatives to tackling 
externalities include bans on dirty production that relies on resources such as fossil 
fuels, as well as models promoting clean production from renewables. These measures 
have their own flaws. In some cases, externalities may not be internalized fully, while 
in other cases the measure may be so drastic that it actually over-compensates for the 
externalities. Despite the challenges in getting things just right in practice, addressing 
externalities improves efficiency. 
Public sector driven internalization of environmental externalities represents only one 
perspective on the possibilities of a green economy.63 According to libertarian policies, 
state intervention should be minimized even in the environmental sector. Libertarian 
policy proclaims that while internalization of externalities is needed, some state 
environmental regulation may go too far. Prohibitions and standards set by 
governments are regarded as less efficient than a model of clearly defined individual 
rights in resources together with reliance on social pressure.64 A libertarian would thus, 
for example, likely prefer privately administered schemes that grant sustainability 
labels or tradable emissions certificates. In a model with tradable emissions certificates 
the state would still often regulate the number of certificates that need to be held by the 
producer, i.e. the cap, while polluters would enter a market where they can trade 
                                                 
62 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (1988) 497-498. 
63 General Assembly, Preparatory for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, First 
Session 17-19 May 2010, Progress to date and remaining gaps in the implementation of the outcomes of 
the major summits in the area of sustainable development, as well as an analysis of the themes of the 
Conference, Report of the Secretary General, 1 April 2010, A/Conf.216/PC/2, para 44. 
64 Libertarian Party Platform, Convention in Columbus, Ohio (June 2014), sec. 2.2. 
<https://www.lp.org/files/2014_LP_Platform.pdf> accessed 15 Dec. 2015. 
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emission rights. This system would clearly define rights and would lower transaction 
costs.65 
All economic theories, including the free market ideal as well as the idea of 
internalizing externalities, are value-laden.66 The emphasis on internalization of 
externalities through a multitude of government intervention as the optimal approach 
to addressing pollution and unsustainable PPMs could be questioned. For example, 
some may hold the view that environmental protection, social equality and the like, all 
have a value of their own fully separable from any notion of efficiency. Internalizing 
or otherwise addressing externalities would under such approach not offer sufficient 
protection. However, in the context of economic law, sustainable development has so 
far been primarily linked to human development and not been given independent 
value.67 
The need to correct market failure has also caught the attention of some law and 
economics scholars.68 Posner viewed it as the duty of the state to take care of the public 
goods and externalities. He also reflected on the relationship between efficiency and 
redistribution of wealth and power.69 It is here submitted that addressing externalities 
is mainly redistributive in the sense that it transfers societal costs to private individuals 
on the ground that those costs originate from the activities of those individuals. The 
desirability of redistribution between poor and wealthy cannot be linked to any 
societally harmful activity by the wealthy in an equally direct manner. The 
redistribution between poor and wealthy groups is a different type of scenario even if 
both cases of redistribution may reduce externalities.  
In sum, although internalizing or otherwise tackling externalities as an economic theory 
on efficiency is by no means value-neutral, it offers a valid approach to environmental 
protection that lies somewhere on the spectrum between the approaches of relying fully 
on market forces and treating the environmental protection as an objective in itself, 
                                                 
65 Reto Jacobs, Marktwirtschaftlicher Umweltschutz aus rechtlicher Sicht: Zertifikatslösungen im 
Luftreinhalterecht der USA und der Schweiz (Schulthess 1997) 33; Mathias Diehr, Rechtschutz im 
Emissionszertifikate-Handelssystem (Duncker & Humblot 2006) 27. 
66 Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice (West 
1990) 48-56; Kenneth L. Avio, ‘Three Problems of Social Organisation: Institutional Law and 
Economics Meets Habermasian Law and Democracy’ (2002) Cambridge J. Economics 501, 503. 
67 Emily Barrett Lydgate, ‘Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual Supportiveness to 
Balancing’ (2012) 11 World Trade Review 621, 632-633. 
68 Especially the Yale school. See Francesco Parisi, ‘Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law 
and Economics’ (2004) 18 European Journal of Law and Economics 259, 264. 
69 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1981) 103-106. 
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without consideration of its instrumental values. Approaching environmental protection 
as a question of externalities takes into account values that are not always thought of as 
efficiency values and integrates them in an economic theory. By framing the analysis 
of economic law against economic theory, it becomes possible to unveil such potential 
neglect of values that would be difficult to justify even from an economic standpoint. 
Again, one could speak of an effort to construct criticism of the economic approach 
‘from within’. 
1.2.2.4. Value Reconciliation and Efficiency 
The most fundamental controversies surrounding public economic law relate to the 
reconciliation of free trade and non-trade values. Examples of the latter would be 
environmental and social values. Some scholars have noted that environmental and 
social sustainability objectives may stand in conflict with free trade or economic 
sustainability.70 Economic freedoms should in that case be reconciled with non-trade 
values. Statements on the need for balancing or reconciliation of values can be found, 
for example, in soft law instruments.71  
Trade law regimes, in particular the WTO, have received criticism for an alleged bias 
in favour of free trade as a value.72 The WTO, however, has proclaimed the objectives 
of free trade and environmental protection to be mutually supportive.73 The reasoning 
has at times been that trade liberalization would improve efficiency and thus reduce 
social and environmental problems.74 The credibility of such claim is questionable 
given the historical sustainability track record of developed countries. Economic, 
environmental and social goals may still be mutually supportive when viewed in light 
of the theory on externalities.  
                                                 
70 Christopher D. Stone, ‘Deciphering Sustainable Development’ (1994) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
977, 977; Emily Barrett Lydgate, ‘Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual Supportiveness 
to Balancing’ (2012) 11 World Trade Review 621, 622, 630-634. 
71 United Nations, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) 
para. 139b. 
72 Robert Howse, ‘Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law’, in J. 
H. H. Weiler (ed), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade 
(2000) 52-53; Oren Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and 
Environment Conflict (Hart 2004) 51-65; John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution 
and Jurisprudence (Routledge 1998) 684-685. 
73 United Nations, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) 
para. 2; The 1994 Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, WTO, 14 April 1994. See also Harri 
Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. (Transnational 
Publishers 2006) 14-16. 
74 WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, Doha Ministerial Declaration, Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 
adopted 14 November 2001, para. 6. 
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Pollution will cause externalities as long as the polluting plants can reap the benefits of 
producing and selling products without facing consequences for the societal costs of 
pollution. State measures that put a price tag on pollution will force polluters to 
internalize the societal costs of the pollution. Similarly, other restrictions on polluting 
activities will reduce negative externalities. Addressing externalities through legal 
measures enhances both environmental protection and efficiency, as the polluting 
plants are no longer allowed to free ride at the expense of public health. Thus, even if 
the non-trade values are often perceived as representing some other values than 
efficiency, they may still incorporate some economic ratio. 
All pillars of sustainable development may shape and support a common ideal of 
efficiency. This does still not fully eliminate the need for value reconciliation tests. 
Various values are reconciled under principles or legal tests in all three jurisdictions. 
Legal tests may further the reconciliation of different values with an efficiency ideal. 
For example, the proportionality review might guard the efficiency ideal.75 
Discriminatory measures that do not promote efficiency may often struggle to survive 
the review, whereas measures that fit some description of efficiency might not be struck 
down.76 Yet, the concept of efficiency leaves room for interpretation. Hence, value 
reconciliation will be necessary even when the objective is to not intervene with 
efficient state-level solutions. Tests that are part of the proportionality review will be 
analysed more in detail in subsequent chapters of this book. 
The reconciliation of values is also needed as free trade and non-trade objectives are 
not fully mutually supportive under all circumstances.77 In particular, the values 
prevalent in economic law could be interpreted to reach beyond efficiency. They would 
then reflect a broader idea of fairness.78 For example, in the Brundtland report it was 
                                                 
75 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2002) (translation by Julian Rivers) 399; 
Aurelien Portuese, ‘Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency’ (2013) 19 
European Law Journal 612. 
76 State measures are not subject to any efficiency requirement as such. States can generally adopt non-
discriminatory inefficient regulations. 
77 Emily Barrett Lydgate, ‘Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual Supportiveness to 
Balancing’ (2012) 11 World Trade Review 621, 630-632. 
78 There is, for example, room for the argument that the protection of public morals or free speech is not 
about addressing externalities but about fundamental rights and values that should be on an equal 
footning with free trade. See Case C-271/08 Commission v. Germany [2010] ECR I-7091, Opinion of 
AG Trstenjak, para. 81; Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, Opinion of AG 
Poiares Maduro, para. 23. For a balancing exercise see Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, 
Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659. For an emphasis on liberty over 
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emphasized that economic development should compromise neither present nor future 
generations.79 Merely addressing current externalities would not necessarily cover the 
interests of future generations. In addition, fairness could be linked to redistribution 
with no efficiency gains between groups of present generations. 
Furthermore, the reconciliation of values through tests is not only about reconciling 
free trade with one non-trade value, such as environmental protection. Namely, non-
trade values are very divergent and may point in all different directions. For example, 
developing nations often see environmental protection as partly conflicting social 
sustainability goals.80 The legal value reconciliation or balancing tests are valuable in 
managing these complexities of the real world. It should be acknowledged that although 
reconciling the multitude of non-trade values might in theory be fully compatible with 
the idea of reducing externalities, there will in practice be difficulties with 
measurability. 
In sum, despite its deficiencies the efficiency theory nicely brings in line competing 
values in economic law and therefore forms a valid point of departure for an analysis. 
Through the theory on externalities, environmental sustainability can be coupled with 
an efficiency approach. Environmental sustainability does not need to stand in full 
conflict with the free trade objectives of economic law but can instead be read as part 
of its core. This is, however, merely theory. It is still far from evident that economic 
law and its tests for value reconciliation have advanced an efficiency rationale in 
practice and if so, what form of efficiency it would be. An analysis of the tests of trade 
law may shed some light on how well reality matches the theoretical approach adopted. 
In other words, what type of inefficiencies are spared under economic law and what 
values underlie such outcomes. 
1.2.3. Comparative Law 
1.2.3.1. Commonalities of Legal Cultures 
National legislation often has its peculiarities, but many nations may still share a 
common legal culture or at least similarities with regards to the deepest and most 
                                                 
free market values see David Friedman, ‘Free Market and Free Speech’ (1987) 10 Harvard J. Law & 
Public Policy 1, 7. 
79 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 43 (1987). 
80 Emily Barrett Lydgate, ‘Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual Supportiveness to 
Balancing’ (2012) 11 World Trade Review 621, 634. 
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fundamental structures of law.81 The principles are to be found at the deeper levels of 
law than the mere surface that consists of legal norms. Legal tests are part of the 
techniques applied in order to enforce underlying principles and values. These could be 
shared among legal cultures. 
A comparative study on legal tests can function as a useful tool in the process of 
contributing to legal theory. 82 Of particular interest for this study are the values that 
underlie economic law in the different legal systems as well as the applicable principles 
and tests. Comparative law may target the legal tests applied for value reconciliation. 
In this respect, the study digs into questions on commonalities that have been rooted at 
a deeper level of legal systems than the mere surface. 
Commonalities between jurisdictions are in some sense natural since laws often emerge 
as solutions to similar social problems.83 In a globalized world the communication 
between the legal systems is ever more frequent and intense. Consequently, previous 
scholars have identified convergence between the free trade doctrines of the WTO and 
the EU.84 It would even appear that, on the one side, civil law systems of many states 
in Europe and, on the other side, common law systems like the one in the U.S. tend to 
converge.85  
This study has evolved from the observation that states have implemented different 
measures to promote renewable energy all over the world and that these forms of rules 
on sustainable process and production methods are being challenged under EU, U.S. 
and WTO law. At the same time, legal tests applied in trade law across the jurisdictions 
bear many similarities. The similarities with regards to both policy development and 
legal structures in other words motivate a comparative study.  
                                                 
81 Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002) 163-164, 183-191; Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Justices 
at Work: An Introduction’ (1997) 18 Cardozo Law Rev. 1609, 1609-1610. 
82 Generally on the value of comparative law for legal theory see Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and 
Method in Law (Ashgate 2003) 36. 
83 Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law’ (2009) 
Brigham Young University Law Rev. 1879, 1879; Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (3rd ed., Clarendon 1998) (translation by Tony Weir) 34. 
84 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), 
The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (2000) 201-232. 
85 J. Paul Lomio, Henrik S. Spang-Hanssen and George D. Wilson, Legal Research Methods in A Modern 
World: A Coursebook (Djøf 2011) 6. 
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1.2.3.2. The Objectives of Comparison 
Comparative analysis may strive to serve various objectives. In some cases, it has been 
awarded the status of a legal source.86 The American legal culture has at least been 
argued to be open to such approach.87 However, comparative law may equally provide 
new knowledge that is valuable for developing legislation as opposed to interpreting it. 
With globalization, the benefits of mutual understanding and learning can be expected 
to increase.88 
Legal systems are complex networks of norms. Therefore, it will normally not be 
possible to transpose a legal solution directly to another jurisdiction. That should still 
not prevent the strengthening of mutual understanding, especially at the level of 
constitutional law. 89 Importantly, legal regimes can be developed as a result of the new 
insights that comparative law has to offer and may be harder to discover through other 
means.90 Such new insights may be particularly valueable in the context of PPM-
criteria. Namely, while the debate on the status of PPM-criteria under trade law has 
been going on for already a couple of decades, there is in each jurisdiction still to date 
quite little jurisprudence on them. Many of the same dilemmas are emerging in all three 
jurisdictions as PPM-criteria become more common and the challenges that relate to 
PPM-criteria are only gradually being resolved. In this state of play aspects and 
argumentation presented in one jurisdiction may enrich the debate in the context of 
another jurisdiction. 
Mutual learning can advance coherence between different jurisdictions. Yet, fairly 
limited attention has been paid to the question of coherence between legal systems.91 
This study forms an effort to contribute to that area of legal research. Namely, it lays 
out a comparison of legal tests in the field of trade law across jurisdictions like the 
WTO, the U.S. and the EU, which all three exist on a level above the state-level. 
                                                 
86 Compare Stanford v. Kentucky 492 U.S. 361 (1989) with US v. Then 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(Justice Calabresi concurring). 
87 Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1999) 108 The Yale Law 
Journal 1225, 1236 and 1281.  
88 Id. 1304-1306; J. Paul Lomio, Henrik S. Spang-Hanssen and George D. Wilson, Legal Research 
Methods in A Modern World: A Coursebook (Djøf 2011) 1. 
89 Lorenzo Zucca, ‘Montesquieu, Methodological Pluralism and Comparative Constitutional Law’ 
(2009) 5 European Constitutional L. Rev. 481, 482-484, 498-499; Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An 
Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed., Clarendon 1998) (translation by Tony Weir) 16-25. 
90 Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate 2003) 111-112. 
91 Stefano Bertea, ‘Looking For Coherence Within the European Community’ (2005) 11 European Law 
Journal 154, 167. 
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Convergence or coherence between jurisdictions is not a value in itself. Rather, it may 
be a means to achieve for example economic efficiency and in that sense better 
markets,92 or political stability. Full and final convergence is perhaps neither achievable 
nor desirable93 but, as also this study aims to show, a common doctrinal core in 
economic law may be emerging.94 Comparative legal research may in other words find 
parallels between legal systems that form pieces in the formation of legal theory in 
economic law.95  
The practical relevance for mutual learning can be observed today already in the project 
of European integration. Namely, comparative law has played a big part in the 
elimination of fragmentation among European systems, consequently facilitating the 
emergence of a common internal market.96 With globalization this path may reach even 
further. Up until recently the EU and the U.S. were negotiating a free trade agreement 
labelled Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In order to make 
progress in negotiations and develop common standards and legal rules for free trade 
agreements it will be beneficial to understand the similarities and differences between 
the systems. One could even argue that coherence between or convergence of the 
systems would be in line with the objectives of such free trade collaboration. Similarly, 
mutual understanding and global coherence may facilitate negotiations in the WTO that 
have been trembling during the Doha Round. 
                                                 
92 T. Sandra Fung, ‘Negotiating Regulatory Coherence: The Costs and Consequences of Disparate 
Regulatory Principles in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement Between the 
United States and the European Union’ (2014) 47 Cornell International Law J. 446, 471; Reza Banakar, 
‘Power, Culture and Method in Comparative Law’ (2009) 5 International Journal of Law in Context 69, 
70; Simone Glanert, ‘Speaking Language to Law – The Case of Europe’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 161, 
161. 
93 Convergence would reduce regulatory competition. When different states try out different regulatory 
solutions to similar problems they may learn from each other and find the models that work the best. 
However, regulatory competition may fail when it comes to regulating externalities. See Miguel Poiares 
Maduro, We the Court—The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart 
1998) 137. 
94 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Cain and Abel – Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law’, in J. H. 
H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade 
(2000) 1-4. 
95 This is in-line with the position that legal theory can be general and apply universally. See H. L. A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., Clarendon 1994). 
96 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed., Clarendon 1998) 
(translation by Tony Weir) 15. 
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1.2.3.3. Methodological Challenges 
Comparative law may not only be a viewpoint, but also a method.97 According to 
Lomio it forms in essence the opposite approach to legal dogmatics.98 It is true in the 
sense that comparative law requires a great deal of contextualization and is therefore 
part of a ‘law in context’ tradition.99 The legal system as a whole forms part of the 
context when interpreting provisions or legal tests.100  
It would appear difficult to completely separate any comparative or contextual 
approach from dogmatics. The study of law is primarily a study rules. These rules may 
include a number of legal tests and principles. The rules also reflect a set of values. 
Even in comparative law it is often necessary to start with dogmatic analysis of rules. 
Thereafter the rules may be compared with the broader legal and societal context in 
mind. Legal dogmatics is also necessary for identifying tests and values. Moving from 
the specific (rules) toward the more general (principles and values) then gives room for 
further contextualization that enables a meaningful comparison. 
The socio-legal reality in each country is unique. In other words, the problems around 
the globe may not be identical, especially when there is a significant gap in terms of 
development between the countries.101 It is therefore not surprising that scholars 
throughout history have not only pointed out the limits of mutual learning between 
jurisdictions, but also the dangers of drawing from foreign experiences.102 In a 
discourse between legal systems there is a risk that wealthy developed countries 
dominate. For example, on the global arena comparative law may then become 
Eurocentric.103 
The fact that sources and rules of interpretation are different from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction adds an additional layer of complexity to comparative law. Norms that may 
                                                 
97 Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate 2003) 111-112. 
98 J. Paul Lomio, Henrik S. Spang-Hanssen and George D. Wilson, Legal Research Methods in A Modern 
World: A Coursebook (Djøf 2011) 60-61. 
99 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Rev. 1; Reza 
Banakar, ‘Power, Culture and Method in Comparative Law’ (2009) 5 International Journal of Law in 
Context 69, 72-73. 
100 Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law’ (2009) 
Brigham Young University Law Rev. 1879, 1902. 
101 Id. 1886-1887. 
102 Charles de Secondant, Baron de Montesquieu, De l'esprit des loix (1748); Alan Watson, Legal 
Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd ed., University of Georgia Press 1993). 
103 Reza Banakar, ‘Power, Culture and Method in Comparative Law’ (2009) 5 International Journal of 
Law in Context 69, 71-76. 
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appear similar are not always interpreted equally. Case law and the role of courts are 
emphasized in the U.S., which at times may result in a slightly more fragmented legal 
system.104 In contrast, civil law puts more emphasis on inference and may not be 
equally receptive of economic argumentation.105 International law and EU law could 
perhaps be placed somewhere in-between these two extremes. Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention106, which guides interpretation in international law, puts a high emphasis 
on the purpose of the agreement that is to be interpreted. Similarly, in EU law 
considerable weight is given to teleological interpretation.107 In economic law this 
naturally invites economic argumentation.  
Analysis of EU law may not fully rely on national methods or the methods of 
international law. While the EU method will largely build on national and international 
experiences, it is still emerging as its own unique approach.108 In EU law there is less 
of a norm hierarchy than in a traditional civil law system that relies heavily on 
inference. This necessitates the development of stronger theory that will ensure the 
stability of the legal system.109 Such approach should also benefit U.S. common law 
and international law if indeed these have evolved as more fragmented regimes to date. 
To put it differently, each of the three jurisdictions may learn from one another when it 
comes to legislative techniques, value reconciliation mechanism and fundamental legal 
theory even in cases where the specific content of the norms may in part be different. 
1.2.3.4. Comparative Law and Economics 
This research falls within the scope of comparative law and economics. The approach 
has been founded on the idea that law can be explained in terms of efficiency, as a fact 
and not necessarily as a normative statement. 
                                                 
104 J. Paul Lomio, Henrik S. Spang-Hanssen and George D. Wilson, Legal Research Methods in A 
Modern World: A Coursebook (Djøf 2011) 12-23, 77-78; Geoffrey Wilson, ‘Comparative Legal 
Scholarship’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds.), Research Methods of Law (Edinburgh 
University 2007) 95. 
105 Klaus Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice? (Springer 2009) (translation by Deborah Shannon) 206. 
106 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Signed at Vienna 23 May 1969, Entry into Force: 27 
January 1980. 
107 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional Justice’’ 
(2008) 19 The European Journal of International Law 769, 776; Case C-350/03 Elisabeth Schulte and 
Wolfgang Schulte v. Deutsche Bausparkasse Badenia AG [2005] ECR I-9215, para 71; Joined cases C-
397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I-8835, para 120; Case C-121/90, Jeen Lolkes 
Posthumus v. Rinze and Anne Oosterwoud [1991] ECR I-5833, para 10. 
108 Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship’ 
(2014) 20 European Law Journal 292, 297. 
109 Id. 311-312. 
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Mattei has emphasized that the comparative dimension of comparative law and 
economics often provides insight into concrete alternatives implemented in other 
jurisdictions instead of focusing on how legal rules (or tests) in the abstract divert from 
the efficiency rationale.110 While the starting point in this book lies with concrete cases 
in the energy sector, the objective is, however, not to compare the legality of various 
measures. Rather, the interest is with the dynamics and comparability of legal tests of 
value reconciliation in trade law and their links to an efficiency rationale. Legal tests 
are examined in order to determine how they function and it is evaluated whether the 
tests may reflect some understanding of efficiency.  
Approaching value reconciliation tests from the perspective of efficiency may reveal 
challenges in the application of legal tests. With the help of comparative law, ideas for 
solutions to those challenges may be derived from the analysis of the application of 
legal tests in other jurisdictions. The comparative approach may in other words offer 
further insight into value reconciliation tests. Ramello has applied the approach to 
intellectual property law and found that while efficiency is present in that field of 
economic law across various jurisdictions, other factors than efficiency may explain 
divergences.111 Similarly, this work will through analysis and comparison of legal tests 
applied in EU, U.S. and WTO law identify values that may supplement or 
counterbalance efficiency. 
1.3. Trade Law in the WTO, the EU and the U.S. 
1.3.1. Free Trade, Free Movement and Interstate Commerce 
Free trade has been an intensively debated topic for more than two centuries. 
Liberalization may create challenges with respect to social welfare and increase states’ 
dependencies on each other, which may create outcomes comparable to colonialism.112 
Yet, free trade has been a fundamental element in both the creation of the United States 
                                                 
110 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (University of Michigan Press 1998) 1-2.  
111 Giovanni B. Ramello, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Comparative Law and Economics’, in 
Theodore Eisenberg and Giovanni B. Ramello (eds.), Comparative Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 
2016) 14-16. 
112 On the risks and potential negative aspects of free trade regimes see Friedrich List, Das Nationale 
System der politischen Ökonomie (4th ed., Verlag von Gustav Fisher 1922); Henry Clay, Life and 
Speeches of Henry Clay, Volume II (Greeley & M’Elrath 1843) 23-24; John Toye and Richard Toye, 
‘The Origins and Interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer Thesis’ (2003) 35 History of Political Economy 
437, 448. 
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and the European Union. An increase in market integration and interdependency may 
also stabilize political relations from the perspective of foreign affairs.  
As part of a more general trend of globalism, states have gradually liberalized world 
trade. Trade law is the field of law that deals with cross-border trade. The global rules 
on trade can be found in World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)113 and the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT)114. The most fundamental provisions on trade in goods have 
been included in GATT, while the TBT agreement introduced further specifications on 
the use of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures. A 
technical regulation is defined in paragraph 1 of annex I as a “document which lays 
down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, 
including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is 
mandatory”.115 
Unions of states have liberalized their respective internal trade even further than is the 
case within the WTO and created a common market for their states. Examples include 
the EU and the U.S. Consequently, these unions also have their own union level trade 
law. In the case of interstate commerce across state borders in the U.S., the dormant 
Commerce Clause derived from the U.S. Constitution116 will apply. In turn, for trade 
between EU Member States the applicable rules are referred to as EU free movement 
law and can be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TEFU).117 
  
                                                 
113 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.  
114 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 121. 
115 On the concept of mandatory see Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (CUP 2008) 324; US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, DS381 (US – Tuna, Mexico II), AB Report, 16 May 2012, paras 184-199.  
116 See U.S. Constitution Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, for the constitutional origins of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
117 Art. 34-36 (outlining the fundamental principles on free movement of goods) and Art. 45-66 (on free 
movement of persons, services and capital as well as the right of establishment), Consolidated version 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, 47. 
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A Selection of Key Provisons in Trade Law 
Jurisdiction Article Text 
U.S. U.S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 
[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
EU Article 34 
Treaty on the Functioning of the  
European Union 
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States. 
EU Article 36 
Treaty on the Functioning of the  
European Union 
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified 
on grounds of public morality, public policy 
or public security; the protection of health 
and life of humans, animals or plants; the 
protection of national treasures possessing 
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or 
the protection of industrial and commercial 
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States. 
WTO Article I.1 
General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 
With respect to customs duties and charges of 
any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports 
or exports, and with respect to the method of 
levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation, 
and with respect to all matters referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties. 
WTO Article III 
General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 
1.   The contracting parties recognize that 
internal taxes and other internal charges, and 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, 
and internal quantitative regulations requiring 
the mixture, processing or use of products in 
specified amounts or proportions, should not 
be applied to imported or domestic products 
so as to afford protection to domestic 
production. 
2.   The products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall not be 
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal 
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in 
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, 
to like domestic products. Moreover, no 
contracting party shall otherwise apply 
33
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internal taxes or other internal charges to 
imported or domestic products in a manner 
contrary to the principles set forth in 
paragraph 1. 
[…] 
4.   The products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national 
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use. The provisions of this 
paragraph shall not prevent the application of 
differential internal transportation charges 
which are based exclusively on the economic 
operation of the means of transport and not 
on the nationality of the product. 
[…] 
WTO Article XI.1 
General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than 
duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export 
licences or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of 
any other contracting party or on the 
exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other 
contracting party. 
WTO Article XX 
General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 
Subject to the requirement that such measures 
are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures:  
(a)  necessary to protect public morals; 
(b)  necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health; 
[…] 
(g)  relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction 
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1.3.2. The Non-Discrimination Principle 
1.3.2.1. De Jure Discrimination 
The guiding principle in trade law is the prohibition of discrimination. Discrimination 
occurs when similar goods, services and economic operators of other states are treated 
less favourably than their in-state counterparts. The prohibition covers both de jure and 
de facto discrimination. De jure discrimination is an explicit form of discrimination. 
Classic examples of de jure discrimination include bans on imports or explicitly treating 
imports less favourably than in-state articles of commerce.  
While some scholars have interpreted de jure discrimination to cover merely 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, and not for example on the basis of residence, 
such definition is probably too narrow.118 It is submitted that de jure discrimination 
occurs when state measures establish unequal treatment explicitly on the basis of 
geographic origin, be that nationality or something else. It would in other words capture 
measures that differentiate on the basis of the nationality of the producer, the destination 
of the good or the place of production.119 Criteria on transport distance may be regarded 
as a comparable form of discrimination in that the link to geographical origin is direct. 
It should, however, be noted that different treatment on the basis of geographical origin 
is not automatically a case of discrimination. The different treatment of out-of-state 
origin must also be less favourable.120  
The U.S. dormant Commerce Clause doctrine applies the term ‘facial discrimination’ 
instead of de jure discrimination to measures that explicitly differentiate purely on the 
basis of state origin.121 For reasons of convenience the term de jure discrimination is 
primarily used in this work. 
                                                 
118 Marcus Klamert, Services Liberalization in the EU and the WTO: Concepts, Standards, and 
Regulatory Approaches (CUP 2015) 275. 
119 Outside the context of free movement of goods, it would also cover differentiation on the basis of 
residence, for example. See also on differentiation on the basis of where a health service was obtained 
Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR I-1831, paras 34-
36. 
120 See e.g. US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, Panel Report, 16 Jan. 1989 (adopted), 
para. 5.11. 
121 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 
(1992); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 
(1994); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992). 
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1.3.2.2. De Facto Discrimination and Legal Tests 
De facto discrimination is equally prohibited under trade law. De facto discrimination 
occurs when the effect of the facially neutral measure is discriminatory. For example, 
under EU law restrictions on advertisements in Sweden were declared de facto 
discriminatory because advertising was more important for imported products that 
otherwise would remain unfamiliar to consumers.122  
The concept of de facto discrimination is familiar to EU and WTO law and roughly 
corresponds with the U.S. concept of undue burden on interstate commerce. Under the 
U.S. doctrine the concept of de facto discrimination is not relied on. The courts instead 
view these circumstances as undue burdens on interstate commerce that require 
justification. Like de facto discrimination, measures causing an undue burden on 
interstate commerce might be facially even-handed and have only incidental effects on 
interstate trade.123 A case on the treatment of drummers, traveling salesmen, illustrates 
this well. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that higher taxation on drummers was 
prima facie unconstitutional because out-of-state companies relied on such form of 
commerce to a higher degree.124  
There are different tests to establish the exact scope of discrimination. Some 
observations on what constitutes prohibited discrimination are briefly offered in the 
remaining parts of this section. The careful reader will note that the thoughts presented 
will refer to jurisprudence on different provisions in respective jurisdictions. While 
there may exist arguments for a coherent interpretation across any particular agreement, 
such as for example GATT, it must still be acknowledged that divergence could occur. 
The purpose here is merely to give a general overview before tackling some tests in 
more detail in subsequent chapters of this book. 
Elaboration on the tests of whether discrimination is at hand can be found in particular 
in WTO law. In order to confirm a case of discrimination of out-of-state products, the 
                                                 
122 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) [2001] 
ECR I-1795, paras 21-24.  
123 See e.g. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888 (1988). 
124 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). For a case before the discrimination tests emerged 
as the core of the doctrine see Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887). See 
however refusals to invalidate restrictions on drummers and peddlers in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 
622 (1951); Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941); Wagner v. City of Covington 251 U.S. 
95 (1919). 
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in-state and out-of-state products compared must be ‘like’ or in competition. The 
likeness test will be analysed in more detail in chapter 2.125 
Furthermore, for discrimination to occur the treatment of out-of-state products must be 
less favourable than like in-state products. Less favourable treatment has to do with 
inequality of opportunity and modification of conditions of competition.126 Even if 
intent can be a strong indicator of discrimination,127 it is not required, at least under 
WTO128 and U.S. law.129 In the U.S. it has been claimed that discriminatory intent 
would not even be sufficient on its own.130 It is instead the effect on market conditions 
that is relevant.131  
In the U.S., some district courts have required evidence of actual discriminatory 
effect.132 In WTO law there is no requirement of any actual effect,133 even if it has at 
times been indicated that actual effects may be of some significance to provide 
sufficient evidence of de facto discrimination.134 It would appear to be sufficient to 
                                                 
125 See section 2.2. 
126 US – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23, Panel Report, 16 March 1992 
(adopted), para. 5.31; US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, AB 
Report, 4 April 2012, para. 180; US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, DS381 (US – Tuna, Mexico II), AB Report, 16 May 2012, para. 214; US –  Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, para. 7.494; US –  
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna, 
Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, AB Report, 20 Nov. 2015, paras 
7.278 and 7.338. 
127 Canada — Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, DS31, AB Report, 30 June 1997, p. 30-32. 
128 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, AB Report, 4 Oct 1996, p. 27-28. 
129 Steven Ferrey, ‘Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level’ (March 
2006) 19 The Electricity Journal 52, 57; Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause 
(Foundation Press 2004) 240. 
130 Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: 
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 
295, 325. See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971). Expression of uncertainty can be 
found in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937); Alliance of Auto. Manufacturers v. 
Gwadosky 430 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2005); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 
987, 1013 (E.D. Cal 2006). 
131 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 US 573, 579 (1986). 
132 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 
5665232 (D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015); Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 43 F. 
Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Colo. 2014). 
133 Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, DS371, AB Report, 17 
June 2011, para. 134 (on Article III GATT); US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, Panel Report, 20 
Oct. 2014, para. 7.183 (on Article 2.1 TBT Agreement). 
134 This has been the position in particular in relation to Article XI GATT. See Argentina – Measures 
Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, DS155, Panel Report, 19 Dec. 
2000, paras 11.20; Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, 
DS477 and DS478, Panel Report, 22 Dec. 2016, para. 7.50. See also Argentina – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Goods, DS438, DS444 and DS445, Panel Report, 22 Aug. 2014, paras 6.264, 6.451 and 
6.476 (stating that no actual effect is required). 
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show that there is a genuine relationship between the measure and its adverse 
impacts.135  This position may be understood so, that what matters is potential effect.136 
The approach of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been similar, as it has 
concluded that measures are prima facie prohibited when they are ‘liable’ to cause a 
discriminatory effect or that such effect ‘cannot be precluded’.137 The analysis of 
whether market shares may shift is thus done in abstract and no evidence of an actual 
shift is needed.  It could be argued that also future market potential should be taken into 
account when considering whether there is a potential effect. 
There is also the question of whether it constitutes discrimination to treat an out-of-
state product less favourably than some in-state products, but at the same time more 
favourable than other in-state products. In this context it is crucial to differentiate 
between on the one hand de facto discrimination and on the other hand de jure 
discrimination or other different treatment with reference to geographical origin. De 
jure discrimination can be found to occur already when one individual out-of-state 
product is treated less favourably than an otherwise identical in-state product and it is 
irrelevant that the treatment of a broader category of similar in-state and out-of-state 
products is perhaps equal on average.138  
In turn, in an analysis of potential de facto discrimination, it would not be sufficient to 
focus on differences in treatment of individual products. Namely, at least according to 
principles established in WTO law, the less favourable treatment of similar individual 
imported products is not sufficient to create de facto discrimination.139 The effect on 
in-state products as a group should be compared with the effect on out-of-state products 
                                                 
135 Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, DS371, AB Report, 17 
June 2011, para. 134. 
136 China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, DS394, Panel Report, 5 July 
2011, para. 7.1081 (on Article XI GATT). 
137 See e.g. joined cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agostini 
(Svenska) Förlag AB and TV-Shop i Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843, paras 42-47. See also case C-405/98 
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795, paras 
21-24. 
138 Case C-213/96 Outokumpu Oy [1998] ECR I-1777, paras 34-36; Case C-152/89 Commission v. 
Luxembourg [1991] ECR I-3141, paras 20-22. Both cases concerned the application of the TFEU 
provision on non-discrimination in taxation. See also Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman 511 
U.S. 641 (1994). 
139 Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 88-89; Federico 
Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO 
Law (Hart 2004) 338-339. 
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as a group.140 Protection of the domestic industry occurs only if the domestic industry 
or an identifiable segment thereof is favoured as a group.141 Under WTO law the effect 
has generally been regarded as discriminatory when the market opportunities of imports 
become worse than the opportunities for domestic products as a result of the measure.142 
Similarly, less favourable treatment would, as a rule, according to the U.S. Supreme 
Court exist only when the measure increases the total market share of in-state 
products.143 
In some instances, an advantage is granted to a small category of (identical or at least 
‘more similar’) products within the larger group of like products (i.e. products in 
competition). For example, among the broader category of dish washers (similar 
products) the subgroup of energy efficient dish washers might be treated more 
favourably. This different treatment is in itself not discriminatory. However, the 
favoured subgroup sometimes consists of products that are produced mainly 
domestically.144 At least under WTO law there may be a breach of the national 
treatment (i.e. non-discrimination) principle even if only a small percentage of domestic 
products fall into the benefitted sub-category.145 It should be pointed out, that also the 
absolute amounts of domestic or imported products that receive more favourable 
treatment is irrelevant.146 A measure will cause less favourable treatment when it alters 
competition and consequently has a negative effect on the competitive position of 
imported products.147  
                                                 
140 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 12 March 
2001, para. 100; US –  Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, AB 
Report, 4 April 2012, paras 178-200. 
141 Ibid. 
142 US – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23, Panel Report, 16 March 1992 
(adopted), para. 5.31; US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, AB 
Report, 4 April 2012, para. 180; US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, DS381 (US – Tuna, Mexico II), AB Report, 16 May 2012, para. 214. 
143 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978). The way of application of this 
principle by the court is still puzzling in this particular case. 
144 See e.g. Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, Panel Report, 11 July 1996, 
para. 4.159. 
145 US – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23, Panel Report, 16 March 1992 
(adopted), para. 5.6. 
146 Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS87, AB Report, 13 Dec. 1999, para. 67. 
147 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB Report, 11 Dec. 
2000, para. 137. 
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Derived from what was stated above, the focus should be on market shares.148 It is here 
submitted that what should be compared is therefore the percentage of all domestic like 
products that fall into the favoured subcategory with the corresponding percentage for 
products imported from any given state. The market shares can be expected to change 
on aggregate in favour of the domestic industry when the percentage of in-state 
products (or traders) that benefit from the measure, is greater than the percentage of 
out-of-state products (or traders) that benefit from that same measure. Again, what 
matters is perhaps not the eventual actual shifts in market share, but the mere potential 
of a shift. Admittedly, markets may be complex and predictions on changes in 
competitive positions and market shares are not always this straight-forward. The 
method of calculation presented here must thus be understood as a baseline, that may 
need to be flexible with respect to case specific circumstances. 
The fact that it is possible to imagine that like products are divided into more than two 
subcategories presents a further dilemma. For example, biofuels from different 
feedstock could be classified in several subgroups. Would there be discrimination in 
case domestic fuel is over-represented in, let us say, the most and the least favourably 
treated subgroups? This problem appears difficult to avoid in a regime that covers de 
facto discrimination. 
In sum, trade law prohibits a broad variety of discriminatory measures. However, it also 
includes the possibility to justify discrimination with reference to, for example, the 
objective of ensuring protection of public health. The adopted measures must still be 
proportional in relation to the objective. The multi-step process that involves the 
examination of potential discrimination and grounds of justification aims at the 
reconciliation of values through legal tests. 
1.3.3. Comparability of Free Trade Regimes  
1.3.3.1. Prohibition of Discrimination, Efficiency and Political Rights 
Each jurisdiction has its own history, context and legal texts. The EU, U.S. and WTO 
are all separate entities with very different competences, structure and function. Hence, 
any comparison of legal value reconciliation tests in trade law of these different 
jurisdictions must reflect awareness of the more fundamental context of those tests. Yet, 
                                                 
148 Similarly in the context of U.S. law see Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-
and-Trade Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. 
Environmental & Administrative L. 87, 142-143. 
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as will be illustrated in the next few subsections, the rules in all three jurisdictions have 
many commonalities despite differences in context and wording. Importantly, they 
reflect very similar basic objectives related to anti-protectionism. Moreover, the 
regimes to a large extent share the same structure of rules on prohibition balanced with 
rules on justification.149 
The declared purpose in the preamble of the GATT was to raise the standard of living 
through higher rates of employment and income by pushing for higher demand, 
production and trade. The rationale of the WTO system, in the form expressed in the 
GATT, would thus appear to be linked to welfare and economic efficiency. The primary 
means to achieve these objectives was the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
as well as the elimination of discrimination.  Most discriminatory measures are 
prohibited under Article III GATT, and Article I further requires states not to award 
any state more favourable treatment than it awards to any other state. The latter is 
referred to as the most favoured nation principle. 
The WTO system incorporated the GATT in 1994. Since then the WTO also covers a 
wide range of other international agreements. One of them is the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade.  Article 2.1 TBT prohibits discriminatory technical 
regulations. Moreover, as laid down in Article 2.2 TBT, measures may not be adopted 
with a view to create or the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. Since the 
TBT Agreement was adopted to further the objectives of GATT,150 the agreements 
must be understood to generally rely on the same principles of law, although panels and 
ABs have clarified that the TBT agreement does provide for some additional 
obligations on nations.151 
A central objective with the creation of a European Community was to enhance 
economic integration. It was believed that such development would improve efficiency 
on the common market and link nations closer together, decreasing the risks of conflicts 
and new wars. The backbone of EU law is the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). In accordance with Articles 28 and 30 TFEU, neither customs 
                                                 
149 Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. 
(Transnational 2006) 40-49. 
150 Preamble, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 121. 
151 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 12 March 
2001, para 80; EC – Trade Description of Sardines, DS231, Panel Report, 29 May 2002, paras 7.14-19. 
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duties nor charges may be collected at internal borders and the Union has common 
duties on imports. Moreover, Article 34 TFEU prohibits quantitative restrictions on 
imports from other Member States and all measures having equivalent effect. The same 
principle is extended to exports in Article 35. These provisions guarantee the free 
movement of goods and the principle of non-discrimination, much like the WTO 
system does on a global level. With time the EU has also evolved into a political union 
and new elements, such as union citizenship, have emerged. Consequently, the 
principle of non-discrimination does no longer necessarily represent an economic ideal, 
but also something comparable to a fundamental right.152   
The United States, in turn, is a federation of states. Thus, in some respects, and 
especially on the political level, it represents a union with even deeper levels of 
integration than the EU. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution is called 
the Commerce Clause. This clause of the Constitution, declares that the Congress shall 
have the power to regulate commerce between the several states. The clause has been 
interpreted to have a ‘negative’ dimension. In other words, the power of the states to 
regulate in the field is limited by the fact that Congress has been given power to regulate 
the matter.153 This negative dimension is also referred to as the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has shaped theories on what exactly the 
limitations to the power of the states to regulate commerce are. The prevailing test of 
law of prohibition under the dormant Commerce Clause builds on the ideals of anti-
protectionism and non-discrimination.154 Facial discrimination155 and undue burdens 
                                                 
152 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 219; Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court –  The European 
Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart 1998) 168-175. 
153 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
154 The prohibition of discrimination can also be found in other parts of the U.S. Constitution. For 
example, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 requires states to award privileges and immunities equally to 
all U.S. citizens. Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment stipulates that no person 
shall be discriminated against. Although these clauses have relevance outside the scope of commerce 
and discrimination on the grounds of state origin, they can still be applicable also in such context where 
simultaneously the dormant Commerce Clause would apply. See e.g. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 US 456 (1981) on the application of the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. 
For a comparison of the forms of discrimination prohibited under the clauses see also Jennifer L. Larsen, 
‘Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 49 South Dakota Law Rev. 844. 
155 See e.g. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
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on inter-state commerce are prohibited. The latter concept is, as previously explained, 
roughly understood as covering measures that de facto benefit in-state industry.156  
In the U.S. the non-discrimination principle on the interstate market has been derived 
from a constitutional clause of federal competence. The dormant element of the clause 
is therefore firmly related to the objective of creating a union. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has also linked non-discrimination to political representation.157 States may not regulate 
to the disadvantage of those interests that are not represented in the legislative process. 
Normally out-of-state interests would be among those lacking voice in the political and 
legislative process. Therefore, they may not be burdened by the implementation 
discriminatory measures. The Supreme Court has also applied the political 
representation test to conclude that discrimination may be justifiable when the 
discriminated out-of-state actors are virtually represented by some in-state interests.158 
Thus, it may be argued that the doctrine in the U.S. does not appear exclusively linked 
to the economic rationale of non-discrimination. This latter application of the political 
representation test has, however, received harsh criticism since out-of-state interests 
will not be effectively and sufficiently covered by in-state interests and 
representation.159 
In sum, while all three regimes share the principle of non-discrimination and the 
economic and welfare objectives linked to trade liberalization, both in the EU and U.S. 
regimes the economic dimension of the principle has become intertwined with a 
political dimension. 
                                                 
156 The U.S. Supreme Court has found state standards on truck size and the characteristics of truck mud 
flaps to be prima facie prohibited. These may cause an undue burden on commerce because without 
mutual recognition the inter-state market becomes fragmented. There is also an element of de facto 
discrimination because in-state businesses adopt the state standard per default, whereas businesses active 
also in other states accrue costs in conforming with several standards. See South Carolina State Highway 
Department v. Barnwell Brothers Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 
520 (1959). 
157 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989); South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell 
Brothers Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185-186 (1938).  
158 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1994). 
159 Anthony L. Moffa and Stephanie L. Safdi, ’Freedom From the Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument 
Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Goods Movement Policies’ (2014) 21 N.Y.U. 
Environmental Law Journal 344, 377-379. See also Robert Verchick, ‘The Commerce Clause, 
Environmental Justice, and the Interstate Garbage Wars’ (1997) 70 Southern California L. Rev. 1239, 
1250-1266.  
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1.3.3.2. Beyond the Non-Discrimination Principle  
Below it will be illustrated how the WTO and the U.S. have for the most part not 
prohibited other market regulation than that of discriminatory nature, although some 
ambiguity remains. In contrast, in the EU free movement law non-discriminatory state 
measures that hinder market access may require justification. 
Incorporating non-discriminatory measures within the scope of trade law may reflect 
several different ideals. On the one hand, it may lay the foundations of a neoliberal 
approach to free trade. The objective of the regime then moves in the direction of 
laissez-faire policy. On the other hand, the prohibition of some non-discriminatory 
measures could equally well only mark a delegation of competence. In other words, 
states bound by trade law would have relinquished their power to unilaterally or 
bilaterally regulate and restrict trade in some respects, but only with the intention to 
decide on such forms of trade regulation multilaterally, either within the union they are 
part of or on a global arena. The competence delegation theory, reflecting an ideal of 
unionism or multilateralism, links to political unity and is separate from the economic 
rationale.  
Market Access Obstacles on the EU Internal Market 
Article 34 TFEU on the free movement of goods does not refer to discrimination. In 
accordance with the provision quantitative restrictions on imports and measures with 
equivalent effect are prima facie prohibited. The ECJ has declared that measures 
hindering market access are prohibited.160 The scope of market access hinders remains 
diffuse. The court has stated that measures do not hinder market access if the effect is 
‘too uncertain and indirect’.161 A careful analysis of the case law would appear to 
                                                 
160 Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (Trailers) [2009] ECR I-519, para. 37; Case C-142/05 Åklagaren 
v. Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos (Mickelsson) [2009] ECR I-4273, para. 24; Case C-337/95 
Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v. Evora BV [1997] ECR I-6013, para. 51; 
Case C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom (BAA) [2003] ECR I-4641, para. 47; Case C-465/05 
Commission v. Italy (Private Security Services) [2007] ECR I-11091, paras 100–102; Case C-400/08 
Commission v. Spain (Hypermarkets) [2011] ECR I-1915, para. 64; Case C-565/08 Commission v. Italy 
(Lawyer Tariffs) [2011] ECR I-2101, paras 49–54; Case C-518/06 Commission v. Italy (Motor Vehicle 
Insurance) [2009] ECR, I-3491, paras 64–70. See also Case C-412/93 Société d’Importation Edouard 
Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA [1995] ECR I-179, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 
38–49; Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. Fédération royale 
belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) [2000] ECR I-2681, Opinion of AG Alber, paras 47–
48. 
161 Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co. v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and Netherlands State 
[1990] ECR I-583, para. 11; Case C-379/92 Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta [1994] ECR 
I-3453, para. 24; Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl v. Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Srl 
[1995] ECR I-2883, para. 41; Case C-67/97 Criminal proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-
8033, para. 22; Case C-412/97 ED Srl v. Italo Fenocchio [1999] ECR I-3845, para. 11; Case C-211/08 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   44 31.7.2019   7.14
 45 
suggest that restrictions on trade become prohibited market access hinders when they 
are so drastic that the probability of some market participant being denied access to 
market becomes sufficiently high.162 It is in principle possible that some PPM-criteria, 
in particular full bans on some unsustainable PPMs, could be declared prima facie 
prohibited under the test of market access hinders. 
Under EU free movement law, the test of hinders to market access has already been 
applied to non-discriminatory measures. The scope of prima facie prohibited measures 
has thus been extended further than in, for example, WTO law, where parties have at 
least not yet challenged comparable non-discriminatory measures, as will be laid out 
below. In case this difference will persist, it may be explained by the higher degree of 
integration and harmonization on the European market. 
Poiares Maduro has argued that the EU obstacle approach that allows the court to 
declare even non-discriminatory trade obstacles as prima facie prohibited is not 
designed on any neoliberal vision. Instead, he regards it as a doctrine that shifts more 
decision-making power to the EU, although he admits that deregulation of the market 
may form an unintended consequence.163 It is true that the broad scope of prima facie 
prohibited measures will offer the ECJ more frequent opportunities to balance or 
reconcile different values. In this sense, the obstacle approach increases the power of 
the ECJ. In case the ECJ concludes that a measure is prima facie prohibited and cannot 
be justified, even the EU legislator could not regulate to the contrary without a change 
to the TFEU. 
Non-Discriminatory Measures under the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Throughout the history of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has struggled with 
the definition of prima facie prohibited measures under the dormant Commerce Clause 
                                                 
Commission v. Spain [2010] ECR I-5267, para. 72; Case C-602/10 Volksbank Romania v. Autoritatea 
Na ̧tionala ̆ pentru Protec ţia Consumatorilor, ECLI:EU:C:2012:443, para 81. The test has also been 
applied in relation to free movement of workers in Case C-190/98 Volker Graf v. Filzmoser 
Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493, paras 24-25; Joined cases C-418/93, C-419/93, C-420/93, C-
421/93, C-460/93, C-461/93, C-462/93, C-464/93, C-9/94, C-10/94, C-11/94, C-14/94, C-15/94, C-
23/94, C-24/94 & C-332/94 Semeraro Casa Uno e.a. / Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco e.a. (Sindaco), 
[1996] ECR I-2975, para. 32. 
162 Max. S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘De Minimis Meets “Market Access”: Transformations in the 
Substance – and the Syntax – of EU free movement law?’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Rev. 523. 
The test has deficiencies with respect to legal certainty and is admittedly difficult to apply in practice. 
Even the harshest critic of such elements can, however, not deny that the Court has gone beyond testing 
for discrimination. 
163 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court—The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart 1998) 67-72. 
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but has now settled for an analysis that relies heavily on the principle of non-
discrimination.164 Even in recent years lower courts have not always fully followed this 
principle. For example, one court ruled that a non-discriminatory ban on foie gras was 
prima facie prohibited. This surprising finding did not affect the outcome as the court 
concluded that there were justifiable grounds for the trade restriction.165 This approach 
to non-discriminatory measures would still resemble the European test of hinders to 
market access, but the Supreme Court has never confirmed it.  
In conclusion, non-discrimination still forms the core in the U.S. doctrine and there are 
very few signs that law of prohibition would extend far beyond it, as has been the case 
in EU free movement law. However, the Supreme Court has developed a test unique to 
the U.S. doctrine that could extend beyond the prohibition of discrimination. Namely, 
the court has occasionally declared measures with extraterritorial effects to be 
prohibited without looking for discrimination. I shall return to the nature of the test of 
extraterritoriality in law of prohibition later in this book.166 
The Scope of Article XI GATT  
Articles I and III GATT prohibit discrimination of foreign products in relation to both 
domestic products and products of other foreign origin. Article GATT XI:1, in turn, 
declares that with the exception of duties, taxes and charges no prohibitions or 
restrictions in the form of quotas, import/export licences or other measures may be 
instituted or maintained on the importation or exportation of goods. The provision 
appears to target primarily restrictions implemented at the border of a state but does not 
explicitly refer to discrimination. 
Could trade restrictions be prima facie prohibited under Article XI GATT even when 
they are non-discriminatory? Two aspects may here be relevant. First, could restrictions 
such as those on trading on Sundays and on the use of a good fall under the article even 
if no discriminatory effect is envisaged? Such restrictions would have a restrictive 
effect on the importation of goods, but the restrictions would not be directly “instituted 
or maintained on importation”. Although these measures might affect the market 
                                                 
164 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press, 1999) 1057-1059. 
Contrary see Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. 
(Transnational Publishers 2006) 53. 
165 Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013). See 
also Brandon P. Denning, Bittker on the regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Supplement 
(Wolters Kluwer 2015) 15. 
166 See section 6.1. 
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access, it is still far from evident that these measures would be covered by Article XI. 
It is fully plausible that for Article XI to apply, the restrictive measure would need to 
be directly linked to the importation or exportation in the same way as quotas and 
license requirements are. 
Secondly, could Article XI cover even restrictions on imports of goods that are not 
produced domestically? Such restrictions would not discriminate in the favour of the 
domestic industry and are here referred to as non-discriminatory measures. Some of 
these measures might of course discriminate between two foreign countries and thus be 
covered by Article I GATT. That is, however, a different topic, and one that I will return 
to below. 
The wording of Article XI would suggest that it covers non-discriminatory restrictions 
and prohibitions on imports and exports. However, the preamble of GATT refers 
merely to the objective of eliminating discrimination. Moreover, the WTO is no 
political union and therefore it can also be expected that political rights have not 
affected the scope of trade law that radically. Instead, welfare through anti-
protectionism continues to form the core.  
Articles I and III GATT only prohibit discriminatory measures.167 It has been argued 
that also Article XI reflects the right to non-discrimination and not market access.168 In 
line with this, a couple of panels have stated that the rationale reflected in Articles III 
and XI is similar in that it is not trade flows but equal competitive opportunities that 
are protected.169 Yet, there have been cases that cast some doubt on the complete 
exclusion of non-discriminatory measures from the scope of Article XI. First, one panel 
ruled that an import ban on a good that is not produced domestically would at least not 
                                                 
167 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of 
EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 118-119; Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy 
(Cameron May 2007) 85-87; Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization: Law and Economics (Routledge 2007) 14. 
168 Sanford E. Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for 
Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental Law 383, 392-293, 
412; Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European J. International Law 249, 251-257. 
This is an aspect partly not recognized in the criticism of EU biofuels law. See e.g. the market access 
reference in Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will 
Reinforce the WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 20. 
169 Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, 
DS155, Panel Report, 19 Dec. 2000, paras 11.20–21; Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, 
Animals and Animal Products, DS477 and DS478, Panel Report, 22 Dec. 2016, paras 7.91, 7.110, 7.197-
198, 7.235-236 and 7.396. 
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automatically trigger Article XI:1, leaving open the possibility that in some cases the 
article might still apply.170 In a different case the appellate body (AB) stated that Article 
XI does not prohibit any condition or burden placed on importation or exportation, but 
only those that limit imports or exports.171 Again, it does not foreclose the possibility 
that the article could cover non-discriminatory burdens. 
Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that there is a tendency to go beyond strictly 
a test of discrimination.172 However, looking at cases where Article XI:1 has been 
applied independently of Article III, it is difficult to find any concrete evidence that it 
would apply to non-discriminatory measures. Some cases have concerned quantitative 
restrictions on importation of textiles,173 an import prohibition of retreaded tyres174 as 
well as strict conditions for horticultural products and animals that only applied to 
imports.175 One other case concerned Argentinian import restrictions on goods in 
general. For example, importers had to match their imports with exports, invest in 
Argentina, use local content in domestic production and give a sworn import 
declaration.176 All requirements had discriminatory effects as they restricted imports 
but not Argentinian goods. 
                                                 
170 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, Panel Report, 18 Sept. 
2000, para 8.91. 
171 Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, DS438, DS444 and DS445, AB Report, 
15 Jan. 2015, para. 5.217. 
172 Grainne de Burca, ‘Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in EU & International Trade Law’, in 
Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market, Unpacking Premises 
(Hart 2002); Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and 
WTO’, in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of 
International Trade? (OUP 2000) 142-143; J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of 
International Trade’, in Joseph Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common 
Law of International Trade? (OUP 2000) 201-231; Simon Lester, ‘The Role of the International Trade 
Regime in Global Governance’ (2011) UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 209, 
272. 
173 Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothings, DS34, Panel Report, 31 May 1999; India 
– Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, DS90, Panel 
Report, 6 April 1999. 
174 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, Panel Report, 12 June 2007. 
175 Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, DS477 and DS478, 
Panel Report, 22 Dec. 2016. The restrictions related to when the right to imports can be applied for, when 
the products can be imported, when the products should have been harvested, to whom the products can 
be sold, penalties for not fulfilling the granted import quota and a requirement to own storage facilities 
for the imports. See also Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken Meat and Chicken 
Products, DS484, Panel Report, 17 Oct. 2017. This case concerned among other things the ban on imports 
of certain products with chicken and restrictions on when the right to import could be applied for and 
how long it was valid. 
176 Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, DS438, DS444 and DS445, AB Report, 
15 Jan. 2015. Some importation formalities are still acceptable even if they only affect imported goods. 
See para. 5.243. 
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The conclusion that Articles III and XI GATT both cover cases of discrimination and 
neither cover any wide range of non-discriminatory measures raises the question as to 
the difference between the provisions. From the wording of Article III, it is clear that it 
prohibits discriminatory internal measures. Article XI, in turn, prohibits prohibitions 
and restrictions at the border. However, according to an interpretive note also Article 
III prohibits discriminatory measures implemented at the border.177 The panel has gone 
so far as to suggest some degree of overlap between Articles III and XI,178 but that 
position has not gained full support.179  
Given that also Article III applies to discriminatory measures implemented at the border 
and that Article XI does not appear to cover non-discriminatory measures, we are faced 
with the question of what the independent value of Article XI might be, at least in the 
case of importation? 
Rather surprisingly, some of the early cases where XI:1 was applied independently of 
Article III related to PPM-criteria. US – Tuna I (Mexico) and US – Tuna (EC), decided 
in 1991 and 1994 respectively, concerned U.S. legislation on the importation of tuna. 
The U.S. had concerns over the encircling and killing of dolphins as a consequence of 
tuna fishing activities and applied restrictions for both foreign and domestic vessels on 
how tuna intended to be sold in the U.S. under a dolphin-safe label could be caught, but 
the rules differed in some respects. The panels in both cases concluded that the 
interpretative note Ad Article III was not applicable because the restrictions on PPMs 
did not affect the products “as such”.180 Instead, the panels went on to apply Article 
XI:1. The panel reports were never adopted but may still serve as guidelines for future 
panels.181  
                                                 
177 Note Ad Article III reads as follows: “Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation 
or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the like 
domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of 
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation 
or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of 
Article III.” 
178 India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, DS146, Panel Report, 21 Dec. 2001, para. 7.224. 
179 Petros Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (OUP 2007) 59. 
180 US –  Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, Mexico I) 
(unadopted), para 5.14; US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – 
Tuna, EC) (unadopted), para 5.8. See also US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, DS58, Panel Report, 15 May 1998, paras 7.15-16. The case concerned U.S. restrictions on the 
methods of catching shrimp without harming turtles. This PPM-rule was comparable to the one in the 
Tuna-Dolphin cases. This time the U.S. did not contest that the measure was prima facie prohibited under 
Article XI:1. 
181 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, AB Report, 4 Oct. 1996, p. 14-15. 
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The panel reports in the tuna-dolphin cases would seem to suggest that when the PPM-
criteria have no effect on the physical characteristics of the product (non-product related 
PPMs), Article III:4 would not be applicable. The most detailed defence of the 
application of Article XI, instead of Article III, to PPM-criteria has been offered by 
Gaines.  Gaines points out that Articles III:1 and III:4 are only applicable to measures 
affecting the sale, distribution or use (etc.) of products. According to Gaines non-
product related PPM-criteria would not affect the sale because the causation between 
compliance with the rule and the product price is too weak.182 The test appears rather 
vague and the text does not contain any reference to a requirement that the measure 
affect “products as such” or their “physical characteristics”. Hence, it is difficult to see 
why Article III:4 could not apply when the measure applies to products and includes 
PPM-criteria.183 Moreover, panels have stated that Article III:4 applies even when the 
measure does not regulate the product or the conditions of sale directly.184 
More recently, panels appear to have confirmed that Article III:4 GATT may apply to 
PPM-criteria. Namely, it was applied on a new U.S. law on the methods of fishing 
tuna185 and later on Indonesian rules requiring that chicken meat has been halal 
                                                 
182 Sanford E. Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for 
Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental Law 383, 412-415. 
Other authors share the view on the applicability of Article XI and have analysed biofuels sustainability 
criteria in light of it. See Claudia Franziska Brühwiler and Heinz Hauser, ‘Biofuels and WTO 
Disciplines’ (2008) 63 Aussenwirtschaft 7, 27; Andrew D. Mitchell and Christopher Tran, ‘The 
Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy Directive with the WTO Agreements’ (Oct. 2009) 
Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 1485549, paras 25-27. 
183 See Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 277-278; Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade: A Comparative 
Analysis of EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 86-87; Tamara Perisin, Free Movement of Goods and Limits 
to Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and WTO (T.M.C. Asser 2009) 138; Robert Howse and Donald 
Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade 
Policy’  (2000) 11 European J. International Law 249, 254-257. See also Andrew D. Mitchell and 
Christopher Tran, ‘The Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy Directive with the WTO Agreements’ 
(Oct. 2009) Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 1485549, paras 
21 and 24. Ackrill and Kay appear to endorse this view by suggesting a review of biofuels sustainability 
criteria in light of Article III. See Robert Ackrill and Adrian Kay, ‘EU Biofuels Sustainability Standards 
and Certification Systems – How to Seek WTO-Compatibility’ (2011) 62 J. Agricultural Economics 551, 
555.  
184 US – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31, Panel Report, 11 Oct. 1994 (unadopted), para. 5.45; Italian 
Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833, Panel Report, 15 July 1958 (adopted), 
para. 12. See also US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, Panel Report, 16 Jan. 1989, 
(adopted), para. 5.10. 
185 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, 
paras 7.469-504. 
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slaughtered186. In Indonesia – Chicken187 the panel attempted to elaborate on the 
difference in scope of Articles III and XI GATT. Indonesia had adopted a number of 
different restrictions on the importation of chicken. The relationship between Articles 
III:4 and XI was closely examined in the context of one of those measures. Namely, 
unlike (fresh) domestic chicken, thawed imported chicken could not be sold at local 
traditional markets. This measure would appear like an internal measure, and not a 
border measure. However, the fact that importers had to make a commitment at the time 
of importation not to sell the chicken at local markets made it a border measure.188  
The panel in Indonesia – Chicken went on to explain that Article III applies to border 
measures if, and only if, an equivalent measure applies to both imported and domestic 
products. By equivalent measure the panel did not mean identical, but comparable. 
Border measures that would only apply to imported goods would not be examined 
under Article III:4. In the end the panel found that Article III:4 did not apply to the 
requirement of a commitment not to sell in traditional markets because there was no 
equivalent measure applied to domestic products.189 
The reasoning of the panel in Indonesia – Chicken is well-aligned with the wording of 
the interpretative note to Article III. Namely, in accordance with the note, Article III is 
applicable to measures enforced on imports at the border in case those measures apply 
also to like domestic products.190 This would leave Article XI some added value also 
in cases of importation. Article XI would ensure market access by prohibiting import 
restrictions even in cases where no comparable restrictions apply for similar domestic 
goods. This reflects the non-discrimination principle as such restrictions constitute one 
form of discrimination of imports. Hence, the context of GATT at least allows for the 
interpretation that Article XI does not cover non-discriminatory measures. 
In sum, panels and appellate bodies have generally not extended the application of 
Article XI to non-discriminatory measures. Yet, this would not automatically mean that 
the scope of prima facie prohibited measures under GATT in all respects is narrower 
than under EU free movement law. Namely, under Article I more favorable treatment 
                                                 
186 Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken Meat and Chicken Products, DS484, 
Panel Report 17 Oct. 2017, paras 7.544-580. 
187 Ibid. 
188 See id., para. 7.191. The panel is not explicit on this point, but hints to it. 
189 Id. paras 7.189 and 7.193-195. 
190 See footnote 177 above. 
51
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   51 31.7.2019   7.14
 52 
of products from one country as compared with the treatment of like products of another 
country is prohibited. In compliance proceedings a panel has stated that this would 
cover even de facto discrimination of products of one country over products of another 
country.191 Since most measures affect the competitive opportunities between goods in 
some way, there is the risk that Article I could be interpreted to have a very broad 
coverage. I leave it for future research to analyze this dilemma more in depth. 
The TBT Agreement: Trade Restrictions and International Standards 
This book does not include any detailed analysis of the status of PPM-criteria under the 
TBT Agreement.192 Instead, with respect to WTO law, it will primarily focus on value 
reconciliation tests applied in the context of GATT. That being said, it is still recognized 
that PPM-criteria will have to comply with the TBT Agreement. It thus forms part of 
the relevant legal context and occasional references and parallels will be drawn to it. 
For this reason, the relationship between non-discriminatory measures and the TBT 
Agreement will briefly be explored. 
Much like Articles I and III GATT, also Article 2.1 TBT clearly refers to discrimination 
in prohibiting technical regulations that treat imported products less favourably than 
like products of national origin. In contrast, Article 2.2 TBT is open for interpretation 
since it prohibits unnecessary obstacles to international trade. In its interpretation of 
Article 2.2 TBT the AB has built on its interpretation of the word “restriction” under 
Article XI GATT, and simultaneously highlighted that only unnecessary restrictions 
are prohibited and thus not all measures with trade restrictive effect.193 Yet, the U.S. 
and Australia have in separate cases appeared to argue for the scope of Article 2.2 TBT 
to extend beyond the prohibition of discrimination.194 The facts of the cases at hand 
were such that it never became necessary for the panels to specifically address that 
argument.  
                                                 
191 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, 
paras 7.415 and 7.439. 
192 For such an analysis see Christiane R. Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO 
Law – Interfacing trade and social goals (CUP 2011) 374-418. 
193 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, DS381 
(US – Tuna, Mexico II), AB Report, 16 May 2012, para. 319. 
194 EC – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs, DS290, Panel Report, 15 March 2005, paras 7.492-499; US – Certain Country of Origin 
Labelling (COOL) Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, 
Panel Report, 20 Oct. 2014, para. 7.360. 
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Some guidance on the extent of prima facie prohibited trade restrictions could 
potentially be found by examining how those prohibited restrictions have been analysed 
against the grounds of justification put forward by the parties. A trade restrictive 
measure may be justified if it is not more trade restrictive than necessary for a legitimate 
objective. Dispute settlement bodies have therefore been forced to discuss the meaning 
of the term ‘trade restrictive’ also in the context of law of justification. 
Unfortunately, no consistent approach can be detected. Some panels and appellate 
bodies have emphasized that trade restrictiveness should be interpreted broadly and that 
it refers to a limiting effect on trade.195 Consequently, panels have on a couple of 
occasions examined the degree of restrictiveness without reflecting much on the 
discriminatory nature of the measures at hand.196 
The issue arose also when U.S. country of origin labelling provisions for meat products 
were challenged in the WTO. The case is known as US – COOL. The AB stated that 
the discriminatory nature of the measure made it considerably trade restrictive.197 This 
statement would suggest that trade restrictiveness can be broader than mere 
discrimination. However, the AB also seemed to hint that added costs as such do not 
amount to a restriction on trade.198  
The AB in US – COOL found the U.S. to have violated Article 2.1 TBT but could not 
conclude whether it complied with Article 2.2 TBT. Later, a panel and an AB had the 
task of examining the compliance of the U.S. with the decision of the original AB. The 
panel in the compliance proceedings (i.e. US – COOL Article 21.5) on the one hand 
stated that trade restrictiveness relates to detrimental impacts on competitive conditions 
and not to actual effects on trade.199 The panel also appeared to accept that an 
alternative measure may be less trade restrictive if the costs in the alternative labelling 
                                                 
195 US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, DS384, Panel Report, 18 Nov. 
2011, paras 7.572-575; US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, DS384, AB 
Report, 29 June 2012, paras 375, 381; US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale 
of Tuna and Tuna Products, DS381 (US – Tuna, Mexico II), AB Report, 16 May 2012, para. 319. 
196 US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, Panel Report, 2 Sept. 
2011, paras 7.358-369; EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, 
DS400-401, Panel Report, 25 Nov. 2013, para 7.426 (The AB later overruled the finding that the TBT 
Agreement was applicable in the case). 
197 US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, DS384, AB Report, 29 June 2012, 
paras 477-490. 
198 Ibid. 
199 US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, Panel Report, 20 Oct. 2014, para. 7.438. 
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system would become more evenly distributed among those who sell meat of different 
origin.200 These statements linked a low level of trade restrictiveness with non-
discrimination. On the other hand, the panel also took the view that trade restrictiveness 
is not limited to actual effects on trade or to market access.201 Moreover, the panel 
seemed to suggest that high non-discriminatorily distributed costs could form a 
restriction on trade.202 The AB in the compliance proceedings was equally ambiguous. 
It referred to trade restrictiveness as linked to competitive opportunities,203 while also 
hinting that non-discriminatory measures could be trade restrictive.204 In conclusion, 
little guidance is available on the interpretation of Article 2.2 TBT and some 
inconsistency prevails. 
In accordance with Article 2.4 TBT nations are obliged to use international standards 
as a basis of their national technical regulation in case there exists an international 
standard that is effective and appropriate for fulfilling the legitimate objective that is 
pursued. There is no need to prove discrimination or any other potential form of trade 
restriction in case the state has not built on an international standard that is deemed 
appropriate for the pursued objective.205 Thus WTO law has in the field of international 
trade already to some degree been extended beyond the prohibition of discrimination. 
However, for sustainable PPMs different standards are only beginning to emerge. 
1.3.3.3. Grounds of Justification  
Discriminatory, and perhaps even some non-discriminatory, measures are prima facie 
prohibited in trade law. A state that has adopted a prima facie prohibited measure may 
present legitimate objectives, also referred to as grounds of justifications, for the 
adopted measure. Prima facie prohibited measures can be justified if there exists a 
legitimate objective. In some respect, one could speak of these legitimate objectives as 
“non-trade” values that are protected within the system of free trade. The prohibition 
of discrimination together with grounds of justification creates a mechanism for the 
reconciliation of free trade values with non-trade values. 
                                                 
200 Id. paras 7.558-559. 
201 Id. para. 7.368. 
202 Id. para. 7.607. 
203 US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, AB Report, 18 May 2015, para. 5.208. 
204 US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, AB Report, 18 May 2015, at fn 643. 
205 EC – Trade Description of Sardines, DS231, AB Report, 26 Sept. 2002, paras 309-311. 
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The grounds of justification under GATT have been listed in Article XX. For example, 
measures necessary for the protection of either public morals or the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health can be justified. Similarly, measures relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources can be justifiable. The objective of 
conservation of natural resources may be relied on only if the measure is made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. In this book 
de facto discriminatory PPM-criteria are assumed to be implemented so that they apply 
to both domestic production and imports. The measures primarily discussed in this book 
are thus as a rule made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production. 
Article 2.2 TBT also refers to the protection of health and environmental protection. In 
turn, Article 2.1 TBT lacks grounds of justifications. However, the Appellate Body has 
integrated the consideration of legitimate objectives in the test for less favourable 
treatment.206 While this to some degree changes the dynamics of the specific tests, it 
should not alter the justification function of legitimate objectives.207 
What is then the relationship between, on the one hand, the protection of health as a 
legitimate objective and, on the other hand, the objective of protecting the environment 
in general and the objective of protecting against pollution from the energy sector in 
particular? It could be argued that the pollution from energy production is so severe 
that it poses a risk for the health of humans, animals and plants at least in the long-term. 
Yet, it ought to also be taken into consideration that the grounds of justification are 
exemptions and should be interpreted narrowly.208  
The WTO Appellate Body has stated that the interpretation of grounds of justification 
needs to be evolutionary, meaning that the text of the exemptions need to be read with 
contemporary values and concerns in mind.209 The knowledge of the serious threats of 
                                                 
206 US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, AB Report, 4 April 
2012, paras 95-101, 173. 
207 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.117-127. 
208 Canada – Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, L/6568, Panel Report 27 Sept. 1989 
(adopted), para. 59; US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, 
Mexico I) (unadopted) paras 5.22, 5.31-32; US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report 
16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) (unadopted) para. 5.26; Case 46/76 W.J.G. Bauhuis v. The Netherlands 
State [1977] ECR 5, para 12; Case 113/80 Commission v. Ireland [1981] ECR 1625, para. 7. 
209 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 114, 128-130. 
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climate change on health as a consequence of environmentally unsustainable 
production has increasingly received international attention. Moreover, a fairly broad 
reading of the public health exemption is not only supported by the contemporary 
environmental context, but also by the more general international legal context. 
Namely, references to sustainable development can be found in the preamble of the 
WTO Agreement and a long list of other international agreements.210 Thus, it is hardly 
surprising that in US – Gasoline the panel confirmed not only that environmental 
protection was a legitimate ground of justification linked to public health protection, 
but that clean air specifically was also an exhaustible natural resource.211 Similarly, 
animals have been found to be exhaustible natural resources.212 Exhaustible natural 
resources include both animals and non-living resources, potentially with the 
qualification that they are depleted faster than they can be recovered.213 
The EU has gone down a similar path. In accordance with Article 36 TFEU prima facie 
prohibited measures may be justified on the grounds of, for example, public morality 
and the health and life of humans, animals and plants. The importance of the 
environment is in turn referred to in, for example, Articles 3, 11 and 37 TFEU. The ECJ 
has through its case law introduced so called mandatory requirements, which can serve 
as grounds of justification on top of those listed in Article 36.214 The court has 
confirmed the protection of the environment in general215 and mitigating climate 
                                                 
210 UN Sustainable Development, UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 
(1992), Agenda 21 (on links to trade see para 2.5); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.1) (Aug. 12, 1992), 
principle 12; WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001) 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 51; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (1994) preamble, para. 1. 
211 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 Jan. 1996, paras 
6.21, 6.36-37; US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 
1996, p. 16-17.  
212 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, 
para. 7.521. 
213 See US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 127-134. Including the conservation of natural resources that are depleted fast as a ground of 
justification reflects a similar idea as the promotion of renewables. Namely, renewables can be defined 
as energy that can be obtained so that the resource is renewed at least at the same rate that it is replenished. 
See Jared Wiesner, ‘A Grassroots Vehicle for Sustainable Energy: The Conservation Reserve Program 
& Renewable Energy’ (2007) 31 William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Rev. 571, 572. 
214 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649, paras 8-10. 
215 Case 240/83 Procureur de la Republique v. Association de defense des bruleurs d’huiles usages 
(ADBHU) [1985] ECR 531, para. 15; Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles) [1988] ECR 
4607, paras 6-9. 
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change in particular216 as mandatory requirements. In addition, the protection of 
biodiversity217 and the promotion of renewable energy218 are of such an importance for 
the environment that they may be considered as also enforcing the protection of health. 
In the U.S., the doctrine of prima facie prohibited measures has entirely been developed 
by the courts and the same is consequently true for grounds of justification.  The 
Supreme Court has confirmed that prima facie prohibited measures may be justified in 
case they serve a legitimate goal.219 There can be little doubt that protection of health 
and safety are legitimate local goals.220 The protection of the environment is related to 
these two goals, and is a valid ground of justification.221 Hence, the mitigation of 
climate change and the protection against air pollution would also form legitimate goals 
under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause.222 Similarly to WTO law, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has even recognized the conservation of natural resources as another legitimate 
objective.223 
All in all, the regimes also share a similar prohibition – justification syntax.224 It is thus 
not difficult to concur with previous research that the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is comparable to both WTO law and EU free movement law.225  
The justification of discriminatory effects with reference to objectives such as public 
health or environmental protection has by Barrett Lydgate been regarded as an ethical 
                                                 
216 Joined cases C-204/12 to 208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits - en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192, para. 91. 
217 Case C-67/97 Criminal Proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033, para. 33; Case C-
100/08 Commission v. Belgium [2009] ECR I-140, para. 93. 
218 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, Opinion of AG Jacobs, 
paras 229-238; Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, para. 75; 
Case C-492/14 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaams Gewest and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:732, para. 101. 
219 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
220 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140-151 (1986); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 
U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
221 C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary 
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Oregon Waste 
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Chemical Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
222 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988); North Carolina ex red. Cooper v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821-823 (W.D.N.C. 2009). See also Daniel A. Farber, ‘Climate 
Change, Federalism, and the Constitution’ (2008) 50 Arizona L. Rev. 879, 923. 
223 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140-151 (1986); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 
456, 471-473 (1981).  
224 Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. 
(Transnational Publishers 2006) 40-49. 
225 Daniel A. Farber, ‘Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy’ (1997) 83 Virginia L. Rev. 1283, 
1300. 
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defence against the risks of free trade.226 In this study the grounds of justification are, 
however, considered from the viewpoint of the legitimacy to adopt measures that limit 
externalities. For example, measures to reduce pollution may tackle externalities and 
thus advance the protection of public health and of the environment. As will be 
discussed in this book, even the protection of public morals may be linked to 
externalities. Measures that reduce externalities promote efficiency and shall at least 
for that reason be justifiable. 
1.4. Trade Law and the Energy Transition 
1.4.1. State Action for Sustainable Energy 
In the previous sections of this chapter recent trends in energy regulation and the 
fundamentals of trade law were laid out. In this fourth and final section the issues dealt 
with in the preceding sections will be brought together. Measures within the diverse 
range of emerging strategies to tackle climate change and promote the transition of the 
energy sector represent new forms of intervention in the market and may conflict with 
the objectives of free trade. This section will include a general description of a set of 
cases in which measures promoting renewable energy have been challenged with 
reference to trade law.  
The mapping of recent case law and out-of-court disputes will be valuable for multiple 
reasons. First, it will illustrate the concrete circumstances where renewable energy 
regulation may test the limits of trade law. Secondly, it will reveal to what extent cases 
under EU, U.S. and WTO law may be similar or different. Thirdly, it will confirm that 
measures promoting renewable energy form an intriguing case study when examining 
the challenges that arise in the application of trade law on PPM-rules. Finally, it will 
expose the gaps that such choice of case study could leave. 
1.4.2. The Energy Market and Unionism 
Before presenting legal cases in the field of energy, a short introduction to the division 
of competences in the sector is in order. 
An internal market has been created in Europe during the last few decades. In the energy 
sector this development has, however, lagged behind in comparison to trade in many 
other goods and services. The task of creating an energy union faces a few challenges. 
                                                 
226 Emily Barrett Lydgate, ‘Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual Supportiveness to 
Balancing’ (2012) 11 World Trade Review 621, 636. 
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Articles 192 and 194 TFEU require unanimity for the EU to legislate on measures that 
significantly affect the energy mix of each state. This seriously restricts EU competence 
in the energy sector. The EU is not yet a fully harmonized and united energy union 
despite some aspirations to make it one. Instead, the fragmented European internal 
energy market is an unfinished product of economic integration. 
In 2009 the EU managed to adopt the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) in order to 
achieve 20 % energy consumption from renewables by 2020.227 The EU has in years 
after that put a lot of emphasis on creating an energy union and completing the internal 
energy market.228 The new Renewable Energy Directive that is planned to enter into 
force in 2021 (RED 2) establishes a binding target of 32 % for energy consumed in the 
EU to come from renewables by 2030.229 Member States will have separate individual 
targets in order to collectively reach the union target. Each Member States will also 
under the directive separately commit to increase the share of renewables in the heating 
and cooling sector by a given annual share230 and to reach 14 % renewables in the 
transport sector by 2030.231 In order to achieve their target for the transport sector 
Member States must set quota requirements for fuel suppliers. The target for the 
transport sector may be reached for example with electricity from renewables or with 
sustainable biofuel and biogas.232 As the 2009 RED, also the new RED 2 will include 
sustainability criteria for transport biofuels.233 The sustainability criteria have been 
fully harmonized, which is evidence of the ambition, and also already the partial 
success, of the EU to create an energy union. 
The responsibility to implement the EU energy strategy still lies with the Member 
States. The Member States have put in place schemes to support renewables but have 
also included provisions that limit the access to the national support to domestically 
                                                 
227 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
228 Commission Communication, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy, COM (2015) 80 final. 
229 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 3. 
230 Id. Art. 23. 
231 Id. Art. 25(1). The 14 % target can be fulfilled by relying on renewables in any part of the transport 
sector. In reality the share will be somewhat lower because non-renewables used for transport other than 
by road or rail are not accounted for.  
232 The contribution from electricity in road vehicles is counted four times its actual energy content. Id. 
Art. 27(2). 
233 Id. Art 29. 
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generated energy. These limitations to electricity support schemes have been declared 
legal by the ECJ because of fears that the objectives related to environmental 
sustainability could otherwise not be achieved.234 Such provisions will at the same time, 
however, create fragmentation on the internal energy market and run counter to the 
stated objective of completing the energy union.235 
In the U.S., although state energy markets differ quite significantly, constitutional 
unionism (federalism) has allowed the federal government to adopt some legislation 
that has laid the foundation for an energy union. For example, under the Federal Power 
Act it is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that has exclusive power 
to regulate wholesale prices and to regulate interstate power sales and transmission.236 
Renewables are promoted under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act237 and 
interstate compacts are prohibited, generally forcing states to cooperate on a federal 
level.238 
U.S. federalism and EU economic integration are somewhat different tracks for shaping 
an energy union. Yet, they both represent the idea of a union based on certain common 
values. On the global arena, such common values are naturally harder to identify. 
Consequently, WTO law may need to show flexibility and tolerance for divergence in 
its value reconciliation tests.  
1.4.3. De Jure Discriminatory PPM-Criteria in the Electricity Sector 
1.4.3.1. Developments in WTO Litigation 
At the heart of the U.S., EU and the WTO trade regimes is the elimination of trade 
barriers, primarily discriminatory government measures. The objective of these efforts 
                                                 
234 See Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099; Joined cases C-204/12 
to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192; Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037. 
235 On this objective see Commission Communication, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy 
Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM (2015) 80 final. 
236 16 U.S.C. § 824. See also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 
515 (1945); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U.S. 61 (1943); 
Federal Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 US 205 (1964); United States v. 
Public Utilities Commission of California, 345 U.S. 295 (1953); Florida Power & Light Co., 404 US 
(1972); Nantahala Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. 953 (1986); Mississippi Power & Light Co., v. 
Mississippi Ex. Rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Corporation 
Commission, 372 U.S. 84 (1963). 
237 16 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq; 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a). See also Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, 
Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 N.Y.U. Environmental L. J. 507, 618-627. 
238 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10. See also Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). 
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is to improve the opportunities to create competitive advantages and consequently 
increase efficiency on the common market.  
The design of incentive programs for renewables, such as feed-in-tariffs (FITs) or 
renewable energy portfolios (RPSs), are aimed at promoting sustainability but may 
simultaneously run the risk of conflicting with the ideals of free trade. This is 
particularly the case when there is some pressure to design the programs so as to 
explicitly favour the domestic renewables sector. There may be several reasons for such 
design, as for example national political pressure to create local jobs. 
It is not uncommon that in-state and out-of-state electricity are treated differently. 
Sometimes such decisions may even be rooted in union level legislation. For example, 
under the new EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) joint projects may be initiated 
between Member States and third countries. Under such projects electricity generated 
outside the EU but consumed inside the Member State will still not account toward the 
renewable energy target if the plant became operational before the summer of 2009 or 
in case the state where production takes place is not a signatory of human rights 
treaties.239 
Cases on national measures that place stricter requirements on electricity generated out-
of-state have so far not emerged under WTO law. There have not been any cases on the 
compatibility with GATT of PPM-criteria applicable in the electricity sector. The focus 
has not been on criteria on sustainable and domestic production, but instead on local 
content provisions, in which the de jure discriminatory element relates to the equipment 
utilized in generating electricity.240 For example, Ontario in Canada had adopted a FIT 
under which benefits were only granted if a certain minimum of the equipment utilized 
in generating electricity was of local origin. In Canada – Renewables WTO dispute 
settlement bodies rejected this form of legislation as unjustifiable discrimination.241 In 
                                                 
239 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 11(2). 
240 For more on local content provisions under WTO law see Thomas, Cottier ‘Renewable Energy and 
WTO Law: More Policy Space or Enhanced Disciplines?’ (2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy 
Rev. 40, 44-45. 
241 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS412 and Canada 
- Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, AB Report, 6 May 2013. See also India – 
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, DS456, AB Report, 16 Sept. 2016; 
European Union and certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, DS452, Request for consultations by China, 5 Nov. 2012; US – Certain Measures 
Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, DS510, Request for consultations by India, 9 Sept. 2016 (Panel 
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many of this type of cases, the measure will be less discriminatory simply by removing 
the de jure discriminatory element, without endangering the objective to, for example, 
protect the environment. An out-of-state product with environmental friendly 
characteristics or produced with environmentally sustainable PPMs will presumably 
benefit the environment much in the same manner as any identical in-state competing 
product. 
The lack of litigation on provisions favouring in-state generated power is likely at least 
in part a reflection of the modest levels of cross-border trade due to the limited 
transimission capacity. Moreover, there may exist justifications for discrimination in 
the power sector. The litigation on the potential grounds of justification that has already 
taken place in the context of EU law is laid out below. 
1.4.3.2. Valid Grounds for De Jure Discrimination in the EU 
In the EU, de jure discrimination has in practice rarely been found justifiable. In this 
respect, the situation is similar to that under WTO law and the U.S. dormant Commerce 
Clause. The electricity sector has, however, provided for some exceptions. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, in examining renewable energy schemes with requirements of 
the electricity being generated in-state, valid grounds of justifications have been 
identified by the ECJ. 
EU Member States have put in place schemes that support renewables but also 
commonly include provisions that limit the access of this support to energy generated 
domestically. For example, in PreussenElektra242 the ECJ was presented with a case 
concerning the German system of feed-in-tariffs (FITs). According to German law, an 
energy supplier had to buy all renewable energy produced in the region of establishment 
for a fixed price. A supplier could get a partial reimbursement in case the renewable 
energy purchased exceeded five per cent of the total energy supply of that supplier. 
PreussenElektra claimed to have an interest in buying more affordable renewable 
energy from abroad and objected to the obligation of buying a large share of domestic 
energy on the grounds that this obligation reduced its capacity to import.  
                                                 
composed on 24 April 2018); US – Certain Measures Relating to Renewable Energy, DS563, Request 
for consultations by China, 14 Aug. 2018. 
242 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099. 
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At the turn of the century the ECJ analyzed the proportionality of the de jure 
discriminatory FIT in PreussenElektra and decided that in the current state of EU 
energy law, discrimination could be justified. Indicating that the situation could change 
with legislative reforms, the court controversially stated that it still in the late 90s could 
be too difficult for national administrations to confirm whether or not the electricity 
provided for by a foreign producer had been generated from renewable resources.243 
The facts in two more recent cases have been similar to those in PreussenElektra. 
Essent Belgium244 concerned the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) implemented in 
Belgium. Belgian suppliers of energy all have to buy a number of ‘green certificates’ 
(RECs) from producers of renewable energy in order to fill a quota that is dependent 
on total supply volumes. Although the option is in theory not fully excluded by the 
national law, Belgian authorities had never accepted foreign RECs, nor awarded RECs 
to imports. Ålands Vindkraft was a similar case. It related to the Swedish system, where 
suppliers also have to buy green certificates (RECs). The system was, however, not 
contested by any Swedish energy supplier. The plaintiff was instead Ålands Vindkraft, 
a Finnish company producing wind power. It had asked the authorities of Sweden to 
award Swedish RECs for the power it supplied to the Swedish network but the request 
had been denied.245  
In his opinion to Ålands Vindkraft Advocate General Bot reached the conclusion that 
differential treatment of imported electricity was no longer justifiable and that the 
Renewable Energy Directive should be considered invalid to the extent that it granted 
Member States the right to discriminate in that regard.246 If this conclusion had also 
been adopted by the court, it would have meant the end of de jure discriminatory 
schemes. Assuming states would have repealed the requirement of in-state generation 
instead of cancelling their schemes completely, companies would have been presented 
with the opportunity to relocate their plants from one state to another without losing 
                                                 
243 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, paras 78-80. For criticism 
see Henrik Bjørnebye, Investing in EU Energy Security – Exploring the Regulatory Approach to 
Tomorrow's Electricity Production (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 108. Oddly, the ECJ had earlier appeared to 
indicate that it in fact could be possible to verify the PPM of electricity. See Case C-213/96 Outokumpu 
Oy [1998] ECR I-1777, para. 37-39. 
244 Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192. 
245 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037. 
246 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, Opinion of AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2014:37, 
paras 110-111. 
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any of the benefits available under the schemes. Renewable energy plants may have 
primarily been established in areas where production would be most efficient.247 While 
this would have some positive effects, it is worthy of note that it would also have meant 
that in some states there would be less renewables and less diversification with respect 
to the energy mix. 
The ECJ did in Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium not follow the opinion of 
Advocate General Bot. Instead, the court took the same approach as in PreussenElektra 
and upheld the de jure discriminatory schemes. Would there then have been any reason 
for the court to divert from its precedent in PreussenElektra? Perhaps. After 
PreussenElektra a directive on renewable energy had been enacted. Articles 15 (9) and 
15 (10) RED248 provide that all Member States shall issue guarantees of origin (GOs) 
for electricity generated from renewable resources. The GOs shall be mutually 
recognized. Admittedly, the 2009 directive clearly distinguished between GOs and 
RECs.249 Under the proposed new Renewables Energy Directive (RED 2) GOs would 
even have to be issued for all renewable energy.250 Even if the distinction between GOs 
and RECs is not as explicit in the proposal for RED 2, the GO is still only intended to 
verify for the consumer that the electricity was generated from renewables. RECs are 
green certificates that can be used to claim benefits under support schemes. 
Advocate General Bot had in his opinion in Essent Belgium argued that it is possible to 
verify the source of imported electricity and that that the argument relied on in 
PreussenElektra should therefore no longer be relevant.251 The available GOs should 
normally provide the information necessary to conclude whether or not the electricity 
that was generated would fulfill the requirements for receiving RECs or gain any other 
                                                 
247 Dörte Fouquet and Angela Guarrata, ‘Judgment of 1st July 2014 in Ålands Vindkraft AB v 
Energimyndigheten, Comments on Case C-573/12’ (2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Rev. 
52, 57. 
248 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
249 Recital 52, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
250 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 19. It was 
under the original RED not compulsory to issue these guarantees of origin for heating and cooling 
produced from renewable sources. Those forms of energy are, however, not frequently subject to 
international trade due to difficulties of transfer. 
251 Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, Opinion of AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2013:294, paras 102-103. 
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benefit for that matter.252 The ECJ noted in Ålands Vindkraft that the reasoning in 
PreussenElektra was outdated.253 Still, it did not agree with the AG and proclaimed 
that the origin of electricity is still too difficult to verify on the European market.254 
This left the impression that not much had changed with regards to legal argumentation 
from the time of PreussenElektra to Ålands Vindkraft.255 Interestingly, a few months 
later in Essent Belgium it did not bring up that same argument. In both cases the ECJ 
still upheld the de jure discriminatory provisions of the national schemes. 
The question of verification difficulties was also touched upon in the E.ON Biofor case. 
The company had imported biogas from Germany to Sweden through gas networks. In 
Sweden the carbon tax on biogas was relatively low. However, the Swedish authorities 
refused to grant the imported gas the status of biogas on the ground that it was too 
difficult to verify that the same amount of gas that was taken out of the cross-border 
network in Sweden as German biogas, had in fact gone into the network in Germany as 
biogas. In contrast, biogas that was put into the gas network in Sweden was granted 
carbon tax reliefs. The ECJ concluded that Sweden had failed to explain why it was 
more difficult to verify the origin of the gas when it had been unloaded on the network 
in another Member State. In the view of the court, it should not be impossible to verify 
that the same amount of biogas is unloaded on and extracted from the network.256 
With the weakening or perhaps even rejection of the argument of verification 
difficulties in the energy sector a second argument might have been more vital for the 
outcome in Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium. An argument for de jure 
discrimination presented in the judgments of 2014 was that Member State would 
otherwise not have control of the effects and costs of the programs.257 The court in 
Essent Belgium emphasized that the proper functioning of the national support scheme 
and the demand for RECs had to be guaranteed.258 The court seemed to imply that 
                                                 
252 See also Angus Johnston et al., ‘The Proposed New EU Renewables Directive: Interpretation, 
Problems and Prospects’ (2008) 17 European Energy and Environmental Law Rev. 126, 136. 
253 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, paras 84-86. 
254 Id., paras 87-88. 
255 Sirja-Leena Penttinen, ‘Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten – The Free Movement Law 
Perspective’ (2015) 13 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 11, 20. 
256 Case C-549/15 E.ON Biofor Sverige AB v. Statens energimyndighet, ECLI:EU:C:2017:490, paras 90-
98. 
257 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, paras 99, 103; 
Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192, para. 102. 
258 Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192, paras 101, 109. 
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without de jure discrimination the burden on some states would become too high, other 
states might free ride and in the end the stability of the renewable support systems 
would be endangered.259  
A potential economic consequence of non-discriminatory support schemes would be 
that those generating electricity from renewable resources would start to search for the 
most beneficial national support schemes and offer their clean energy to those 
countries.260 This would allow the economic and environmental benefits to leak out-of-
state.261  
The risk of free riding could endanger system stability. A non-discriminatory RPS may 
in a worst case scenario result in no new incentives for clean PPMs. Namely, granting 
RECs to out-of-state renewable energy projects would allow the quantity of RECs to 
increase drastically.262 The influx of requests for RECs would especially originate from 
generating facilities in states that would not have any RPS system or would have very 
low quotas. From an environmental perspective this may be problematic because even 
if states would not be justified in prioritizing their own environment, the non-
discriminatory RPS would invite generating facilities in states with no or low quotas to 
request RECs for their renewable energy, and the quota of the importing state would be 
saturated without there having been any increase in renewable energy globally.263 The 
increase in RECs would drive prices down and retailers could fulfill their quota easily 
by buying cheaper dirty energy and separately very cheap RECs. Consequently, the 
environmental benefits of the RPS would be more or less nullified. Through 
                                                 
259 Already hinting toward this see Armin Steinbach and Robert Brückmann, ‘Renewable Energy and the 
Free Movement of Goods’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 1, 14. 
260 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of electricity 
from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, COM (2000) 279 final, 6; Angus 
Johnston et al., ‘The Proposed New EU Renewables Directive: Interpretation, Problems and Prospects’ 
(2008) 17 European Energy and Environmental Law Rev. 126, 137; Angus Johnston and Guy Block, EU 
Energy Law 350 (OUP 2012). 
261 Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 246-250, 270-271; Anne 
Havemann, ‘Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws 
with the Federal Constitution’ (2012) 71 Maryland L. Rev 848-885, 872; Patrick R. Jacobi, Note, 
‘Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States Can Stop Worrying 
and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2006)  30 Vermont L. Rev. 1079, 1095-1096. 
262 The surplus of RECs is already currently a problem. See Joel H. Mack et al., ‘All RECs are Local: 
How In-State Generation Requirements Adversely Affect Development of a Robust REC Market’ (2011) 
4 The Electricity Journal 8, 17. 
263 Max Jansson, ‘Free Movement of Electricity and the Revival of System Stability Justifications’ (2017) 
18 German Law Journal 595, 611-613. 
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discrimination the state may avoid free riding and the outcome might in that sense 
secure efficectiveness.264 
Pure economic concerns cannot form valid grounds of justification. The system stability 
concern relating to schemes for promoting renewable energy does not appear to have 
been considered to constitute a pure economic concern but was perhaps viewed more 
as a structural question related to environmental protection.  
Could the reasoning by the ECJ in Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium apply equally 
to other forms of schemes, such as FITs? In both judgments the court emphasized that 
the RPS under scrutiny could only function properly in case there are market 
mechanisms ensuring that green certificates are available under fair terms for those 
subject to any quota obligations. In addition, any penalties for failing to fulfil their quota 
must be proportional.265 Van Calster has interpreted the court to have set out the 
existence of market mechanisms as a requirement for any de jure discriminatory 
renewable energy scheme to survive the proportionality review. He notes that FITs 
would not meet such requirement.266 However, the intention of the court might merely 
have been to state that well-functioning market mechanisms for trade in certificates are 
necessary for a RPS as the environmental objective would otherwise not be advanced. 
The court might in other words not have passed any judgments on the requirements that 
would apply to other types of schemes, such as FITs. 
Szydzło has assumed that the reasoning of the ECJ in Ålands Vindkraft and Essent 
Belgium would apply equally to other forms of schemes, such as FITs.267 There are 
good reasons for such an assumption. RPSs are schemes that rely on quota obligations 
and do not involve direct government spending. In contrast, FITs and grant programs 
rely on the public authorities offering direct financial support. An EU Member State 
might be concerned that too many applications come in and threaten financial stability. 
Still, as an alternative to de jure discrimination, the state could opt to limit the number 
of annually accepted applications. Capping FITs or subsidies will, however, create 
                                                 
264 Ibid. 
265 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, paras 113-118; 
Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192, paras 111-115. 
266 Geert, Van Calster, ‘Climate Change and Renewable Energy as a Super Trump for EU Trade Law –  
However all Essent clear’ (2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Rev. 60, 64-65. 
267 Marek Szydło, ‘How to reconcile national support for renewable energy with internal market 
obligations? The task for the EU legislature after Ålands Vindkraft and Essent’ (2015) Common Market 
Law Rev. 489, 497. 
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some uncertainty as the producers cannot know when funds will run out.268 In addition, 
states that implement programs to promote renewables may see their investment in 
clean and sustainable PPMs leak to other states. This will in turn discourage states from 
implementing such programs to protect the environment in the first place.269 Supporting 
the relevance of these aspects is the fact that in Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium 
the ECJ added that even for a RPS the elimination of the in-state requirement would 
risk resulting in reduced investor confidence.270  
The proposed new Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) reflects the case law 
developments. The Commission proposal included provisions that would have required 
Member States to gradually open up their renewable support schemes in the electricity 
sector to electricity generated in other Member States.271 However, the final 
compromise text of the new directive puts more emphasis on the concerns of system 
stability and only encourages Member States to accept imported electricity for their 
support schemes. The Commission shall by 2023 reassess whether opening up the 
national schemes for imported electricity should be made obligatory.272 
In 2016 the ECJ ruled on yet another case of preferences awarded to electricity from 
renewable resources generated in-state. The Belgian law under scrutiny in Essent 
Belgium II allowed electricity from renewable resources that was fed directly into the 
in-state distribution network to be distributed free of charge. Similar benefits were not 
granted for imported electricity. Unlike FITs and RPSs this scheme awarded benefits 
to suppliers and therefore did not provide direct and certain benefits to renewable 
energy producers. Therefore, the ECJ found the measure to be disproportional and 
unjustifiable.273 
                                                 
268 Max Jansson, ‘Free Movement of Electricity and the Revival of System Stability Justifications’ (2017) 
18 German Law Journal 595, 613-614. 
269 Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology Law Quarterly 243, 270. 
270 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, paras 99, 103; 
Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192, para. 102. 
271 Article 5 and recital 17, European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast), COM(2016) 
767 final. 
272 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 5 as well 
as recitals 22-23. 
273 Case C-492/14 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaams Gewest and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:732, paras 111-
117. 
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The ECJ cases discussed in this subsection related to de jure discriminatory elements 
in schemes to promote renewable energy and sustainable PPMs. The energy union has 
not unlocked its true potential in part because de jure discrimination has been found to 
be justifiable in the electricicty sector. It is still important that in developing strategies 
with respect to promoting renewable energy, the EU and its Member States take into 
consideration the building blocks already laid out in EU free movement law. What is 
more, the EU can – perhaps even should – learn from experiences in the U.S discussed 
below. 
1.4.3.3. Scepticism Toward Explicit Preference to In-State Origin in the U.S. 
De jure discrimination occurs when importers of power from out-of-state plants are 
denied RECs by the authority in the importing state. Not accepting out-of-state power 
when granting renewable energy credits would clearly create less favorable treatment 
of imports. This is not the same as not accepting out-of-state RECs for the in-state RPS. 
Renewable energy credits (RECs) in different jurisdictions may represent very different 
attributes and are therefore not like products. There could hence be an obligation to 
grant foreign power RECs while there would be no obligation to accept foreign RECs. 
The case of in-state requirements for RECs has received attention in the context of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. In the U.S. a debate has emerged as to whether or not 
various in-state requirements in a RPS are disproportionate.274 American scholars have 
generally regarded in-state requirements to breach the dormant Commerce Clause275 
                                                 
274 Nathan Endrud, ‘State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in 
Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation’ 
(2008) 45 Harvard Journal on Legislation 259, 271-273; Patrick R. Jacobi, Note, ‘Renewable Portfolio 
Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the 
Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2006) 30 Vermont L. Rev. 1079, 1128-34; Carolyn Elefant and Edward 
A. Holt, ‘The Commerce Clause and Implications for State Renewable Portfolio Standard Programs’ 
(2011) CleanEnergy States Alliance: State RPS Policy Report 4, 12; Anne Havemann, ‘Surviving the 
Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal 
Constitution’ (2012) 71 Maryland L. Rev. 848, 884; Steven Ferrey, ‘Renewable Orphans: Adopting 
Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level’ (2006) 19 The Electricity Journal 52, 59-60; Trevor D. 
Stiles, ‘Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2009) 4 Environmental and Energy 
Law and Policy Journal 34, 65. Compare with Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 295, 333-334. 
275 Trevor D. Stiles, ‘Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ 4 Environmental and 
Energy Law and Policy Journal 34, 64 (2009); Carolyn Elefant and Edward A. Holt, ‘The Commerce 
Clause and Implications for State Renewable Portfolio Standard Programs’ (2011) CleanEnergy States 
Alliance: State RPS Policy Report 4-15; Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to 
Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 243, 272-274; Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: 
Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 N. Y. U. 
Environmental L. J. 507, 583 and 642; Nathan Endrud, ‘State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their 
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and when the laws have been challenged states have so far quickly repealed the de jure 
discriminatory provision.276 U.S. courts have thus often not had a chance to evaluate 
whether or not the arguments that the ECJ concluded to justify in-state requirements 
under EU law could also be given weight in the application of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has on one occasion hinted 
that the in-state requirement would not be upheld even if that question was not 
specifically at stake in the case.277 
Some American scholars have noted that by accepting only electricity generated in-
state free riding may be avoided and the outcome might in that sense secure 
efficiency.278 However, for this objective all out-of-state electricity would not 
necessarily need to be excluded from the RPS. The alternative to an absolute in-state 
generation requirement would be requirements placed on the out-of-state generating 
facility. Such provision could take the form of a requirement of grid interconnection 
with or delivery of electricity to the state where the support, for example in the form of 
RECs, is granted.279 In an even stricter model the requirement for support would be that 
the electricity is consumed in the state granting the support. Although these alternatives 
would increase the administrative burden,280 they would allow more competition than 
                                                 
Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, 
and Possible Federal Legislation’ (2008) 45 Harvard Journal on Legislation’ (2008) 259, 270; Patrick R. 
Jacobi, Note, ‘Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States Can 
Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2006) 30 Vermont L. Rev. 1079, 
1111-1112. 
276 TransCanada Power Marketing v. Ian Bowles et al., No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS (complaint April 16, 
2010) (D. Mass.) (in-state requirement repealed, case settled); State, ex rel. Missouri Energy 
Development Association v. Public Service Commission, 386 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. App. Ct. W.D. 2012) 
(in-state requirement repealed, case dropped); Nichols and FuelCell Energy, Inc., v. Markell, et al, No. 
1:12-cv-00777 (D. Del.) (complaint 2012) (in-state requirement repealed, case dropped 2015). See also 
Ohio Supreme Court, In the Matter of the Application of Champaign Wind, LLC, Slip Opinion No. 2016-
Ohio-1513 (the court did not find it necessary to rule on the in-state requirement); In the Matter of the 
Commission's Review of its Rules for the Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard Contained in Chapter 
4901:1-40 of the Ohio Code, Case No. 13-652-EL-ORD (Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 2014) 
(repealing the in-state requirement). 
277 Illinois Commerce Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
278 Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 323-331; Daniel K. Lee 
and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine 
to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 295, 335. 
279 This type of requiremement is referred to as an option in the new RED 2. See Directive (EU) 
2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the 
use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 5(2). 
280 Nathan Endrud, ‘State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in 
Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation’ 
(2008) 45 Harvard J. on Legislation 259, 272. 
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a model that shuts out all imports from the support scheme, while still offering a fair 
amount of stability for the scheme.  
Connecticut has adopted a RPS and it grants RECs only to plants that generate 
electricity that is delivered to Connecticut. Although the model is de facto 
discriminatory, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit still found the RPS to 
be justifiable and proportional.281 This appears in-line with the theory presented above 
on plausible alternatives to a complete rejection of REC-requests from out-of-state 
generation. It is unfortunate that these types of alternative models have not received 
much consideration in the EU. 
It is in the context of de facto discrimination that the delicate questions pertaining to 
the relationship between trade and environment become most evident and it is in this 
context that PPM-criteria present a true dilemma. This book shall thus not dig deeper 
into the complexities linked to the justifiability of de jure discrimination. The above 
debate on that issue will only serve as a background. Instead, the focus will for the 
rest of the study shift to de facto discrimination. 
1.4.4. De Facto Discriminatory PPM-Criteria for Electricity, Heating and Cooling 
1.4.4.1. Promoting Renewables and Penalizing Other Energy Sources 
The debate on the reconciliation of free trade and environmental protection in the 
context of the energy sector does not end at explicit preference of in-state goods and 
projects. Natural resources are distributed unevenly among states. Oil, natural gas and 
coal can be found in specific geographical regions. States rich in these fossil resources 
have been able to establish a valuable export industry in times when energy is one of 
the most fundamental commodities. Fossil fuels are still today often the cheapest option 
for energy.  
The unequal distribution of natural resources means that encouraging the utilization of 
certain energy sources will advance the economic interests of some regions, while 
                                                 
281 Allco Finance v. Klee, 16-2946, (2d Cir. 2017). The court mentioned two reasons. First, the burden 
on interstate commerce was not clearly excessive of the benefits. This represented the application of the 
traditional proportionality test referred to as the Pike balancing test. Secondly, the court noted that more 
renewable energy out-of-state would not serve the in-state interests relating to security of supply and 
environmental protection. This second point is more controversial as it would suggest that security of 
supply could be a valid ground of justification in this context and that states could prioritize their own 
environment over out-of-state environment. Cf. Max Jansson, ‘Free Movement of Electricity and the 
Revival of System Stability Justifications’ (2017) 18 German Law Journal 595, 606. 
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closing market opportunities for others. For example, all fossil fuels are not treated 
equally. In many developed countries the tax on petroleum is relatively high. In 
contrast, the tax on gas and coal tends to be much lower. What is more, the tax on 
gasoline is as a rule significantly higher than the tax on diesel, although diesel could be 
claimed to be more polluting.282  
While the different treatment of various fossil fuels has not gained too much attention, 
the same is not true for recent strategic benefits granted to renewables. The call for an 
increased share of renewables in the energy mix threatens to substantially distort the 
traditional patterns of the market. As with fossil fuels, the access to various renewable 
resources, in order to generate solar power, hydro power, wind power or energy from 
biomass, is also uneven among states. For example, Austria has a strong hydroelectric 
industry, whereas Denmark has taken advantage of its windy shorelines and Spain has 
great solar power potential. In the U.S. the central area from North Dakota to Texas has 
steady winds, the Midwest dominates in corn supply for ethanol, the Southwest has 
great solar potential and some states have good access to geothermal energy. At the 
same time a state like West Virginia does not have such promising potential when it 
comes to renewables.283 The preferred resources of a state may, sometimes without any 
discriminatory intent, be those with great local potential. 
Even differential treatment of various renewables could in principle raise concerns of 
discrimination. In the context of RPS schemes U.S. states have adopted very different 
definitions of renewable energy.284 Comparably, in the EU some states have left out 
large hydropower plants from the scope of renewables that receive beneficial status.285 
                                                 
282 For a WTO law analysis of differences in taxation of fossil fuels see Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Domestic 
Taxation of Energy Products and Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This a Case of Unlawful Discrimination?’ 
(2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 359. 
283 T. Mai et al., ‘Exploration of High-Penetration Renewable Electricity Futures’ (2012) 1 Renewable 
Electricity Futures Study, NREL/TP-6A20-52409-1 (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory). 
284 Steven Ferrey, ‘Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the 
New Infrastructure of Renewable Power’ (2011-12) 7 Texas J. Oil, Gas and Energy L. 59, 65; Steven 
Ferrey, ‘Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the 
U.S. Future’ (2012) 17 Virginia J. Law & Technology 89, 97-100. Even within the federal legal 
framework several definitions exist. See Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and 
States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 
12 N.Y.U. Environmental L. J. 507, 573-577. 
285 Such states include Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. See Danyel Reiche and Mischa Bechberger, 
‘Policy Differences in the Promotion of Renewable Energies in the EU Member States’ (2004) 32 Energy 
Policy 843, 844; Yong Chen and Francis X. Johnson, ‘Sweden: Greening the Power in a Context of 
Liberalization and Nuclear Ambivalence’, in William M. Lafferty and Audun Ruud (eds.), Promoting 
Sustainable Electricity in Europe – Challenging the Path Dependence of Dominant Energy Systems 
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Other states have a broad definition of renewables, but differentiate between, for 
example, wind and solar power by implementing different feed-in-tariffs for them or 
set different quotas for different sources of renewable energy.286 Some states have in 
turn decided to promote certain technology more than other technologies by creating 
carve-outs. A carve-out is a quota obligation for a specific technology, such as e.g. solar 
power, to be fulfilled by retailers in addition to the general quota for all renewables.287 
De facto discriminatory effects may occur in case states promote to the highest degree 
those renewables for which it has comparative advantages, for example as a 
consequence of its geography and weather conditions. 
In sum, there are many potential circumstances where claims of de facto discrimination 
could arise. The next few subsections will briefly map the different cases related to 
energy that have already emerged. The cases offer a good overview of the type of 
context in which courts have been and will continue to be expected to reconcile free 
trade and environmental protection, while at the same time taking into account the 
particularities of PPM-criteria. 
1.4.4.2. U.S. Law and the Power Sector 
Legal regimes are formed out of a complex network of norms. Primary law on free 
trade is in other words not the only set of rules that apply to measures adopted to 
regulate PPMs. Some measures on PPMs may be prohibited by legal rules outside the 
scope of trade law. The range of measures that never fall under trade law scrutiny 
because they are prohibited by other norms vary significantly between the different 
jurisdictions. 
In the U.S. federal and constitutional law shape the relevance of the dormant Commerce 
Clause for state-level PPM-criteria in the electricity sector. In accordance with Article 
VI of the U.S. Constitution, federal law covering a field will pre-empt any state 
legislation. This so called Supremacy Clause has to a large extent hindered states from 
                                                 
(Edward Elgar 2008) 219, 240-242; Maarten J. Arentsen, ‘The Netherlands: Muddling Through in the 
Dutch Delta’, in William M. Lafferty and Audun Ruud (eds.), Promoting Sustainable Electricity in 
Europe – Challenging the Path Dependence of Dominant Energy Systems (Edward Elgar 2008) 45, 51. 
286 Catherine Redgwell et al., ‘Energy Law in Europe: Comparisons and Conclusions’, in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al. (eds.), Energy Law in Europe – National, EU and International Law and Institutions 
(OUP 2001) 1030. 
287 On e.g. solar carve-outs see Steven Ferrey, ‘Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The 
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power’ (2011-12) 7 Texas J. Oil, Gas 
and Energy Law (2011-12) 59, 67-68. 
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adopting FITs. Namely, under the Federal Power Act it is FERC that has exclusive 
power to regulate wholesale prices and to regulate interstate power sales and 
transmission.288 Consequently, establishing a FIT comparable to those implemented in 
European countries has been regarded to fall into the category of pre-empted state 
regulation.289 There are, however, circumstances where states may still adopt FIT-
programs and a few states have used this possibility.290 
Dormant Commerce Clause cases on subsidies are also unlikely to emerge. Namely, 
subsidies are generally exempted from the scope of the clause.291 There are, however, 
certain schemes that might not benefit from the exemption. According to the Supreme 
Court a tax scheme applicable to the whole sector may not be coupled with a de jure 
discriminatory subsidy.292 The scope of the subsidy exemption will be revisited later in 
this book.293 
As indicated above, not all subsidy scheme will benefit from the exemption to the 
dormant Commerce Clause. The ambiguity of the scope of the exemption might be 
relevant for some schemes in the power sector. For example, several states apply system 
benefit charges (SBC) on retail sales of power. These charges are generally paid by the 
retail customer and the proceeds go to a renewable trust fund (RTF) operated by a state 
authority. The funds are then used to subsidize renewable energy projects. There are 
states, which grant the subsidies also to out-of-state projects.294 Normally, however, the 
subsidies are limited to in-state projects and are thus de jure discriminatory. The SBC 
and RTF schemes could potentially be prima facie prohibited and would then be 
                                                 
288 16 U.S.C. § 824. See also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 
515 (1945); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U.S. 61 (1943); 
Federal Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964); United States v. 
Public Utilities Commission of California, 345 U.S. 295 (1953); Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 
(1972); Nantahala Power & Light Co., 476 U.S. 953 (1986); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. 
Mississippi Ex. Rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Corporation 
Commission, 372 U.S. 84 (1963). 
289 Steven Ferrey, ‘Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable 
Energy in the U.S. Future’, (2012) 17 Virginia J. Law & Technology 89, 110-120. 
290 U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘Feed-In Tariffs and similar programs’ (4 June 2013) 
<https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.php> accessed 16 March 2018. 
291 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809 (1976); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 278 (1988); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994). 
292 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
293 See section 2.3.2.1. 
294 Mark Bolinger et al., ‘Clean Energy Funds: An Overview of State Support for Renewable Energy’ 
(April 2001) LBNL-7705, 19. 
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difficult to justify under the strict proportionality review that could apply.295 This risk 
has spurred some debate over how the schemes could be redesigned in order to avoid 
Commerce Clause challenges.296 
All in all, while FITs and subsidies may be challenged in the U.S., they are not the most 
likely dormant Commerce Clause cases. Instead, cases in the electricity sector have 
mostly concerned RPSs. Around half of the states in the U.S. have enacted a RPS to 
promote electricity from renewable resources. So far, no precedents would indicate that 
the Supreme Court would apply the same argument related to system stability that the 
ECJ has reverted to when it has found that even de jure discriminatory schemes are 
justifiable. Although the relevance of a system stability argument under U.S. law cannot 
be dismissed with complete certainty, it is worthy of note that some lower courts have 
opted not to apply, or even discuss, it.  
The federal district court in Colorado had to rule on a case where the plaintiff, Energy 
and Environment Legal Institute (E&E Legal; formerly American Tradition Institute), 
was an institute representing electricity utilities and a coal company. It had brought a 
case against the State of Colorado, in which it argued that the state is breaching the 
Commerce Clause in promoting renewable energy through a RPS program. The 
institute seemed especially concerned over the competitive advantages created for wind 
power over fossil resources.297 The district court adopted in E&E Legal the view that 
state RPSs should not benefit from any exemption and that they may be prima facie 
prohibited in case they have discriminatory effect. Importantly, the court applied a 
proportionality review for the RPS without any reference to a system stability 
                                                 
295 Steven Ferrey, ‘Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level’ (March 
2006) 19 The Electricity Journal 52, 59. 
296 Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 304-305; Steven Ferrey, 
‘Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure 
of Renewable Power’ (2011-12) 7 Texas J. of Oil, Gas & Energy Law 59, 99-101; Steven Ferrey, 
‘Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through 
the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 N.Y.U. Environmental L. J. 507, 595-610. 
297 Wind power has grown the most under RPS programs in the US and seems to get a large share of 
energy subsidies. See Ryan Wiser and Galen Barbose, ‘Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United 
States: A Status Report with Data Through 2007’ (2008) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
Report; Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the 
Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 N.Y.U. Environmental 
Law J. 507, 525. 
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argument.298 This approach was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit.299 
It should be noted that E&E Legal argued that some parts of the state regulations were 
facially discriminatory. However, the institute also maintained the position that 
eliminating the facially discriminatory elements of the RPS program would not be 
sufficient, since promoting wind power at the expense of the coal industry in other 
states places an undue burden on interstate commerce. Already the district court found 
the Colorado RPS to be prima facie prohibited due to an undue burden on interstate 
commerce and proceeded to a proportionality review.300 The undue burden might stem 
from discriminatory effect. Measures promoting one resource over another could be de 
facto discriminatory if the state is relatively strong in utilizing that resource.301 
Although Colorado has relatively large coal reserves, it also sits on great potential for 
renewables, especially wind power. Similar claims of de facto discrimination could 
arise in challenges targeting RPS schemes all across the U.S. since the distribution of 
energy resources is fairly uneven. Some states are rich in coal302 or gas, while other 
states have more hours of sun or wind per annum.303 Measures to promote renewables 
taken by renewable intensive states, like for example California, would weaken the 
competiveness of the energy industries in other states that rely more on fossil fuels.  
The court found that while the RPS adopted in Colorado burdened out-of-state 
commerce (read: coal heavy states), the burden was still not clearly excessive of the 
benefits. The test of balancing the burden with the benefits applicable in the context of 
the dormant Commerce Clause is referred to as the Pike balancing test. The application 
of the Pike balancing test confirmed the RPS to be constitutional. A verdict of 
                                                 
298 Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Colo. 2014). 
299 Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015). 
300 Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Colo. 2014). 
301 For examples of different strategies without de jure discriminatory in-state requirements see Steven 
Ferrey, ‘Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the New 
Infrastructure of Renewable Power’ (2011-12) 7 Texas J. Oil, Gas and Energy L. 59, 65-74. 
302 E.g. Pennsylvania, Ohio and North Dakota. See Richard Cowart, ‘Addressing Leakage in a Cap-and-
Trade System: Treating Imports as Sources’ (2006) RAP White Paper 8; US Energy Information 
Administration, US Department of Energy, Annual Coal Report 2009 (2010) 32. 
303 Charles F. Kutcher et al., ‘Tackling Climate Change in the U.S.: Potential Carbon Emission 
Reductions from Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy by 2030’ (2007) ASES Report, 22; Andy S. 
Kydes, ‘Impacts of a Renewable Portfolio Generation Standard on US Energy Markets’ (2007) 35 
Energy Policy 809, 813-814. 
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unconstitutionality would have been a major set-back for the development of renewable 
energy.304  
A RPS does commonly not only differentiate between renewable and fossil resources, 
but also between different renewables as it excludes some renewables from its scope. 
Similarly as in the case of E&E Legal, a court could also on the basis of such 
observations find undue burden on interstate commerce and test for proportionality. 
The question of the constitutionality of favouring one renewable over another has been 
referred to a court at least on one occasion. The case, however, did not relate to any 
RPS, but to the approval of a merger and the decision of Massachusetts’ distribution 
company to sign a contract with only a wind power plant.305 The lawsuit was dismissed 
for reasons unrelated to trade law and no proportionality review was thus ever carried 
out. 
Another case on electricity, North Dakota v. Heydinger, concerned the decision by 
Minnesota to restrict the import of power from carbon dioxide intensive resources and 
to prohibit long-term contracts with plants that emit carbon dioxide over a certain 
threshold.306  The measure affects negatively mainly coal plants and would benefit wind 
power.307 Minnesota has essentially no coal industry308 and a lot of potential for wind 
power. Hence, it would seem that the coal moratorium planned by Minnesota is de facto 
discriminatory, in fact almost comparable to facial discrimination.309 In this case first 
the federal district court310 and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit311 
                                                 
304 Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: 
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 
295, 299. 
305 Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts v. Ann G. Berwick, 17 F.Supp. 3d 113 (D. Mass. 2014). In 2015 
the 1st Circuit remanded the case back to the district court. See Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts, v. 
Angela M. O’Connor, Case no. 14-1597 (1st Cir. 2015). In 2016 the case was dismissed because the 
contract at stake had been terminated. 
306 Next Generation Energy Act, Minnesota Statutes § 216H.03, subdiv. 5-6; Daniel K. Lee and Timothy 
P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law, 295, 315-316. 
307 Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Boarder War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 74-75. 
308 U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Coal Report 2009 
(2010). See also Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Boarder War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 91-95. 
309 Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Boarder War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 91-92. 
310 North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014). 
311 North Dakota v. Heydinger, Cases no. 14-2156 and 14-2251 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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did not find sufficient arguments for justification and concluded that the scheme was 
unconstitutional.  
The details of the analysis of justification and the differences for the different outcomes 
of value reconciliation in the Minnesota and the Colorado cases will be discussed later 
in this book.312 At this stage, it is sufficient to conclude that cases on the proportionality 
of de facto discriminatory PPM-criteria applicable in the energy sector have already 
reached U.S. courts. 
1.4.4.3. Rare Disputes in the EU 
Similar challenges on the renewable energy agenda to those that have been filed in U.S. 
courts have not yet emerged in the EU. This has mostly to do with ECJ case law. It was 
previously described how even de jure discriminatory support schemes for sustainable 
electricity have been declared proportional and thus justifiable. Hence, it is only logical 
that the potential de facto discriminatory effect of other schemes has not been 
challenged. 
The lack of cases in the electricity sector on de facto discrimination may be regarded 
to also reflect the weaker nature of the European energy union. First, Member States 
may in accordance with the strict norms on competence and legislative procedure in 
Articles 192 and 194 TFEU decide on their energy mix to the extent the EU has not 
legislated otherwise under the requirement of unanimity. There may exist a reluctance 
to question the national decisions even with reference to free movement law. Secondly, 
with regards to electricity limited cross-border grid-connections continue to put 
restraints on the volumes of cross-border trade. 
On one occasion, however, the de facto discriminatory nature of a state measure 
targeting PPMs in the energy sector arose to the fore, although it never reached the 
courts. Namely, critical voices were raised when Austria in 2011 planned to ban the 
import of electricity from nuclear power.313 A ban on the import of nuclear power 
would constitute a restriction on the import of a product, electricity, solely on the basis 
of process and production methods that have no impacts on the physical characteristics 
                                                 
312 See section 6.1.6. See also section 2.3.3.1. 
313 Cat Contiguglia, ‘Austria to ban import of nuclear fueled energy’ (13 July 2011) 
<www.praguepost.cz/business/9422-austria-to-ban-import-of-nuclear-fueled-energy.html> accessed 28 
April 2014. 
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of the end product. Austria did not appear concerned that it would not be able to verify 
the PPM of imports.  
Austria has no nuclear power plants. The country, however, imports energy that is 
purchased at an exchange. The origin of this energy is rarely traced, but some of it 
comes from nuclear power plants. It was estimated that nuclear power covers just below 
four per cent of electricity consumed in Austria. At the same time, reportedly 80 per 
cent of the population opposes nuclear power and 74 per cent are in favour of an import 
ban.314  
After reviewing the Austrian plan, the Commission advised the state to amend it and 
finally Austria opted to restrict the import of nuclear power less severely, by 
introducing a system of obligatory labelling. The labelling scheme is expected to lead 
to voluntary anti-nuclear commitments from retailers.315 The position of the 
Commission might indicate intolerance of PPM-criteria that go so far as to create a 
complete market access ban. 316 
Is there any valid reason for the position held by the Commission, when the ECJ has 
accepted even de jure discriminatory PPM-criteria in the electricity sector? Perhaps. 
First, what Austria planned was a full ban, which at least in theory could be a more 
severe than the restrictions that result from FITs and RPSs. Secondly, the justifiability 
of de jure discrimination is primarily attributable to the risks of financial stability and 
                                                 
314 ‘Atomstromverbot in Österreich Rechtlich Machtbar’ (10 Oct. 2011) 
<www.greenpeace.org/austria/de/themen/atom/was-wir-tun/Raus-aus-Atomstrom/Rechtsgutachten-zu-
Atomstrom-Importverbot/> accessed 23 March 2016. 
315 See the new §79a of the electricity law (Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und –organisationsgesetz), Beschluss 
des Nationalrates, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und –organisationsgesetz 2010, 
das Gaswirtschaftsgesetz 2011 und das Energie-Control-Gesetz geändert warden, 2389 der Beilagen 
XXIV. GP (3 July 2013) 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/BNR/BNR_00790/fname_314193.pdf> accessed 13 April 
2014; Press Release from Austria’s Parliament, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 645 (4 July 2013) 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2013/PK0645/> accessed 13 April 2014. See also ‘Kein 
Verbot von Atomstromimport’ (16 Jan. 2012) <http://derstandard.at/1326502878730/NGOs-
enttaeuscht-Kein-Verbot-von-Atomstromimport> accessed 14 Feb. 2014; Markus Stingl, ‘Kompromiss 
im Atom-Streit’ (13 April 2012) <http://kurier.at/wirtschaft/kompromiss-im-atom-streit/774.061> 
accessed 14 Feb. 2014; Claus Hecking, ‘Umstrittenes Umweltgezetz: Osterreich Stoppt Import von 
Atomstrom’ (3 July 2013) <www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/energiewende-oesterreichs-totaler-
atomausstieg-a-909206.html> accessed 14 Feb. 2014; ‘Raus Aus Atomstrom’ (3 July 2013) 
<www.greenpeace.org/austria/de/themen/atom/was-wir-tun/Raus-aus-Atomstrom/> accessed 14 Feb. 
2014; Craig Morris, ‘Austria to Go 100 per cent Nuclear-Free’ (24 July 2013) 
<www.renewablesinternational.net/austria-to-go-100-percent-nuclear-free/150/537/71512/> accessed 
14 Feb. 2014. 
316 The Commission has tended to condemn unilateral PPM-criteria. This is well illustrated by the 
disapproval of Dutch labels on sustainable forestry already in 2003. See Jochem Wiers, Trade and 
Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 2003) 360-361. 
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reshuffling that may arise when states implement schemes such as FITs and RPSs to 
promote sustainable power. However, when a state decides to restrict some PPMs 
through, for example, a market access ban, the stability justification would not 
actualize. Thus, the rules on promoting sustainable and restricting unsustainable energy 
might not necessarily be identical despite being in some respect just opposite sides of 
the same coin.  
A comparison with the developments in the U.S. reveals that the interaction between 
different rules outside trade law has produced a rather different reality. Even if PPM-
criteria are a sensitive topic in both jurisdictions and even if trade law principles are 
quite similar, the actual concrete measures that face litigation has been and will 
continue to be vastly different.  
The lack of EU case law on de facto discrimination in the energy sector would suggest 
that proportionality tests would in practice rarely come into play. Yet, there are two 
important justifications for a more detailed analysis of also EU free movement law. 
First, the above discussion reveals that there might still be at least some energy cases 
where the proportionality principles would become relevant. Secondly, PPM-rules are 
designed also in other sectors than the electricity sector.  
1.4.4.4. Measures to Curb Carbon Emissions in Light of WTO Law 
States have adopted laws to reduce carbon emissions of their domestic industry, 
including the energy sector. As a consequence, the concern has arisen that 
competitiveness on the global market is lost. Companies in other jurisdictions would 
avoid these restrictions and could therefore increase their market share. Consequently, 
the real effect of the emissions mitigation law would be hampered. This problem could 
be tackled by establishing PPM-criteria and extending the application of the criteria 
also to products that are produced out-of-state but are later imported. 
The EU has considered the option to either extend its Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
to emissions linked to imported products or to implement a border tax adjustment for 
carbon emissions. Some academic debate followed on the GATT compatibility of such 
measures.317 Yet, in the end the EU, acknowledging the potential legal problems, 
                                                 
317 Maureen Irish, ‘Renewable Energy and Trade: Interpreting Against Fragmentation’ (2013) The 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 217, 233-235; Warren H. Maruyama, ‘Climate Change and the 
WTO: Cap and Trade versus Carbon Tax?’ (2011) 45 J. World Trade 679; Christine McIsaac, ‘Opening 
a GATE to Reduced Global Emissions: Getting over and into the WTO’ (2010) 44 J. World Trade 1053; 
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abandoned this path.318 The only exception became the application of the ETS to flights 
to and from non-EU cities,319 although also that piece of legislation was put on hold.320 
All in all, emissions trading systems with extraterritorial scope, import bans on goods 
produced with high levels of emissions and border adjustments for emissions in the 
production phase have remained a rarity, in part because of political sensitivity.321  
Some discussion has, however, emerged on the relationship between GATT and 
measures to promote electricity from renewables with merely de facto discriminatory 
effect.322 These measures could take the form of RPSs or FITs.323 It still appears that 
these measures generally go unchallenged. Although the energy transition and the 
increased focus on renewables have again brought PPMs to the fore, it would appear 
                                                 
Charles E. McLure, Jr, ‘The GATT Legality of Border Adjustments for Carbon Taxes and the Cost of 
Emission Permits: A Riddle, Wrapped in a Mystery, Inside an Enigma’ (2011) 11 Florida Tax Rev. 221; 
Paul-Erik Veel, ‘Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies’ (2009) 12 J. 
International Economic Law 749, 771-75; Ryan Vanden Brink, ‘Competitiveness Border Adjustments 
in US Climate Change Proposals Violate GATT: Suggestions to Utilize GATT’s Environmental 
Exceptions’ (2010) 21 Colorado J. International Environmental Law & Policy 85; Tracey Epps and 
Andrew Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate: How the WTO Can Help Address Climate Change 
(Edward Elgar 2010); Ludvine Tamiotti, ‘The Legal Interface Between Carbon Border Measures and 
Trade Rules’ (2011) 11 Climate Policy 1202; Stéphanie Monjon and Philippe Quirion, ‘A Border 
Adjustment for the EU ETS: Reconciling WTO Rules and Capacity to Tackle Carbon Leakage’ (2011) 
11 Climate Policy 1212; Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Unilateral Trade-Related Climate Change Measures’ (2012) 
13 J. World Investment & Trade 888. See also Rafael Leal-Arcas and Andrew Filis, ‘Legal Aspects of 
the Promotion of Renewable Energy within the EU and in Relation to the EU’s Obligation in the WTO’ 
(2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Rev. 3, 21-22. 
318 Commission Communication, Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission 
reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, COM (2010) 265 final, 11-12. 
319 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community, OJ L 8, 13.1.2009, 3. 
320 Decision No 377/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2013 derogating 
temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community, OJ L 113, 25.4.2013, 1. 
321 Robert Howse and Antonia L. Eliason, ‘Domestic and International Strategies to Address Climate 
Change: An Overview of the WTO Legal Issues’, in Thomas Cottier et al. (eds.) International Trade 
Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (2010) 59. 
322 Rafael Leal-Arcas and Andrew Filis, ‘Renewable Energy Disputes in the World Trade Organization’ 
(2015) 13 Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence, 32-33. 
323 Excluded from the scope of GATT are, however, in accordance with Article III.8(a) “laws, regulations 
or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production 
of goods for commercial sale”. In Canada – Renewables this exemption was regarded not to apply for 
the FIT at hand. See Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, 
DS412 and Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, AB Report, 6 May 2013, 
paras 5.68-79. For criticism see Maureen Irish, ‘Renewable Energy and Trade: Interpreting Against 
Fragmentation’ (2013) The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 217, 223-226. In principle, either 
Article III:8(a) or III:8(b) could potentially apply to some FIT under different circumstances. On Article 
III:8 see also EEC – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related 
Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627, Panel Report, 14 Dec. 1989, (adopted); Arwell Davies, ‘The GATT 
Article III:8(a) Procurement Derogation and Canada – Renewable Energy’ (2015) 18 Journal of 
International Economic Law 543. 
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that conflicts in practice do not all too frequently arise in the WTO system. This is in 
part because the lack of interconnected grids and subsequent transmission contraints 
have limited international trade in the power sector. Cottier has, however, envisoned 
that cross-border trade in electricity will increase in the future, which could lead to new 
types of disputes.324 
As highlighted by Wu and Salzman, local content requirements and other forms of de 
jure discrimination have so far dominated the field of energy disputes.325 Relating in 
turn to de facto discrimination, the discussion on the legality of PPM-criteria in energy 
legislation might not get as much attention. Future discussion may come to evolve 
around whether the EU and others could put restrictions on the importation of resources, 
such as for example tar sands. Tar sands is allegedly one of the worst energy resources 
from an environmental perspective.326 The Fuel Quality Directive of the EU requires 
fuel refiners to reduce the GHG intensity of sold fuel.327 In October 2011 the Parliament 
decided that tar sands should be assigned a higher emissions value than conventional 
oil. Canada has stated that it would take legal action against such restrictions.328 In the 
end no final agreement on any provision targeting tar sands was ever struck, and the 
idea of stricter limitations on tar sands was abandoned in December 2014.329 
In the energy sector cases on de facto discrimination are perhaps most likely to emerge 
in relation to unequal treatment of various raw materials that can be utilized to produce 
the same final product, be that electricity, fuel or something else. That should not be 
interpreted to mean that questions relating to the status of PPM-criteria under WTO law 
could not become an issue of increased practical relevance. First, PPM-criteria are also 
adopted in other sectors than the energy sector. Secondly, although cases on PPM-
                                                 
324 Thomas, Cottier ‘Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or Enhanced Disciplines?’ 
(2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Rev. 40, 47-48. 
325 Mark Wu and James Salzman, ‘The Next Generation of Trade and Environmental Conflicts: The Rise 
of Green Industrial Policy’ (2014) 108 Northwestern University L. Rev. 401. 
326 For an extensive critical review of the environmental and social sustainability see Toban Black et al 
(eds.), A line in the Tar Sands – Struggles for Environmental Justice (Between the Lines 2014). 
327 Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a mechanism 
to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards 
the specification of fuel used by inland waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC, OJ L 140, 
5.6.2009, 88. 
328 Damian Carrington, ‘Canada Threatens Trade War with EU over Tar Sands’ (20 Feb. 2012) 
<www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/feb/20/canada-eu-tar-sands> accessed 25 Feb. 2016. 
329 James Crisp, ‘Canada Tar Sands Will Not be Labelled ‘Dirty’ After All’ (17 Dec. 2014) 
<www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/canada-tar-sands-will-not-be-labelled-dirty-after-all/> 
accessed 12 Nov. 2017. 
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criteria do not seem imminent in the field of electricity trade, they may arise in the 
biofuels sector. The study is therefore in the following sections expanded into other 
fields of the energy sector, in particular biofuels for transportation. 
1.4.5. The Fuel Industry and the Biofuels Sector 
1.4.5.1. The Threat of WTO Litigation 
Unlike electricity, feedstock and fuel are more easily traded on a global arena. US – 
Gasoline was already an early example of a case on fuel trade, environmental protection 
and de jure discrimination. In that case the appellate body found that U.S. rules on 
emission effects of gasoline were discriminatory, disproportional and breached 
GATT.330 
Zarrilli has speculated that more cases on energy trade and de facto discrimination may 
come before the WTO in the future. For example, many states tax gasoline at a higher 
rate than diesel, despite some studies claiming the latter to cause more severe pollution. 
Countries with significant gasoline export could therefore potentially argue that such 
measures constitute unjustifiable discrimination.331 
Leaving gasoline aside, it is noted that biofuel policies have been contentious. For 
example, anti-dumping measures adopted by the EU against Argentinian and 
Indonesian biofuels have been found to breach WTO law.332 It also seems that pressing 
questions on energy PPM-criteria, de facto discrimination and GATT compatibility 
relate to biofuels. Although trade in biofuels is still quite modest, it is expected to 
increase in the near future.333 Over 60 states worldwide already have in place some 
regime to promote biofuels.334 Apart from subsidies, also tax reductions would appear 
common.335 Only a few have, however, developed criteria to differentiate between 
                                                 
330 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996. 
331 Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Domestic Taxation of Energy Products and Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This a 
Case of Unlawful Discrimination?’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 359, 359-367. 
332 EU – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentinia, DS473, AB report, 6 Oct. 2016; EU – 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia, DS480, Panel report, 25 Jan. 2018. 
333 Enrique Rene de Vera, ‘The WTO and Biofuels: The Possibility of Unilateral Sustainability 
Requirements’ (2008) 8 Chicago J. International Law 661, 666. 
334 Jim Lane, ‘Biofuels Mandates Around the World: 2015’, Biofuels Digest, (31 Dec. 2014); Renewable 
Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), Renewables Global Status Report (2014), 14–15. 
335 Stephanie Switzer and Joseph A. McMahon, ‘EU Biofuels Policy – Raising the Question of WTO 
Compatibility’ (2011) 60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 713, 725; Alan Swinbank, ‘EU 
Policies on Bioenergy and their Potential Clash with the WTO’ (2009) 60 J. Agricultural Economics 485, 
492-495; Doaa Abdel Motaal, ‘The Biofuels Landscape: Is There a Role for the WTO?’ (2008) 42 
Journal of World Trade 61, 71. 
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sustainable and unsustainable biofuels. Three schemes of biofuels sustainability criteria 
are worth mentioning here. The U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard 2 (RFS2)336 requires 
gasoline refiners to place a share of their fuel purchases in biofuel that meets 
sustainability criteria or credits corresponding to such share. California’s Low Carbon 
Fuel Standard (LCFS)337 in turn requires fuel providers not to provide fuel exceeding 
on average a given carbon intensity value. Sustainable biofuels are attractive options 
because of their lower carbon intensity but the fuel providers may also ensure 
compliance by purchasing credits. Finally, EU directives338 oblige Member States to 
promote biofuels that comply with drafted sustainability criteria. This may be executed 
by implementing for example subsidies, quotas or tax rebates. 
Biofuels sustainability criteria are criteria on the sustainability of the PPMs. More than 
a decade ago, Gaines concluded that controversies on PPM-criteria within the WTO 
framework would remain modest in numbers.339 Some scholars have argued that the 
lack of cases in the energy sector indicates that most current state strategies are in 
compliance with WTO law.340 That is, however, not necessarily the case. The lack of 
litigation may equally have to do with the high costs of proceedings and the fact that 
many developing states lack the financial resources to challenge measures adopted by 
developed states. There is therefore reason to reflect on the compatibility of currently 
applied PPM-criteria with trade law. 
                                                 
336 40 C.F.R. 80 subpart M. 
337 Assembly Bill 32, 2006 Leg. Regular Session (California 2006) (amended Nov. 2015); California, 
Governor’s Executive Order S-01-07 (2007). 
338 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16; Directive 2009/30/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification 
of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by 
inland waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 88. In 2015 significant 
amendments were agreed upon to promote 2nd generation biofuels with no ILUC effects. See Directive 
2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending Directive 
98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, 1. The Renewable Energy 
Directive of 2009 will in 2021 be replaced by a new directive. See Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82. 
339 Sanford E. Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for 
Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental Law 383, 388. 
340 Robert Ackrill and Adrian Kay, ‘EU Biofuels Sustainability Standards and Certification Systems – 
How to Seek WTO-Compatibility’ (2011) 62 J. Agricultural Economics 551, 561; Kati Kulovesi, 'Real 
or Imagined Controversies? A Climate Law Perspective on the growing links between the International 
Trade and Climate Change Regimes’ (2014) 6 Trade, Law and Development 55. 
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The EU and the two American biofuel sustainability schemes could potentially conflict 
with the rules of GATT in many respects. For example, while EU rapeseed biodiesel or 
U.S. corn ethanol would generally qualify as sustainable under their respective regimes, 
some imported fuel from other feedstock might not, despite comparable environmental 
impacts. In other words, the criteria might be designed to protect the market share of 
their own fuels.  
Argentina, one of the main exporters to the EU, has initiated proceedings under the 
WTO system. The first case341 was directed at the Spanish implementation of EU 
directives in a manner that guaranteed benefits almost exclusively to fuels produced in 
the EU. The incompatibility with GATT was evident and the EU settled the case.342 
However, in 2013 Argentina again filed a complaint in the WTO as regards EU 
sustainability criteria for biofuels and asked for consultations.343 This second case 
targets the de facto discriminatory effects of the EU model. 
The EU sustainability criteria challenged by Argentina rely in part on a life-cycle 
analysis of the GHG emissions of various biofuels. The GHG emission score will 
depend on, in particular, the feedstock and production process utilized. Biofuels is 
categorized as sustainable only in case the estimated GHG emissions are sufficiently 
low as compared to fossil fuel emissions (i.e. exceeds an emissions savings threshold). 
It should be highlighted that a biofuel classified as unsustainable will not be denied 
market access. However, financial prioritization in the form of subsidies to biofuels or 
obligatory quotas for biofuels can only be made available for those biofuels that comply 
with the sustainability criteria. In practice, it results in a system where compliance with 
the criteria becomes important for competitiveness on global markets. 
Each producer can under the EU directive individually get the emissions levels for the 
production facility certified or may alternatively choose to rely on default values 
established for various production paths from different biomass feedstock. The 
                                                 
341 European Union and a Member State – Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of Biodiesels, 
DS443, Request for consultations by Argentina, 17 Aug. 2012 (establishment of panel deferred 17 Dec. 
2012). 
342 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 6. 
343 European Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing 
of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, DS459, Request for consultations by 
Argentina, 15 May 2013. For a discussion on the case see Rafael Leal-Arcas and Andrew Filis, ‘Legal 
Aspects of the Promotion of Renewable Energy within the EU and in Relation to the EU’s Obligation in 
the WTO’ (2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Rev. 3, 15-19. 
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availability of a low default value will be beneficial for the producers. If the producer 
can be assigned a sufficiently low default value, it will enjoy a lower administrative 
burden to get verified as a sustainable producer and, in addition, the sustainability 
classification will be available even if the producer actually emits higher levels of GHG 
emissions. Biofuels from soybean has in the EU been assigned a fairly high default 
value. Argentina exports to the EU biodiesel from soybeans and was not content with 
the emission threshold that the EU had chosen to adopt in defining sustainable biofuels.  
What the appeal of Argentina seems to focus on is that the emissions savings threshold 
chosen by the EU is arbitrary and may have been chosen so as to secure that dominant 
domestic resources and production will be categorized as sustainable. In particular, 
Argentina is concerned about EU’s original choice of a 35 % GHG emission savings 
threshold since soybean diesel, common in Argentina, has been assigned only a default 
value of 31 %.  By the end of 2018 the case remained in standstill: no panel had been 
established, the case had not been withdrawn and no mutually agreed solution had been 
notified. It should in this context be pointed out that the emissions savings threshold 
has since been raised for new biofuels plants and will become even higher in the 
future.344 
Additional challenges directed at biofuels sustainability schemes could emerge. The 
potential discriminatory effects of a scheme will depend on the specific elements of the 
adopted scheme. For example, Erixon has speculated that grandfathering provisions, 
which exempt old facilities from new stricter GHG savings requirements, might 
increase discriminatory effect.345 Another relevant factor may be the choice of 
threshold for GHG emission savings that is required for sustainability. A third element 
could be the choice between calculating individual sustainability scores for each 
producer or assigning default values for certain combinations of feedstock and refinery 
process. 
                                                 
344 Directive 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, 1. See Article 1.3(a) 
amending Article 7b(2) of Directive 98/70/EC (the Fuel Quality Directive) and Article 2.5(a) amending 
Article 17(2) of the RED. See also Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 
21.12.2018, 82, Art. 25(2) and 29(10). 
345 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 20. 
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Potential discrimination is in part linked to the differences between developed and 
developing countries. It should be recalled that states have under WTO law some 
options to favour developing countries through taxation and import quotas.346 The same 
could potentially apply also to the design of sustainability criteria for biofuels.347 Yet, 
there is reason to believe that current models applied in the EU and the U.S. might have 
exactly the opposite effect.  There is a risk that especially the biofuels industry of 
developing nations would lose competiveness due to the sustainability criteria. For 
example, taking into account emissions from land use change effects that takes place 
when biodiverse land is, either directly or indirectly, converted into land for cultivating 
biofuel feedstock might put developing countries at a disadvantage. Namely, biodiverse 
tropical forests are growing in some developing countries, which means that the risk of 
the biofuels industry having a negative effect on biodiverse land may be higher there. 
Consequently, biofuels from developing nations would be more likely to get poor 
sustainability ratings. This is particularly the case if the U.S. and the EU continue along 
the path of scrutinizing also indirect land use changes (ILUC). Another reason for why 
developing countries might get poor sustainability scores could stem from the fact that 
transportation will be long from developing countries to the markets of developed 
states, where most fuel still today is consumed.  
According to de Vera measures to promote sustainable biofuels may be difficult to 
justify under WTO law.348 The argument will be scrutinized more in detail in later parts 
of this book when justifiability is discussed.349 In any case, under GATT and WTO law 
more generally, when it comes to measures promoting sustainable PPMs in the energy 
sector biofuels sustainability criteria would appear most prone to legal challenges. 
Sustainability criteria for solid biomass, if adopted, would form another likely target of 
claims of discrimination. The EU Commission has encouraged EU Member States to 
adopt sustainability criteria for solid biomass that is used for heating and electricity 
                                                 
346 See Art. I(b) GATT; GATT Contracting Parties, Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and 
More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT 26th 
Supp. BISD 203 (1980); EC – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
DS246, AB Report, 7 April 2004, paras 66-76. 
347 Enrique Rene de Vera, ‘The WTO and Biofuels: The Possibility of Unilateral Sustainability 
Requirements’ (2008) 8 Chicago J. International Law 661, 675-679. 
348 Ibid. 674-675. 
349 See chapter 5. 
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generation.350 Now union-wide criteria entered into force with the new Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED 2).351 
It should be noted that potential de facto discriminatory effect of sustainability criteria 
does not constitute the only, and perhaps not even the biggest, hinder to global trade in 
biofuels. Tariffs are still legal under WTO law and have remained fairly high for 
biofuels, although some states have opted to implement lower tariffs either universally 
or for developing countries.352 Moreover, the system is plagued by fragmentation. 
Ethanol is an alcohol with multiple end uses and subject to a much higher tariff than 
biodiesel.353 Already for some time proposals for a more coherent approach have been 
tabled, but so far, the system has not been modified to classify environmental goods in 
general or biofuels in particular under a unified tariff class.354 The issues related to tariff 
fragmentation are important but fall outside the scope of this thesis. The focus is instead 
on the tests for value reconciliation and justifiability of de facto discriminatory PPM-
criteria.  
1.4.5.2. Biofuels Sustainability Criteria under EU Free Movement Law 
Free movement law cases on state-level PPM-criteria have not yet emerged in the EU. 
With respect to the energy sector the reasons are not the same for the biofuels sector as 
for the electricity sector.  For the biofuels sector the reason is that fully harmonized 
sustainability criteria for biofuels (and bioliquids) have been adopted under the RED. 
These criteria are applicable for financial support for consumption of biofuels and for 
renewable energy quotas. Member States may according to Article 17 (8) RED not 
adopt stricter national criteria. A similar provison has been proposed for the new RED 
2.355 
                                                 
350 Report from the Commission on sustainability requirements for the use of solid and gaseous biomass 
sources in electricity, heating and cooling COM (2010) 11 final, 8. 
351 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 29 as well 
as recitals 94 and 101. 
352 Haniff Ahamat and Nasarudin Rahman, ‘Restricting Biofuels Imports in the Name of the 
Environment: How Does the Application of WTO Rules Affect Developing Countries?’ (2014) 7 J. East 
Asia & International Law 51, 75-76. 
353 Alan Swinbank, ‘EU Policies on Bioenergy and their Potential Clash with the WTO’ (2009) 60 J. 
Agricultural Economics 485, 490.  
354 Stephanie Switzer and Joseph A. McMahon, ‘EU Biofuels Policy – Raising the Question of WTO 
Compatibility’ (2011) 60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 713, 734-735. The initiative to 
reduce tariffs for environmental goods can be found e.g. in WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (adopted 14 November 2001), para 31 (iii). 
355 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 29(12). 
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The biofuels sustainability criteria apply, as mentioned, for renewable energy quotas. 
A ban on unsustainable biofuels would form a (zero) quota and might therefore also be 
covered by the directive. Due to the broad scope of harmonization there is barely any 
room for national PPM-criteria on biofuels criteria that could become a target for claims 
of discrimination.356 
Under the 2009 RED Member States should achieve 10 % renewable energy in the 
transport sector by 2020. After 2015 amendments to the RED that target could no longer 
be fulfilled by only so called first generation biofuels from food and feed crops. These 
biofuels from feedstock associated with land use change were capped at seven per cent 
of final energy consumption in the transport sector.357 Running somewhat at odds with 
Article 17(8) RED on the surface, the amended provisions encouraged states to provide 
extra incentives to so called advanced biofuels, produced from feedstock associated 
with no land use change.358 
The proposed new Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) clarifies the options of 
exceptions to the requirements of treating equally all biofuels that comply with EU 
sustainability criteria. Under RED 2 consumption of energy from renewables should 
reach 14 % in the transport sector by 2030. This should be achieved by the 
implementation of obligations on fuel suppliers in the road and rail transport sector. 
Separate lower targets have been implemented for advanced biofuels and the 
contribution from biofuels produced out of feed and food crops is capped.359 It is clearly 
stated in the RED 2 that the prohibition of stricter national sustainability criteria is 
without prejudice to the right of awarding advanced biofuels additional support.360 
Advanced biofuels are, however, defined in the directive and Member States may not 
set any additional criteria.361 Yet, questions with respect to trade law compatibility 
                                                 
356 Taxation schemes could perhaps fall outside the scope of the RED if they do not constitute financial 
support for consumption. In that case taxation should be reviewed in light of EU primary law. 
357 Directive 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, 1. See in particular 
recitals 7-8, annex II (adding a new annex IX) and Article 2(2) amending Article 3 of Directive 
2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 25(1). 
360 Id., Art. 29(12). 
361 Id., Annex IX. The Commission may through delegated acts modify the annex. See Art. 28(6). 
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could arise from the fact that Member States may with reference to evidence of different 
levels of indirect land use change attributed to diffierent fuels introduce separate quotas 
for various first generation biofuels.362 
Furthermore, under RED 2 Member States could develop national sustainability criteria 
in two specific cases. First, such criteria could be applied for solid biomass used for 
generating electricity or producing heating and cooling. Secondly, such criteria could 
be applied temporarily for biofuels in the outermost regions of the union.363 The design 
of such national incentive schemes might naturally create controversies with reference 
to free movement law.  
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the compatibility of the directive itself with the 
Treaty and free movement law could in principle be challenged. However, that type of 
cases have been rare. 
1.4.5.3. Biofuels Sustainability Criteria and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
In the U.S. the federal government has enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) 
in order to promote sustainable biofuels in the transport sector.364 Dormant Commerce 
Clause cases will generally not emerge in a biofuels context as federal biofuels law has 
been adopted. The RFS2 pre-empts states from adopting laws to promote biofuels. State 
level schemes or restrictions on biofuels will be unconstitutional regardless of what 
their fate would have been under the dormant Commerce Clause.  
However, the federal government has in the Clean Air Act granted California an 
exemption to implement its own system of promoting sustainable biofuels.365 Other 
states may also opt for the Californian model instead of the RFS2 and a couple of states 
have already done so or expressed plans for doings so.366  
California’s LCFS and its potential future implementation by other states are not pre-
empted by federal law. Hence, the question of their compliance with the dormant 
                                                 
362 Id., Art. 26(1). 
363 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Articles 29(13) 
and 29(14). 
364 40 C.F.R. 80 subpart M. For more on the RFS2 and future outlooks see Timothy A. Salting and Jay 
P. Kesan, ‘The Renewable Fuel Standard 3.0?: Moving Forward with the Federal Biofuel Mandate’ 
(2014) 20 N.Y.U. Environmental Law J. 374. 
365 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012). 
366 Washington has been legislating to implement a LCFS. Oregon has already adopted their own LCFS. 
See 2018 Washington Legislature HB 2338; Oregon Administrative Rules Chapter 340 Division 253 
(Oregon Clean Fuels Program); 2009 Oregon Legislature HB 2186; 2015 Oregon Legislature SB 324. 
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Commerce Clause has arisen. Under the scheme fuel providers should not exceed an 
average level of carbon intensity. They may either opt to certify individual values for 
their fuel or then rely on the default value that has been determined for the PPM applied 
at the biofuels plant. In determining the default value for carbon intensity (GHG 
emissions), California’s original LCFS took into account transport distance, transport 
methods, farming practices, land use change and the local electricity utilized in the 
biofuels plants. Out-of-state corn ethanol was awarded higher default values than 
Californian corn ethanol due to differences between production in California and in the 
Midwest in respect of local electricity generation used in the production process in the 
biofuels plants.367  The reliance on cheap coal in the Midwest lead to the Californian 
legislator assigning a high estimate for emissions from the power used in the plants. 
One may have expected that Midwest corn ethanol would also have been burdened by 
a higher estimate of emissions from transportation. This was, however, not the case. 
Namely, corn ethanol produced in California often relies on feedstock from Midwest 
and transporting the heavy corn across the U.S. generally generates more transport 
emissions than transporting ready fuel from the Midwest to California. 
The LCFS has been challenged in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. Unlike the district 
court368, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did in this case not put much 
emphasis on the fact that the default values as part of the standard explicitly 
differentiated on the basis of geographical origin. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not 
adopt the strict proportionality review normally applicable in cases of de jure 
discrimination. Instead it took the position that the life-cycle approach that California 
relied on might only be subject to the more lenient Pike balancing test.369 To put it 
differently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not seem to equate the 
LCFS with cases of de jure discrimination. The court had to rule on several questions 
of law in the case, but importantly, it did not proceed into any proportionality review 
and did not point to any breach of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
The challenge against California’s LCFS did not end with the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. Namely, the court ended up remanding the case back to the district court. In 
particular, the district court was to examine whether the LCFS discriminated in purpose 
                                                 
367 Assembly Bill 32, 2006 Leg. Regular Session (California 2006) (amended Nov. 2015); California, 
Governor’s Executive Order S-01-07 (2007). 
368 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
369 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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or effect. This is important, because even if the Court of Appeals had not equated the 
LCFS with de jure discrimination, the stricter proportionality review may apply even 
in some cases where the measure discriminates in purpose or effect, or in other words 
in cases of de facto discrimination. The exact conditions for strict scrutiny to apply 
instead of the Pike balancing test are rather ambiguous, as will be depicted later in this 
book.370 
While the case had been pending in courts, California revised its LCFS. The revised 
LCFS of 2015 changed the default values for emissions to origin-neutral. In other 
words, Midwest and Californian corn ethanol received the same default value. 
However, for producers requesting the calculation of individual values of carbon 
intensity for their own production, factors such as transport distance and the emissions 
from using local electricity are still taken into account.  
In a memorandum decision and order on a motion to dismiss the district court in 2017 
stated that while neither the old nor the new LCFS had a discriminatory purpose, they 
still plausibly caused a discriminatory effect. The court would also find that it was 
plausible that there were not sufficient arguments for the justification of these effects.371 
The court could enter into final judgement without elaborating on those two issues 
because the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the claims. On appeal the arguments that 
the 2015 LCFS was facially discriminatory and that its purpose was discriminatory 
were rejected by the Ninth Circuit.372 I shall discuss the case in several different 
contexts in this book.373 It is worthy of note that in a similar challenge against Oregon’s 
LCFS the same Court of Appeals dismissed all claims of unconstitutionality.374 
In conclusion, while EU free movement law cases on the national transposition of 
biofuels sustainability criteria are not very likely to emerge, Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union already offers an example of a case on the legality of biofuels sustainability 
criteria with the dormant Commerce Clause. This adds to the global tensions and 
                                                 
370 See section 3.2.3.2. 
371 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
372 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
373 See sections 3.2.2.7., 3.2.3.4-3.2.3.5., 5.2., 6.1.5-6.1.6 and 6.2.2.3. See also section 2.2.4. 
374 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018); see 
also American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 
5665232 (D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015). 
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speculations of WTO-compatibility of biofuels sustainability criteria adopted in 
developed countries. 
1.4.6. Concluding Remarks on Emerging Cases 
This book is a study on de facto discriminatory PPM-criteria and the problems that are 
linked to the assessment of such rules under trade law. The academic debate and the 
few cases that have already emerged in the different jurisdictions illustrate that 
promoting renewable energy is becoming a topical issue within trade law. The problem 
of reconciling free trade and the ideal of a clean energy sector has actualized in various 
contexts. 
Of the three jurisdictions dealt with here, it is U.S. courts that have seen the largest 
number of cases filed before them. A large variety of cases on de jure discrimination 
and de facto discrimination in relation to PPM-criteria in both the electricity and the 
biofuels sector have already been argued before courts. In turn, under WTO law most 
cases on energy regulation have related to other aspects than PPM-criteria. However, 
Argentina’s challenges on EU sustainability criteria for biofuels indicates that countries 
are continuously monitoring developments and even considering potential de facto 
discriminatory effects of PPM-criteria. Finally, there is the EU, where despite a lot of 
recent new developments in the energy sector, ECJ cases on PPM-criteria applicable to 
the energy sector have so far been confined to de jure discrimination. Yet, the debate 
on the relationship between EU free movement law and Austrian plans to restrict 
imports of electricity generated by nuclear fission illustrated that the electricity sector 
could be one of the sectors where the number of cases on PPM-criteria in the future 
could increase. 
The analysis of the energy sector showed that so far cases on the trade law legality of 
de facto discriminatory PPM-criteria have not yet emerged in abundance. Although the 
energy sector has some limitations to be kept in mind, it still already today offers a 
number of good practical examples. Hence, some case studies included in this book 
center around measures adopted for the electricity and the biofuel sectors. Ultimately, 
the focus of the research is still on the application of legal tests in the context of PPM-
criteria and not on the energy sector as such. The study is pertinent more generally 
across all sectors of commerce where PPMs are of relevance and therefore also cases 
on PPM-criteria outside the energy sector provide input. 
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In itself, the necessary reconciliation of free trade and environmental protection in cases 
on promoting renewable energy in particular, and sustainable PPMs in general, 
represents nothing new. It has been part of each trade regime already during their early 
decades and legal tests of value reconciliation have evolved with case law. Current 
trends in the energy sector will, however, present new challenges for the value 
reconciliation exercise. First, modern energy strategies relate to the environmental 
attributes of process and production methods or even the whole life-cycle of a product. 
This will raise questions with regards to traditional tests of economic law that have so 
far received limited attention. Secondly, questions regarding the supply of energy tend 
to trigger many issues and values, which are not always easy to align. For example, 
while renewables may reduce GHG-emissions, they may raise concerns of 
affordability, security of supply, hazardous waste (e.g. solar panels) or biodiversity (e.g. 
impacts of large hydro power plants). Subsequent chapters of this book will address 
this complexity. 
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Chapter 2 – Value Reconciliation Tests in Law of Prohibition 
Trade law can be divided into two areas: law of prohibition and law of justification. 
The former covers rules and principles on how a prohibited restriction on trade is 
defined, whereas the latter covers rules and principles on how those restrictions can be 
justified. The objective of this chapter is to create a better understanding of the free 
trade objective and examine whether the tests of law of prohibition might include 
elements of value reconciliation, before then in subsequent chapters moving on to 
examining how the free trade objective is reconciled with objectives such as 
environmental protection in law of justification. 
The definition of the restrictions on trade can be broken down into at least four main 
dimensions. It should, however, be noted that the dimensions are closely connected and 
that the legal tests may be intertwined. In any case, the first dimension relates to the 
form of the measure adopted. The form of the measure is here understood as a concept 
that covers the legal form. The focus is, for example, on whether the measure can take 
other forms than a written statute and whether the measure must establish binding rules. 
These issues will be examined in section 2.1. 
The second dimension concerns the purpose and effect of the measure. In other words, 
whether discrimination or other elements, such as market access hindrance, is at hand. 
This dimension was touched upon already in part in chapter 1,375 where the objective 
was to illustrate the types of energy cases in which a need to reconcile values has arisen. 
The second section of this chapter, section 2.2, will, however, address this dimension 
from a different perspective. Namely, it will present an analysis of which products are 
to be considered similar for the purposes of determining whether or not there is 
discrimination between like products. 
As a rule, trade law covers state action. The economic form of the measure might differ 
in the sense that states regulate market conditions, standards and restrictions but also 
purchase on the market and grant subsidies. The variety of measures adopted, among 
other things, reflect the idea that the state might act in the capacity of market regulator 
and market participant. The identity of those covered by trade law and determining the 
capacity in which they must act to be bound by trade law forms the third dimension. It 
is in other words examined what type of state action may be exempted from trade law 
                                                 
375 See section 1.3.2. 
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and what type of private action may be covered. This discussion will be included in 
section 2.3. 
The traded object forms the fourth and final dimension. EU free movement law applies 
to the movement of goods, services, capital and persons but each element has been 
dedicated its own Articles in the TFEU.376 According to the ECJ, oil377 and 
electricity378 are goods, as should also be any other form of energy. The GATT and the 
TBT Agreement apply to trade in products. In US – Gasoline the panel did not question 
the assumption made by both sides of the dispute that oil was a product.379 In contrast 
to EU and WTO law, the dormant Commerce Clause does not differentiate between 
articles of commerce. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has had no problems finding it 
applicable to energy sources such as petroleum380, coal381, ethanol fuel382 and 
electricity383.384 
With the objective to promote renewable energy, and in order to facilitate the 
internalization of externalities, states have created tradable products out of the 
environmental attributes of production. For example, in a cap-and-trade system (also 
known as emissions trading system, ETS) the amount of yearly emissions is capped and 
companies receive emissions allowances (i.e. emissions trading certificates, ETCs). 
Companies may trade these allowances. Similarly, in a RPS the state will set a quota 
for renewables for some group of market players, for example retailers or producers 
and importers. RECs are granted for energy generated from renewable resources and 
may be used to fulfil the assigned quota.  Those receiving RECs may trade them. Energy 
companies that have been assigned a quota and use renewables below the quota may 
then purchase RECs from those that exceed their quota. 
                                                 
376 Art. 34-36 and 45-66, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, 47. 
377 Case 72/83 Campus Oil limited and others v. Minister for Industry and Energy and others [1984] 
ECR 2727, paras 12-20. 
378 Case C-158/94 Commission v. Italy [1997] ECR I-5789, paras 14-20.  
379 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 January 1996. 
380 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
381 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
382 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
383 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 33 (1982). 
384 There are, however, limits to what can be articles of commerce. See McBurney v. Young 133 S. Ct. 
1709, 1720 (2013). The Court concluded that information files on state citizens were not articles of 
commerce. 
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While the REC is a certificate of financial value awarded for past activity, an ETC is a 
permit with financial value that entitles the holder to certain future activity. This 
difference is quite technical, but according to Engel pivotal. She argues that the ETC is 
a permit and hence, cannot be an article of commerce.385 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit did not see any problem to apply trade 
law to tradable RECs when it stated that Michigan would be in breach of the dormant 
Commerce Clause because the in-state requirement in the RPS discriminated against 
out-of-state renewable energy.386 Equally, in Essent Belgium, the ECJ did not hesitate 
to apply trade law to the Flemish authority’s decision to only award RECs for renewable 
energy generated in Belgium. The Court refused to rule on whether RECs or GOs are 
goods. It, however, concluded that since RECs are presumably normally traded together 
with the electricity, restrictions on trade in RECs also restrict trade in electricity.387 
If there is a restriction in the trade of the environmental attributes, that is almost 
automatically also going to affect the trade in the underlying energy, even when the 
certificates can be traded unbundled. Moreover, ‘goods’ and ‘articles of commerce’ are 
broad concepts. States cannot define what is and what is not an article of commerce.388 
Both arguments would arguably apply also in the case of an ETS and ETCs. 
  
                                                 
385 See Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 259-261, 270. 
386 Illinois Commerce Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
387 Joined cases C-204/12 to 208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits - en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192, paras 81-88. 
388 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978); Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant 
Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity 
Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 260. 
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2.1. The Measure under Scrutiny in Trade Law  
2.1.1. A Value Choice 
The measure under scrutiny in trade law will often be a state regulation, but it can also 
take some other form. That will be the focus of this first section of chapter 2. The tests 
to determine whether the form of the measure is such, that the measure can be covered 
by trade law, falls within the realm of law of prohibition. In this sense, the tests are 
closely linked to the tests of discrimination discussed in chapter 1.389 However, the 
discussion here in chapter 2 shifts the focus on whether some of the tests in law of 
prohibition could be linked to value choices. 
In this section it will be examined what type of measures fall under trade law scrutiny. 
It is analyzed in what respect the scope of measures may be broad or narrow. The 
objective is to clarify whether or not requirements in trade law on the form of the 
measure might reflect a structural imbalance between the free trade and environmental 
protection, even when both components are viewed in terms of efficiency. 
2.1.2. The Form of the State Measure 
2.1.2.1. Regulations and Administrative Practices 
Nations and states have adopted various measures in order to promote energy from 
renewable resources. These measures may take the form of restricting unsustainable 
production through requirements on retailers. Such measures can be classified as 
prohibitive (negative). Other measures may be positive in the sense that they establish 
support for certain sustainable producers. Both positive and negative action are often 
enacted as laws or through other binding regulations.  
The different regimes on trade law express what may form a prima facie prohibited 
measure in different terms. In all jurisdictions state laws and regulation fall, as a rule, 
under the scope of trade law. Articles I and III GATT cover laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use. The term affecting shall be interpreted broadly.390 Article I further 
mentions rules and formalities, whereas Article III.1 refers to quantitative regulations. 
                                                 
389 See section 1.3.2. 
390 US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, Panel Report, 20 Oct. 2014, paras 7.638-639. 
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An AB of the WTO has in 2002 hinted that apart from measures in the form of official 
and generally applicable documents, the GATT would also cover any discriminatory 
administrative practice.391 For Article XI this had already earlier been confirmed on a 
few occasions.392 The wording of that article is, however, broader compared to Articles 
I and III, as it prohibits ‘restrictions’ made effective through ‘measures’. Still, Articles 
I and III should also cover administrative practices since terms such as ‘requirements’ 
and ‘formalities’ also have a quite broad meaning. Further support for that conclusion 
can be drawn from the interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX, which prohibits the 
application of otherwise justifiable measures in case they form, for example, arbitrary 
discrimination. This provision has been said to target the application of a measure,393 
which would cover also the administrative practices in implementing the rules. 
The language of Article 34 TFEU resembles that of Article XI GATT. It prohibits 
quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect. Apart from any laws 
and regulations it has been interpreted to cover administrative practice, at least in case 
the practice is applied generally and consistently.394 WTO law would probably also 
cover only general and consistently applied administrative practice since the long and 
costly litigation process would for practical reasons not be suitable for a challenge on 
some single exceptional government decision. 
                                                 
391 EC – Trade Description of Sardines, DS231, AB Report, 26 Sept. 2002, para. 281. 
392 Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Beverages by Canadian Marketing Agencies, L/6304, 
Panel Report, 5 Feb. 1988 (adopted), paras 4.24-25; US – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages, DS23, Panel Report, 16 March 1992 (adopted), para. 5.63. 
393 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 22; 
US –  Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, paras 
115-116, 160. 
394 Case 21/84 Commission v. France (Postal Franking Machine) [1985] ECR 1355, para. 13. Oddly, 
this would however not appear to apply for public procurement decisions, which are measures covered 
by EU free movement law even as individual measures not part of any general and consistent 
administrative practice. See Case 45/87 Commission v. Ireland (Dundalk Water Supply) [1988] ECR 
4929; Case C-359/93 Commission v. The Netherlands [1995] ECR I-197, paras. 23-29; Case C-234/03 
Contse SA and others v. Instituto Nacional de Gestión (Ingesa), formerly Instituto Nacional de la Salud 
(Insalud) [2005] ECR I-9315; Case C-226/09 Commission v. Ireland [2010] ECR I-11807, paras. 29, 41; 
Case C-231/03 Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di Cingia de’ Botti [2005] ECR I-7287, 
paras. 17-22; Case C-260/04 Commission v. Italy (Horse-race betting) [2007] ECR I-7083, paras. 25-36; 
Adrian Tokar, ‘Institutional Report’, in Ulla Neergaard, Catherine Jacqueson and Grith Skovgaard 
Ølykke (eds.), Public Procurement Law: Limitations, Opportunities and Paradoxes, The XXVI FIDE 
Congress in Copenhagen, 2014 Congress Publications Vol. 3, 192. For criticism see Peter Kunzlik, 
‘Green Public Procurement – European Law, Environmental Standards and ‘What To Buy’ Decisions’ 
(2013) 25 Journal of Environmental law 192. 
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On the basis of case law, the dormant Commerce Clause would at least prohibit 
discriminatory state regulation.395 The U.S. Supreme Court has also applied the 
dormant Commerce Clause to state administrative decisions denying licenses for 
various forms of commerce.396 It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court precedent 
extends the application even to single administrative decisions. Equally, no actual 
practice does necessarily need to have emerged in case the law authorizes a 
discriminatory practice and it is not too unlikely that it will be put into practice.397 All 
in all, subjecting administrative practice to the provisions of the doctrine is important 
because it assures that states cannot circumvent trade law even if the adopted regulation 
is neutral.  
2.1.2.2. Recommendations 
In Austria, a significant majority of the population oppose nuclear power, as previously 
discussed.398 Thus, the government originally planned to implement a system that 
would ban any import of electricity from nuclear power plants. In the end, it opted for 
a system of labelling instead. The system works so that facilities generating electricity 
receive energy certificates that indicate amount and source. In other words, they 
resemble RECs but can be issued with different codes to not only electricity from 
renewables, but also to electricity from fossil fuels or nuclear power. Electricity 
retailers are then required to buy energy certificates corresponding to the amount of 
electricity that they sell. 399  
The objective has all the time been to eliminate Austria’s indirect contribution to the 
nuclear power industry. At the time of adopting the new law, both ministers and a 
                                                 
395 John Attanasio and Joel K. Goldstein, Understanding Constitutional Law (4th ed. Lexisnexis, 2012) 
212. 
396 HP Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). 
397 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 582 n.5 (1986); 
HP Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531, 545 (1949); Nathan Endrud, ‘State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the 
Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation’ (2008) 45 Harvard Journal on Legislation 259, 
276-279.  
398 See section 1.4.4.3. 
399 See the new §79a of the electricity law (Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und –organisationsgesetz), Beschluss 
des Nationalrates, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und –organisationsgesetz 2010, 
das Gaswirtschaftsgesetz 2011 und das Energie-Control-Gesetz geändert warden, 2389 der Beilagen 
XXIV. GP (3 July 2013) 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/BNR/BNR_00790/fname_314193.pdf> accessed 13 April 
2014. 
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Parliament press release confirmed this.400 The Austrian government expected the 
retailers in Austria to voluntarily commit to not purchase any nuclear power or to 
contribute to that industry in any way. In sum, Austria’s government clearly was 
committed to recommend retailers not to import nuclear power. This European case 
raises the question as to whether a mere recommendation may fall foul of trade law? 
Let us begin with assessing how WTO law has dealt with recommendations in general. 
An explicit prohibition to ‘encourage’ discriminatory behaviour can be found in Article 
3.4 TBT. The central government may not issue recommendations for local government 
and NGOs to adopt discriminatory or other unjustifiable technical regulations in case 
the local government or NGO has legal powers to enforce the technical regulations. The 
existence of this provision that is applicable to quite specific circumstances may suggest 
that there might have been an intention to limit the scope of prohibited government 
recommendations at least in the context of the TBT agreement.  
Article XI GATT prohibits “restrictions… made effective through…. measures”. The 
concept of ‘measures’ could be seen as covering even recommendations. Yet, one may 
ask whether there are any ‘restrictions’ when there are merely non-binding 
recommendations that have actual restrictive effects? Perhaps. In contrast to 
‘measures’, concepts such as rules, formalities, laws, regulations and requirements in 
Articles I and III do not seem to entail recommendations that do not take the form of a 
rule, law or regulation, but are instead part of a declaration, policy or the like. A 
measure that is not a rule, law, regulation or formality could be prohibited also when 
they constitute requirements. A requirement is something that is binding. 
There are some arguments that could explain why the scope of measures could 
potentially be broader under Article XI. That article is applicable to restrictions on 
imports and exports. In other words, it applies to measures enforced at the border and 
thus do not apply to domestic products. If an import restriction is applied on goods all 
while substitutes are traded on the internal market without any similar restriction, the 
import restriction will in essence have the nature of a de jure discriminatory measure. 
                                                 
400 Press Release from Austria’s Parliament, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 645 (4 July 2013) 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2013/PK0645/> accessed 13 April 2014. See also Markus 
Stingl, ‘Kompromiss im Atom-Streit’ (13 April 2012) <http://kurier.at/wirtschaft/kompromiss-im-atom-
streit/774.061> accessed 14 Nov. 2017; Claus Hecking, ‘Umstrittenes Umweltgezetz: Osterreich Stoppt 
Import von Atomstrom’ (3 July 2013) <www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/energiewende-oesterreichs-
totaler-atomausstieg-a-909206.html> accessed 14 Feb. 2014. 
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Prohibiting such recommendations may be less controversial than it would be to extend 
the prohibition of recommendations to internal measures that only have de facto 
discriminatory effect. This is of course under the presumption that Article XI does not 
extend to non-discriminatory trade restrictive measures. 
Moving to an analysis of EU law, it should be noted that the EU Commission has at 
one point in time stated that ‘measures’ in the context of EU free movement law should 
be interpreted to include also recommendations.401 The ECJ appears to have taken a 
similar position. In Buy Irish, the Court was faced with a case where the Commission 
challenged a campaign launched in Ireland to promote domestic goods. The Court first 
stated that the financing and other government involvement meant that the campaign 
could be attributed to the state.402 Thereafter, the Court concluded that the campaign, 
despite its alleged limited practical effect, was a measure with potential effect 
comparable to binding measures. Hence, it fell under the scope of free movement 
law.403  
The Buy Irish case related to a de jure discriminatory campaign. The same interpretation 
of the concept of measure should, however, apply uniformly in EU free movement law. 
The meaning of the same term in Article 34 TFEU should not vary depending on the 
de jure or de facto nature of discrimination. Recommendations that are not de jure 
discriminatory should therefore also under EU law be regarded as state measures. In 
conclusion, value choices by states do not escape tests of justification, including 
proportionality, merely by being formulated as recommendations. 
2.1.2.3. GOs and Labels for Sustainable PPMs Established by States 
States sometimes pursue important societal objectives and values by setting up labelling 
schemes that only gain their practical effect through the reactions of private parties on 
the market. For example, Article 15 RED requires each EU Member State to issue 
Guarantees of Origin for renewable electricity404 and RED 2 will expand this to any 
                                                 
401 Commission Directive 70/50 of 22 December 1969 based on the provisions of Article 33 (7), on the 
abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and are not 
covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty, OJ L 13, 19.1.1970, 29. 
402 Case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005, para. 15. 
403 Id., paras 23-30. See also case C-227/06 Commission v. Belgium [2008] ECR I-46, para. 69; Case C-
171/11 Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) –  Technisch-
Wissenschaftlicher Verein, ECLI:EU:C:2012:453, para. 23. 
404 Article 15, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC [2009] OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
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renewable energy.405 These GOs are normally granted to plants generating power and 
contain information on the quantity of power and the resource utilized. The GOs only 
serve the function of illustrating to consumers the source of energy.406  
RED 2 confirms that states may even grant GOs to non-renewables.407 Let us return to 
the curious case of Austria. The population and the government are very much against 
nuclear power.408 Worthy to note is also that Austria has a large domestic hydropower 
sector.409 In January 2015 a new law entered into force in Austria that extended the 
issuance of GOs to also other sources of energy than renewables.410 The purpose of the 
law is to encourage retailers to purchase any form of non-nuclear GOs,411 and through 
this mechanism affect the market for nuclear power that is generated in power plants in 
neighbouring countries, especially just across the Austrian border in Czech Republic.412 
The tradable Austrian GOs are something in-between traditional GOs and tradable 
RECs. Purchasing non-nuclear GOs is voluntary and there is no obligatory quota to 
fulfil. Sweden had already earlier adopted a similar law,413 but it has not attracted so 
                                                 
405 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 19. 
406 A power exchange must provide retailers with information of the shares of different energy sources 
that represent the mix of ‘grey power’ and this information is further provided for the consumers. See 
Article 3(9), Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ 
L 211, 14.8.2009, 55. 
407 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 19(2). 
408 ‘Atomstrom-Umfrage 2011’ (28 June. 2011) 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/austria/de/themen/atom/was-wir-tun/Raus-aus-Atomstrom/Umfrage-zu-
Atomstrom/> accessed 20 May 2014. 
409 E-Control, Key Statistics 2013, at 20-25, <http://www.e-control.at/documents/20903/-/-/6455d2e3-
8e4e-458a-864c-6916c2586c6d> accessed 12 March 2016. 
410 See the new §79a of the electricity law (Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und –organisationsgesetz), Beschluss 
des Nationalrates, Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und –organisationsgesetz 2010, 
das Gaswirtschaftsgesetz 2011 und das Energie-Control-Gesetz geändert warden, 2389 der Beilagen 
XXIV. GP (3 July 2013) 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/BNR/BNR_00790/fname_314193.pdf> accessed 13 April 
2014. In the EU there is only an obligation to award GOs for renewables and for high efficiency 
cogeneration. See Article 14(10) and Annex X, Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 
2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, 1. 
411 Press Release from Austria’s Parliament, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 645 (4 July 2013) 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2013/PK0645/> accessed 13 April 2014. See also Markus 
Stingl, ‘Kompromiss im Atom-Streit’ (13 April 2012) <http://kurier.at/wirtschaft/kompromiss-im-atom-
streit/774.061> accessed 14 Nov. 2017; Claus Hecking, ‘Umstrittenes Umweltgezetz: Osterreich Stoppt 
Import von Atomstrom’ (3 July 2013) <www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/energiewende-oesterreichs-
totaler-atomausstieg-a-909206.html> accessed 14 Feb. 2014. 
412 For an unsuccessful challenge on the right to have nuclear parts close to the border see case C-115/08 
Land Oberösterreich v. ČEZ as. [2009] ECR I-10265. 
413 Lag (2010:601) om ursprungsgarantier för el (especially § 1, 3 and 14); Förordning (2010:853) om 
ursprungsgarantier för el (especially § 2-3). 
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much attention since there is less of a consensus in Sweden among retailers and 
consumers of the need to avoid altogether some specific way of generating electricity; 
neither nuclear power, nor any other process. 
The GOs in Austria are issued by transmission system operators and state controlled 
agencies administer the trade in GOs. The system is established by law and could 
potentially be a state measure under EU free movement law. The question is really 
whether there is any direct causa between the government action and the 
discrimination414 and whether the lack of such causa would mean that the measure 
cannot be prima facie prohibited. In case the state labelling scheme includes some de 
jure discriminatory feature, the causa between the scheme and the discriminatory effect 
would be apparent.415 However, the discriminatory effects of GO-systems stem 
primarily from market preferences of private parties.  
The ECJ has ruled that states are responsible for the discriminatory effects of 
advertising bans even if the effect is partly dependent on consumer behaviour.416 Those 
cases can, however, be distinguished from GO-systems in that an advertising ban 
prevents consumers from making informed conscious decisions, whereas the effects of 
a GO-system is exactly the opposite. In the case of GO-systems that are not de jure 
discriminatory, one could perhaps argue that the nexus between the state and the 
condemned (discriminatory) effects may be too weak for the system to be prima facie 
prohibited. 
In cases on origin marking the ECJ has found the nexus to be sufficient. The 
requirement to indicate the origin on the products applied equally to all goods but it 
was evident that consumers would to some degree prefer domestic goods as a 
consequence of origin marking. The ECJ found that the measure was prohibited 
because it would enable customers to assert their prejudice against foreign goods.417 
Origin marking is still perhaps somewhat different from GOs. While origin marking 
                                                 
414 …or restriction on market access. 
415 This was the situation for example in Buy Irish. See case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland (Buy Irish) 
[1982] ECR 4005. 
416 Joined cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agostini (Svenska) 
Förlag AB and TV-Shop i Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-3843, para. 43. See also Case C-405/98 
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-1795. 
417 Case 207/83 Commission v. United Kingdom [1985] ECR 1201, para. 17. See also case C-362/88, 
GB-INNO-BM v. Confédération du commerce luxembourgeois [1990] ECR I-667. 
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requirements might also not be jure discriminatory, they would still be explicitly linked 
to geographical origin. 
The purpose of trade law has not been to question market behaviour. There is thus 
strong appeal in declaring origin neutral state labelling schemes that merely increase 
information on the market to fall outside the scope of prima facie prohibited state 
measures.418 Admittedly, such approach would entail some risks. States have a 
tendency to be inventive and design new types of measures and it may be very difficult 
to distinguish whether the discriminatory effects can in full be attributed to some ‘pure’ 
consumer preferences or whether the detailed design of the system has increased the 
discriminatory effect. The state is responsible for each element of its design and the 
effects. Hence, there may be practical reasons to still examine government labelling 
schemes carefully in light of legal tests in law of justification even if there is no de jure 
discrimination.  
2.1.3. Turning the Tables: Inaction on Externalities 
The discussion on state measures was so far in this chapter focused on circumstances 
where promoting renewable energy or other forms of sustainability action in the form 
of state laws, recommendations or labelling schemes can constitute a measure in breach 
of trade law. This represents a traditional well-established approach under which 
measures taken to protect environmental or other legitimate values must be justified if 
discriminatory. 
Fossil fuels are cheap and dominate the energy sector at least in part because their 
negative externalities have not been addressed by restrictions.419 In case states decide 
to treat products produced with PPMs that cause different levels of externalities equally, 
could that not discriminate against states with clean and sustainable industries? The 
decision not to tackle pollution has generally not been throught to constitute a prima 
facie prohibited measure. This would, however, reflect a bias in trade law in favor of 
free trade at the expense of the objective to eliminate externalities. 
                                                 
418 See also Sanford E. Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for 
Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental Law 383, 416. 
Gaines takes the position that voluntary eco-labels would not constitute government measures and would 
not be covered by GATT. This is certainly true for privately administered schemes. As pointed out here, 
it is less clear whether it should apply also for origin neutral state administered schemes.  
419 Uma Outka, ‘Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels, Barriers to Renewable Energy’ (2012) 65 
Vanderbilt L. Rev., 1679, 1690-1691. 
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Under an alternative approach, the failure to address externalities could constitute a 
measure distorting free trade. From such perspective, the failure to take action to, for 
example, limit carbon dioxide emissions would be regarded as prima facie 
prohibited.420 In principle, this would only be an extension of the non-intervention test 
already applied in EU free movement law.  
The non-intervention test has been applied in a few cases. The objective of hindering 
Member States from circumventing their obligations under free movement law has 
invited the ECJ even to declare non-action by Member States to constitute ‘measures’. 
This doctrine has been applied when France did not hinder its citizens from attacking 
shipments of imported fruit, vegetables and berries, and equally when Austria allowed 
protesting citizens to block a major transit route to Italy.421 The ECJ concluded that the 
failure of the Member States to intervene was a conscious state measure. In sum, in 
accordance with the test, states have an obligation to intervene when private parties, 
perhaps through their market power, significantly disrupt or interfere with the business 
activities of other market participants.  
There are some arguments for and against the application of the non-intervention test 
for determining the existence of a measure in the context of limited action to curb 
pollution. First there is the argument that the non-intervention test has been applied so 
far only in exceptional cases. What is more, these cases have concerned either de jure 
discrimination or direct restrictions on cross-border transit. However, there is again the 
counter-argument that the definition on what a ’measure’ is should not depend on the 
nature of discrimination and that the test could therefore apply also to de facto 
discriminatory non-intervention in the area of tackling pollution. Secondly, there is the 
argument that a case of market failure with high levels of externalities caused by private 
parties would not represent a case of significant and direct interference with competing 
business activities. Here also, there exists a counter-argument. Namely, the polluting 
                                                 
420 Cf. Farber’s argument that a failure to regulate carbon emissions could constitute a subsidy. See Daniel 
A. Farber, ’Climate Policy in a System of Divided Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory 
Linkage’ (2012) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2174024, 8. A later version of the article 
did not include this point. See Daniel A. Farber, ’Climate Policy and United States System of Divided 
Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage’ (2014) 3 Transnational Environmental 
Law 31. 
421 Case C-265/95 Commission v. France [1997] ECR I-6959, paras 30-31; Case C-112/00 Eugen 
Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659, paras 57-64. 
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companies would harm the society and could therefore also be regarded to interfere 
with other businesses.  
A new approach toward externalities would enable states and their businesses to 
demand justification from other states that create competitive advantages by allowing 
polluting activities that often end up affecting also the environment of neighboring 
states and the global climate. This would admittedly radically change trade law as we 
know it today. There would be much less restriants on what could constitute a prima 
facie prohibited measure if state inaction would fall under scrutiny in trade law; and it 
is submitted it should. States would still continue to have at their disposal grounds of 
justification and in case of scientific uncertainty the state would often be able to justify 
inaction. 
The consequence of a strict approach to inaction would be that when a state despite 
overwhelming scientific evidence fails to address some environmental problem, it 
would be found to be in breach of the trade law if its inaction puts its in-state industry 
in a more favorable position. Admittedly, the downside of such change in perspective 
would be that courts would get an increasing amount of cases to handle since the broad 
scope resulting from covering also inaction could not be counterbalanced by excluding 
any measures that tackle externalities from the scope of ‘measures’ under trade law. 
2.1.4. Imbalance Between Trade and Environment 
Free trade and non-discrimination forms the rule in trade law and grounds of 
justification, for example related to environmental protection, form the exceptions. This 
may create a bias in favour of free trade and non-discrimination, in particular as 
exemptions are to be interpreted narrowly. In previous research it has, however, been 
pointed out that the outcome of value reconciliation may in principle be the same, 
regardless of which value is the main rule and which is the exception.422  
More severe bias might instead arise from the fact that cases of state inaction almost 
never become scrutinized under value reconciliation tests. As portrayed in this chapter, 
trade law in each jurisdiction has left the scope of both covered objects of trade (i.e. 
articles of commerce) and the form of covered measures quite broad. Yet, a category 
of measures – inaction with respect to externalities – appears to so far not have come 
                                                 
422 Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. 
(Transnational 2006) 40-49. 
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within the scope of scrutinized measures. Leaving inaction outside the scope of prima 
facie prohibited measures would result in a bias against so called non-trade values, 
including environmental and social values. The potential bias is only further highlighted 
by the fact that innovative state administered GO-systems and labelling schemes that 
intend to reduce externalities through market behavior in turn run a risk of being 
declared prima facie prohibited. This is not altered by that fact that such discriminatory 
schemes should as innovative means to address externalities often be justifiable, 
provided that they do not contain any de jure discriminatory elements. 
The identified potential bias may provoke considerations of changes in litigation 
strategies and even in legal policy. The argument may gain further strength with the 
realization that externalities come with an economic cost, revealing an element of 
inefficiency in a field of law that in part has been built around the ideal of efficient 
markets.  
The potential structural bias identified here justifies a thorough study on the 
reconciliation of free trade and environmental values. How are free trade and 
environmental protection reconciled when they clash in concrete practical cases? Is 
there any bias reflected also in the legal tests applied in the reconciliation? In the two 
remaining sections of this chapter legal tests that has been applied in law of prohibition 
will be examined, with a view to determine how well these tests are equipped for the 
purpose of reconciling free trade and non-trade values. 
2.2. The Likeness (or Similarity) Test 
2.2.1. Likeness and PPMs 
Measures that cause discriminatory effects are prima facie prohibited under each trade 
law regime. Under the principle of non-discrimination, out-of-state products shall not 
be treated less favourably than similar in-state products. The existence of prohibited 
discriminatory effects, or de facto discrimination, is established through a two-tier test. 
First, the products compared must be similar or like. Secondly, the out-of-state group 
of like products must be treated less favourably.423 
                                                 
423 In other fields of law the test for determining discrimination is in part different. For example, in U.S. 
laws on racial discrimination the mere discriminatory effect will not trigger any assumption of illegality 
unless it can be linked to further indications of a discriminatory purpose. See e.g. Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976); Jennifer L. Larsen, ‘Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce’ (2004) 49 South 
Dakota Law Review 844, 857-858. 
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While the test of less favourable treatment clearly presents difficult questions, as 
illustrated in chapter 1,424 so does also the test of likeness. Which elements of a product 
are relevant for determining likeness? Can two physically identical products be like 
products even if the process and production methods of one of them are much more 
sustainable than those relied on in producing the other? 
This second section of chapter 2 will explain how the test of likeness/similarity has 
been shaped. The intention is to map the different elements of the test. This will enable 
an analysis of the underlying objective that the test reflects and how it may be linked to 
efficiency. In addition, it will be analysed how the likeness test might incorporate 
legitimate – in particular environmental – values. The objective is in other words to 
determine whether the test is applied as a value reconciliation test and whether it is a 
suitable tool for reconciling free trade and non-trade values. Measures adopted on 
PPMs in the energy sector will form the context for the discussion. 
2.2.2. The Likeness Test in WTO Law 
2.2.2.1. Competition and Intent 
Being the most detailed regime with respect to likeness, WTO law provides a good 
starting point for the analysis. Articles I:1, III:2 and III:4 in the GATT and Article 2.1 
in the TBT Agreement mention the concept of like products without specifying how 
likeness is to be assessed. The context of each provision must be acknowledged. Hence, 
the concept of like products is not to be interpreted fully identically under all 
provisions.425 
In accordance with the first sentence of Article III:2 imported products shall not be 
taxed more heavily than like domestic products. Here, the concept of like has been 
interpreted to cover only almost identical products. The reason for the narrow 
interpretation is to be found in the broad scope of the rule put down in the second 
sentence of the same paragraph. Namely, in that sentence it has been established that 
taxation should in any case not be applied so as to afford protection to domestic 
products. It is further clarified in an interpretative note to Article III426 that no less 
                                                 
424 See section 1.3.2. 
425 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, Panel Report, 11 July 1996, paras 
6.21-6.23; Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (CUP 2008) 
329. 
426 Note Ad Article III:2 (Annex I of GATT). 
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favourable treatment should be afforded to directly competitive or substitutable 
products. What follows from this is that the second sentence does not only cover cases 
of actual substitutes, but also requires equal treatment of products that are capable of 
being substitutes.427 In other words, the products must be treated similarly in case 
competition potentially could develop in the near future.428 Hence, under III:2 as a 
whole, the category of products to be compared is rather broad, even if the concept of 
like products is narrow under Article III.2, first sentence.  
Under Articles I:1 and III:4 the concept of like products is broader than the very narrow 
concept in III:2, first sentence. It has been argued that like products under these two 
GATT provisions would lie somewhere in between the narrow interpretation of Article 
III:2, first sentence, and the broad interpretation of product categories to be compared 
under the second sentence.429 It is plausible that the full scope of like products and 
products in competition under Article III:2 might almost coincide with the scope of like 
products in other GATT provisions, such as Articles I:1 and III:4. 
Although the concept of likeness under Article III:4 could be assumed to correspond to 
the coverage of like and substitutable products under III:2, the Appellate Body in EC – 
Asbestos refrained from taking a stance when confronted with that question.430 Still, in 
applying Article III:4 in EC – Asbestos, the AB stated that two products would be like 
in case they were in competition with one another.431 The same interpretation of 
likeness would appear to apply also for Article 2.1 TBT.432 
There has previously existed a different interpretation of likeness. Article III:1 contains 
a provision according to which measures should not be applied so as to afford protection 
to domestic products. The article sets the foundations for the interpretation of the rest 
                                                 
427 Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS75, AB Report, 18 Jan. 1999, para. 114. 
428 Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS75, Panel Report, 17 Sept. 1998, para. 10.48. 
429 On Art. I see Petros C. Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary 
(OUP 2005) 117. 
430 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report 12 March 
2001, paras 94-99. 
431 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report 12 March 
2001, paras 98-100. See also US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, 
Panel Report, 14 April 2015, paras 7.473 (Article III:4) and 7.407-409 (Article I). 
432 US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, AB Report, 4 April 
2012, paras 95-96, 111, 120; US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, DS384, 
AB Report 29 June 2012, para. 269; US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements: 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, Panel Report, 20 Oct. 2014, para. 
7.631. 
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of Article III and is directly referred to in Article III:2. The phrase ‘so as to afford 
protection’ was interpreted so that two products were only like if the different treatment 
of the products reflected protectionist intent.433 The dispute settlement bodies seem to 
be abandoning the test.434 In Japan – Alcohol (1996)435 and US – Gasoline436 the 
respective panels confirmed the interpretation that two products can be like regardless 
of what the intent of the regulation has been and this conclusion was not reversed by 
the Appellate Bodies. In sum, no test of subjective intent in determining likeness is 
applied anymore.437 
2.2.2.2. The Four Factor Test 
Even if the scope of like products is linked to the notion of competition, the panels have 
developed some more detailed criteria to assess the likeness of two products. In Japan 
– Alcohol (1996) the panel and the Appellate Body examined the concept of like 
products as well as the concept of substitutable products under Article III:2, second 
sentence. The case concerned EU’s complaint that Japan levied a lower tax on sochu 
than on whiskey, cognac and white spirits. The panel and the AB stated that the physical 
characteristics, the tariff classification, the end-use as well as consumer tastes and 
habits are all relevant factors.438 Furthermore, it was pointed out that the elasticity in 
substitution is a relevant indicator of substitutability, and needs to be considered in the 
overall assessment of likeness with respect to end-use, price and consumer 
behaviour.439 However, even if the cross-price elasticity is relevant, it is perhaps not a 
decisive criterion on its own.  
                                                 
433 US – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31, Panel Report, 11 Oct 1994 (unadopted), paras 5.9-15; US – 
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23, Panel Report, 16 March 1992 (adopted), paras 
5.25, 5.71. 
434 Won-Mog Choi, “Like Products” in International Trade Law – Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO 
Jurisprudence (OUP 2003) 82. 
435 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, Panel Report, 11 July 1996, paras 6.16, 
6.33-35; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, AB Report, 4 Oct 1996, p. 18-
33. 
436 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 January 1996, 
paras 6.5-6.13; US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 
1996. 
437 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 323-324. 
438 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, Panel Report, 11 July 1996, paras 
6.21-6.28; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, AB Report, 4 Oct. 1996, p. 
19-23. See also Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97 (1970) para. 18. 
439 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS8, DS10 and DS11, AB Report, 4 Oct. 1996, p. 25-26. 
111
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   111 31.7.2019   7.14
 112 
The factors mentioned in Japan – Alcohol (1996) have been repeated also in connection 
to likeness under non-tax provisions such as Articles I440 and III:4 GATT441 and 2.1 
TBT442.   
The likeness of energy products can be approached from the perspective of the four-
factor test outlined in previous cases. Physical properties constitute the first element of 
comparison. The claim has been made that energy products are not physically 
similar.443 The statement applies to the energy resources but not to the electricity 
generated from those resources, as the end product will be fully identical regardless of 
resources utilized. In contrast, in comparing energy resources, such as coal or wind, 
there is indeed significant difference in the physical properties. Similarly, there are 
some physical differences between (transport) fuels made from different resources. 
The assessment of physical difference was at stake in EC – Asbestos. The case emerged 
when Canada brought forward a complaint against EU’s decision to ban the import of 
products containing asbestos. The Appellate Body seemed to accept that toxicity was a 
physical property. Hence, the more serious health risk of a product could render it 
different and non-substitutable from otherwise similar products.444 Ex analogia, it could 
be argued that green energy is unlike other energy due to differences in effect on the 
environment. However, it must be pointed out that the argumentation in EC – Asbestos 
has already received harsh criticism.445 In addition, the case in EC – Asbestos concerned 
the toxicity of the product itself and health hazards related in particularly to the physical 
use (consumption) of the product. In the case of energy, the difference in ‘toxicity’ 
would not relate to the physical properties of the product, but to the emissions that arise 
in the production phase. 
                                                 
440 US – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, DS392, Panel Report, 29 Sept. 2010, 
paras 7.424–7.427, 7.429. See also Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 
DS54, DS55, DS59 and DS64, Panel Report, 2 July 1998, para. 14.141. 
441 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 January 1996, 
paras 6.8-6.9; EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 
12 March 2001, paras 101 and 109; US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, 
DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, para. 7.472. 
442 US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, Panel Report, 2 Sept.  
2011, para. 7.119. 
443 Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Domestic Taxation of Energy Products and Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This a 
Case of Unlawful Discrimination?’ (2003) 37 J. World Trade 359, 376. 
444 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report 12 March 
2001, paras 113-141. 
445 See e.g. Tamara Perisin. Free Movement of Goods and Limits to Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and 
WTO (T.M.C. Asser 2009) 151. 
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The second factor to be taken into account in the assessment of likeness is the end-use 
of the products. Similar end-use means that the consumer consumes the products in the 
same situation for the same purpose.446 Differences in PPMs for electricity would not 
affect the end use. For fuels the analysis is more complex. On the one hand, the PPMs 
will not affect the purpose of fuel to facilitate transportation. The end use is in this sense 
similar. On the other hand, the PPM might be reflected in the physical characteristics 
of the fuel, which means that all fuels cannot be utilized in similar engines. Is there a 
difference in end-use if one fuel is intended for use in one type of car engines and 
another fuel is used in a different type of engines? 
Technology could influence substitutability. For example, a change in transport fuel 
may require a change of car or engine. An increase in cross-price elasticity would be 
expected to take place as the technological barriers to interchangeable use of resources 
diminish.  
A further dimension related to end-use is worthy of note. According to the Appellate 
Body two products can be regarded as substitutes even if they are not perfect 
substitutes.447 What is more, in accordance with the case law the actual primary use is 
less relevant than the theoretical capability to serve a function.448 This suggests that the 
threshold for substitutability could be reached even when the degree of substitutability 
is relatively modest. In the energy sector the end-use can be for example electricity, 
transport fuel as well as heating and cooling. Electricity can be regarded as a product 
with broad end-use that is to some degree a substitute to transport fuels as well as to 
other methods of heating and cooling. How high the required threshold for 
substitutability is set will have significant relevance for trade law. 
The third aspect to consider in examining likeness of energy products is consumer 
habits and tastes. The concept of consumers should probably be understood broadly as 
covering all types of consumers of energy. This means that it is not only the habits and 
tastes of private persons, but also the actions of industrial players that may matter.  
                                                 
446 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of 
EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 260. 
447 Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, DS31, AB Report, 30 June 1997, p. 25-29; Korea 
– Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS75, AB Report, 18 Jan. 1999, para. 118. 
448 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 12 March 
2001, para. 117; US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, AB 
Report, 4 April 2012, para. 125. 
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Giving relevance to consumer habits and tastes will mean that the market could to a 
large extent decide if green and dirty energy are like products.449 The behaviour of 
consumers is to a high degree influenced by price. Therefore, the panel has confirmed 
that the price of two products may influence the assessment of likeness.450 In other 
words, the cross-price elasticity of demand on a market without distortions would be of 
relevance, but it is often difficult to estimate because the measures under scrutiny often 
affect prices.  
The price of transforming renewable resources into consumable energy is still at the 
moment higher than the use of many fossil fuels or nuclear power. Consequently, in 
case consumers main concern is with price, then the price difference would speak in 
favour of accepting energy from renewable resources as a different product than other 
forms of energy. Moreover, in the energy sector, the cross-price elasticity has been 
estimated to be strong only in the long term. However, a tendency of buyers reacting 
with decreasing delay to price changes in energy generated from one resource by 
switching to other resources was identified around the turn of the century.451 
EC – Asbestos could be read as an invitation to take other aspects than price into account 
when assessing consumer habits and tastes. The Appellate Body appeared to accept the 
view that consumers would be expected to react to differences in the immediate health 
risks that the products pose as such through their physical characteristics. In Indonesia 
– Chicken the panel was more explicit with regards to the relationship between 
consumer tastes and health aspects. In 2016 Indonesia had amended some 
discriminatory elements of its laws on importation and sales of chicken. The legislation 
still included a requirement that businesses have cold storage facilities available for 
frozen and chilled chicken meat at the markets where the chicken was sold. This 
requirement burdened imported chicken more than domestic chicken. Namely, 
imported chicken is frozen before it is imported and sold, whereas domestic chicken is 
often sold fresh. Unlike imported chicken, domestic chicken was largely unaffected by 
the cold storage requirement applicable only to frozen chicken. The panel repeated the 
familiar statement that products in competition are like, but still went on to conclude 
                                                 
449 Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law Resolving Conflicts 
Between Climate Measures and WTO Law (Brill 2009) 219-220. 
450 Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, DS302, 
Panel Report, 26 Nov. 2004, para. 7.336. 
451 Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Domestic Taxation of Energy Products and Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This a 
Case of Unlawful Discrimination?’ (2003) J. World Trade 359, 361-364. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   114 31.7.2019   7.14
 115 
that frozen and fresh chicken are dissimilar products because without a cold storage 
requirement the physical properties of frozen chicken would change with a relevance 
for the healthiness and this would spur reactions from consumers.452 While microbial 
growth is not an inherent part of chicken in the same way as unhealthy properties are 
inherent parts of asbestos, the thawing of frozen chicken would still affect the physical 
properties of the chicken and thus also affect how healthy the physical products is. 
In EC – Asbestos and Indonesia – Chicken the health risks of the products were directly 
and immediately linked to the physical properties of the products. The toxicity was 
either an inherent property of the product (asbestos) or a result of unsustainable 
processing (not keeping the chicken cold after thawing it). In contrast, in the energy 
sector the health risks are less immediate and there are circumstances where the health 
risk does not directly stem from the physical properties of the products as in the cases 
described above. The health risk instead comes in the form of emissions from the PPMs. 
It is not the product that is toxic but the emissions. Moreover, in the cases of asbestos 
and bad chicken meat the health risks are primarily or even exclusively materialized for 
the parties directly dealing with or consuming (i.e. eating or using) the product. In 
contrast, with respect to unsustainable PPMs the negative health effects burden the 
general public. In conclusion, the principles shaped in EC – Asbestos and Indonesia – 
Chicken cannot be applied by analogy for cases on PPMs generally. 
The choice of protecting the environment and conserving clean air through the support 
of sustainable PPMs is in part about efficiency but could at least be argued to partly be 
a question related to morals, and perhaps the morals of consumers. The case of 
differences in the environmental effects of PPMs differs from those on asbestos and 
chicken meat also in this respect. Some claim that consumer behaviour is guided by 
first and foremost the price and not by moral considerations.453 Others disagree and 
claim that consumers will care for the environment and adopt their habits 
accordingly.454 In sum, consumer tastes and habits could be used as an argument both 
for and against the likeness of various energy products. 
                                                 
452 Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken Meat and Chicken Products, DS484, 
Panel Report, 17 Oct. 2017, paras 7.309-320. 
453 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (CUP 2008) 380-381. 
454 Dale Arthur Oesterle, ‘Just Say ‘I Don’t Know’: A Recommendation for WTO Panels Dealing with 
Environmental Regulations’ (2001) 3 Environmental L. Rev. 113, 130. 
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When dealing with energy trade, an AB has recently hinted that it might accept the view 
that consumers value energy produced with as little as possible detrimental effects on 
the environment.455 What is more, the AB has stated that not only the prevailing, but 
also the potential consumer preferences should be taken into account.456 Providing 
consumers with more information on the environmental effects of transforming 
resources into consumable energy would probably increase the relevance of this factor 
in consumer choice.  
A working group has pointed out the need to examine consumer tastes and habits 
country by country.457 In practice, this would mean that when a measure is taken by 
one government to differentiate between energy products from different resources, the 
assessment of consumer habits and tastes would only focus on local consumers. 
Consequently, states with more environmentally conscious consumers would be in a 
better position to argue for the legitimacy of their discriminatory PPM-criteria. 
The tariff classification is the fourth and final element in the analysis of likeness. Here 
it is not decisive what tariffs the state imposing a contested measure has adopted, but 
how other countries classify the products in their tariff system.458 In other words, 
relevance could here be given to international tariff classification or possibly 
classification in the majority of states.  
Against this background it is worthy of note that once some resources have been 
transformed into electricity, the resource or PPM utilized is no longer relevant for tariff 
category in almost all states. In contrast, in the fuel sector the tariffs vary substantially. 
For example, the tariff for bioethanol is usually much higher than that for biodiesel. 
In sum, the likeness test is built around the notions of competition and substitutability. 
In addition, the test relies on four factors in WTO law. Generally, it is important to note 
                                                 
455 See Canada –Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS412 and 
Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, AB Report, 6 May 2013, paras 5.167-
179. The relevant part of the decision related to the interpretation of the SCM Agreement (Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14). Apart from focusing on both supply- and demand-
side substitutability the AB also seemed to reason that government preferences for renewables reflect 
consumer preferences for renewables. Cf. Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, DS412 and Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, Panel 
Report, 19 Dec. 2012, para. 7.318. 
456 Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS75, AB Report, 18 Jan. 1999, para. 120. 
457 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97 (1970) para. 18. 
458 Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135, Panel Report, 11 June 1981 (adopted), para. 
4.8. 
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that for most products the four factors may point in different directions and sometimes 
it may even be difficult to determine whether a specific factor points to similarity or 
dissimilarity. 
The four factors are partly interlinked. The choice of PPM will not affect end-use and 
tariff classification unless the PPM affects the physical characteristics of the product. 
In turn, consumer habits and tastes may be affected by the choice of PPM independently 
of any changes to physical characteristics. Hence, in cases on PPM-criteria it becomes 
pivotal to at the outset determine the effects of the PPMs for the physical characteristics 
and for consumer tastes and habits. For fuels both these factors may to some degree 
provide arguments for dissimilarity, whereas for electricity consumer tastes and habits 
remains the only argument that could be relied on in arguing for dissimilarity. However, 
the same factors may equally provide arguments in favour of finding the products to be 
similar despite different PPMs.  
2.2.2.3. Differences in PPMs, Overall Analysis and Teleological Arguments 
Likeness is an overall analysis of the different elements and arguments under all four 
assessment criteria.459 It has been argued that products need to be like under all 
assessment criteria in order to be regarded as like products.460 In reality, the assessment 
has not appeared to be applied that strictly. For example, it is not unthinkable that two 
products would work as almost perfect substitutes and therefore be like products even 
if they are physically quite different or fall under different tariff classes in most states. 
Many academics have argued that WTO panels would not accept two products to be 
unlike with sole reference to process and production methods.461 In turn, Howse has 
                                                 
459 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 12 March 
2001, para. 109. 
460 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of 
EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 334. 
461 Martha Roggenkamp et al. (eds.), Energy Law in Europe – National, EU and International Law and 
Institutions (OUP 2001) 87-89; Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Domestic Taxation of Energy Products and 
Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This a Case of Unlawful Discrimination?’ (2003) 37 J. World Trade 359, 
377-379; Robert Ackrill and Adrian Kay, ‘EU Biofuels Sustainability Standards and Certification 
Systems – How to Seek WTO-Compatibility’ (2011) 62 J. Agricultural Economics 551, 555-556; 
Andrew D. Mitchell and Christopher Tran, ‘The Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy Directive 
with the WTO Agreements’ (2009) Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law Research Paper 
No. 1485549, paras 13-17; Maureen Irish, ‘Renewable Energy and Trade: Interpreting Against 
Fragmentation’ (2013) The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 217, 223; Sanford E Gaines, 
‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade 
Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental L. 383, 418. See also Rex J. Zedalis, ‘A Theory of the 
GATT “Like” Product Common Language Cases’ (1994) 27 Vanderbilt J. Transnational Law 33, 73 
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argued that if there is a non-protectionist policy ground behind the plan to differentiate 
two products on the basis of PPM’s, these products should not be considered like.462 
Wiers also views it plausible to argue that two very similar products are in fact unlike 
due to the difference in PPM.463  
In US – Malt Beverages the panel concluded that beer produced in small and large 
breweries were like products.464 The scale of production was hence irrelevant. Yet, this 
does not exclude the possibility that the PPMs could be.  
In Canada – Renewables the AB examined a feed-in-tariff adopted by Ontario. The 
tariff was granted under the condition that the facility generating electricity utilized 
local products to a certain extent. Interestingly, in its examination of the application of 
GATT to the facts of the case the AB stated that PPMs may need to be taken into 
account in the assessment of likeness.465 Yet, it found no need to complete this thought 
in the case at hand. More than two decades earlier the panel in Japan – Alcohol (1987) 
had similarly indicated that PPMs may matter as it briefly mentioned the manufacturing 
process of alcohol to be a criterion in the assessment of likeness.466 That statement, 
however, related to the narrower concept of likeness under Article III.2 and may not be 
applicable in the context of non-tax WTO provisions, such as Article III:4 GATT. 
In cases on U.S. laws introducing criteria on sustainable fishing methods the panels 
have had to compare both tuna caught with dolphin-safe methods to tuna caught with 
the effect of killing dolphins, and shrimp caught with turtle exclusion devices with 
shrimp caught without such devices. Since Article XI was applied in these 
environmental cases, the likeness test was never applied. However, in US – Tuna 
(Mexico I) the panel still actually indicated that the production method would not be 
                                                 
(with quotes from Third Committee: Commercial Policy, Summary Record of the Fortieth Meeting, UN 
Conference on Trade and Employment, UN Doc E/Conf.2/C.3/SR.40, 1947, 1). 
462 Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 90. See also 
Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction: An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 249, 261-262. 
463 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 91. See also Rafael Leal-Arcas and Andrew Filis, ‘Renewable Energy Disputes in the World Trade 
Organization’ (2015) 13 Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 32. 
464 US – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23, Panel Report, 16 March 1992 
(adopted), para. 5.19. 
465 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS412 and Canada 
– Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, AB Report, 6 May 2013, paras 5.63, 5.74 
(fn 523). 
466 Japan – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, 
L/6216, Panel Report, 13 Oct. 1987 (adopted), para. 5.7. 
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relevant for assessing likeness.467 This appears to have been implicitly confirmed in US 
– Tuna (Mexico II).468 
All in all, the WTO system reveals a complex multifactor test for likeness. It should be 
emphasized that the purpose of the WTO agreements on trade is to protect the market 
in each commodity from discrimination and a market ought to be defined with reference 
to real (or potential) competition. The outcome of an overall analysis of the four factors 
should therefore be applied under the broader ‘framework test’ of competition and 
substitutability.469 This interpretation would confirm likeness as a primarily economic 
test and differences in PPMs would as such not be relevant. The differences in PPMs 
may still affect, for example, health risks and may thus be relevant for likeness when 
the differences in health risks affect the competition between products.470 In other 
words, the PPMs may affect consumer choice and thus likeness.471 However, the 
restrictive effect current legal structures may have on the evolution of consumer tastes 
must also be recognized.472 Likeness is thus not only about current competition, but 
also about potential future competition. 
2.2.2.4. Supply, Demand and the Value Chain 
With competition as the core element of the likeness test, it becomes crucial to establish 
the level at which competition should occur. Substitutability and competition can be 
analysed for both the demand and supply side. This differentiation has received 
attention under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement)473. 
                                                 
467 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, Mexico I) 
(unadopted), para. 5.15. 
468 US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, DS381 
(US – Tuna, Mexico II), AB Report, 16 May 2012, para. 202. The conclusion that dolphin safe tuna was 
like any other tuna was not contested. See also US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, para. 7.496. 
469 Critical of such economic analysis of likeness see dissent in EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 12 March 2001, para. 154.  
470 US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, AB Report, 4 April 
2012, paras 119, 136. 
471 Enrique Rene de Vera, ‘The WTO and Biofuels: The Possibility of Unilateral Sustainability 
Requirements’ (2008) 8 Chicago J. International Law 661, 673. 
472 Stephanie Switzer and Joseph A. McMahon, ‘EU Biofuels Policy – Raising the Question of WTO 
Compatibility’ (2011) 60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 713, 730. See also EC – Trade 
Description of Sardines, DS231, Panel Report, 29 May 2002, para. 7.127. 
473 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
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The SCM Agreement introduces strict limits on the use of subsidies.  Under the 
agreement, subsidies specific to an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises or group 
of industries within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, may be prohibited if they 
confer a benefit. It may be recalled that the Canada – Renewables case concerned local 
content requirements that were part of Ontario’s FIT. In its analysis of a benefit the AB 
concluded that both supply and demand side substitutability had to be considered in 
determining the relevant market.474 
Supply side substitutability has normally not been referred to in the application of 
GATT.475 A rare exception can be found in US – Automobiles, which concerned the 
higher taxes applicable in the U.S. on expensive luxury cars and on cars with high fuel 
consumption. The panel appeared to reflect on the ability of different manufacturers to 
produce cars of different quality, price levels and fuel efficiency.476 
Choi has reflected on arguments for the rejection of the relevance of supply side 
substitutability but eventually considered it as complementary, and thus decisive 
mainly in cases where it is high and demand side substitutability is disputed.477 With 
indicators such as end-use as well as consumer tastes and habits, the focus has been on 
the demand side under GATT. It is submitted that this is in line with the purpose of the 
agreement to guarantee non-discrimination and improve efficiency. Lack of 
competition on the supply side should not allow states to segregate on demand side 
markets where the companies compete.  
To complicate things further, there is often not simply supply from producers directly 
to end-consumers that express a demand. Instead, competition takes place at many 
stages of the value chain, including wholesale and retail. For example, there is often 
limited competition between biodiesel, bioethanol and gasoline on the retail level 
because customers drive cars with engines that only support certain fuels or blends. 
Competition at the wholesale level might be more intense and, importantly, the 
                                                 
474 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS412 and Canada 
- Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, AB Report, 6 May 2013, para. 5.172. See 
also EC – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, DS316, AB Report, 18 May 2011, para 
1121; Harri Kalimo, Filip Sedefov and Max Jansson, ‘Market Definition as Value Reconciliation: The 
Case of Renewable Energy Promotion Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures’ (2017) 17 International Environmental Agreements 427. 
475 Won-Mog Choi, “Like Products” in International Trade Law – Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO 
Jurisprudence (OUP 2003) 42-45. 
476 US – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31, Panel Report, 11 Oct. 1994 (unadopted), paras 5.14-15, 5.25-26. 
477 Won-Mog Choi, “Like Products” in International Trade Law – Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO 
Jurisprudence (OUP 2003) 33-49. 
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competition between various fuels is in part reflected in the competition between 
different motor manufacturers and between different cars. In other words, the fuels 
compete even if the competition does not take place when the fuel itself is purchased. 
This pattern of competition ought to be relevant in the analysis of likeness. Were it not, 
states would be able to nullify the objectives of the agreements by introducing 
discrimination before the retail level.478 
2.2.2.5. The Energy Sector 
In previous parts of section 2.2 it was argued that competition and substitutability form 
the core of the likeness test. The four factor test guides the analysis. Let us consider 
some concrete examples from the energy sector. 
Electricity is similar with respect to physical properties, end use and tariff classification 
regardless of PPMs. Only a significant shift in consumer tastes and habits could reduce 
competition to the extent that electricity generated with different PPMs would not be 
considered like. 
Fuels that can be used (or be blended for use) in similar engines are in fairly close 
competition. For example, biodiesel fuels are all like regardless of what feedstock has 
been used in production. Similarly, all bioethanol fuels are like barring any major 
change in sensitivity toward the life-cycle sustainability among consumers.  
There is also the question of substitutaibility of biofuels with fossil fuels. On the one 
hand, biodiesel and petrodiesel may differ with respect to physical properties and tariff 
classification. On the other hand, various ratios of biodiesel and petrodiesel can be used 
in diesel-engines. There is therefore significant competition between petrodiesel and 
biodiesel. The degree of competition is admittedly hampered to some extent by the 
standardization of specific blend ratios. In other words, consumers are normally offered 
only certain pre-determined blends. Nevertheless, the competition would still currently 
seem to be sufficient for likeness as most consumers are not very sensitive to the 
differences in environmental impacts of the fuels. Consumer habits and tastes could of 
course change quickly. When consumers become more sensitive to how clean the fuels 
                                                 
478 Similarly with respect to the definition of relevant market under the SCM Agreement see Harri 
Kalimo, Filip Sedefov and Max Jansson, ‘Market Definition as Value Reconciliation: The Case of 
Renewable Energy Promotion Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ 
(2017) 17 International Environmental Agreements 427, 438. 
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are, the substitutability of, for example, petrodiesel and biodiesel will decreaee and they 
will no longer be like products. 
Various ratios of gasoline and bioethanol can be used in flex-fuel engines. The degree 
of substitutability could be argued to be high enough for petroleum and bioethanol to 
be like products. However, there is significant uncertainty with respect to that 
conclusion. Namely, many engines still run optimally with some specific ratio of the 
mix between bio-based fuel and petroleum-based fuel because the properties of various 
fuels differ to some degree. Perhaps it was this that the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon had in mind when it found that petroleum does not compete with 
bioethanol.479 
The case of fuels that cannot be used in similar engines is arguably even more complex. 
The degree of competition is lower between fuels that cannot be used to run the same 
engines. This concerns in particular the distinction between on the one hand (bio)diesel 
and on the other hand gasoline and bioethanol. As long as consumers are not highly 
sensitive of the PPMs, there will still exist some competition. Yet, it is not evident 
whether the degree of competition is sufficient for likeness. The competition for 
consumers will often take place when the companies and consumers purchase the 
vehicle and not when they purchase the fuel for final consumption. On the retail market 
for cars consumers pick between cars with various engines and the fuel that go into the 
engine will likely affect the decision to some degree. Estimating the competition 
between different fuels at the stage of purchasing vehicles is admittedly difficult due to 
the fact that the purchasing decision is also influenced by so many other factors than 
merely the fuel that the engine consumes. An analysis of likeness should also take into 
account that in the process of designing car models car manufacturers make decisions 
on the type of engine that would be used in the model and this decision will be affected 
in part by the fuel that is used in the engines. For these reasons fuel producers likely 
lobby for consumers and producers to favor the type of engines that run on their fuel. 
It is still quite obvious that the substitutability between biodiesel and bioethanol will be 
relatively low and would likely not be regarded as like products. Whether the degree of 
substitutability is sufficient for the fuels to be like under trade law must still be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
                                                 
479 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 
5665232 (D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015). 
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Finally, similar difficulties arise when assessing the similarity between electricity and 
fuels. In applying the SCM Agreement the panel in Canada - Renewables stated that 
there would exist no close substitutes for electricity.480 Indeed, in comparison with, for 
example, fuels the physical properties and tariffs are vastly different. However, both 
are capable of serving similar functions. From a broad perspective, the end use partly 
overlaps. Again, the degree of substitutability would be decisive for the outcome. Under 
current market conditions it is still highly unlikely that electricity and fuels would be 
found to be like products. 
The system is not without gaps. Natural resources needed in the energy sector and 
equipment for various energy plants differ substantially when it comes to both physical 
characteristics and tariff classification, as well as under a narrow perception of end use. 
Products like coal, solar panels, wind turbines and equipment for nuclear reactors are 
not sufficiently like for equal treatment to be required. Consequently, states would have 
a lot of room for steering their energy policy without much risk of infringing the non-
discrimination principle. 
2.2.3. The Rarity of Likeness Tests in EU Law 
Under EU free movement law, the test of likeness (similarity) is much less detailed than 
in WTO law. Article 110 TFEU on taxation includes a similar non-discrimination 
requirement as does the provisions on free movement. The ECJ has in the context of 
that article referred to physical characteristics, consumer needs and customs tariffs 
when assessing similarity.481 In the case of taxation, there are, however, no grounds of 
justification listed in the Treaty. Instead, the ECJ appears to take into account legitimate 
objectives, such as public health, by relying on a narrow concept of similarity. The ECJ 
has in the context of taxation even stated that the process method may be a relevant 
factor in determining similarity.482 Yet, like in WTO law, the narrower concept of 
likeness in the article on non-discriminatory taxation should preclude interpretation ex 
analogia in cases outside the context of taxation, such as those related to free movement 
of goods. 
                                                 
480 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS412 and Canada 
– Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, Panel Report 19 Dec 2012, para. 7.279. 
481 Case 45/75 Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Großhandels GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Landau/Pfalz 
[1976] ECR 181, para. 12. 
482 Case 140/79 Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v. DAF SpA [1981] ECR 1, paras 12-15; Case 106/84 
Commission v. Denmark [1986] ECR 833, para 12. See also joined cases C-393/04 and 41/05 Air Liquid 
Industries Belgium SA v. Ville de Seraing and Province de Liege [2006] ECR I-5293, para 58. 
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Outokumpu was a case on the excise duty charged on electricity in Finland. The duty 
was levied on imported electricity at a flat medium level rate. In contrast, the rate for 
domestic electricity was either higher or lower than that flat rate depending on the 
method of production. The ECJ did not apply free movement law, but instead the Treaty 
provision on non-discriminatory taxation. The court found that the law was 
unjustifiable, as importers were not even given the opportunity to demonstrate that their 
electricity had been generated with sustainable methods.483 Interestingly, in the path to 
arriving at its eventual conclusion, the court appeared to suggest that differences in the 
production method employed do not necessarily make electricity from various sources 
dissimilar. Yet, simultaneously, the court stated that different treatment on the basis of 
differences in PPMs may be justifiable if it pursues legitimate objectives.484 Given the 
fact that the Treaty provisions on taxation do not include any grounds of justification, 
it is rather unclear whether the court intended to create such grounds or whether it after 
all considered PPMs to affect likeness in the context of taxation. Whatever the answer, 
it might not resolve the dilemma for free movement provisions, which include grounds 
of justification in the Treaty and thus allow at least in theory for a broader concept of 
likeness. 
In the context of public procurement law one Advocate General has argued that 
pollution levels, at least in the consumption phase, are of relevance for the likeness 
test.485 However, the concept of likeness in the application of the equal treatment 
principle under public procurement directives might be narrower than the concept of 
likeness in free movement law. Namely, in the application of the equal treatment 
principle under the directives there exists no grounds of justification. Environmental 
values are thus already integrated into the evaluation of equality.  
                                                 
483 Case C-213/96 Outokumpu Oy [1998] ECR I-1777, para. 39. See, however, Geert van Calster, 
‘Climate Change and Renewable Energy as a Super Trump for EU Trade Law –  However all Essent 
clear’ (2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy Rev. 60, 62. Van Calster goes so far as to interpret 
the court to indicate that out-of-state electricity would have to be granted the lowest tax rate per default. 
484 Case C-213/96 Outokumpu Oy [1998] ECR I-1777, para. 30. 
485 See Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne 
[2002] ECR I-7213, Opinion of AG Mischo, para. 150. The AG is of the opinion that two companies are 
not in a comparable situation when one is able to offer gas powered buses and the other one only offers 
buses that run with more polluting fuel. The ECJ did at least not reject this line of reasoning, although it 
also did not explicitly confirm it. The case related to the application of the public procurement directive, 
but the same idea may be argued for when it comes to ‘similarity’ under the TFEU provisions. However, 
such nuanced likeness test not anchored in the test of substitutability could blur the line between 
prohibition and justification tests in free movement law. 
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In EU free movement law likeness tests have normally not been applied. Already the 
fact that likeness has rarely been reflected on in judgements might be seen to indicate 
that likeness is viewed as a broad concept. Some indications of a departure from a pure 
competition and substitutability test can, however, be traced. In particular, a 
controversial exception to treating likeness in terms of competition and substitutability 
can be found in Walloon Waste. In this case the ECJ concluded that domestic and 
foreign waste were not similar products.486 The approach in Walloon Waste again raises 
the question of whether pollution in the production phase also could make a difference 
and if, for example, electricity from different resources could be unlike despite of a 
competitive relationship.487  
It is submitted that products under free movement law are considered similar as long as 
there is a competitive relationship between them.488 This competitive relationship 
should exist at least partially. Strong indications of such relationship would exist when 
the products have similar physical characteristics, the same intended use and fulfil the 
same consumer needs.489 In other words, products could not be unlike only on the basis 
of different PPMs,490 unless consumers in the future would become very sensitive to 
differences in PPMs so that the degree of competition would be significantly reduced. 
In sum, the ECJ has rarely applied any likeness test in the context of free movement 
law since the likeness of the products compared in most cases has been evident and thus 
often not even been questioned. As was argued in relation to WTO law, the test of 
competition and substitutability is to be preferred. Indeed, when similarity has been 
debatable, the ECJ – and the EFTA Court – have on some occasions applied the test of 
competition. However, other cases have put this approach into question. A somewhat 
similar state of affairs can be detected in U.S. case law, as discussed below. 
                                                 
486 Case C-2/90 Commission v. Belgium (Walloon Waste) [1992] ECR I-4431, paras 34-37. See also Peter 
von Wilmowsky, ‘Waste Disposal in the Internal Market: The State of Play After the ECJ’s Ruling on 
the Walloon Import Ban’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Rev. 541. 
487 The problem of likeness in the context of electricity has been discussed in Andreas J. Gunst, ‘Energy 
Trade in the European Common Market’ (2003) 21 J. Energy & Natural Resources Law 447, 455. 
488 Case C-391/92 Commission v. Greece (Infant Milk) [1995] ECR I-1621, para 18. 
489 Case E-19/11 Vín Tríó ehf. v. Iceland [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 974, paras 60-66. For some reason in the 
latter case the EFTA Court cited case law on taxation provisions and did not recognize that the concept 
of similarity has been broader under the free movement provisions. The Court concluded that two 
alcoholic beverages were not like. 
490 See also Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and 
WTO’ in Joseph Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of 
International Trade? (OUP 2000) 135. 
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2.2.4. Tests of Competition and Substitutability in U.S. Law 
In U.S. case law the likeness test has been described in fairly vague terms. In Bacchus 
the Supreme Court concluded Hawaii okolehao liquor and fruit wines to be like 
products because there was ‘some competition’.491 The Court has in other cases stated 
that the objects of comparison must be similarly situated or substantially similar,492 or 
that products shall be in competition, fully or partially, actually or prospectively.493 
In Clover Leaf Creamery the Court seemed in its assessment of undue burden on 
commerce to implicitly suggest that nonreturnable milk bottles were similar to 
paperboard cartons, although the different treatment was in the end upheld for other 
reasons.494 Another case evolved around Alaska’s decision to implement a tax on 
salmon frozen on ships and then exported and canned in Washington. In-state canneries 
had to pay an even higher tax, while fresh frozen salmon sold on the in-state market 
was exempted from the tax. The Supreme Court concluded that no discrimination was 
at hands because fresh frozen salmon would not compete with salmon exported and 
canned out-of-state.495 The focus on competition in defining likeness, and thus the 
relevant market, under the dormant Commerce Clause has led some authors to draw 
parallels with competition law, where the analysis of competition on relevant markets 
forms a core test.496 
The manner in which the competition test has been applied under the dormant 
Commerce Clause has in some cases been fairly controversial. For example, in GM v. 
Tracy497 at stake was a ‘sales and use’ tax on natural gas sales in Ohio. It applied to 
purchases from a wide range of distributors, but exempted gas purchased from the 
state’s own regulated utility. As a preliminary remark, taxation falls under the dormant 
Commerce Clause and the test of likeness could therefore be expected to be identical 
regardless of whether the case concerns taxes or other state measures. In its ruling in 
                                                 
491 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
492 Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 342 (2008); United Haulers Association 
Inc v. Oneida Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 342 (2007); General Motors 
Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-299 (1997); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564, 582 (1997). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 163 (9th Cir. 2007). 
493 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997). 
494 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
495 Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961). 
496 Richard B. Collins, ‘Economic Union as a Constitutional Value’ 63 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 43 (1988) 75; 
Donald H. Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (1986) 84 Michigan Law Rev. 1091, 1095-1096. 
497 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997). 
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GM v. Tracy the Supreme Court took a unique approach to similarity as it declared that 
the competition on the non-captive market was not sufficient to make gas from the state 
utility and gas from other companies like products, because there would be no 
competition on the captive market.  
A captive market is a market where the number of potential suppliers is unusually low. 
According to the court in GM v. Tracy, residential consumers in the captive market 
would continue to turn to the utility because they value ‘stability of rate and supply’. 
While it is debatable how much competition and substitutability is required between 
products in order for them to be like, the reasons for not finding any competition in the 
energy market for residential customers did not seem fully convincing. The stability 
argument could have been introduced later at the justification stage of the analysis, 
when the Pike balancing test is applied. 
The reasoning applied in GM v. Tracy was echoed by the district court in LSP 
Transmission Holdings.498 The case concerned the electricity market in Minnesota, 
where local electricity utilities often are transmission owners with a monopoly on sale 
of electricity to consumers in their areas within the state. Hence, there is no competition 
in the retail market. In Minnesota new transmission lines are approved for construction 
from time to time. A state law gave incumbent electricity utilities the right construct 
and own the new transmission lines and other companies could get the opportunity only 
if the local incumbent expressed no interest. While there clearly was competition in the 
market for building transmission lines, the district court found that incumbent 
electricity utilities were not similarly situated as out-of-state transmission builders 
because there was essentially no competition in the market for electricity sales to 
consumers. This reasoning is controversial. The district court further emphasized that 
favoring incumbent electricity utilities ensured the reliability of electricity supply. This 
should, however, not be a factor in the evaluation of similarity, but instead a factor 
taken into account in examining grounds of justification. 
Despite the fact that U.S. case law is open for criticism in some respects, it would seem 
to confirm the application of the competition test. Thus, differences in PPMs would be 
relevant only to the extent they affect the degree of substitutability and competition. 
                                                 
498 LSP Transmission Holdings v. Lange et al., Civil No. 17-4490 (DWF/HB) (D. Minn 2017). 
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Non-trade factors, such as public health, would not be relevant per se, or in other words 
outside the framework of the competition test.499 
There has also in the U.S. been some academic discussion on the relevance of PPMs 
for the assessment of likeness. It has been argued in the literature that all electric power 
is identical regardless of the resources utilized to generate the power.500 However, there 
are also scholars who maintain that the differences in carbon emissions reflect real 
differences and that the products may be deemed unlike on the basis of their carbon 
score.501  
Some case law has emerged on likeness in the energy sector. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit has found that RECs awarded by different states are not like 
products.502 This is a well-reasoned position because the definition of a REC will differ 
from state to state. For example, while one state might award RECs to large hydropower 
plants, other might not. This does not mean that electricity from different states would 
be dissimilar products. 
In line with the competition-oriented approach, the district court in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union would in 2011 appear to have taken the view that all ethanol fuels 
regardless of PPMs are like products since they are physically and chemically 
identical.503 As may be recalled, the case concerned California’s low carbon fuel 
standard (LCFS) that relied on life-cycle analysis and assigned to biofuels produced in 
different regions different default values for carbon emission. In particular, the value 
was different for Californian and Midwest corn ethanol. The district court found, among 
other things, that the LCFS was facially discriminatory and unconstitutional. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court ruling in 
2013. It concluded that the LCFS was not facially (i.e. de jure) discriminatory despite 
relying on factors related to geographic origin in the calculation of emissions levels.504 
                                                 
499 This can be contrasted with the approach to likeness under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. See e.g. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). The Court 
concluded that drug addicts are not like other people with reference to health and safety.  
500 Lawrence Fogel, ‘Serving a “Public Function”: Why Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs Should 
Survive a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge’ (2010) Wisconsin Law Rev. 1313, 1330-1333. 
501 Daniel A. Farber, ‘Climate Policy and United States System of Divided Powers: Dealing with Carbon 
Leakage and Regulatory Linkage’ (2014) 3 Transnational Environmental Law 31, 40-42. See also Kirsten 
H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The 
Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243. 
502 Allco Finance v. Klee, Case no. 16-2946 (2nd Cir. 2017). 
503 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
504 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 77 ERC 1077 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Factors of relevance for estimating emissions levels included the resource mix for 
generating electricity in the state and the distance feedstock or fuel had to be transported 
during the production process. The ruling by the Court of Appeals, however, left 
unanswered the possibility of undue burden (de facto discrimination) and did not 
explicitly address the question of likeness. The case was remanded to the district court, 
which also did not explicitly rule on likeness. This time, however, in a memorandum 
decision and an order on the motion to dismiss the district court determined it was at 
least plausible that the LCFS had discriminatory effects.505 This conclusion would 
suggest that it assumed that differences in PPMs had at least not affected likeness of 
corn ethanol fuels. On the basis of this case it would appear that ethanol fuels produced 
with different methods and different emissions levels (due to differences in transport 
distances and in the PPMs of the electricity used at the fuel production facilities) are 
like products.  
In Oregon the district court examined a biofuels sustainability scheme similar to that of 
California’s LCFS. The court, among other things, stated that petroleum and ethanol 
fuels are not like products.506 This does not necessarily contradict with the court’s 
findings in California. As noted in the discussion on WTO law, the degree of 
substitutability might be deemed sufficient between different ethanol fuels, but not 
between fuels that differ more significantly, such as petroleum and bioethanol. Yet, 
with modern flexible engines it might become increasingly more difficult to argue that 
petroleum and ethanol fuels do not compete to a sufficiently high degree. 
2.2.5. Likeness and Value Balancing 
The likeness (similarity) test is applied to identify groups of similar products and 
differentiate them from groups of products that are different. Products that are different 
do not need to receive similar treatment. The test, in other words, functions to identify 
a legitimate reason for differentiation. This legitimate reason is tightly linked to the 
lack of competition. After all, the core element of trade law is to protect fair and 
efficient non-discriminatory competition. 
                                                 
505 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). The claims of discriminatory effects 
were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs after the decision and therefore not addressed further by the 
district court or the Ninth Circuit. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th 
Cir. 2019). 
506 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 
5665232 (D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015). 
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The EU and the U.S. have rarely invited considerations that would question likeness 
and thus appear to have accepted a rather broad interpretation of similarity. The limits 
to the scope of like products remain unknown because claims of discrimination between 
products that compete only to a limited extent have been rare. It is obvious that the 
scope of likeness should not be broadened too much. Some indirect form of competition 
can be found between very different products and a requirement of like treatment in 
such cases would paralyze regulators. 
The WTO has perhaps been conscious of the risks of a broad concept of like products. 
Namely, it has developed a more nuanced test for assessing whether two products are 
like. This four factor test allows for taking into account the complexity of markets. EU 
and U.S. courts could undoubtedly benefit from drawing more attention to the details 
of a likeness test. At the same time there needs to be awareness of the risk that the WTO 
approach in turn presents. The downside of the four factor test is that it diverts attention 
away from the competition rationale. Likeness should not be determined by an overall 
weighing of likeness in terms of physical characteristics, end-use, consumer tastes and 
tariff classifications without any common benchmark. In case substitutability would 
not be used as a common benchmark, the overall weighing would have the 
characteristics of a value balancing test and would be haunted by problems of 
incommensurability.  
The reasoning and outcome of WTO cases support the conclusion that competition and 
substitutability still forms the core of the likeness test. Other elements, including 
differences in PPMs, are to be considered under the likeness test only as supporting 
indicators. This last point is crucial, since a likeness test that would distance itself from 
competition, would trade away the core market objective of free trade and non-
discrimination, for simplicity. 
The idea of likeness as a concept evolving around competition reaffirms the economic 
rationale of trade law. Markets are, however, incredibly complex. Competition can take 
place on various levels of the value chain and at any level two products can be full 
substitutes or only substitutes to a minimal degree. These observations reveal the 
difficulty in determining which products ought to be considered like for the purposes 
of trade law. It is unfortunate that none of the three regimes have developed any more 
detailed guidance on how to assess whether the degree of competition is sufficient. 
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In sum, three points should be emphasized with regards to likeness. First, the EU and 
the U.S. should consider making more explicit the assessment of likeness.  At least 
some of the four factors identified already in WTO law could be useful in the analysis 
of substitutability. Secondly, all three jurisdictions should be more specific about the 
degree of substitutability that is necessary for two products to be like. Finally, as a rule, 
in case the degree of substitutability identified as sufficient is fulfilled on the demand 
side on any level of the supply chain no further analysis of supply side competition 
should be required. 
The implementation of the points listed above would not eliminate the necessity of case 
by case analysis altogether, although they would create certain boundaries to court 
discretion. Importantly, they would increase transparency and improve legal certainty. 
2.3. The State as Market Participant 
2.3.1. The Regulation – Participation Dichotomy 
Discriminatory measures by states are as a rule prima facie prohibited under trade law. 
These prohibited measures often take the form of laws or other regulation. As discussed 
in the first section of this chapter,507 the discriminatory effects could equally well arise 
from administrative practice or recommendations. Any of these would constitute a 
measure if it can be attributed to the state. 
Private actors also take various measures. In particular, companies make decisions to 
buy and sell on the market. They might also establish purchasing policies. Private actors 
that adopt strategies on the basis of making a profit are usually regarded to participate 
on the market. In these activities companies have the right to make decisions that will 
favor products, sellers or buyers of some origin. In other words, private companies and 
organization are under trade law508 free to discriminate on the basis of origin509 in their 
trading activities.510 
                                                 
507 See section 2.1.2. 
508 Private companies with a dominant position might breach competition law rules in case they 
discriminate. 
509 Companies could likely not discriminate on the basis of some other factors, such as race, because of 
legislation outside the scope of trade law. 
510 US v. Colgate & Co., 250 US 300, 307 (1919). 
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Market regulation is when the state exercises governmental powers that are unavailable 
to private parties.511In some cases public authorities may take on activities that 
resemble market participation more than market regulation. For example, a public 
authority might purchase something through public procurement. Another example 
would be the decision by a state to set up an entity to deal with recycling. The latter 
example depicts how the public sector may decide to intervene in the market, in 
particular if there is a market failure and the private companies have not managed to 
find business models that would serve both their private economic interests and the 
public (environmental) interests of the state (or general public) to tackle negative 
externalities.  
There are various views on what rules should apply to state market participation. 
Although discriminatory state regulation of the market is prohibited in the U.S., 
similarly to EU and WTO regimes, a distinction is in the U.S. drawn between state 
regulation and market participation. U.S. courts have developed exemptions to the 
dormant Commerce Clause for various state measures that would fall under a broad 
understanding of market participation. Market participation can be regarded as an 
overarching concept for various forms of state action that are exempted from dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. This market participant doctrine narrows the scope of law 
of prohibition.  
As will be illustrated in this third section of chapter 2, the diverse range of market 
participant exemptions has inspired a debate as to whether also state measures to create 
new markets should be exempted from trade law and the non-discrimination principle. 
In this context it should be kept in mind that renewable energy has to some degree 
struggled to gain a foothold on the market because production costs are high compared 
to the alternative of fossil fuels. In addition, infrastructure has been built to serve fossil 
fuels and fossil fuels have for a long time received financial support. Similar market 
structures also create challenges for new sustainable PPMs in other markets than the 
energy market. One could potentially argue that in supporting renewable energy and 
sustainable PPMs the state is creating new markets and that these measures should be 
exempted from the non-discrimination principle in order to give states more freedom 
to promote sustainability.  
                                                 
511 See e.g. Coalition for Competitive Electricity et al v. Zibelman, Case No. 16-CV-8164 (VEC) 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
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An analysis of the relevance of the market participant exemptions for measures to 
promote sustainable PPMs in the energy sector will require some background and 
context. It is in order to introduce briefly various exemptions. Hence, this section 2.3 
will start with an overview of exemptions applicable to the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Most of these exemptions will be linked to the idea of a distinction between the state as 
a market regulator and a market participant. Hence, it is examined more in detail how 
and under what conditions tests that belong to the family of market participation 
exemptions are applied. Recent trends and potential future development of the market 
participant doctrine are considered with the objective to shed light on the potential 
implications of these tests for schemes that are implemented by states in order to create 
new commercial opportunities for sustainable products. The ultimate objective is to 
evaluate the potential of market participant tests as means to reconcile values. Of 
particular interest is whether market participation and creation exemptions could form 
suitable tests for reconciling free trade and environmental values.  
2.3.2. Exemptions to the Dormant Commerce Clause 
2.3.2.1. Subsidies 
Subsidies are closely related to trade law. They are, however, excluded from the scope 
of Article III GATT by Article III:8(b) and are instead covered by the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.512 In the EU distortive subsidies are governed 
by Articles 107-109 TFEU (on state aid), but the general provisions on free movement 
could still also apply on top of the articles on state aid.513  
In the U.S., the non-discrimination principle does not apply to subsidies due to an 
exemption to the dormant Commerce Clause introduced by the Supreme Court. A state 
may favor its own citizens when distributing subsidies. Thus, any de jure or de facto 
discriminatory subsidy will according to the Court comply with the U.S. Constitution 
even without any applicable ground of justification.514 Oddly, the Supreme Court has 
still occasionally denied ever actually explicitly confirming the exemption.515  
                                                 
512 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
513 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099. 
514 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809 (1976); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 278 (1988); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994). 
515 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). La Puma has expressed doubt 
as to whether the exception really applies. See Christopher P. La Puma, ‘Massachusetts Tax and Subsidy 
Scheme Violates Commerce Clause: West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,’ (1995) 47 Tax Law 641, 653. 
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As a rule, granting subsidies from general funds complies with the Constitution.516 The 
scope of legal subsidies was, however, narrowed down in West Lynn Creamery.517 The 
case concerned a tax in Massachusetts on all sales of raw milk from in-state and out-
of-state dealers to in-state retailers. The proceeds of the tax were used directly to 
subsidize in-state dairy farmers. In other words, the pricing order consisted of a non-
discriminatory tax and a discriminatory subsidy scheme, neither of which could be 
declared illegal on their own. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the measure 
combined formed a scheme that violated the dormant Commerce Clause.518 The Court 
relied on a test of political representation. Namely, in-state farmers would normally 
lobby against any tax on wholesale transactions, but due to the fact that they were fully 
compensated for the costs of the tax through the subsidy, they had no incentives to 
lobby against the tax.519  
From an economic perspective the general exemption for subsidies would appear 
artificial and difficult to justify.520 Bittker has therefore been critical of the doctrine 
and, for example, pointed out that illegal tax breaks and legal subsidies are two sides 
                                                 
516 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1994); Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant 
Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity 
Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 304-305; Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, 
Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 N.Y.U. Environmental Law J. 507, 588. For references to West Lynn 
Creamery in the field of energy regulation see Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th 
Cir.1995); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Bayh, 72 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 1995). The cases shed little light on the 
subsidy exemption. 
517 William L. Oemichen, ‘Milk, State Taxes, State Subsidies, and the Commerce Clause: When States 
Cannot Tax an Agricultural Commodity to Fund a Subsidy for Its Struggling Industries, West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994)’ (1995) 18 Hamline L. Rev 415, 428. See also Dan T. 
Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 301; Dan T. Coenen and 
Walter Hellerstein, ‘Suspect Linkage: The Interplay of State Taxing and Spending Measures in the 
Application of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules’ (1997) 95 Michigan L. Rev. 2167, 2195-2201. 
See also Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 296-304. 
518 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199-205 (1994). 
519 Id. at 199-200. 
520 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1061; Nathan 
Endrud, ‘State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation’ (2008) 45 Harvard 
J. on Legislation 259, 269; Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 335. Yet 
Engel suggests that the exemption could in fact be expanded. 
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of the same coin.521 The exemption of subsidies will allow states to circumvent the 
prohibition of protectionist measures by granting subsidies to in-state businesses.522 
One theory in support of exempting subsidies relies on the principle that taxpayers 
should have the right to enjoy the benefits that are established with the help of their 
funds.523 This relates to the concerns that out-of-state persons and entities would 
otherwise be able to free ride.524 Although certainly a legitimate concern, it is still 
difficult to distinguish subsidies from other state measures on the basis of this theory. 
There are perhaps some differences between subsidies and other measures. For 
example, subsidies must often be renewed, whereas discriminatory tax breaks or other 
regulations may apply until revoked. This is still not a difference that exists per 
definition, as it is dependent on legislative choices. 
It has been pointed out that in-state voters could be expected to react in case the state 
legislature takes measures that include discriminatory elements that render them 
economically inefficient.525 As such, this would apply for both subsidies and other 
measures. However, in comparison to measures such as tax breaks, subsidies could be 
argued to be more transparent.526 Namely, taxpayers can see directly from state 
expenditures the amounts spent. This would mean that in the case of subsidies the 
feedback effect from voters could in theory have more force. 
The transparency ideal in U.S. trade law reveals that within the framework of the 
constitutional economic norms exist non-trade values even outside the scope of grounds 
of justification. Criticism could naturally be directed at this development. When 
transparency and political representation have been given relevance, the focus has in 
part shifted away from pure economic logic. The fundamentals of the non-
discrimination principle on the interstate market seem undermined by the creation of 
an exemption that reflects the ideal of transparency. The West Lynn Creamery 
                                                 
521 Boris I. Bittker, Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Aspen 1999) para. 6-
78. See also Stanley S. Surrey, ‘Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures’ (1970) 83 Harvard L. Rev. 705, 717. 
522 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992), Justice Rehnquist dissenting. 
523 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980). 
524 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1094-1095. 
525 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (4th ed., West 2010) 176. 
526 Dan T. Coenen, ‘Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1998) 107 Yale L. J. 965, 
985; Dan T. Coenen, ‘Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause’ 
(1988) 88 Michigan L. Rev. 395; Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause 
(Foundation Press 2004) 298-299; John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional 
Law (4th ed., West 2010) 185-187. 
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exemption to the general subsidies exemption illustrates how the U.S. doctrine 
struggles to uphold a principle that creates inconsistency in the application of the 
dormant Commerce Clause against the backdrop of economic reality. In any case, it 
would appear that transparency has influenced law of prohibition under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, although in a controversial manner. I shall return to the relevance 
of transparency in law of justification later in this book.527 
The subsidy exemption is only one of several exemptions to the dormant Commerce 
Clause created by the U.S. Supreme Court. It is closely linked to what the courts often 
refer to as market participation. This is illustrated by a case on promoting low-GHG 
emission electricity generation. The case concerned a Zero-Emissions Credits (ZEC) 
Program implemented by New York. Nuclear power plants that deliver electricity to 
New York retail consumers are awarded credits that are bought by a state authority. 
This essentially forms a subsidy. Retailers are then required to purchase credits in 
proportion to their sales. Without considering any grounds of justification or 
proportionality the district court declared that adopting subsidies to benefit in-state 
taxpayers does not breach the dormant Commerce Clause. The court concluded that the 
program was justified as a subsidy but also added that it was a case of market 
participation and that the program would equally be legal under the market participant 
doctrine.528 This highlights the close connection between the exemptions. Subsequent 
parts of this section will strive to bring clarity to the various types of cases that have 
traditionally been regarded as some form of market participation in a broad sense. 
2.3.2.2. Public Entity Exemption 
The public entity exemption is an exemption often placed into the broader category of 
market participant exemptions. The public entity exemption refers to the fact that state 
authorities are free to favour their public entities over any out-of-state (and in-state) 
competitors. This reflects the idea that a state may favour its own citizens when 
adopting the role as market participant.529 
                                                 
527 See sections 3.1.9. and 4.2.2. 
528 Coalition for Competitive Electricity et al v. Zibelman, Case No. 16-CV-8164 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. 
2017). 
529 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (3rd ed., Aspen 2006) 449. 
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The public and the private actors on the market are in some sense not considered to be 
similar. For example, in United Haulers530 the Supreme Court examined a state 
requirement that all waste be processed at a public in-state facility before export. The 
Court emphasized that waste processing was a typical government function. It also 
argued that public entities are not comparable to private businesses on the market. 
Hence, although the scheme was clearly facially (i.e. de jure) discriminatory, the Court 
exempted it from strict scrutiny. While the majority adopted that approach, it was 
unable to agree among itself whether the applicability of the public entity exemption 
meant that the measure automatically should survive the dormant Commerce Clause or 
if Pike balancing,531 a more lenient proportionality test, should still be applied.532 Be 
that as it may, the outcome was that a majority found the measure to be constitutional.533 
The public function that the Court referred to may be linked to the risk of externalities 
and market failure in the waste sector, were the trade subject to free competition. 
In another case, Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis534, Kentucky had to 
defend its favorable tax treatment of its own state bonds. The Supreme Court argued 
that public bonds are different from other bonds and that the state was performing a 
public function. Here the public function would simply be the collection of funds. After 
having found the case to fall under an exemption,535 the Court, unlike in United 
Haulers, refused to analyze the case in light of any proportionality review. The Court 
deemed such balancing to fall under the competence of Congress and to be unsuitable 
for a court to undertake. The case is also peculiar in the sense, that unlike most cases 
                                                 
530 United Haulers Association., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 
330 (2007). 
531 See chapter 3 for more details on the Pike balancing test. 
532 Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, except for the part in which Pike balancing was 
applied. Three justices joined in full. Justice Scalia concurred in everything but the application of Pike 
balancing in the case. Justice Thomas, concurring, viewed the measure as constitutional because he 
rejected the applicability of any dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which two justices joined. 
533 Compare with C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). In that 
case the state favored a private processing facility. However, the facility had entered into a contract to 
sell its business to a public entity for a nominal sum after a few years. Yet, the Court concluded that the 
measure violated the dormant Commerce Clause. This illustrates that the line between private and public 
is not clear-cut. The faith of public-private partnerships under the public entity exemption remains 
unknown. 
534 Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008). 
535 Notably the Court referred to the market participant exemption even in this case, although, as the 
treatment favored a public entity, it would arguably have been more suitable to differentiate the case 
from other market participant cases and use the concept of public entity exemption. 
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that have benefitted from an exemption, which will be discussed later in this chapter, 
the Kentucky law did not relate to any market failure, but merely to a public function. 
In sum, the public entity exemption grants the state regulator the authority to treat in-
state public market participants more favorably than out-of-state and in-state private 
companies. This rests on the observation that they are not similar to private market 
participants at least when they perform some traditional government function. 
2.3.2.3. The Market Participant Exemption Sensu Stricto 
State regulation that favors state enterprises or other public entities participating on the 
market is one thing. State enterprises participating on the market and taking 
discriminatory decisions is another,536 even if they are closely related. The state acts as 
a market participant in both cases, but under the public entity exemption it is the state 
market participant that is favored, whereas under the market participant exemption 
sensu stricto it is the state market participant that is favoring some private entities. 
In Hughes v. Alexandria537 the Supreme Court had to evaluate a decision by Maryland 
to enter into the market of end-of-life treatment of old cars. A public authority was 
established to deal with what was regarded as a market failure. The authority purchased 
demolished cars at a premium provided that the private processor of old cars could 
show documentation of ownership of the cars. Because of the premium, the system was 
from an economic point of view equal to a subsidy.538 Discrimination arose since the 
requirements on documentation on in particular car ownership were more stringent for 
out-of-state processors. Yet, the Court found that the system complied with the 
Constitution because the public authority was regarded as a purchasing market 
participant and could therefore discriminate against out-of-state processors. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that states can decide how, with whom and for whose 
benefit it deals.539 In Hughes v. Alexandria the court echoed this principle. It 
emphasized that when participating in the market, states are similar to private traders 
and are burdened by the same market constraints. This argumentation is interesting, 
since under the public entity exemption it was precisely the difference between public 
                                                 
536 In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) the Supreme Court did not 
appear to acknowledge this taxonomy and categorized all these cases as market participation of the state. 
537 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
538 On subsidies and the dormant Commerce Clause see sections 1.4.4.2. and 2.3.2.1. 
539 Heim v. McCall, 239 US 175 (1915). 
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and private market participants that justified the exemption. The Court also pointed out 
that states should be able to benefit the in-state taxpayers that fund the public utility. 
However, this argument does not seem justifiable in light of the economic rationale of 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine more in general. There is economically hardly 
any difference if the state benefits its own taxpayers through discriminatory regulation, 
taxation or decisions by utilities it owns and controls. 
It is not surprising, that the market participant exemption has been met with great 
criticism in the academic literature.540 In fact, the Supreme Court itself has never been 
unanimous on its applicability.541 All that being said, it has still often gained majority 
approval in the Supreme Court. In Reves v. Stakes the court had to deal with a decision 
by South Dakota to operate a cement plant. Like in Hughes v. Alexandria the decision 
appeared to have been originally motivated by concerns of market failure. In times of 
shortage the plant restricted its sales to only in-state buyers. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the state in its capacity as a seller was a market participant and could 
take measures that aimed at ensuring its taxpayers received the benefits instead of out-
of-state free riders.542  
On the one hand, there certainly is some appeal to the argument reflected in some U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, that a state may in the capacity of market participant tackle free 
riding and market failure.543 A parallel may be drawn to the public entity exemption 
and the references that the Supreme Court has made to the right to favour states when 
they perform ‘a public function’. In cases such as United Haulers, Hughes v. Alexandria 
and Reves v. Stakes, the state was either trying to create a market that would otherwise 
not exist or tackling externalities that would otherwise be ignored. In order to ensure 
that the state shall have sufficient incentives to do so, the Court allows more state 
discretion in the design of the measure, even to the extent that there may be 
discrimination.  
                                                 
540 Christine H. Kellett, ‘The Market Participant Doctrine: No Longer "Good Sense" or "Sound 
Law"‘(1990) 9 Temple Environmental Law & Technology J. 169; Jonathan D. Varat, ‘State 
“Citizenship” and Interstate Equality’ (1981) 48 University of Chicago Law Review 487; Laurence H. 
Tribe, Constitutional Choices (HUP 1985); Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental 
Law in the EC and the U.S. (Transnational Publishers 2006) 380. 
541 For harsh criticism of the exemption see South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 
82, 102-103 (1984), Justice Rehnquist dissenting. 
542 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980). 
543 See also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1095. 
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On the other hand, the market participant exemptions in the U.S. doctrine blur the line 
between law of prohibition and law of justification. The reference in some cases to 
circumstances of ‘market failure’ would indicate that some non-trade values have 
received attention already at the stage of law of prohibition. The market participant 
exemptions would not seem necessary for tackling concerns of market failures, since 
such aspects would be protected by the application of the grounds of justification.  
Finally, it is should be pointed out that the market participant tests have not always been 
linked to market failure. Admittedly, in Reves v. Stakes the authority was a seller and 
in the Hughes v. Alexandria it was a buyer on highly imperfect markets. However, 
according to the Supreme Court state utilities may discriminate also when they are 
acting neither as a buyer or seller on highly imperfect markets. More specifically, the 
exemption has applied also, for example, when new employees were hired for state 
financed projects.544 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has applied the 
doctrine when the state granted loans.545 Similarly, the public entity exemption was 
applied in Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, which concerned the 
constitutionality of a tax break to those who invest in state bonds and thus was not 
linked to any market failure. In case these market participant exemptions are indeed not 
limited by any market failure test, they would be even more difficult to defend with 
reference to any economic rationale. What is more, once a state has adopted a 
discriminatory law, other states have retaliated by introducing similar laws.546 
All in all, the regulation – participation distinction is a much more formalistic test than 
the value reconciliation tests in law of justification.547 The choice for a formalistic 
approach in U.S. law might find some legitimization or explanation in perceived 
deficiencies in the proportionality tests applicable in law of justification of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. I shall return to this point in the chapters on law of justification. 
                                                 
544 White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). 
545 Carll v. South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Authority 327 S.E.2d 331 (S.C. 1985). 
546 Kingsley S. Osei, ‘The Best of Both Worlds: Reciprocal Preference and Punitive Retaliation in Public 
Contracts’ (2011) 40 Public Contracts L. J. 715. 
547 Cf. formalism in EU free movement law as a consequence of the decision in joined cases C-267/91 
and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernhard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
For criticism see e.g. L.W. Gormley, ‘Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judgment in Keck and 
Mithouard’ (1994) 5 European Business Law Rev. 63. 
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2.3.2.4. Market Participation, Public Procurement and the Private-Public Divide 
A contracting authority that makes an individual procurement decision would in 
principle be a market participant, even if it would often not tackle any market failure 
with its decision to procure. Consequently, it has been argued that a decision by a U.S. 
public authority to favor, for example, locally produced food would not be prima facie 
prohibited.548 A merely de facto discriminatory procurement provision to buy 
sustainable food or energy would then also fall under the market participant exception. 
It is, however, submitted that there may be pressure for the interpretation of the market 
participant exemption under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause to move in a different 
direction due to the fact that the U.S. has now become a party to the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA), which includes the requirements of non-
discrimination and equal treatment. 
In some cases the state regulator might decide to require the market participating 
authority, for example procuring authorities, to discriminate. This situation resembles 
but is not identical to any of the exempted cases described above. It is instead a form 
of self-regulation that might also enjoy an exemption from the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Namely, U.S. Courts of Appeals have applied the market participant exemption 
to cases where state laws have given preference to in-state goods or bidders in 
procurement procedures.549 No difference appears to have been made between 
requiring market participants to discriminate and merely granting them a right to do so. 
It is also worthy of note, that even if it in the case of discriminatory procurement laws 
often have been the legislator/regulator that introduces discrimination, it has been 
equated with market participatory discrimination. The procurement laws have regulated 
the behavior of contracting authorities, which have been regarded as market 
participants. 
The position on discriminatory public procurement laws of the Courts of Appeals may 
gain some support from a Supreme Court judgment in a case, White, concerning a city 
                                                 
548 Jason C. Czarnezki, ‘States as Market Participants in the U.S. and the EU?  - Public Purchasing and 
the Environment’ (2013) 2 Swedish Institute For European Policy Studies, 10-11; Amy S. Ackerman, 
‘Buy Healthy, Buy Local: An Analysis of Potential Legal Challenges to State and Local Government 
Purchase Preferences, (2011) 43 Urban Lawyer Journal 1015. 
549 Big County Foods Inc v. Anchorage School District, 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992); Smith Setzer & 
Sons, Inc. v S.C. Procurement Review Panel, 20 F.3d 1311 (4th Cir. 1994). See also J.F. Shea Co., Inc. 
v. Chicago, 992 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1993); Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Jason C. Czarnezki, ‘States as Market Participants in the U.S. and the EU?  - Public 
Purchasing and the Environment’ (2013) 2 Swedish Institute For European Policy Studies, 17-20. 
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ordinance that required projects financed with public financing to have 50 % local 
workers employed. It was here the private party receiving the public contract that would 
take the final discriminatory hiring decisions. The market participant exemption was 
ruled to apply to regulations that require governmental agencies or publicly financed 
entities to discriminate.550 
Even if the state regulator might require or allow procuring authorities or other publicly 
financed entities to discriminate, it is clear that it may not normally require private 
market participants without any link to the public sector to discriminate. Hence, even 
in U.S. law it might be important to draw the line between private and public. This is 
done through a nexus test.  
U.S. courts have ruled that when there is a contractual relationship between the private 
party and the state, for example through public procurement or other mechanisms of 
extensive public funding, the state might be free to require the private company to 
discriminate in its market activities, by selling or buying in-state goods or by employing 
state residents.551 This principle does, however, not apply when the state has merely 
granted a subsidy to the company, since there is no on-going contractual relationship 
that would create sufficient nexus.552 The whole doctrine invites abuse, since states may 
through the creation of a strong contractual nexus with private parties aim at securing 
that their requirements of discriminatory behavior survives Commerce Clause 
challenges.  
A doctrine on the applicability of the market participant exemption to state laws that 
require public entities and publicly financed enterprises to discriminate has perhaps 
emerged. Yet, it should again be noted that the measures under scrutiny in White and 
the in cases on the application of the market participant exemption to public 
procurement regulation are all from a time prior to U.S. accession to the GPA. The non-
discrimination principle in that agreement might create pressure to limit the scope of 
the market participant exemption in a public procurement context. 
At least one U.S. Court of Appeals has rejected the application of the market participant 
exemption to a state law related to public procurement. More specifically, the court 
examined in WCM Windows a state law that required contractors to employ only local 
                                                 
550 White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).  
551 Ibid. See also Big County Foods Inc v. Anchorage School District, 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992). 
552 Cf. South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   142 31.7.2019   7.15
 143 
workers in public projects. One could view this as a state law that required private 
parties to discriminate and that it therefore should not enjoy any exemption. However, 
in essence it was a question of a state law that required market participants (contracting 
authorities) to require private parties (the contractors) to discriminate. Therefore, there 
was at least some room for the argument that the exemption could have applied in 
accordance with White.  
The court in WCM Windows did not give relevance to the fact that it in the case were 
private contractors that would take the final discriminatory measure. Instead, the court 
emphasized that the discriminatory law was not only applied to cases where the state 
government was involved directly in the administration or the financing of the 
procuring authority but extended to all local public purchasers. In other words, the court 
distinguished between the state government and local authorities despite the latter being 
part of the state government. In the end, the court took the view that the discriminatory 
regulation on procurement would not be exempted.553 Yet, the differentiation between 
the state and local authorities that are part of the state appears formalistic and it is 
difficult to see why such distinction should be drawn. In conclusion, in case the 
exemption applies to state laws requiring discrimination in public procurement, the 
exemption should logically apply regardless of whether the market participant is the 
central state government or some subordinate local authority. 
As with the market participant exemptions generally, also the application of the 
exemption on some discriminatory public procurement laws is rather controversial. For 
example, while acknowledging that the exemption has applied under some 
circumstances to procurement laws, Czarnezki has still argued that in case state 
procurement laws encouraging local purchasing authorities to adopt sustainable 
procurement have discriminatory effect, they would need to be considered under law 
of justification.554 
2.3.2.5. Limits to the Market Participant Exemptions 
The scope of the exemptions is highly important because of the drastic consequences. 
When the market participation exemptions kicks in, normally no further proportionality 
                                                 
553 WCM Window Co v. Bernardi 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984); Benjamin C. Bair, ‘The Dormant 
Commerce Clause and State-Mandated Preference Laws in Public Contracting: Developing a More 
Substantive Application of the Market Participant Exemption’ (1995) 93 Michigan L. Rev. 2308.  
554 Jason C. Czarnezki, ‘States as Market Participants in the U.S. and the EU?  - Public Purchasing and 
the Environment’ (2013) 2 Swedish Institute For European Policy Studies, 25-26. 
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review has been applied.555 This offers flexibility for example for states to promote 
renewable energy. As described in the subsections above, the various types of market 
participant exemptions may perhaps not be limited by any market failure test. 
Moreover, it is unclear what the Supreme Court has meant when it has stated that one 
type of market participant exemption, namely the public entity exemption, applies when 
the state serves a public function.  
There are some known limits to the market participant exemption. Naturally, the 
exemption only exempts a measure from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, and not 
from any potential breach of some other part of the Constitution.556 What may be 
regarded as more of a true exception to the market participant doctrine is that when the 
state measure also simultaneously falls within the scope of prohibited extraterritorial 
regulation557, the latter doctrine prevails, and no exemption applies.558  
Another limitation relates to the definition of participation. As discussed above relating 
to public procurement, a state might participate in the market even when it is only in a 
contractual relationship with a private enterprise actually carrying out the business.559 
Activities not covered by that relationship but relating to business operations of the 
private party after completion of the contract or otherwise outside the sphere of any 
contract with the public sector, would certainly not fall under the exemption. For 
example, Alaska Department of Natural Resources had at one point in time the intention 
to sell timber. It required that the buyer would process the timber in-state. This 
requirement breached the dormant Commerce Clause because the market participant 
exemption would not apply. The court viewed the processing market not to be part of 
the market that the state participated in.560  
                                                 
555 White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. 
Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See, however, 
Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008). There the Court stated that previous 
case law has been inconsistent as to whether a lenient proportionality review should take place for de 
jure discriminatory measures that are covered by the market participant exemption. The review has, 
however, only been applied in the context of one type of market participant exemption; the public entity 
exemption. 
556 On the Foreign Commerce Clause see e.g. Brannon P. Denning and Jack H. McCall, Jr., ‘The 
Constitutionality of State and Local “Sanctions” against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States' 
Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?’ (1999) 26 Hastings Constitutional L. Q. 307. 
557 For a discussion on extraterritoriality in law of prohibition see section 6.1. 
558 Air Transport Association of America v. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
559 Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 311-313. 
560 South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   144 31.7.2019   7.15
 145 
Finally, the Supreme Court has also ruled that states may not restrict the export of 
natural resources.561 Coenen has suggested that trade in natural resources would form 
an exception to the market participant doctrine.562 It would, however, not seem 
necessary to interpret the cases on natural resources as exceptions. The cases concerned 
circumstances where the states had regulated the export of natural resources by private 
enterprises. The mere fact that the resources were within state boundaries did not make 
it a market participant in the first place. 
2.3.3. From Market Participation to Market Creation? 
2.3.3.1. Market Creation and the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause 
As discussed previously, many, although not all, of the market participant exemption 
cases have related to states addressing market failures. In addition, the public entity 
exemption has been linked to the notion of public function. A state might address 
market failure or serve a public function when creating new markets. Therefore, some 
scholars have speculated as to whether markets created by the state could be exempted 
from the dormant Commerce Clause.563 On the one hand, when states create markets it 
is often through regulation and not participation. On the other hand, the market 
participant exemptions have relied primarily on the theory that states should be able to 
benefit from what they have created.564  
States in the U.S. have a lot of liberty in designing their energy market. A RPS and the 
associated tradable RECs are created by the state. The state does not with such schemes 
participate in the market for electricity generation, wholesale or retail. Ferrey has 
argued that market creation is a form of regulation and since the trade in RECs will 
occur between private parties no exemption should apply. 565 However, the fate of 
market creation is not easy to judge, since the exemptions to the dormant Commerce 
Clause form a doctrine that has developed slowly and has not yet gained any definite 
form. 
                                                 
561 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-954 (1982); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
262 U.S. 553, 599 (1923). See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
562 Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press, 2004) 309-310. 
563 Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (HUP 1985) 146; Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, 
‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 295, 359-360.  
564 Dan T. Coenen, ‘Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause’ 
(1988) 88 Michigan L. Rev. 395, 422. 
565 Steven Ferrey, ‘Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the 
New Infrastructure of Renewable Power’ (2011-12) 7 Texas J. Oil, Gas & Energy L. 59, 103-105. 
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Fogel has discussed the applicability of the market participant exemptions on another 
form of promoting clean energy: the cap and trade system.566 A state cap and trade 
system for GHG emissions would set a cap on in-state emissions. Allowances that grant 
the right to emit GHG emissions are created by the state. These allowances are then 
distributed or auctioned to companies. Companies emitting less GHG emissions can 
sell their allowances to companies emitting more GHG emissions. This system will 
increase costs for the in-state industry that needs to ensure it has a sufficient amount of 
allowances. If interstate trade is not restricted, in-state producers will lose market share 
to out-of-state companies that are not subject to a similar scheme at home and thus are 
allowed to emit more. A restriction on access of out-of-state products to the in-state 
market is in this context called a leakage law.  
A leakage law will burden the out-of-state industry. Fogel has argued that the most 
palpable harm of a leakage law probably falls on the local community as they do not 
get access to less expensive imported products and that this could justify the law.567 
This is debatable, as the provisions, like any other discrimination, restricting interstate 
trade, restricts the market opportunities of out-of-state industries. As another argument 
in defending the legality of cap and trade systems with leakage laws Fogel classifies 
the cap and trade system as a public-private partnership. He argues that such model 
could potentially fall under the market participant exemptions.568 
It should be noted that the cap and trade system is a state-controlled program to promote 
clean air. Importantly, preventing the benefits of the program from being fully 
undermined due to leakage can be seen as a public function addressing market 
failure.569 These arguments would also apply with similar force to RPS schemes. Yet, 
it should be recalled that states take many measures for public benefit that still are 
categorized as regulations and in such cases the legitimate objectives of the public 
                                                 
566 Lawrence Fogel, ‘Serving a “Public Function”: Why Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs Should 
Survive a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge’ (2010) Wisconsin L. Rev. 1313. 
567 Id. 1342-1344. 
568 Id. 1347-1349. 
569 Id. 1345-1346. See however Steven Ferrey, ‘Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to 
the Regulation of Global Warming’ (2008) 35 Ecology L. Q. 835, 882. Acknowledging that the cap and 
trade system is created by the state, Ferrey still puts emphasis on the fact that even in a cap and trade 
system the parties doing the trading are private companies. The discussion on cap-and-trade systems 
could thus be linked to the debate on whether public-private partnerships should benefit from the 
exemptions to the Clause. On this problem see Dan T. Coenen, ‘Where United Haulers Might Take Us: 
The Future of the State-Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2010) 95 Iowa L. 
Rev. 541, 571. 
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function only come into play in law of justification. The case for a market creation 
exemption appears difficult to defend. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that there are some differences between creating 
a cap and trade system and a RPS. In a cap and trade system the state creates products 
(emission allowances) and the market in that same product. In a RPS the state also 
creates some products (RECs) and the market for them. However, in the context of a 
RPS one might also need to consider whether the market in an underlying product, 
renewable energy, already exists or has been created through the RPS. It is not clear 
whether this consideration is of significance. It could be argued that in the case of cap 
and trade systems the market is always non-existent before it is created, while the 
“degree” of creation might in the case of a RPS depend on how developed the market 
in the renewables that will be supported has been before the state actually intervenes 
with its supporting measures. Hence, even if a market creation exemption would apply, 
it would still not be evident that it would extend to a RPS. 
Some indications of the fate of a market creation exemption claim could perhaps be 
found in Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court has stated that a state may 
decide on the burdens on commerce, in case such commerce would not exist without 
subsidies having been granted.570 It could be argued, that the same principle should 
apply to markets that would not exist if the state had not created the tradable good. This 
would be the case of RECs created by states to allow for trade under a RPS scheme. 
The RECs are virtual creations that represent the environmental advantages of 
renewables.571 The credits are awarded with the objective of internalizing the 
externalities of non-renewables and they only exist through the decision of a state to 
create them. Yet, as noted above, trade in the underlying energy often exists even 
without any RECs. 
In 2013 the Supreme Court appeared to endorse a market creation exemption in 
McBurney v. Young. The plaintiff challenged a Virginia law that denied out-of-state 
residents access to state documents. It is debatable as to whether those documents were 
                                                 
570 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815 (1976). 
571 Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: 
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 
295, 335; Steven Ferrey, ‘Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat 
to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power’ (2011-12) 7 Texas J. of Oil, Gas & Energy L. 59, 102-
103. 
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articles of the commerce in the first place. The court, however, also made the following 
argument:  
“We have held that a State does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause when, 
having created a market through a state program, it “limits benefits generated by [that] 
state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to 
serve.” […] “Such policies, while perhaps ‘protectionist’ in a loose sense, reflect the 
essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government – to serve the 
citizens of the State.”572 
Arguments against a market creation exemption can equally be found in Supreme Court 
cases. For example, the Court has struck down state measures that limit the access of 
out-of-state vehicles to its roads, even if building roads could be seen as creation of 
new markets.573 Coenen has argued that construction and maintenance of channels of 
commerce, such as highways, form an exception to the market participant doctrine.574 
The decision to create a road network is an active and productive measure. Moreover, 
it is offering all traders a network to utilize, and in that sense creates markets for various 
articles of commerce. Precedent would thus suggest, that offering a network that 
enables trade does not make the state a market participant. To some extent this 
resembles a state decision to set up a system for trade in RECs. If accepted, this view 
would mean that no market creation exemption would apply. 
Altogether Supreme Court case law offers arguments both for and against a market 
creation exemption. Given that there still is limited guidance from the Supreme Court, 
some recent case law from lower courts with respect to the concept of market creation 
should be taken note of. For example, Allco Finance concerned the RPS adopted by 
Connecticut. The state grants RECs only to electricity that is delivered to the 
transmission network of New England, which covers Connecticut and a number of 
other states. In its decision, the district court575 briefly referred to market creation, 
                                                 
572 McBurney v. Young 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013). See also Dan Farber, ‘Constitutional Issues in Cap and 
Trade: New Light From an Unexpected Source’ (June 17, 2013) <http://legal-
planet.org/2013/06/17/constitutional-issues-in-cap-and-trade-new-light-from-an-unexpected-source/> 
accessed 13 May 2017. 
573 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 
450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
574 Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 312, 340-342. 
575 Allco Finance v. Klee, case no. 3:15-cv-608 (CSH) and 3:16-cv-508 (CSH) (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2016). 
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whereas the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit576 gave such an aspect no 
thought. Neither court found any violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
It is also worthy to recall the case of E&E Legal, in which the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Colorado examined the state RPS. The court upheld the state RPS 
without any reference to a market creation exemption.577 Instead the court concluded 
that the program did not breach the prohibition of extraterritorial regulation and to the 
extent the program might have had discriminatory effects, they were justified on 
environmental grounds.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was only 
asked to examine the case from the perspective of extraterritoriality578 and in the end 
affirmed the ruling.579 Market creation was thus never on the table. 
The confusion that prevails with respect to market participation exemptions generally 
and the issue of market creation in particular is apparent from a couple of recent district 
court decisions on state programs of awarding zero-emission credits to nuclear power 
plants. As explained already above,580 New York has adopted ZEC program under 
which the state authority purchases credits from nuclear power plants that deliver 
electricity to New York retail customers. This was challenged in Coalition for 
Competitive Electricity. While the district court concluded that it formed a subsidy 
exempted from any closer scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause, it also 
referred to the argumentation of the district court in Allco Finance and echoed the idea 
that a state acts as a market participant when it creates RECs/ZECs. The court did not 
seem to give relevance to the fact that in Allco Finance the Court of Appeals, unlike 
the district court, did not put emphasis on market creation.  
In its analysis of market participation and creation the district court in Coalition for 
Competitive Electricity also pointed out that the ZEC program did neither establish any 
“trade barrier” nor did it “prevent or regulate the flow of energy”.581 It is not entirely 
clear what the court intended to suggest with these expressions. Would a ZEC program 
or a RPS that has the effect of fully preventing market access be prima facie prohibited 
                                                 
576 Allco Finance v. Klee, Case no. 16-2946 (2nd Cir. 2017). 
577 Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Colo. 2014). 
578 For more on the case and extraterritoriality see section 6.1.6. 
579 Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015). The 10th 
circuit did not find the RPS to constitute extraterritorial regulation.  
580 See section 2.3.2.1. 
581 Coalition for Competitive Electricity et al v. Zibelman, Case No. 16-CV-8164 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. 
2017). 
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regulation and not market creation or participation? The Second Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the district court but did not rule on the merits of the Commerce Clause 
claim because the plaintiffs lacked standing.582 
Illinois has adopted a ZEC program that on many accounts resembles that of New York. 
The state will award ZECs to qualifying energy generating facilities. It is generally 
expected that those facilities will be two in-state nuclear power plants. Electricity 
utilities will then be obligated to purchase ZECs from those two plants. The district 
court in Old Mill Creek583 did not directly apply any subsidy, market participant or 
market creation exemption. Instead, it started by examining the program and found that 
there was no evidence of facial discrimination because the criteria for selecting the 
qualified energy generating facilities were objective. Interestingly, only after this 
finding did the court advance the idea that the creation of ZEC has created a new market 
in a new “credit commodity”. Importantly, the district court acknowledged that the 
implementation of the ZEC program could still affect the wholesale market in 
electricity. It is submitted that the market in credits and the market in electricity are 
closely connected. Despite seemingly recognizing this, the district court without much 
elaboration concluded that the burden on interstate trade in electricity was still only 
incidental. 
As a consequence of not relying on any exemption, the district court in Old Mill Creek 
had to evaluate whether any burden on interstate commerce (i.e. de facto 
discrimination) could be justifiable. Under the applicable proportionality test, the Pike 
balancing test,584 it is assessed whether the burden is clearly excessive of the benefits. 
Given that the court had found the burden to be incidental, it was as such not 
controversial that it went on to conclude that the ZEC program survived the Pike 
balancing test. The court emphasized the benefits of reduced GHG emissions. Yet, it 
should be noted that the court also took the unorthodox approach of adding to its 
arguments that also the right to market participation and market creation formed a 
legitimate objective that should be weighed against the burden on interstate commerce. 
The decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court.585 
                                                 
582 Coalition for Competitive Electricity v. Zibelman, case no. 17-2654-cv (2d Cir. 2018). 
583 Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163-1164 (N.D. Illinois 2017). 
584 See chapter 3 for more details on the Pike balancing test. 
585 Electric Power Supply Association v. Star, cases nos. 17-2433 & 17-2445 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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Courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, ought to elaborate more on the reasons for 
the market participant exemption. A better understanding of the reasons behind the 
market participation exemptions would offer better tools to evaluate the arguments for 
any market creation exemption. A market creation exemption could strengthen the 
position of strategies to internalize or otherwise tackle externalities. At the same time, 
the exemptions invite even de jure discrimination that may not be necessary for 
addressing externalities. Thus, market participation and creation exemptions would not 
appear to promote efficiency. The whole idea of a market creation exemption is 
questionable from the perspective of economic theory. This is why it is submitted here 
that such an exemption should not be introduced. It would be vital that if courts still opt 
to apply any such exemption, they explain why it is reasonable to deviate from an 
economic ratio in economic law. 
2.3.3.2. Market Creation and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures586 (SCM Agreement) is part 
of WTO law. It may be recalled that subsidies that are specific to an enterprise, an 
industry, a group of enterprises or a group of industries within the jurisdiction of the 
granting authority, do not comply with the SCM Agreement under certain conditions. 
For example, subsidies are prohibited if they are contingent on export performance or 
the use of domestic goods. In addition, subsidies are actionable in case they cause 
prejudice to the interests of other states, injury to their industry or nullifies benefits 
accruing under GATT. 
In the SCM agreement a subsidy is defined as a financial contribution by a public body. 
Subsidies may also take the form of government income or price support. Regardless 
of form, an additional condition for the existence of a subsidy is that the contribution, 
income or support confers a benefit. 
A few years ago, Ontario offered a FIT to companies that generated electricity from 
renewable resources, under the condition that the facilities utilized in-state equipment 
and labor to a sufficient degree. This system was challenged in Canada – Renewables 
and was found to clearly breach the non-discrimination principle in GATT.587 The 
                                                 
586 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
587 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS412 and Canada 
– Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, AB Report, 6 May 2013. 
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Appellate Body concluded though, that the FIT was not a subsidy and therefore would 
not breach the SCM Agreement. 
In applying the SCM Agreement, the AB pointed out two reasons why the FIT did not 
confer any benefit. First, the AB found that the electricity markets for fossil fuels and 
renewables are separate.588 This narrow definition of the relevant market that in essence 
disregarded competition and substitutability has received harsh criticism.589 Secondly, 
the AB introduced a market creation test. Namely, it claimed that the market for 
electricity from renewable resources would not exist without government regulation. 
According to the AB, the market could be created through FITs or quantity mandates.590 
The AB added that the measures by a government to create a market cannot distort the 
market because without the intervention the market would not exist in the first place.591 
The market creation test has also received harsh criticism from commentators. First, 
there is little in the text of the SCM Agreement that would hint to any such test.592 
Secondly, it would be very difficult to draw the line between created and existing 
markets.593 For example, the market for advanced biofuels would probably be regarded 
as a created market currently.594 How long would the market need to exist and how 
competitive would the sector need to become before it is an existing market?  
The most serious concern relating to the market creation test is that it will allow states 
to pursue industrial policy.595 Namely, the measures to create new markets do not 
                                                 
588 Id., paras 5.171-178. 
589 Luca Rubini, ‘What does recent WTO litigation on renewable energy subsidies tell us about 
methodology in legal analysis? The good, the bad, and the ugly’ (2014) EUI Working Papers – RSCAS 
05; Luca Rubini, ‘The wide and the narrow gate: Benchmarking in the SCM Agreement after the Canada 
– Renewable Energy/FIT ruling’ (2015) EUI Working Papers – RSCAS 09, 7. 
590 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, DS412 and Canada 
–  Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, DS426, AB Report, 6 May 2013, para. 5.175. 
591 Id., para. 5.188. 
592 Luca Rubini, ‘The wide and the narrow gate: Benchmarking in the SCM Agreement after the Canada 
– Renewable Energy/FIT ruling’ (2015) EUI Working Papers – RSCAS 09, 9; Aaron Cosbey and Petros 
C. Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The 
Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) EUI Working Paper Series – RSCAS 
17, 1. 
593 Luca Rubini, ‘The wide and the narrow gate. Benchmarking in the SCM Agreement after the Canada 
– Renewable Energy/FIT ruling’ (2015) EUI Working Papers – RSCAS 09, 9; Aaron Cosbey and Petros 
C. Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The 
Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) EUI Working Paper Series – RSCAS 
17, 12-13. 
594 Harri Kalimo, Filip Sedefov and Max S. Jansson, ‘Market Definition as Value Reconciliation: The 
Case of Renewable Energy Promotion Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures’ (2017) 17 International Environmental Agreements: Politics Law and Economics 427. 
595 Aaron Cosbey and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy 
and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) EUI 
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always rely only on objectives that are considered justifiable, such as environmental 
protection.596 Even in the case at hand, Canada – Renewables, it was evident that the 
FIT was designed and introduced also in order to create local jobs. 
The market creation test would significantly narrow the scope of what constitutes a 
subsidy under the SCM Agreement. Yet, the SCM Agreement is not meant to offer 
states a ‘carte blanche’, but to strike a delicate balance between conflicting interests 
and to mitigate uncertainty.597 The narrow relevant market test and the market creation 
test do not appear well suited for reconciling the relevant values. 
The problem with the SCM Agreement is that there are no applicable grounds of 
justification related to environmental protection. As a consequence, the AB was forced 
to adhere to ‘legal acrobatics’.598 In interpreting the SCM Agreement one will face a 
similar dilemma as when applying Article 2.1 TBT or Article 110 TFEU; without any 
explicit grounds of justification the method for value reconciliation must be searched 
for elsewhere. 
An option would be to revise the SCM Agreement, for example by adding grounds of 
justification.599 These grounds could be comparable to those in Article XX GATT or 
refer to the correction of market failures.600 Whatever the solution, the consensus seems 
to be that the market creation test introduced in connection with the SCM Agreement 
is far from ideal. The test is a way to recognize that market failures justify government 
intervention and its application could be specified in the future. Yet, in focusing on the 
distinction between new and old markets the test would appear to miss more relevant 
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596 Steve Charnovitz and Carolyn Fischer, ‘Canada – Renewable Energy: Implications For WTO Law on 
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597 US – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the 
EC, DS108, Panel Report, 20 Aug. 2001, para. 8.39. 
598 Aaron Cosbey and Petros Mavroidis, ‘Heavy Fuel: Trade and Environment in the GATT/WTO Case 
Law’ (2014) 23 Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 23, 288-301; 
Aaron Cosbey and Petros Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and 
Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) Journal of 
International Economic Law 11. 
599 Steve Charnovitz and Carolyn Fischer, ‘Canada – Renewable Energy: Implications For WTO Law on 
Green and Not-so-green Subsidies’, in Carlo Carraro (ed.), Climate Change and Sustainable 
Development, (2014) Nota Di Lavoro 94, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 51. 
600 Aaron Cosbey and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy 
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Working Paper Series – RSCAS 17, 24-27. 
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questions of value reconciliation, such as whether or not the subsidy is designed to 
efficiently achieve legitimate objectives. 
2.3.4. A Comparison with EU Law 
2.3.4.1. State Regulation Contra Market Participation in Public Procurement 
The U.S. dormant Commerce Clause covers state regulation, whereas state market 
participation is not covered. EU free movement law is similar to the dormant Commerce 
Clause in that it covers state regulation. A difference between the two is that in contrast 
to the U.S. doctrine, no market participant exemption is applied for state participation 
in EU free movement law.  
Some academic debate has emerged on an exemption to EU free movement law for 
public procurement. Before examining the exemption, some background information 
must be provided. First, all forms of economic activity on the internal market, including 
procurement are governed by the Articles of the TFEU. Public procurement shall 
therefore also fall under the scope of free movement law.601 Secondly, EU free 
movement law applies only to ‘measures’. Discriminatory national procurement laws 
are measures and may fall foul of free movement law.602 Similarly, as discussed 
previously,603 a general and consistently applied practice is also a measure covered by 
free movement law.604 A single tender forms an administrative decision but is neither 
general nor consistently applied. It could be argued that individual decisions on the 
design of a call for tenders, including the technical specifications and the award criteria 
for that specific case, do not form any general and consistent administrative practice 
and should therefore be excluded from the category of measures that may constitute 
                                                 
601 Case 45/87 Commission v. Ireland (Dundalk Water Supply) [1988] ECR 4929, Opinion of AG 
Darmon, para. 28; Case C-225/98 Commission v. France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) [2000] ECR I-7445, 
para. 83; Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin 
kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, paras 63 and 82; Recital 1, Directive 2014/24/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing 
Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Recital 2, Directive 2014/25/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 
243; Recital 4, Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. 
602 Case 3/88 Commission v. Italy (Data Processing) [1989] ECR 4035, para. 9; Joined cases C-147/06 
and C-148/06 SECAP SpA and Santoroso Soc. coop. arl v. Comune di Torino [2008] ECR I-3565, para. 
35. 
603 See section 2.1.2.1. 
604 Case 21/84 Commission v. France (Postal Franking Machine) [1985] ECR 1355, para. 13; Case C-
489/06 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECR I-1797, paras. 46-56. 
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prohibited restrictions on trade.605 However, the ECJ has still applied EU free 
movement law to single procurements.606 It is against this background that the 
discussion on a potential exemption for some procurement decisions has emerged.  
The exemption proposed by some scholars would apply for de facto discriminatory 
public procurement decisions on what to buy (so called excluded buying decisions).607 
A prominent view in the field of public procurement is that public authorities should 
have a broad discretion in specifying the subject-matter of their contract.608 An 
exemption to EU free movement law for decisions on what to buy could be regarded as 
linked to the market participant doctrine. In making decisions on what to buy public 
authorities would act as market participants.609  
The potential exemption would not apply to de jure discriminatory procurement 
decisions and other procurement criteria closely linked to geographical origin, such as 
language requirements.610 In addition, it is clear from the ECJ case law that it could not 
apply to decisions on ‘from whom to buy’. For example, Serrantoni concerned an 
Italian law that prohibited members of permanent consortiums to submit bids in the 
                                                 
605 Peter Kunzlik, ‘Green Public Procurement – European Law, Environmental Standards and ‘What To 
Buy’ Decisions’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental law 173, 193. 
606 Case 45/87 Commission v. Ireland (Dundalk Water Supply) [1988] ECR 4929; Case C-359/93 
Commission v The Netherlands [1995] ECR I-197, paras. 23-29; Case C-234/03 Contse SA and others v. 
Instituto Nacional de Gestión (Ingesa), formerly Instituto Nacional de la Salud (Insalud) [2005] ECR I-
9315. See also C-226/09 Commission v. Ireland [2010] ECR I-11807, paras. 29 and 41; Case C-231/03 
Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di Cingia de’ Botti [2005] ECR I-7287, paras. 17-22; 
C-260/04 Commission v. Italy (Horse-race betting) [2007] ECR I-7083, paras. 25-36; Adrian Tokar, 
Institutional Report, in Ulla Neergaard, Catherine Jacqueson and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke (eds.), Public 
Procurement Law: Limitations, Opportunities and Paradoxes, The XXVI FIDE Congress in 
Copenhagem, 2014 Congress Publications Vol. 3, 192. 
607 For arguments for an exemption see Peter Kunzlik, ‘Green Public Procurement – European Law, 
Environmental Standards and ‘What To Buy’ Decisions’ (2013) 25 J. Environmental Law 173, 188-193; 
Roberto Caranta, ‘General Report’, in Ulla Neergaard, Catherine Jacqueson and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke 
(eds.), Public Procurement Law: Limitations, Opportunities and Paradoxes, The XXVI FIDE Congress 
in Copenhagen, 2014 Congress Publications Vol. 3, 135-139; Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik, ‘EC 
Regulation of Public Procurement’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and 
Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 59-68; Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of 
the EC Treaty and directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical Review, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter 
Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 160-162. 
608 Catherine Weller and Janet Meissner Pritschard, ‘Evolving CJEU Jurisprudence: Balancing 
Sustainability Considerations with the Requirements of the Internal market’ (2013) EPPPL 55, 56; 
Buying Green! A Handbook on Environmental Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 
2011) 22.  
609 For a discussion on the state as regulator and buyer/consumer see Christopher McCrudden, Buying 
Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 538-568. 
610 Case 45/87 Commission v. Ireland (Dundalk Water Supply) [1988] ECR 4929; Case C-379/87 Anita 
Groener v. Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Educational Committee [1989] 
ECR 3976; Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4139; 
Case C-243/89 Commission v. Denmark (Storebealt) [1993] ECR I-3353, para. 45; Case 76/81 SA 
Transporoute et Travaux v. Minister of Public Works [1982] ECR 417, para. 14. 
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same tender as the consortium. The ECJ concluded that such law was in breach of the 
principle of equal treatment and the principle of proportionality.611 The ECJ added that 
the law also constituted a prima facie prohibited non-discriminatory hinder to market 
access and was not justifiable due to the disproportionality of the measure in relation to 
its objectives.612 Thus, the Court seemed to apply the tests of free movement law. 
A more recent case, Spezzino, concerned an authority that gave preference to non-profit 
organizations in awarding contracts for ambulance services. The court applied free 
movement law and while it was prima facie prohibited to disfavour for-profit entities, 
the measures were in the end declared justifiable on social grounds.613 Moreover, in 
Libor, the court had to assess the decision by an authority in Milan to exclude a bidder 
on the grounds of unpaid social security contributions. Albeit the provisions of the 
directives were not applicable to the case, the ECJ applied free movement law. Without 
any reflections on potential discrimination, the decision by the authority was regarded 
as a prima facie prohibited trade hinder. It could still be justified on grounds relating to 
ensuring “the reliability, diligence and responsibility of the tenderer and its proper 
conduct in relation to its employees”.614  
A prohibition on members of a consortium to compete with the consortium, giving 
preference to non-profit actors and excluding bidders with unpaid social security 
contributions can all be classified as decisions on from whom to buy. The ECJ has also 
applied free movement law in cases where purchasing authorities required the bidder 
to have offices in a specific region615 or to be established in a specific region.616 These 
cases could be regarded both as de jure discriminatory and as decisions on from whom 
to buy. Finally, the ECJ has found that direct awards may create prohibited hinders to 
                                                 
611 Case 376/08 Serrantoni Srl and Consorzio stabile edili Scrl v. Comune di Milano [2009] ECR I-
12169, paras. 31-46. 
612 Id. paras 41-45. 
613 Case C-113/13 Azienda sanitaria locale n. 5 <<Spezzino>> and Others v. San Lorenzo Soc. Coop. 
sociale and Croce Verde Cogema Coop. Soc. Onlus, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2440, paras 51-52, 65. 
614 Case C-358/12 Consorzio Stabile Libor Lavori Pubblici v. Comune di Milano, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2063, paras 24-41. 
615 Case C-360/89 Commission v. Italy [1992] ECR I-3401, paras 7-15; Case C-234/03 Contse SA and 
others v. Instituto Nacional de Gestión Sanitaria (Ingesa), formerly Instituto Nacional de la Salud 
(Insalud) [2005] ECR I-9315, paras 37-38, 41-46, 55, 56-67, 79. 
616 Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v. Unita sanitaria locale No 2 di Carrara [1990] 
ECR I-889, para. 11-18; Case C-351/88 Laboratori Bruneau Srl Unita sanitaria locale RM/24 di 
Monterotondo [1991] ECR I-3641, paras 7-8. 
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the market access of foreign bidders.617 Hence, decisions on how to buy would also not 
fall under any exemption. 
It is sometimes difficult to draw a clear distinction between decisions on what to buy 
and from whom to buy it. Moreover, the ECJ has never confirmed the existence of this 
type of exemption. Unsurprisingly, the idea of an exemption for decisions on what to 
buy has received criticism.618 
In case law on environmental sustainability criteria the ECJ has generally stated that 
free movement law applies but has not carried out any detailed analysis of 
discrimination.619 For example, the Concordia case concerned a tender organized by 
the city of Helsinki for a bus route. The city had stated in the award criteria that 
additional points would be awarded on the basis of the pollution profile of the buses. In 
practise, the pollution profile criterion in Concordia eliminated most potential bidders 
from the race and one of the few transport undertakings eligible for those extra points 
was the city’s own company. The ECJ stated that this did not mean that the tender 
design breached the procurement law principle of equal treatment.620 Although the 
criteria also appeared to have discriminatory effect, the ECJ did not make any explicit 
conclusion on that point. 
Wienstrom, in turn, was a case where a public authority in Austria had published a call 
for tenders for electricity. The authority had specified that the power must come from 
renewable resources. While some aspects of the criteria were incompatible with the 
directive and therefore never assessed under free movement law,621 the Court also 
                                                 
617 Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] I-8585, 
para. 50; Case C-220/06 Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de 
Correspondencia v Administración General del Estado (Correos), ECLI:EU:C:2007:815, para. 76. See 
also Berend Jan Drijber and Helene Stergiou, ‘Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law’ (2009) 
46 C.M.L.Rev. 805, 817-819. 
618 Jörgen Hettne, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement and the Single Market – Is There a Conflict of 
Interest?’ (2013) 8 E.P.P.P.L. 31, 36-37; Agris Peedu, ‘National Report – Estonia’, in Ulla Neergaard, 
Catherine Jacqueson and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke (eds.), Public Procurement Law: Limitations, 
Opportunities and Paradoxes, The XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, 2014 Congress Publications 
Vol. 3, 330. 
619 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin 
kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, paras 63 and 82. On social sustainability criteria 
see also Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v The Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, para. 37. For a 
discussion on whether there might have been discrimination at hand see Lawrence Gormley, ‘Some 
Reflections on Public Procurement in the European Community’ (1990) 1 European Business Law 
Review 63. 
620 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin 
kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, paras. 85-86. 
621 Similarly see Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284. The 
case concerned the decision by a public authority in the Netherlands to purchase coffee machines and 
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examined whether it was in breach of free movement to assign environmental criteria 
a weight of 45 % in the comparison of bids. The ECJ simply concluded that no evidence 
had been presented that would suggest any breach of the Treaty provisions of free 
movement.622 
In case the exemption for decisions on what to buy was implicitly considered and 
regarded applicable by the ECJ in Concordia, which concerned environmental effects 
in the consumption phase, would it also have applied in Wienstrom? The latter case 
concerned PPM-criteria, which fall somewhere in-between the categories of ‘what to 
buy’ and ‘who can sell’.  It has been argued that the lack of any proportionality review 
in Wienstrom would indicate that decisions on PPM-criteria belong to the category of 
decisions on what to buy and that these are exempted from free movement law review 
under a market participant doctrine.623 Interestingly, in other academic works it has 
been argued that criteria on PPMs should not fall into the category of excluded buying 
decisions and would need to be justified.624 Similarly to criteria on PPMs, criteria on 
delivery methods may or may not be categorized as decisions on what to buy. 
A decision on who needs to be employed by the entity that gets the contract has not 
been viewed as part of excluded buying decisions.625 There has been more uncertainty 
as to whether excluded buying decisions could cover the working conditions of those 
employed.626 A recent case appears to now have rejected the possibility of referring to 
any exemption with respect to working condition criteria. A German authority had 
required that bidders guarantee that also their subcontractors carrying out work in other 
                                                 
apply criteria relating to labels that are awarded for producers with organic farming methods (ecological 
criteria) and who pay small-scale developing country producers a fair price (fair trade criteria). 
622 Case C-448/01 EVN AG & Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, para. 43. 
623 Peter Kunzlik, ‘Green Public Procurement – European Law, Environmental Standards and ‘What To 
Buy’ Decisions’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 173, 189-191. 
624 Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik, EC Regulation of Public Procurement, in Sue Arrowsmith and 
Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 65-66; 
Sue Arrowsmith, Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical Review, 
in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (ed.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law 
(CUP 2009) 150 and 160. According to Arrowsmith most PPM-related criteria would however be 
justifiable. 
625 Sue Arrowsmith, Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical 
Review, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (ed.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 150; Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. The Netherlands [1988] ECR 
4635, para. 30; Case C-225/98 Commission v. France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) [2000] ECR I-7445, para. 
50. 
626 Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik, EC Regulation of Public Procurement, in Sue Arrowsmith and 
Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 68. This 
uncertainty also concerns criteria that prohibit child labour. 
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countries, such as Poland, comply with German minimum wage provisions. 
Interestingly, the ECJ did not seem to outright condemn the extraterritorial dimension 
of the requirement. However, it was very clear on the point that free movement law 
applied, that the requirement to pay German salaries in Poland was discriminatory and 
that, despite its social objective, the criterion was not proportional since the costs of 
living in Poland did not necessitate salaries of German levels.627 
Much uncertainty remains with respect to the existence and application of an exemption 
on decisions by procuring public authorities on what to buy. There is thus a need for 
ECJ rulings clarifying the matter. It is argued here that the court should not develop any 
exemption to EU free movement law that would rely on the perception of the state 
authorities as market participants when they purchase for example goods and services.  
Even if the case load could increase with no exemption for decisions on what to buy,628 
the solution should for several reasons not be the introduction of an exemption to free 
movement law. First, public authorities never act purely as market participants in the 
same way as private parties do but also consider the wider implications of their actions 
and often pursue social policy goals.629 It is characteristic of the state to address 
externalities that profit-oriented companies may neglect due to their focus on company, 
and not societal, costs. Secondly, if public authorities had the right to define the market 
by a decision on what to buy,630 it would open up for the risk of public authorities 
defining a narrow market with the effect, or even intent, of practically making bidding 
impossible for out-of-state companies that do not offer the same required goods, but 
still are competitors on the same market in the eyes of buyers and consumers more 
generally because they offer substitutes to the goods that the contracting authority has 
defined that it wants to purchase. The re-definition of the relevant market and like 
products taken by a public authority would be in contradiction with to the principle of 
non-discrimination and would be detrimental to free trade and efficiency. Thirdly, an 
exemption would create incoherence as states could carry out an industrial policy 
                                                 
627 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235, paras 30-34. 
628 For such concerns see Peter Kunzlik, ‘Green Public Procurement – European Law, Environmental 
Standards and ‘What To Buy’ Decisions’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 173, 192-193. 
629 See e.g. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 
procurement, 20.12.2011, COM (2011) 896 final, p.2; Catherine Weller and Janet Meissner Pritschard, 
‘Evolving CJEU Jurisprudence: Balancing Sustainability Considerations with the Requirements of the 
Internal market’ (2013) EPPPL 55. 
630 For this suggestion see Peter Kunzlik, ‘Green Public Procurement – European Law, Environmental 
Standards and ‘What To Buy’ Decisions’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 173, 192. 
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agenda through public procurement even if the same objectives could not be pursued 
through other measures. Finally, the risks of a continuously high case load could partly 
be mitigated by Commission guidance and clear rulings by the ECJ on how public 
tenders ought to be designed in order to comply with free movement law. 
In conclusion, the idea of market participant exemptions has generally been rejected in 
EU free movement law. Yet, the peculiar case of public procurement decisions 
illustrated that some pressure to go down that path can also be identified in EU free 
movement law. Admittedly, the proposed exemption may be less controversial if it 
applies only when there has been some individual decision by an authority and not 
when national procurement laws or general and consistent procurement practices define 
what to buy with the intent or consequence of favoring in-state products or bidders. 
2.3.4.2. Private Market Participation and Private Regulation 
Private market participation is not covered by the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause. In 
turn, the status of private regulation has not been challenged in the U.S.  This would 
indicate that it is regarded as also not covered. 
Similarly to U.S. law, EU free movement law does at least as a rule not cover private 
market participation. The ECJ has clarified that it is measures enacted by states that fall 
under the rules of free movement law and that private parties cannot breach Article 
34.631 However, the ECJ has also ruled that measures by private parties can be covered 
by the rules on free movement under certain conditions.  
First of all, measures by private parties are covered by free movement law in case there 
is a sufficient nexus between the private and the public. Under EU free movement law 
the state is responsible for the actions of private companies and organizations if it has 
established the private entity, defines its objectives, appoints its management, delegates 
power to it through either laws or contracts, or if the entity is fully or at least primarily 
financed by the state.632 Comparably under GATT panels have concluded that sufficient 
                                                 
631 Case 311/85 ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. ASBL Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke 
en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR 3801, para. 30; Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic v. Eco-
Emballages SA [2002] ECR I-5031, para. 74. See also Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave 
Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para. 5. 
632 Case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005, para. 15; Case 222/82 Apple and 
Pear Development Council v. K. J. Lewis Ltd and others [1983] ECR 4083, para. 17; Case C-16/94 
Édouard Dubois & Fils SA and Général Cargo Services SA v. Garonor Exploitation SA [1995] ECR I-
2421, para. 20; Case C-325/00 Commission v. Germany [2002] ECR I-9977, paras 17-21; Case C-171/11 
Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) – Technisch-
Wissenschaftlicher Verein, ECLI:EU:C:2012:453, paras 27-32. 
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nexus exists in case the company adopting the discriminatory measure is a trading 
monopoly established by the state.633 The nexus test has been introduced with the 
purpose of hindering states from circumventing the law by working through private 
organizations. 
The test of sufficient nexus is not the only doctrine on the applicability of EU free 
movement law to measures by private parties. The ECJ has ruled that a ‘group or an 
organization that exercises certain power over individuals and can impose conditions’ 
as well as organizations that ‘regulate in a collective manner’ are bound by free 
movement law.634 These have generally been organizations that have some form of 
exclusive rights recognized in law, such as trade unions and bar associations. However, 
also sports organizations, which are a type of natural monopoly, are caught by the 
‘collective regulation’ test. In sum, EU free movement law appears, perhaps unlike the 
dormant Commerce Clause, to cover even some private regulation. On the one hand, 
this approach blurs the line between free movement law and competition law, where 
companies with a dominant position on the market are prohibited from discriminating 
because such action would constitute abuse of the dominant position.635 On the other 
hand, the application of the non-discrimination principle to private parties with 
regulatory powers could also be viewed to complement EU competition law. 
                                                 
633 Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10, Panel Report, 5 
Oct. 1990 (adopted), para. 79; Import, distribution and sale of Alcoholic Beverages by Canadian 
Marketing Agencies, L/6304, Panel Report, 5 Feb. 1988 (adopted), para. 4.26; Canada – Import, 
distribution and sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, DS17, Panel Report, 
16 Oct. 1991 (adopted), para. 5.15. Note also that Article 3.1 TBT states that WTO members must ensure 
that even non-governmental bodies respect Article 2 TBT, including the non-discrimination provisions. 
This requirement applies, however, only if the non-governmental body has a legal power to enforce 
technical regulations. The requirement of legal power to enforce indicates that a nexus to the legislative 
(regulating) functions of the state must exist. 
634 Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405, para. 17; Case 266/87 
The Queen v. Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, ex parte Association of Pharmaceutical 
Importers and others [1989] ECR 1295, para. 14; Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal Club Liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and 
others and Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR 
I-4921, paras 82-87; Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v. Ligue Francophone de 
Judo et Disciplines Associées ASBL, Ligue Belge de Judo ASBL, Union Européenne de Judo (C-51/96) 
and François Pacquée (C-191/97) [2000] ECR I-2549, para. 60; Case C-411/98 Angelo Ferlini v. Centre 
Hospitalier de Luxembourg [2000] ECR I-8081, para. 50; Case C-309/99 J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. 
Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde 
van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap [2002] ECR I-1577, para. 
120; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others [2007] 
ECR I-11767, para. 98; Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 33-37. 
635 See Article 102 TFEU. 
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Sustainability standards and related labels or certification have been developed by 
NGOs in many fields in order to complement government action. These voluntary 
certificates serve to inform consumers that, for example, products are not the result of 
unsustainable forestry or that food has been produced in accordance with principles of 
organic farming. These sustainability labels illustrate what has been called the 
privatization of regulation.636 
Could the collective regulation test be applicable for voluntary private labelling 
schemes? In comparison with sports associations some, perhaps crucial, differences can 
be identified. Although the labelling scheme would regulate in a collective manner, it 
might perhaps not exercise sufficient power over companies, in particular as it could 
not impose conditions. Of course, a labelling scheme could even have a natural 
monopoly, but it is not clear whether that alone would be sufficient for free movement 
law to apply. First, companies have the option of not adopting the label. Secondly, there 
is still a real possibility of the introduction of competing labels to the market. In 
contrast, in the sports sector all clubs are bound by the rules of the national association 
and it is often unrealistic to expect competing associations. Having two competing sport 
associations with their separate national championships would disturb the functioning 
of the system in a fundamental way. Hence, the argument for the applicability of EU 
free movement law to measures by private parties is somewhat weaker in the case of 
labelling schemes.  
Some authors have argued that in addition to the more established tests of collective 
regulation and state nexus, also ‘powerful’ private market actors would be bound by 
the provisions on free movement of goods.637 This would appear to invite some form 
of de minimis test. Yet, the suggested approach would be problematic when put in the 
context of sustainability labels. A labelling organization would become powerful only 
once its labels have been widely adopted. However, it would not seem in line with the 
rationale of free trade that once consumers have made the choice of valuing highly 
some label, that scheme could prima facie breach the Treaty. 
                                                 
636 Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World 
Economy (Princeton University Press 2012). 
637 Christoph Krenn, ‘A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect “Jigsaw”: Horizontal Direct Effect and 
the Free Movement of Goods’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Rev. 177; Gareth Davies, ‘Freedom of 
Movement, Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract’ (2012) 20 European Review of Private Law 
805, 813. 
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There have been cases that even a powerful regulator test could not explain. In a few 
odd cases on free movement of workers and services the ECJ has applied the free 
movement provisions on action taken by private parties on normal competitive markets. 
The Court also made no reference to any collective regulation or nexus test. Two of 
these cases have related to discrimination by companies of jobseekers. The third case 
related to discriminatory car insurance conditions. In justifying why free movement law 
applied to a measure by a private party the ECJ referred to TFEU Articles on EU 
citizenship and non-discrimination of nationality as well as to the fundamental nature 
of the freedoms. 638  It is unclear as to whether this far-reaching application of free 
movement law should apply only in cases of de jure discriminatory measures.639 
The broad application of free movement law to private measures relating to the free 
movement of workers and services in a few odd cases does seem at odds with the 
statements in cases on trade in goods explicitly rejecting the applicability of EU free 
movement law to measures by private parties.640 However, the cases where EU free 
movement law has been applied to measures by private parties without any reference 
either to the collective regulation or the nexus test have been rare. When it comes to 
trade in goods and services EU free movement law should normally not apply to private 
party measures other than those attributed to the state or those constituting collective 
private regulation. De jure discrimination of people (jobseekers) is perhaps such a 
severe threat to the idea of EU citizenship that it constitutes a special case under the 
Treaty rules, including free movement law. 
                                                 
638 Case 251/83 Eberhard Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG [1984] ECR 4277, paras 14-
18 (free movement of workers/services), paras 19-23 (free movement of goods); Case C-281/98 Roman 
Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR I-4193, paras 30-36; Case C-94/07 Andrea 
Raccanelli v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV [2008] ECR I-5939, paras 
40-46. 
639 One of the cases related to different treatment of cars with customs registration plates (indicating 
country of registration) and another to the different treatment of job applicants without a national 
language certificate. The cases are very close to de jure discrimination. The third case related to the 
opportunity of applicants to receive an employment contract instead of a grant. The ECJ left it to the 
national court to determine whether there was discrimination. It did, however, not explicitly state that 
the discrimination would only be prohibited if the criteria applied for receiving employment contracts 
were related directly to nationality. 
640 Case 311/85 ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. ASBL Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke 
en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR 3801, para. 30; Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic v. Eco-
Emballages SA [2002] ECR I-5031, para. 74. See also Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave 
Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para. 5. 
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2.3.4.3. Opposite Paths in the EU and the U.S. 
Trade law in both the EU and the U.S. cover state regulation and as a rule neither cover 
private participation. There are still differences between the two jurisdictions in that the 
U.S. exempts state participation and the EU in turn covers some private regulation. Yet, 
the EU state nexus test for covering private party measures and the U.S. market 
participation tests for exempting state participation still share some common traits at 
the level of theory. They have emerged from the realization that the classic idea of the 
state as regulator and private parties as market actors does not hold in modern society. 
The complexities of both regulatory and market activities have, however, pushed EU 
and U.S. in part in opposite directions. While U.S. courts have carved exemptions for 
the state to the non-discrimination principle, the ECJ has expanded the scope of prima 
facie prohibited measures.  
Both the EU and the U.S. model can be problematic for efficiency. The U.S. model is 
very favourable for environmental strategies but might invite unnecessary de jure 
discrimination. The EU model, in turn, might present a challenge for market-based 
solutions to externalities. However, it was observed that even if the ECJ has perhaps 
opened Pandora’s box with the application of free movement law to a surprisingly 
broad range of cases of private party action, the case law would still on most accounts 
allow for the construction of tests that significantly limit the applicability of EU free 
movement law to measures by private parties and thus may well not extend to voluntary 
PPM-labelling schemes established and administered by private organizations. 
Furthermore, in the case of EU, grounds of justification provide a safeguard for market-
based measures with legitimate objectives. 
2.3.5 Market Participant Tests and the Economic Approach 
The market participant tests have been applied under the dormant Commerce Clause 
already for quite some time. The idea of granting the state in its capacity as market 
participants more freedom to drive in-state policy has not been developed to the same 
extent under EU free movement law. This would suggest that the level of market 
integration is higher in the EU.  
A thought underlying the market participant tests would appear to be that public bodies 
can be compared to private actors when they take on economic activities on the market. 
It has thus more or less implicitly been suggested that the public body should in this 
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capacity have comparable freedom. The rationale is somewhat similar to that of the 
principle of competitive neutrality familiar from competition law. In accordance with 
the competition neutrality principle the public and private actors should face a level 
playing field.641 However, in competition law the concern is that the public sector 
would distort the market through benefits that public entities enjoy, whereas reversely 
the market participant exemption aims to address concerns that public entities would 
be in a less favorable position. 
The problem with equating state market participants with private market participants is 
that the state rarely genuinely acts according to the same business logic as private 
parties. It is in practice also difficult to make a distinction between regulation and 
participation. That point became evident from the analysis of the case law, in which the 
market participant exemption has been applied even when there were regulatory 
elements at hand. 
There have been further arguments made in connection with the application of the 
market participant exemptions. It was noted that they have been applied with reference 
to the right of the state to ensure that benefits are kept in-state when measures are 
funded by in-state taxpayers and carried out by the state. Yet, it is difficult to see how 
this argument can be reconciled with the objective of eliminating protectionism. 
Economically it would make no difference if the state favors the in-state industry 
through restrictive regulations or through publicly funded initiatives. 
It could potentially be argued that discrimination by state market participants would not 
evolve into a significant problem since a state will be accountable to its voters when it 
decides to discriminate through state market participation.642 However, the same, fairly 
weak, accountability applies also in case of discriminatory market regulation. 
Yet another argument used in the context of applying the market participant exemptions 
have been that states should have more extensive freedom to carry out public functions 
and address market failures. The desire to tackle market failures is also reflected in the 
                                                 
641 On this principle see e.g. Competitive Neutrality: Managing a Level Playing Field Between Public 
and Private Businesses (OECD 30 Aug. 2012). 
642 The accountability might be seen as weaker when the public function is served through a multistate 
program. See Robin K. Craig, ‘Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate 
Renewable Energy Programs and Projects’ (2010) 81 U. Colorado L. Rev. 771, 795-796. Yet, it is 
submitted that the democratic accountability should be intact as long as the state has the option to 
withdraw. Therefore, the fate of both state and multistate programs under any exemption doctrine should 
be the same. 
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idea that the market participant exemption in the U.S. could motivate the application of 
a new market creation exemption. On the one hand, the exemptions would increase 
flexibility for public actors to advance innovative and sustainable solutions. On the 
other hand, the exemptions would simultaneously open the door for hidden, or 
sometimes even explicit, discriminatory elements. Market participation and market 
creation tests do not allow for advanced reconciliation of the values involved. As a 
consequence of applying exemptions the balance gets heavily tipped in favor of state 
restrictions on free trade. Naturally, allowing for some degree of discrimination could 
be necessary in order for companies introducing new (sustainable) technology to 
establish themselves on the market and gradually become competitive. The justifiability 
and proportionality, including the necessity, of the measure with all its discriminatory 
elements would, however, be better scrutinized under law of justification and the 
proportionality review. 
The exemptions to the dormant Commerce Clause make it possible for states to adopt 
even de jure discriminatory measures when acting as market participants or when 
granting subsidies. At the same time many other forms of measures that have the same 
economic consequences are prohibited. It is difficult to identify any economically 
coherent theory underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. The exemptions risk 
creating contradictions with the efficiency rationale common in economic law. In other 
words, law of prohibition under the dormant Commerce Clause appears already to have 
been infiltrated by other values. The values underlying the idea of the state as a market 
participant or subsidizing entity seem to weigh more heavily than the value of non-
discrimination in trade and related efficiency. As explained above, the value underlying 
the market participant exemption is the state’s right to market participation on similar 
terms as private companies. In turn, the right for states to grant de jure discriminatory 
subsidies relates to the idea that subsidies are transparent, and that in-state voters will 
not re-elect legislators that implement unsound subsidies.  
It is difficult to say what the direct cross-jurisdictional influence has been, but in EU 
public procurement law prominent scholars have argued in favor of a test that resembles 
the market participant exemptions applied in the U.S. Moreover, a market creation test, 
similar to that discussed in the context of U.S. law, has now recently been introduced 
in the application of SCM Agreement. At the very least, this underlines the 
commonalities between various fields of economic law even across jurisdictions.  
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The market participant and market creation exemptions represent classic formalism, 
where the exemption does not depend on the necessity of the discriminatory elements 
of the measure. For example, under the SCM Agreement the applicability of the market 
creation test would depend on whether the market is mature or new. The test is too rigid 
and does not even offer simplification that could be argued to bring clarity and legal 
certainty.  
It is perhaps interesting to note that the formalism has been introduced by judicial 
bodies in the U.S. and in the WTO. Rigid rules do not always stem from codification 
(as perhaps is typical in civil law) but may also arise from judicial activism. It falls 
outside the scope of this book to examine the circumstances and principles under which 
new tests constructed through judicial activism become failures or success stories. 
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Conclusions on Value Reconciliation in Law of Prohibition 
There has been extensive previous research into the clash between trade and 
environment.643 Some of this research has focused on the strength of environmental 
protection as an argument in trade law and other fields of economic law. This framing 
of the problem may leave the impression that free trade and environmental protection 
lie in conflict and that a balance must be struck. Yet, many have been quick to point 
out that promoting trade and economic growth on the one hand, and sustainable 
development and environmental protection on the other hand, may in fact be mutually 
supportive.644 In other words, they can be reconciled in a way that forces no 
compromise. 
Assuming that trade and environment can be mutually supportive, we are faced with 
the question of how this has or should be ensured within the realms of economic law. 
Poncelet has called for a ‘fair balance’.645 Such a vague concept still reflects the idea 
of a need for compromise. The approach advocated in this study relies on the 
observation that environmental protection may strive to tackle externalities. Addressing 
externalities may serve the same efficiency ideal as the non-discrimination principle of 
free trade. The hypothesis in this study is therefore that economic law can be interpreted 
to reflect an efficiency ideal. 
Moffa and Safdi have criticized the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause for not giving 
sufficient weight to the value of reducing externalities and for advancing a perception 
of economic efficiency that is not in line with the spirit of the Constitution.646 Other 
scholars have, in turn, found that at least EU and WTO law have during the last couple 
of decades gradually become more favorable toward environmental protection.647 
Would that then indicate that the ever stronger emphasis on climate change and life-
                                                 
643 See e.g. Edith Brown Weiss, Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and John Howard Jackson, Reconciling 
Trade and Environment (Brill 2008) 1-4. 
644 WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, Doha Ministerial Declaration, Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 
adopted 14 November 2001, para. 31; Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Law and the Internal Market 
(OUP 2014) 471-473; Charles Poncelet, ’Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection in EU 
Law: A Troubled Relationship?’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 171, 181; Steve 
Charnovitz, Path of World Trade Law in the 21st Century (World Scientific 2014) chapter 11. 
645 Charles Poncelet, ’Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection in EU Law: A Troubled 
Relationship?’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 171, 174. 
646 Anthony L. Moffa and Stephanie L. Safdi, ’Freedom From the Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument 
Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Goods Movement Policies’ (2014) 21 N.Y.U. 
Environmental Law Journal 344, 347 and 380-385. 
647 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Law and the Internal Market (OUP 2014) 383; Aaron Cosbey 
and Petros C. Mavroidis, ’Heavy Fuel: Trade and Environment in the GATT/WTO Case Law’ (2014) 23 
Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 288. 
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cycle analysis has pushed economic law, and in particular trade law, closer to a genuine 
efficiency theory that recognizes the true cost of externalities? This second chapter of 
the book provided several observations with respect to this question. 
The optimism expressed here toward the reconciliation of trade and environment as 
fully mutually supportive serving the same efficiency objective does not imply that 
trade and environment are on an equal footing in trade law.648 It was noted that trade 
law has not fully adhered to an efficiency rationale when it comes to the definition of 
‘measures’ that may be prima facie prohibited. State measures to tackle externalities 
may be challenged under trade law and will be found prima facie prohibited if 
discriminatory. In contrast, state inaction and decisions not to address pollution caused 
by private parties has so far not been scrutinized under trade law, despite the fact that 
the emissions increase externalities and the inaction could have discriminatory effects 
in the sense that the in-state polluting companies may gain an international competitive 
advantage. Admittedly, this state of affairs has not been developed by courts. Instead, 
it would appear that the argument for scrutinizing state inaction in the wake of climate 
change has not yet been presented to the courts. 
The fact that inaction has as a rule not been scrutinized creates a structural bias in favor 
of aggressive trade policy over environmental protection.649 This is not altered by the 
fact that states should be successful in defending measures to reduce externalities. Since 
such measures may be prima facie prohibited states are forced to invest resources to 
design measures that to every detail will survive the proportionality review. This may 
delay or even hinder states from adopting such measures. At least from the perspective 
of efficiency, the optimal solution would not be to create market participant/creation 
exemptions for all state measures that tackle externalities since they may include 
unnecessary discriminatory elements. Instead the bias could be tackled by allowing 
parties to challenge the passive response of states to externalities under not only 
environmental law, but also trade law. This is not to suggest such test would be easy to 
construct; legally or politically. 
                                                 
648 On the equality of trade and environment see Gerd Winter, ’The GATT and Environmental Protection: 
Problems of Construction’ (2013) 15 Journal of Environmental Law 113. 
649 Similarly see Charles Poncelet, ’Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection in EU Law: 
A Troubled Relationship?’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 171, 201. 
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While the above indicated deviations from the efficiency ideal, the analysis of tests in 
law of prohibition still confirmed that the efficiency ideal lies at the core of trade law. 
Namely, under trade law discriminatory measures are prima facie prohibited. 
Discrimination may only occur between like or similar products. It was argued that like 
products should be understood as products that are substitutes to a sufficient degree and 
thus are in competition, because such an approach would advance non-discrimination 
on relevant markets. Moreover, it was illustrated that this approach has generally been 
applied. Differences in PPMs would consequently not automatically make products 
unlike. A narrower definition would blur the line between law of prohibition and law 
of justification, as environmental and other grounds of justification would affect already 
the definition of discrimination. It would also allow states to advance protectionist 
objectives by differentiating between competing products, which would hamper 
efficiency with no environmental gain. 
In fact, the category of like products should probably be understood as quite broad and 
it would to some extent even take into account the potential for competition in the 
foreseeable future. The forward-looking approach that tests for likeness in the 
foreseeable future would put pressure on states to eliminate artificial barriers to the 
marketability of new innovative products. For example, with respect to first and second 
generation biofuels in the transport sector, the future potential of various fuels indicates 
that at least long-term substitutability exists. There may be a gradual transformation 
toward likeness within the biofuel market. Eventually, different biofuels might even be 
substitutes to more traditional fuels. 
In WTO law the likeness test has been the most detailed but also the most complex. 
Similarities and differences in physical characteristics, consumer tastes, end use and 
tariff classification are to be assessed. The four factors applied as indicators of likeness 
should, however, not be interpreted to be of independent value. Likeness can neither be 
confirmed nor excluded on the basis that three out of four factors point to that 
conclusion. The factors are merely to assist in the application of a holistic analysis of 
substitutability. The relevance of tariff classification as one of the four factors 
supporting the analysis of substitutability may be questioned, because unlike the other 
three factors, it is an outcome of legislative decision-making. However, the 
classification itself is internationally largely harmonized even if tariffs may vary 
significantly.  
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A detailed analysis of substitutability forms a well-reasoned economic approach. 
Unfortunately, the lack of details and transparency with respect to likeness in the EU 
and the U.S. has caused some incoherence. Moreover, it would be important in all 
jurisdictions to specify what degree of substitutability is needed for likeness. In 
complex cases the market analysis of substitutability may require similar depth as in 
competition law. I leave it to future research to determine whether even similar tools 
could be applied. 
The application of the likeness test confirms that there is an underlying efficiency 
rationale that the courts across all three jurisdictions follow, but also that there has been 
pressure to divert from it. The likeness test has sometimes allowed for considerations 
of non-trade values. This does as such not yet form a side-step from the efficiency 
rationale since, for example, environmental aspects are relevant for substitutability if 
they affect consumer habits. However, a diversion from the efficiency rationale occurs 
in the application of the test650 when the environmental aspects are considered beyond 
the context of substitutability.  
The occasional diversions from the efficiency rationale become even more evident 
when examining the market participant and market creation exemptions in law of 
prohibition. Various exemptions to the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause, which all fall 
under the broad category of market participation exemptions, have been applied already 
for years. Public authorities have the power to discriminate when they act as market 
participants and do not regulate the market. While these exemptions give authorities 
more room to tackle environmental externalities, they also invite more disguised 
discrimination and do not serve any economic logic. The same applies to a potential 
market creation exemption, which has been the subject of discussion in the U.S. For 
example, by promoting renewable energy the state may help push new solutions over 
an economic market access barrier that it would not otherwise be able to overcome. 
However, exempting these measures altogether from closer scrutiny would allow states 
to use the exemption in order to incorporate discriminatory elements that do not serve 
the goal of reducing externalities.  
                                                 
650 This is does not automatically result in a non-efficient outcome in the case at hand. That question is, 
however, outside the scope of this work. 
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Three more remarks on the market participant and market creation exemptions are in 
order. First, the exemptions put into question the conclusion by Moffa and Safdi that 
the dormant Commerce Clause does not sufficiently take into account externalities.651 
The problem is perhaps not that the dormant Commerce Clause lacks tools to take into 
account externalities, but that it offers so generous tools that the efficiency ideal is still 
not achieved. In case even a de jure discriminatory environmental protection scheme 
can rely on an exemption, the problem of externalities would be addressed, but 
simultaneously the de jure discriminatory elements would create unnecessary 
inefficiencies.  
Secondly, the origins of the market creation doctrine can be found in the market 
participation doctrine and the reasons for the introduction of the latter did not 
necessarily lie in the objective to tackle externalities. Courts have tried to justify the 
exemptions with reference to the right of the state taxpayers to benefit from what they 
have funded and the state has created. In addition, the exemptions advance competition 
neutrality in the sense that state actors are granted the freedom to act and discriminate 
in much the same manner as private actors. It should again be noted that there appears 
to be strong links between trade and competition theory. Importantly, courts have 
sometimes, but not always, linked the application of the exemptions to circumstances 
of market failure. Under an economic approach market participant and market creation 
exemptions would be rejected in the US. However, if they are to stay, they ought to be 
coupled with the test of market failure. 
Thirdly, the only instance of an unambiguous application of a market creation 
exemption was found in a case on the interpretation of the SCM Agreement. The 
approach of the WTO Appellate Body was understandable, because without such an 
exemption it would have struggled to find justification of subsidies to renewables 
altogether. The SCM Agreement does not include any environmental ground of 
justification of measures with discriminatory effect. The AB opted for the approach that 
perhaps guaranteed efficiency to the best possible extent given current legislative 
framework. 
                                                 
651 Anthony L. Moffa and Stephanie L. Safdi, ’Freedom From the Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument 
Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Goods Movement Policies’ (2014) 21 N.Y.U. 
Environmental Law Journal 344, 347 and 380-385. 
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In sum, with the increasing appreciation of sustainability and the ever more blurry 
distinction between the tasks of the private and the public sector, has come pressure to 
integrate values linked to sustainability into law of prohibition either through the test 
of similarity or through the application of market participant and market creation 
exemptions. These tendencies should be rejected. Market participant and market 
creation tests do not offer optimal tools for reconciling trade and non-trade values. The 
different trade, environmental and social values involved are instead to be reconciled 
through the application of a proportionality review. Consequently, the focus in 
subsequent chapters turn to grounds of justification and proportionality. 
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Chapter 3 – Value Reconciliation Tests in Law of Justification: 
Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection 
Measures that are prima facie prohibited may be legal provided that they serve a 
justifiable objective. For example, environmental protection may justify a scheme 
favoring environmentally sustainable PPMs in the energy sector.  
Unfortunately, there is not always consensus on what should be regarded as sustainable 
PPMs. Even within the EU it has not been politically possible to reach any agreement 
on a priority list of different PPMs in the energy sector.652 The diversity of 
environmental harm associated with each energy resource and type of plant result in a 
situation where environmental protection can be invoked as justification for favoring 
or restricting any given PPM in an effort to justify a measure. For example, the 
objectives of minimizing the risk of nuclear disasters, the climate change effects of 
fossil fuels and the ecological harm of some renewables would all in principle form 
valid grounds of justification. The potential for relying on sustainability as an argument 
for a wide variety of energy strategies is further underlined by the fact that a strategy to 
improve environmental sustainability of the energy sector as a whole could require at 
least some diversification.653  
What follows from the above, is that the test of justification can only gain force from 
the design the proportionality review. In order for bans, quotas and similar measures to 
be justified, they must be proportionate in relation to their objectives. This third chapter 
of the book will focus on proportionality. The overall objective is to form a picture of 
how different tests under the proportionality review work in reconciling free trade and 
environmental protection. 
The first section of chapter 3 will deal with tests of proportionality in EU free movement 
law and under GATT. Geradin has claimed that PPM-criteria will often struggle to meet 
the requirement of proportionality.654 With this in mind, it is of particular interest to 
                                                 
652 Catherine Redgwell, ‘Energy, Environment and Trade in the European Community’ (1994) 12 J. 
Energy & Natural Resources L. 128, 147. 
653 The European Commission has stated that one of the objectives with the Renewable Energy Directive 
is the diversification of energy sources, although the reasons for this might relate more to energy security 
than environmental concerns. See Communication From the Commission to the European Council and 
the European Parliament – An Energy Policy For Europe 2007, COM (2007) 1 final, 10-15; Commission 
Communication, Energy Roadmap 2050, COM (2011) 885 final, 2. 
654 Damien Geradin, Trade and the Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
32-33. He concludes that unilateral PPM-criteria are very unlikely to be legal under EU free movement 
law. 
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examine the proportionality review in the context of PPM-criteria. The objective is to 
identify challenges that in the review of PPM-criteria might emerge from the 
application of classic proportionality tests, such as the test of suitability and the least 
restrictive measure test. Thereafter the potential relevance of other tests of 
proportionality will be examined with a view to find solutions to the dilemmas that can 
be linked to the application of the suitability test and the least restrictive measure test. 
In the second section of chapter 3 the structure of the proportionality review under the 
U.S. dormant Commerce Clause will be analyzed with the objective to determine 
whether it could offer some valuable solutions to the challenges of reviewing the 
proportionality of PPM-criteria. It will be illustrated that the U.S. model in part suffers 
from similar deficiencies as the EU and WTO models and that while the U.S. model 
has some advantages, it is also plagued by some unique problems. 
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3.1. Proportionality Tests in WTO and EU Law 
3.1.1. A Common Perception of Proportionality under the TFEU and the GATT  
The proportionality tests are applied by the ECJ to confirm whether or not the measure 
is suitable and necessary for fulfilling the justifiable objective.655 The necessity test 
includes a requirement that the measure is the least trade restrictive measure to achieve 
the justifiable objective. The same elements of proportionality can be traced in GATT, 
even if the structure may at first sight appear more nuanced and complex. 
The proportionality principle in Article XX GATT is expressed in slightly different 
terms in relation to different grounds of justification. In accordance with Article XX(g) 
the measure must relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. In turn, it 
has been stipulated in Article XX(b) that prima facie prohibited measures may be 
justified provided they are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
The term ‘necessary’ deviates from the term ‘relate’ and it has been confirmed that the 
interpretation of these shall not be identical.656  
Yet, the difference between ’relate’ and ’necessary’ is primarily technical. First, it will 
below be shown how they both include a suitability review. Secondly, while the 
necessity review perhaps in part is carried out under Article XX(b) but not Article 
XX(g), both paragraph (b) and (g) are still covered by the chapeau of Article XX, which 
prohibits “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade”.657 It will be shown 
that the chapeau introduces a necessity review to cases that fall under XX(g). Thus, the 
chapeau brings about a coherent approach to proportionality under Article XX. There 
is essentially only one uniform proportionality test applicable under GATT and it bears 
strong resemblance to the proportionality test applicable in EU free movement law. It 
is therefore justifiable to build the detailed comparison of the different elements of the 
EU and WTO tests around the concepts of suitability and necessity.  
                                                 
655 Joined cases 279/84, 280/84, 285/84 and 286/84 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke and others v. 
Commission [1987] ECR 1069, para. 34; Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles) [1988] 
ECR 4607, paras 6-12; Case C-131/93 Commission v. Germany [1994] ECR I-3303, paras 18-29; Case 
C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech Srl v S. & T. Srl [1998] I-4301, paras 57-61; Case C-67/97 Criminal 
Proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033, para. 37. 
656 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 17-
18; Canada – Measures Affecting the Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, L/6268, Panel 
Report, 20 Nov. 1987 (adopted), paras 4.5-4.6. 
657 For a similar provision see Art. 3.5, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 (1992). 
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Suitability and necessity of the measure constitute two core elements of the 
proportionality review in both EU and WTO law. The review of suitability and 
necessity can be deferential, meaning that states are given much freedom to pursue their 
national strategies. Alternatively, the review could be intense. Under an intense review 
courts would be stricter when reflecting on whether the state goes too far in pursuing 
an objective that as such is legitimate.  
This first section of the chapter will offer a closer look at the suitability and necessity 
tests and will illustrate that the proportionality review has been deferential in some 
cases and more intense in other cases. Thereafter it will be assessed whether some other 
tests may additionally apply for determining the proportionality of PPM-criteria. The 
objective is to evaluate how much discretion states have in designing their strategies to 
tackle externalities in order to promote efficiency. 
3.1.2. Suitability Tests 
3.1.2.1. Inconsistent Approach in EU Law 
The suitability test may be viewed as a test of causality. In the case of environmental 
PPM-criteria there must exist a sufficient link between the measure and the 
environmental objective. For criteria that apply even to imports, the causality chain 
consists of a few links. First, the measure should reduce the domestic demand of 
products produced with unsustainable methods. Secondly, there must also be a further 
link between the reduced domestic demand and a decrease in foreign production. 
Finally, there should exist a further link between the decrease in foreign production and 
decrease in foreign, and probably also cross-border, environmental harm. 
It is far from evident how probable the positive outcomes of the measure must be in 
order for it to be suitable. In principle, evidence that the measure actually achieves the 
objective could be required or it could be required that the measure is expected to have 
an effect with some probability. Alternatively, it could be sufficient that the measure is 
logically capable to cause the desired effect. In a case concerning a restriction on the 
amount of dry matter in bread, the ECJ stated that the measure was unsuitable for the 
protection of health because there was ‘no connection’.658 The Court did at least not 
rule out the possibility that logical capability could have been sufficient. 
                                                 
658 Case 130/80 Criminal proceedings against Fabriek voor Hoogwaardige Voedingsprodukten 
Kelderman BV [1981] ECR 527, para. 10. 
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When Finland tried to justify a system of prior authorization for the distribution of 
spirits, the ECJ stated that the measure would be proportionate only if it would 
‘effectively combat’ the negative effects of alcohol consumption. This implied that 
there had to be an actual or at least an expected positive effect. It was, however, 
sufficient that the measure only partially had been able to reduce the problems related 
to public order and health.659 In other cases the ECJ has been less explicit in how it 
views the suitability test. For example, with the aim to secure press diversity, Austria 
looked into restricting major newspapers from increasing their market share by 
including reader competitions in their papers. The ECJ stated that the measure was 
suitable only if such competitions would be capable of bringing about a change in 
demand through incentives. The Court left the assessment for the national court. It did 
so by stating that the national court must analyse the effects of the measure in light of 
the conditions on the national market.660 The power to decide on this important step in 
the value reconciliation process was thus left for the national court.  
Both the Finnish and the Austrian case would seem to suggest that a mere logically 
constructed theoretical capability of contribution to the aim might not be sufficient. A 
similar approach can be identified in other cases where the suitability has been difficult 
to assess. For example, the ECJ has concluded that a state may introduce gambling 
licenses in order to control the activity and reduce criminal activity in the sector. 
However, the suitability of setting a maximum number of licenses to be awarded was 
according to the ECJ dependent on the specific market circumstances and had to be 
assessed by the national court.661 
In a recent case the ECJ appeared to be looking for expected positive effects. The case 
concerned a Belgian law that granted electricity from renewable resources distribution 
through the network free of charge if the electricity had been directly fed into the in-
state network. The ECJ emphasized that the benefits of the law were directed at 
suppliers and not the producers, i.e. those generating green electricity. The court found 
potential benefits to green electricity generators to be too indirect, uncertain and risky. 
Therefore, there had not been established any genuine ability of the measure to achieve 
                                                 
659 Case C-434/04 Criminal Proceedings against Jan-Erik Anders Ahokainen and Mati Leppik [2006] 
ECR I-9171, paras 38-39. 
660 Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer 
Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689, paras 28-31. 
661 Joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Criminal proceedings against Massimiliano 
Placanica and Others [2007] ECR I-1891, para. 58. 
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a legitimate objective.662 While the Court thus seemed to reject the suitability of the 
measure, it oddly enough still went on to add that the measure would not be necessary 
as there would exist more effective and less discriminatory measures to promote 
renewables.663 
In contrast to the cases depicted above, the Court can in principle decide to only reject 
proportionality if it finds no logical capability of the measure to have any effect.664 The 
test of logical capability would form a very deferential test in the sense that it would 
not be too difficult for the state measure to reach the threshold. PPM-criteria would 
logically affect domestic demand and therefore also total global demand, the market 
share of foreign producers utilizing the targeted PPM, the environmental effects around 
the foreign production plant and at least in the long term the global environment. 
The ECJ has at times adopted the more deferential approach. One case, Zenatti, 
concerned the decision of Italy to restrict the taking of bets to certain bodies. The ECJ 
stated that the measure would be suitable only if it ‘reflected a concern to bring about 
genuine diminution in gambling opportunities’ and was ‘genuinely directed to realizing 
the objective’.665 There was no explicit indication that an actual effect had to exist with 
any probability. Yet again the ECJ left it to the national court to determine whether the 
measure was proportional. 
In conclusion, while the ECJ has often appeared to require that the measure can be 
expected to have positive effects with some unspecified probability, it has not been 
fully consistent. The suitability test has been plagued with both inconsistency and lack 
of clarity. 
                                                 
662 Case C-492/14 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaams Gewest and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:732, para. 115. 
663 Id. para. 116. 
664 Similar interpretation of suitability is possible in other fields of EU law. See e.g. the test of not 
’manifestly inappropriate’ referred to in joined cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Antonio 
Crispoltoni v. Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Giuseppe Natale and Antonio Pontillo v. Donatab Srl 
[1994] ECR I-4863, para. 42; Case C-189/01 H. Jippes, Afdeling Groningen van de Nederlandse 
Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren and Afdeling Assen en omstreken van de Nederlandse 
Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2001] 
ECR I-5689, paras 82-83; Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow GmbH v. Landrat des Lankreises 
Bad Doberan [2006] ECR I-679, paras 38-39. 
665 Case C-67/98 Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, paras 36-37. 
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3.1.2.2. Articles XX(b) and XX(g) GATT 
There initially existed a lot of suspicion toward PPM-criteria in the context of WTO 
law.666 In US – Tuna (Mexico I) the panel had to examine a U.S. law that introduced 
restrictions to the market for yellow-fin tuna. Tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific with certain methods that were hazardous for dolphins could not be sold in the 
U.S. labelled as dolphin-safe. The law targeted in particular tuna fishing with purse-
seine nets and reflected disapproval of encircling of dolphins with the objective to 
maximize the tuna catch. This method causes high rates of distress among dolphins and 
even deaths. The reason for introducing these restrictions for fishing in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific was that in the area the unsustainable fishing methods had been 
commonly relied on since tuna there tend to swim closely around dolphins. 
The U.S. law had a significant effect on market access. It meant that tuna not caught 
with methods deemed sustainable under U.S. legislation could not be imported and sold 
in case the package contained a dolphin-safe label. There was of course the option of 
(re)packaging the product without the label, but such action would make the product 
less attractive for U.S. consumers. 
The U.S. rule had a significant impact on Mexican fishers, who to a large extent were 
fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific with purse-seine nets. The panel’s key finding 
was that the PPM-criteria were extraterritorial as they applied to PPMs adopted outside 
U.S. waters by non-U.S. vessels. The criteria were not justifiable in the first place for 
this reason.667 In subsequent cases this approach has been abandoned.  
Apart from its statement on extraterritoriality, the panel in US – Tuna (Mexico I) also 
provided some insight on the interpretation of Article XX(g) GATT. In accordance with 
Article XX(g) GATT the measure must relate to the conservation objective. The panel 
concluded that the law on PPMs for fishing tuna did not even relate to the protection of 
dolphins. In this context it should be noted that certain exemptions applied to the ban 
on dolphin-safe labelled tuna that had been caught with methods that as a rule were 
regarded as hazardous for dolphins. Imports were exempted from the ban on the use of 
dolphin-safe labels if, for example, the rate of incidental killings of dolphins was not 
                                                 
666 Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on use of 
PPM- based Trade Measures’ (OCDE/GD(97)137, 1997) 33. 
667 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, Mexico I) 
(unadopted), para. 5.27. 
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more than 25 % above the U.S. average for any given year. The reason provided for the 
conclusion that the measure did not relate to the protection of dolphins was that the 
maximum rate for killed dolphins by Mexican vessels was tied to the rate of killings by 
American vessels during any given year, which resulted in a very unpredictable 
standard for the Mexicans.668 While it may have been arbitrary of the U.S. to make the 
market access of Mexican tuna labelled dolphin-safe dependent on such calculations, it 
also in my opinion seems controversial to imply that the relationship between the 
measure and the objective was non-existent. 
Later development has however brought the interpretation of ‘relate to’ much closer to 
a suitability test, in the sense that the threshold for finding a relationship has become 
much lower.669 In US – Gasoline the panel addressed the compatibility with GATT of 
a U.S. law on clean gasoline. On the basis on historical data each refiner was assigned 
a benchmark for fuel quality that it was obliged to meet in future years. The main 
problem with the model was that importers had fewer categories of data that they could 
rely on for the calculation of the benchmark. Reverting the conclusion of the panel,670 
the AB found that the measure in general would relate to the conservation of natural 
resources despite the fact that some de jure discriminatory elements of the measure 
would not necessarily relate to the conservation.671 The AB also clarified that the test 
of relationship only required that the measure was primarily aimed at the objective, 
substantially related to it and was not merely incidentally and inadvertently aimed at 
it.672 The criteria that a measure is primarily aimed at the objective is problematic in 
the sense that in cases with mixed objectives it may be difficult to determine which aim 
is primary. For example, is the primary aim of giving preference to short transportation 
distance environmental protection or boosting local industry? 
                                                 
668 Id. para. 5.33. 
669 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade – A Comparative Analysis 
of EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 225. Others have classified the ‘relationship’ test as a means and ends 
test. See e.g. Simon Lester et al, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Hart 2008) 383. 
670 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 January 1996, 
para. 6.40. 
671 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 16-
18. Similarly for a deferential review see Canada – Measures Affecting the Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, L/6268, Panel Report, 20 Nov. 1987 (adopted), paras 4.5-4.6; US –  Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, paras 7.533-536. 
672 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 15-
20. 
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Similar criteria were laid out in US – Shrimp, which concerned a U.S. law on the use 
of turtle-exclusion devices when fishing shrimp. The criteria on fishing methods were 
designed to conserve turtles. According to the AB, the test of relationship requires that 
the measure reasonably related to the objective or, in other words, that the relationship 
was close and genuine. The AB concluded that the PPM-criteria on fishing related to 
turtle conservation. This was not altered by the fact with respect to shrimp originating 
from a country that did not by law require its shrimp fishing vessels to use devices that 
guarantee turtle safety, the law even banned imports of shrimp batches certified as 
sustainably caught.673 
The suitability test in WTO law focuses on the measure in general and not on specific 
elements of the measure. We are still left with the question of whether it under WTO 
law would be sufficient that the measure is logically capable of having the positive 
effect aimed at or if the effect would need to be expected. Or perhaps even required to 
actually take place. 
The relationship test includes under Article XX(g) GATT includes a suitability test. 
According to Perez the relationship does not require any proof that the measure has an 
actual effect.674 One reason is that it would take too long for some effects to emerge in 
a verifiable form. Yet, this still leaves open the question of whether an actual effect 
would need to be expected or whether logical capability of an effect is sufficient. 
In the application of the test of a relationship between the measure and the objective of 
conservation, the effectiveness of the measure has been referred to. US – Tuna (EC) 
was the second case where the panel had to examine U.S. criteria on dolphin-safe tuna-
fishing methods. The panel stated that the test of relationship required that the measure 
was primarily aimed at the conservation objective but interpreted this phrase in a very 
narrow manner when it concluded that the PPM-criteria were not primarily aimed at 
conservation because they could only be effective were other states to change their 
policies.675 For similar reasons the measure could not in the panel’s view be considered 
                                                 
673 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 136-141. The AB still hinted that a measure might not relate to its objective in case it is 
disproportionately wide in its scope. This could have been interpreted as an introduction of a value 
reconciliation or balancing test already under the relationship test. These aspects are, however, normally 
addressed under the test of arbitrary discrimination, i.e. under the chapeau of Article XX GATT. 
674 Oren Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and 
Environment Conflict (Hart 2004) 73. 
675 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) 
(unadopted), paras 5.22-27. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   182 31.7.2019   7.15
 183 
necessary for dolphin protection.676 A couple of years later in US – Gasoline the AB 
hinted that the predictability of an effect could be of relevance and that the measure 
would at least not relate to the objective in case it realistically could never have any 
effect.677 In US – Shrimp the AB stated that in the case at hand there was a direct 
connection between the measure and the objective and that it would be an effective tool 
to reach the objective.678  
In the application of Article XX(g) the focus of the panels and the ABs has at times 
been on the expected effectiveness of the measure. While the intensity of the test has 
varied, there are no clear indications that mere logical capability to advance the 
legitimate objective would be sufficient. As stated by Voigt,679 measures adopted to 
promote renewables, including sustainable biofuels, would still normally relate to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The decision whether to apply a test on 
expected effect or a test on logical capability will be relevant only under special 
circumstances, as will be illustrated later in this chapter. 
The test under Article XX(b) may be compared with that applied under Article XX(g). 
In accordance with Article XX(b) measures necessary to protect public health may be 
justifiable. The choice of words has been slightly different in Article XX(b) GATT as 
compared to Article XX(g). Instead of ‘relating’ the term ‘necessary’ has been opted 
for. Yet, also this necessity test encapsulates a suitability requirement. Two cases may 
shed some light on the nature of the test. 
Brazil – Tyres concerned an import ban on retreaded tyres. Brazil had not banned 
domestic retreaded tyres. Yet, its objective with the import ban was to reduce the 
number of waste tyres since studies had shown a link between an accumulation of waste 
tyres and certain tropical diseases. The idea was that by restricting imported retreaded 
tyres the demand for domestic waste tyres to be retreaded would increase. The panel 
examined some statistics and concluded that first, waste tyres pose a health risk and 
secondly, that the measure was capable of contributing to the objective of health 
                                                 
676 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) 
(unadopted), paras 5.36-38. See also US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 
1991 (US – Tuna, Mexico I) (unadopted), para. 5.28. 
677 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 21-
22. 
678 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 136-141. 
679 Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law Resolving Conflicts 
Between Climate Measures and WTO Law (Brill 2009) 226-227. 
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protection.680 The panel seemed to analyse whether the measure ‘can reasonably be 
expected to contribute’ to the objective.681  
The AB in Brazil – Tyres stressed at one point that the hypothesis of contribution 
needed to be logical,682 which forms a very deferential standard. However, in the same 
context it stressed that the measure would only be necessary if it was apt to produce a 
material contribution.683 This contribution can be quantitative or qualitative.684 In the 
end the AB found it likely that a contribution would stem from the import ban.  
The AB in Brazil – Tyres seemed to reject any requirement of actual effect. Indeed, no 
actual contribution should be required since the positive effects of some measures, for 
example measures mitigating climate change, may only become visible with significant 
delay. Furthermore, the AB report in Brazil – Tyres could be read to suggest that some 
form of de minimis threshold for the probability of a real contribution applies. 
Borrowing from the effects doctrine of competition law, Wiers has brought forward the 
idea that an environmental objective might only be defendable if the potential effect of 
the measure is direct, substantial and foreseeable.685 This would equally suggest some 
form of probability threshold for expected effect. 
Some further insight was provided in EC – Seals, which concerned the interpretation 
of whether an EU ban on seal products was necessary to protect public morals under 
Article XX(a) GATT. The ban included a few minor exemptions awarded to, for 
example, seal products that had been put on the market by Inuit hunters. The AB in EC 
– Seals stated that in a case on moral protection, there would be no need to analyse the 
                                                 
680 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, Panel Report, 12 June 2007, paras 
7.115-148. 
681 Id. 7.145-147. 
682 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, paras 149-
155. 
683 Ibid. 
684 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, paras 146, 
186. See also Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB Report, 
11 Dec. 2000, paras 163-164; US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, DS285, AB Report, 7 April 2005, para. 306. Equally, the health risk need also not to 
be quantified. See EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB 
Report, 12 March 2001, paras 167, 172. 
685 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 274. 
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risks to seals more in detail.686 This already indicates a fairly deferential test. Could it 
be more deferential than under Articles XX(b) and XX(g)?  
Admittedly, some could argue that the necessity test under Article XX(a) does not 
contain a similar suitability review as is applied under Articles XX(b) and XX(g). As a 
rule, similar concepts and tests should be interpreted consistently and in a coherent 
manner across all articles of GATT. Importantly, both Articles XX(a) and XX(b) 
include the concept ‘necessary’ as a basis for the suitability and necessity tests. 
However, it could be argued that a deferential suitability test under Article XX(a) could 
stem from the fact that the measure is easily deemed suitable to eliminate the link 
between domestic demand and the conduct perceived as immoral. In other words, when 
it comes to the objective of moral protection there might not be any need for a test on 
the contribution to seal protection since the measure already contributes to a cleaner 
conscious among the population of the state adopting the measure. 
While the panel in EC – Seals had applied the test of material contribution actually 
achieved,687 the AB seemed to reject it and focused on whether the measure was capable 
of making a contribution and does make some contribution.688 Both the panel and the 
AB appeared to require more than a mere logical capability to achieve a contribution. 
Furthermore, the AB proclaimed that quantitative contribution was preferred over 
qualitative and that also potential future contribution would be relevant.689 The 
requirement of expected contribution under the suitability analysis was in this case in 
part implicit. Namely, the idea had been brought forward that with the exemption for 
Inuit communities, imports of Norwegian and Canadian seal products might simply be 
replaced by Greenlandic products. The AB found no evidence that this would occur to 
any significant degree, implying that the ban could be expected to have a real effect. 
Although the AB concluded that the ban was necessary to protect public morals, the 
                                                 
686 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.198-199. 
687 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov 2013, paras 7.624-639. 
688 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.221-228, 5.242-247. Similarly in the context of Art. 2.2 TBT see US – Certain 
Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and 
Mexico, DS384, AB Report, 18 May 2015, para 5.209. However, in that case the AB also appears to 
give weight to actual contributions to the objective. See para. 5.201 and fn 658 in the report. 
689 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.221-228, 5.242-247. 
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measure would, as discussed later, in the end be found to breach the chapeau of Article 
XX in part due to the design of some exemptions under the measure.690 
All in all, the test of suitability as applied under the concept of ’necessary’ in Article 
XX(b) GATT would appear quite similar as under Article XX(g). The panels and ABs 
appear inclined to examine whether the measure can be expected to have the desired 
effect, although inconsistency can be traced. It is not evident what the probability of 
the effect should be. The state of affairs is not all too different from that in EU free 
movement law. 
3.1.3. Necessity – The Least Restrictive Measure Test 
3.1.3.1. EU – A Moderately Intense Review 
In order for a measure to be proportional, it must, apart from suitable, also be necessary 
for the legitimate objective. A measure is not necessary if there is an alternative measure 
that is less trade restrictive and equally effective as the measure under review. The 
alternative measure should in other words guarantee an equal level of protection.691 As 
long as full harmonization has not yet taken place, EU member states have usually been 
given the freedom to decide on the level of environmental protection.692 Similarly, the 
member states have a wide margin of discretion in defining their moral values for the 
purposes of justification of trade restrictions.693 
In theory, all measures could be regarded as necessary to achieve some specific level 
of protection. For example, a full sales ban is the only, and thus the least restrictive,694  
measure to promote the highest level of protection in case the product is unsustainable. 
However, the ECJ rarely applies such extremely deferential necessity test. For example, 
already in Cassis de Dijon the Court applied a more intense necessity test. The case 
concerned German rules on the minimum alcohol strength of certain liqueur beverages. 
The objective of the rule was to protect fair competition and consumer interests. 
                                                 
690 See section 4.2.5. 
691 Case C-473/98 Kemikalieinspektionen v. Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I-5681, para. 40. 
692 Case 94/83 Criminal proceedings against Albert Heijn BV [1984] ECR 3263, para. 16; Case 54/85 
Ministere public against Xavier Mirepoix [1986] ECR 1067, para. 15. 
693 Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’, in 
Joseph Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade? (OUP 2000) 164. 
694 While sales bans would form more severe restrictions on trade than import bans, they would at least 
put domestic and imported goods (e.g. biofuels) on an even footing. Import bans would thus in the context 
of trade law be more trade restrictive (i.e. discriminatory) than bans on sales. See Andrew Mitchell and 
Tania Voon, ‘Regulating Tobacco Flavors: Implications of WTO Law’ (2011) 29 Boston University 
International Law J. 383, 408-409. 
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Namely, standardization of products in the form of minimum limits of alcohol content 
for beverages increases transparency. The purpose of the minimum alcohol percentage 
for the liqueur was to ensure that cheap beverages with low alcohol content would not 
confuse consumers and take over market share. Yet, the Court found the ban on low 
alcohol content liqueur beverages not to be necessary because other measures, like 
labelling, would be sufficient to address the same risks.695  
The moderately intense necessity test allows for the ECJ to conclude that labelling, as 
a less restrictive alternative, is equally effective as the ban. However, in reality there is 
probably a theoretical difference in effectiveness. Namely, there is no guarantee that all 
consumers actually read the labels, and thus the ban would have been slightly more 
effective. The same logic would apply to the comparison of effectiveness of bans on 
(environmentally) unsustainable PPMs and labelling schemes for sustainable PPMs. 
Might the proportionality review have been more intense merely because the offered 
alternative was labelling? There is some room for an argument that the intensity of the 
test should be relatively high when a labelling alternative is presented. This view would 
reflect the idea that labelling has some properties that makes is particularly desirable. 
Labelling increases information on the market and allows consumers to make informed 
decisions with respect to what PPMs and level of sustainability they prefer. Still, it is 
submitted that this is not sufficient reason for adopting the intense scrutiny of a ban or 
some other restrictive measure. Namely, with labelling a free rider problem will 
emerge. The state could argue that the ban is necessary in order to tackle the 
environmental externalities to a greater extent than consumers are willing to do 
voluntarily. The idea that labelling would form a special case justifying unusually strict 
scrutiny is also undermined by the fact that an intense test has been applied also in cases 
where the proposed alternative measure was not labelling.696  
It may be recalled that the test applied in Cassis de Dijon could be described as having 
focused on whether or not there were less trade restrictive measures that achieve almost 
or practically the same level of protection. On some occasions the ECJ has however 
                                                 
695 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649, para. 13. See also J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, 
in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade (2000) 222. Weiler notes that the labeling alternative was almost as effective as the ban and that 
this was sufficient for giving preference to labelling in the eyes of the court. 
696 See e.g. Case C-265/06 Commission v. Portugal ECR [2008] I-2245, paras 40-48. 
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applied an even more intense review. The application of an intense proportionality 
review has resulted in the Court concluding that some equally effective alternative 
existed even when no alternative put forward would appear to even come close in 
effectiveness. One such case concerned Portugal’s ban on the use of tinted film on car 
windows. The Court did not deem the ban necessary for inspecting e.g. the use of seat 
belts.697  Unfortunately the Court did not explain what alternative measure would 
guarantee an equal level of protection. For example, the alternative of opening the car 
doors would clearly not be as effective for inspecting the use of seatbelts. 
The intensity of the proportionality test applied by the ECJ has varied considerably 
from case to case and may not be the same for all cases of PPM-criteria. On the one 
hand, the review is often less intense under scientific uncertainty.698 If we consider the 
plans of Austria to ban the import of nuclear power,699 the fact that measures taken to 
limit nuclear power specifically, and the choice of energy policy in general, involves 
politically sensitive considerations and difficult balancing between the different 
environmental and social effects of various energy resources, would speak in favor of 
a less intense review. The gravity of nuclear accidents may also put pressure on the ECJ 
to allow more national discretion. On the other hand, the review may be more intense 
when the state taking the measure is in a clear minority.700 The fact that the strict view 
on risks of nuclear power places Austria in a minority would seem to increase the 
chances of an intense review. In sum, it is difficult to predict the intensity of the review 
in a case concerning restrictions on nuclear power. The same may apply to PPM-criteria 
more in general since they, one the one hand, currently still in many fields represent a 
novel legislative approach not adopted by many states and, on the other hand, rely on 
science that often involves a significant degree of scientific uncertainty. 
3.1.3.2. WTO – Necessity in Two Steps 
A prima facie prohibited measure is according to Articles XX(a) and XX(b) GATT 
justifiable if it is necessary to protect the legitimate objective. In the case of Article 
                                                 
697 Ibid. 
698 Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law: A Study on the Relationship Between the Freedoms 
(OUP 2002) 212-213. 
699 For more on these past plans see sections 1.4.4.3 and 2.1.2. 
700 Damian Chalmers et al., European Union Law (CUP 2006) 833; Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the 
Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart 1998) 68-78. 
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XX(a) the legitimate objective is public morals and in the case of Article XX(b) it is 
human, animal or plant life or health.  
Articles XX(a) and XX(b) explicitly refer to necessity. Unlike what was once 
suggested,701 the proportionality review nowadays tends to begin with an analysis of 
’necessity’ for public morals or public health on a very general level. The necessity test 
is at this stage of the proportionality review not about the necessity of each individual 
element of the measure, but instead about the necessity of the measure more in general. 
Similarly, under Article XX(g) the analysis on whether a measure ‘relates’ to natural 
resource conservation will focus on whether the measure as a whole relates to the 
objective, with limited consideration given to the relationship between the justifiable 
objective and individual elements of the measure.702 
The point made above may be illustrated with an example. In EC – Seals the AB was 
confronted with EU legislation that prohibited the import of seals and seal products. 
The import prohibition included some minor exemptions that, among other things, 
allowed for the import of seals killed by Inuit communities to continue. In the 
interpretation of necessity under Article XX(a) in relation to the protection of public 
morals, the AB concluded that even if the exemptions to the import ban were taken into 
account, the law would still contribute to its societal objective. In other words, even if 
the exemptions might not have been necessary for the main objective, the measure in 
general was still necessary. Pivotal was the test of the necessity of the measure in 
general and not of the individual elements, which may have been WTO-inconsistent 
(i.e. discriminatory). In this respect, the necessity test is rather deferential in the sense 
that it gives deference to states adopting their measures. The approach does not even 
seem to diverge from the proportionality review under XX(g), where ‘relate’ is used 
instead of ‘necessary’.703 
The examination of the necessity of a measure in general has at times resulted in such 
a deferential test that even measures with de jure discriminatory elements have survived 
                                                 
701 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 January 1996, 
para. 6.40. See also Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 
168. 
702 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 11-
22; EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov. 2013, paras 7.624-634. See also US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, paras 138-141. 
703 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.185, 5.192, 5.217. 
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the necessity test. In Brazil – Tyres the AB found the import ban on re-treaded tyres 
necessary. The ban was expected to create a higher demand in domestic tyres, which 
would encourage more re-treading of domestic waste tyres and thus reduce problems 
associated with waste tyres. Management schemes were in place for waste tyres but 
according to the AB the legislation would be less effective if not coupled with an import 
ban on retreaded tyres.704  
The necessity test has had teeth in a few cases. For example, Thailand – Cigarettes 
concerned an import ban on cigarettes. The panel found the ban not to be necessary 
because the same objective to control the quality and quantity of cigarettes could be 
pursued through labelling and advertisement restrictions.705 The measure was, 
however, de jure discriminatory, since domestic cigarettes could be sold on the 
market.706 The case is already fairly old and additionally, it may be that the de jure 
discriminatory elements were decisive for the measure not surviving the necessity test. 
As concluded above, the necessity test has been deferential in that it does not include a 
review of individual elements of the measure. The test has also been deferential from a 
different perspective. Under GATT each state may select its desired level of protection 
with respect to the legitimate objective. The necessity test then requires a comparison 
of the level of protection linked to the adopted measure and the level of protection 
linked to a proposed alternative measure. Under an intense review it could be concluded 
that a measure is not necessary if a less trade restrictive alternative ensures almost or 
practically the same level of protection. The approach has, however, been quite 
deferential, as WTO members have been able to fend off challenges against their 
measures. As was the case also in EU free movement law, any measure to promote the 
protection of public health could be the least restrictive alternative to achieve the 
desired level of protection.707 For example, in EC – Asbestos the AB concluded that 
                                                 
704 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, para. 170-
175. 
705 Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10, Panel Report, 5 
Oct. 1990 (adopted), paras 75-81. 
706 See also US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, Panel Report, 16 Jan. 1989 (adopted), 
para. 5.26. The same level of protection must be targeted with respect to domestic and foreign products. 
707 In line with this see EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, 
AB Report, 12 March 2001, paras 168-172; US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, Panel 
Report, 16 Jan. 1989 (adopted), para. 5.26; US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, AB Report, 7 April 2005, paras 308-309; US – Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 30; Brazil – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, para. 140. 
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controlled use of asbestos would not provide the same level of protection as a ban on 
import and use.708 States do not have to accept alternatives that contribute to the 
objective to a lesser degree.709 
In the necessity review in EC – Seals both the panel and the AB considered the 
sustainability labels as an alternative to a full ban on seal products but found that labels 
ensuring the same level of protection would not be reasonably available in this case. In 
other words, the analysis of the degree of contribution to the objective of the alternative 
was linked to the analysis of the feasibility of such option.710 Disregarding the particular 
facts of in EC – Seals, it is still interesting to note that the AB went to great lengths to 
show that a sustainability label would not ensure the same level of protection as a ban. 
This could be read to suggest that labels under some circumstances might ensure the 
same level of protection. Given that labels would at best normally ensure only almost 
the same level of protection, the reasoning in EC – Seals could be regarded as an 
indication that the necessity test might be more intense than the outcome of the 
necessity analysis in cases of the last two decades would suggest. 
Perhaps the most controversial application of an intense necessity test came in Korea – 
Beef. The case concerned the dual retail system for beef in Korea. Imported beef had to 
be sold in separate specialized stores in order not to confuse consumers and to protect 
against fraud. The AB started by clarifying that there is a broad spectrum of thresholds 
between ‘contribution’ and ‘indispensable’ and that ‘necessity’ is closer to the latter 
than the former.711 Against this backdrop the AB found recordkeeping requirements to 
be sufficient and the dual retail system thus to be unnecessary. Even if the dual retail 
system might have been marginally more effective, the AB did not view it as 
relevant.712  
Korea – Beef could be read to indicate that the necessity test is not deferential to the 
extreme. Such conclusion has merit, because the test would otherwise risk not having 
                                                 
708 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 12 March 
2001, para. 174. 
709 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, para. 5.273. 
710 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov 2013, paras 7.478-505 and 7.639; EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 22 May 2014, paras 5.267-280. 
711 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB Report, 11 Dec. 
2000, para. 161. 
712 Id. paras 178-182. 
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any added value. Some parallels could be drawn to the EU model where harsh 
restrictions on imports may be disproportionate if for example labelling can achieve 
almost the same level of protection. It is, however, important to note the AB in Korea 
– Beef put the actual pursued level of protection into question by claiming that the 
objective of Korea cannot have been to eliminate fraud completely.713  While this may 
be even more controversial from the perspective of state sovereignty, it is different from 
an intense necessity review where an alternative measure is found to guarantee more or 
less an equal level of protection. 
There continue to exist unanswered questions on the WTO model as much as on the 
EU model. The interpretation of the concept of ‘necessary’ has generally mounted to a 
quite deferential test. There have, however, been some indications that it might not be 
deferential to the extreme. Be that as it may, the test of ‘necessary’ under Articles XX(a) 
and XX(b) still only forms the first step of a necessity review in cases where those 
articles are applicable. The chapeau of Article XX introduces a further necessity test. 
The chapeau of Article XX prohibits “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade”. This provision applies regardless of which ground of justification 
has been relied on. In other words, even if the tests of ’relate’ under Article XX(g) 
GATT and ’necessary’ under Articles XX(a) and XX(b) may to some degree differ with 
regards to the initial parts of the proportionality review, each ground of justification is 
still covered by the chapeau. The chapeau covers the manner in which the state measure 
is applied.714 The manner in which as measure is applied is generally revealed already 
by its design and structure.715 In case a law includes arbitrary discrimination, then so 
will almost automatically also its implementation. Thus, neither legal provisions as 
such, nor their implementation may create arbitrary discrimination.716 
                                                 
713 Ibid. 
714 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 22. 
715 US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States and second recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, AB report, 14 Dec. 2018, para. 6.270. 
716 See e.g. EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, 
Panel Report, 25 Nov 2013, para. 7.648. 
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In WTO law a necessity test has been integrated into the application of the chapeau. In 
some respect one could speak of a ‘disguised necessity test’.717 Unlike tests of whether 
the measure ‘relates’ to conservation or is ‘necessary’ to protect health, the review 
under the chapeau will examine the merits of each element of the measure at hands.718 
The necessity of the measure is thus evaluated with consideration given to the necessity 
of all its individual discriminatory elements. This structure of the proportionality review 
has in practice produced case law where almost every time the fate of the measure is 
not determined under the concepts of ’relating’ and ’necessary’ in Article XX GATT, 
but under the chapeau. This final step of the proportionality review has teeth. In 
addition, it ties the different initial forms of tests together to produce a coherent whole. 
The chapeau targets hidden interests and disguised purposes.719 It also reflects the 
principle of good faith,720 which would hint to a test of purpose.721 Yet, determining 
the purpose of a measure or its implementation is very difficult. Even explicit 
statements by individual officials might not reflect the purpose of the public authority 
as a collective actor. Hence, no separate test to determine purpose has ever been 
designed. 
The purpose of the chapeau is to hinder the abuse of Article XX.722 Under the chapeau 
the reasons behind the discriminatory elements of the measure under scrutiny must be 
in line with the justifiable environmental objective.723  In other words, the design of the 
measure, with its discriminatory elements, must be rationally related to a justifiable 
policy aim.724 A measure is not the least restrictive way to achieve an aim if it includes 
                                                 
717 Arthur E. Appleton, ‘GATT Article XX’s Chapeau: A Disguised “Necessary” Test?” The WTO 
Appellate Body’s Ruling in United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline’ 
(1997) 6 Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 131. 
718 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 25. 
719 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, Panel Report, 18 Sept 
2000, paras 8.236-239. 
720 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
para. 158. 
721 See Simon Lester et al, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Hart 2008) 414. 
722 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
para. 150; US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, 
p. 22-23. 
723 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, paras 225-
227. See also US – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31, 11 Oct. 1994 (unadopted). In this case the distinction 
made between two goods in the U.S. law was consistent with the environmental objective. Therefore, 
the law did not have the effect of affording protection to domestic production. 
724 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, para. 5.306; US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel 
Report, 14 April 2015, para. 7.553. 
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elements that increase discriminatory effect but have no rational relationship to a 
justifiable objective. The test under the chapeau is with respect to this aspect 
comparable to the proportionality approach under EU law, which requires that there is 
no other less trade restrictive alternative that would fulfil the justifiable objective 
equally well. 
All in all, the chapeau includes a necessity review that carefully scrutinizes the specific 
design of the measure. But how intense is that review? Would a measure be declared 
unnecessary if a less discriminatory alternative would ensure almost the same level of 
protection? While this question would deserve more elaborate research, a few 
observations can be offered here. 
US – Shrimp concerned a U.S. law that required the use of turtle-exclusion devices 
when harvesting shrimp. U.S. vessels had to use the devices. Importation of shrimp was 
possible from countries with a similar requirement. At the time of the WTO dispute 
there was on-going litigation in U.S. courts on whether sustainably harvested shrimp 
from countries that had not implemented a similar requirement could be imported. The 
original AB found that the design of the measure breached WTO law in part because 
the U.S. required the use of a particular device and did not accept equally effective 
methods.725 The U.S. changed the implementation of the measure to allow also for other 
equally effective shrimp fishing methods. The law was still challenged by Malaysia in 
compliance proceedings, but this time the U.S. came out victorious.726 The ban on 
unsustainably caught shrimp survived the chapeau without any consideration given to 
the less trade restrictive alternative of introducing sustainability labels. A reason for 
this might have been that Malaysia did not present labelling as an alternative. Yet, the 
case could also be read to suggest that the necessity review under the chapeau is quite 
deferential after all. If true, uniformity under Article XX as a whole could only be 
maintained if the necessity review in the interpretation ‘necessary’ in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) is equally deferential. 
In case the GATT is more deferential than the EU with respect to the test of least 
restrictive measure, it could be explained by the fact that there in the EU has been a 
                                                 
725 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 161-164. 
726 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU 
by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   194 31.7.2019   7.15
 195 
higher degree of integration and harmonization among states, whereas in the context of 
the WTO state sovereignty might be given slightly more weight. At this point it must, 
however, be noted that according to an AB the chapeau includes also other tests than 
the test of a rational relationship between the discriminatory element of the measure 
and the justifiable objective.727 It is submitted that the review under the chapeau of 
Article XX GATT is not constrained to a necessity test in the form of analysis of 
potential less discriminatory alternatives that fulfil the same objective. Although the 
AB making the statement referred to above did not explicitly lay out what other tests it 
was referring to, examples of other proportionality tests will be offered in later in this 
book. 
3.1.3.3. Estimating the Difference in Effectiveness Between Alternative Measures  
In cases of de facto discrimination, the suitability test and the necessity test have been 
fairly deferential in both the EU and the WTO. Member states may set strict standards 
of protection, while courts and panels will show deference when reviewing the 
justifiability of those measures. The tests have, however, not been deferential to the 
extreme. Under the necessity test, or more specifically the least restrictive measure test, 
a minimal additional benefit might, at least under EU free movement law, not always 
justify a measure that is more restrictive than the alternative. When the test of least 
restrictive measure is given some degree of intensity courts should be careful in how 
the difference in effectiveness of alternative measures is calculated. 
In examining the proportionality of the measure, the court might conclude that it can 
be expected to make a genuine contribution to the legitimate objective. When testing 
for necessity of a ban on some unsustainable PPMs the court will go on to consider 
alternative measures. As alternatives to a ban on the unsustainable PPMs the state 
could, for example, adopt a quota for sustainable PPMs (e.g. RPS) or guarantee 
producers using sustainable PPMs a premium on top of the market price (e.g. FIT). For 
simplicity, it is here assumed that the alternatives considered would all also have an 
expected effect and would therefore equally be suitable.  
The quota and the price premium would normally be less effective than a full ban. 
However, if the difference in effectiveness is sufficiently small, it would appear that 
                                                 
727 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, AB Report, 20 Nov. 2015, 
para. 7.316. 
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the ban could sometimes be declared to be unnecessarily strict. The court will face the 
question of whether there is any less trade restrictive alternative to the ban, that would 
practically (i.e. almost) guarantee the same level of protection. How should the 
potential difference in level of protection be calculated? While courts have never been 
explicit on this point and do not tend to take on such technical and mathematical 
exercise, understanding different approaches to the problem is still important for 
consistent and unbiased application of the law. Therefore, some potential theories are 
developed below. 
Let us assume that the objective with the ban would be to reduce pollution. The 
difference in effectiveness between the ban and the alternatives can be expressed in 
several different ways. First, the difference could be expressed in absolute terms. This 
would be a measure of units of pollution. Secondly, the difference could be expressed 
in terms of units relative to the perfect scenario of elimination all harmful pollution. In 
other words, it would be calculated how many percent the difference expressed in 
absolute terms (i.e. pollution units) is of all pollution experienced in the state adopting 
the PPM-criteria. 
The problem with the two calculation alternatives presented above is that they are 
functions of the market size and power of the state adopting the PPM-criteria. A large 
state is more likely to have significant domestic demand and is therefore also more 
likely to import more in absolute terms. What follows is that, ceteris paribus, the 
difference in effect between the measure and the alternatives in a large state, say 
Germany, will probably be more significant than in a small state like Latvia. 
Consequently, the measure would be more likely to survive even moderately intense 
scrutiny if adopted by Germany. This will be the outcome regardless of whether the 
total amount of pollution experienced in the state adopting the PPM-criteria only 
includes pollution that comes from out-of-state production or also includes the pollution 
that used to come from in-state production but that has been fully eliminated by the 
PPM-criteria, either as a consequence of the same measure or with an earlier measure 
adopted already before the criteria were expanded to also apply for imports. 
A third way to express the difference in effect between the adopted measure and 
alternatives should be considered. An option would be to calculate how many percent 
more the ban eliminates the harm as compared to the alternatives. This would be an 
estimate of how effective the ban is relative to how effective the alternative measure is. 
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In other words, it would be an estimation of relative effectiveness. The option of 
comparing two measures with reference to their relative effectiveness seems like the 
preferable option, as it would put states on an equal footing.  
A final twist can be added. Sustainability labels that allow consumers to make the 
choice between the sustainable and unsustainable option could be considered as an 
alternative to bans, guaranteed market price premiums and quotas. Sustainability labels 
would be (almost) equally effective as a ban only if the state has consumers that are 
very sensitive to the PPMs and value the label highly. This would ironically mean that 
a state with highly sensitive consumers would face more difficulty in putting forward 
the case that sustainability labels are not equally effective and that a ban is the only way 
to achieve the desired level of protection. 
In conclusion, courts should be aware of the various available methods of estimating 
the difference in effectiveness of measures. In addition, they need to be mindful of the 
potential consequences of adopting a particular method. It was submitted here that the 
moderately intense necessity review coupled with a focus on the relative effectiveness 
of the adopted measure and the proposed alternative is often a reasonable approach.  
3.1.4. Scenarios of No Expected Effects 
3.1.4.1. Market Power and the Case of a Ban on Nuclear Power 
In principle, it may be that in some cases the prominent suitability test of ‘expected 
contribution’ leads to the conclusion that there is no expected effect of the 
implementation of PPM-criteria also on imports. Similarly, the necessity test enables 
for example the ECJ to conclude that it would not be necessary to take any measure at 
all because the benefits of a PPM-measure are too small or unlikely. In case the benefits 
are minimal, the ECJ may state that the same level of protection is achieved without 
any PPM-criteria for imports. This interpretation of the necessity test resembles those 
versions of the suitability test where a genuine contribution or expected effect is 
required. 
Whether or not there will be any expected effects will depend on a number of factors. 
First, there must be some reduction in demand of the unsustainable PPMs in the state 
adopting the measure. Secondly, this must reduce total global demand of products from 
the state of production. Thirdly, that should reduce output in the state of production. 
Fourthly, reduced output must reduce the harmful effects. Lastly, it might even be 
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required under trade law that the benefits of the reduction in harmful effects in the state 
of production also with time become beneficial for the state adopting the measure.728 
States may struggle to claim any expected effects of their PPM-criteria under some 
particular circumstances. In the electricity sector in general there is some risk that the 
effects of a ban on power from some PPM is nullified due to reshuffling. 729 This means 
that those generating power simply shift sales of unsustainable power to other states 
and the PPM-sensitive state gets sustainable power that was previously sold to other 
states. Normally, however, when the demand of products from specific PPMs decreases 
in one state and products of a sustainable PPM increases, there will be price signals to 
producers. The theory that the characteristics of the electricity sector allows for 
reshuffling to eliminate all effects of a ban on some PPMs is complex. It is highly 
debatable as to whether reshuffling could fully eliminate the benefits of extending 
PPM-criteria to imports. Hence, it is here not given too much weight. 
A ban on nuclear power would, however, constitute a special case as there may exist 
additional reasons to fear that such measure will not have any expected effects. The 
most significant risks related to nuclear power plants are not linearly linked to levels of 
supply. In fact, the risks are probably almost constant for the plant if in operation. Thus, 
the benefit in the form of reduced public health and safety risks would only occur if 
demand drops sufficiently to cause plant closures. That in turn might occur only when 
the ban is adopted by a state with large volumes of imports. States with large volumes 
of imports are more likely to be states with large volumes of consumption. These are 
often economically powerful ‘large’ states, such as Germany. In sum, in the particular 
case of a ban on nuclear power the market power of the state may need to be 
exceptionally significant in order for the measure to have expected effects on first of 
all output, and secondly risks on the environment, public health and public safety. 
In case bias in favor of large powerful states would be incorporated into EU free 
movement law, it would threaten the democratic foundations of the jurisprudence. 
                                                 
728 On whether or not this last step might be required see section 6.2-6.3. 
729 On the theory of reshuffling in the electricity sector see Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of 
California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 
3 Michigan J. Environmental & Administrative L. 87, 108-110, 117-118. See also Irmgard Kischko, ‘Ein 
“Mascherl” fur den Atomstrom’ (4 June 2013) 
<http://kurier.at/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/kennzeichnung-ein-mascherl-fuer-den-
atomstrom/14.758.025> accessed 28 April 2014. 
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Large states already have a stronger presence in the legislative process in the EU.730 
The bias would thus increase their power. 
The bias risk should perhaps be taken even more seriously in the context of WTO law, 
because even if the differences in market power are always to some extent a function 
of population size, the socio-economic dimension becomes more prominent when 
developing and even the least developed countries are involved. There have been 
concerns that the WTO system does not safeguard against eco-imperialism.731 It is 
crucial for the legitimacy of the system that the design of the proportionality review 
does at least not increase such problems. Developing nations should have equal 
possibility to implement PPM-criteria even if it might not foster significant demand 
changes to also affect supply to a great extent. 
The lack of expected effect in terms of public health and safety could of course in the 
case of a ban on nuclear power lead to the state defending its measure on moral grounds. 
A ban on nuclear power could clean the consciousness of the people in the state 
consuming the electricity as the contribution of their purchasing to the nuclear power 
industry has in theory been cut. The question would then be whether nuclear power is 
a question of public morals under trade law doctrine. I shall return to the moral defense 
later in this book.732 It will in particular be submitted that the defense may be 
unsuccessful because the conclusion from a proportionality review may in this 
particular situation be that labelling serves the moral objective equally well. 
3.1.4.2. Effect of Measure Negligible for Reasons Unrelated to Market Power 
Other factors than market size and power of the state adopting the measure could render 
the measure without any expected effects. Consequently, not adopting any measure 
could, at least from one perspective, be practically equally effective. The expected 
effect test (suitability) and the least restrictive measure test (necessity) could again in 
these situations lead to the conclusion that the measure would not be proportional. In 
this subsection it is analyzed whether such conclusions could be problematic and if so, 
how the tests could be calibrated to avoid the problems. 
                                                 
730 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court – The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart 1998) 123-129. 
731 David Hunter et al, International Environmental Law and Policy (Foundation Press 1998) 1188. See 
also Petros Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary (OUP 2005) 212.  
732 See sections 6.2-6.3. 
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First, it could be argued that even if adopting PPM-criteria would reduce in-state 
demand in products produced with unsustainable PPMs, and even if that would affect 
out-of-state supply, the measure would not be suitable and necessary in case the local 
environmental benefit does not reach the territory of the state adopting the measure.733 
Some environmental effects might never spread across borders if the environmental 
harm is so minimal and temporary that it has been fully nullified before it reaches other 
states. In that case the state planning PPM-criteria would not have any environmental 
interest and therefore not taking it into account would not pose any serious issue of 
bias. At the other end of the spectrum are GHG emissions that have a direct and 
immediate cross-border effect. Somewhere in between those two extremes are many 
forms of environmental effects. In contrast to GHG emissions, those effects are 
primarily local in nature but still spread across borders in the long term.  
It has been argued that grounds of justification come into play only when there is a 
direct health risk.734 This might not be the case when the effects only show in the long-
term.735 Yet, the severity of environmental effects would justify a broader 
understanding of health as a ground of justification.736 Importantly, no bias against 
slowly accumulating but severe effects should exist. The problem may be addressed by 
taking into account long-term effects that eventually may become more than 
insignificant in their effect. Hence, many long-term effects should likely also justify 
discrimination and hinders to market access.737 
Secondly, there should be no bias against effects that are highly unlikely but extremely 
severe when they materialize, such as in the case of a nuclear accident. Some challenges 
may arise in case the tests of suitability and necessity include considerations on whether 
the probability of an effect is sufficient enough. In assessing whether the environmental 
benefit is genuine, expected and worth protection with reference to the alternative of 
                                                 
733 On this theory of a requirement that the environmental effect becomes cross-border see sections 6.2-
6.3. 
734 Ludwig Krämer, ‘Environmental Protection and Art. 30 EEC Treaty’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law 
Rev. 111, 118; Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community 
(Clarendon 1996) 72. 
735 For a critical review of stretching the protection of health to long term effects see Jukka Snell, Goods 
and Services in EC Law: A Study on the Relationship Between the Freedoms (OUP 2002) 180. 
736 Henrik Bjørnebye, Investing in EU Energy Security – Exploring the Regulatory Approach to 
Tomorrow’s Electricity Production (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 109-110. 
737 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, Opinion of AG Jacobs, 
para. 232. 
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not taking any action, the low probability should on its own not be decisive. The 
potential magnitude of the effect should also be taken into account. 
It seems plausible to account for long-term effects and the severity of the risks in the 
tests of suitability and necessity. Another type of bias may be more complex to address. 
When two states adopt an identical restriction on PPM-criteria applicable to both 
domestic production and imports, the state that is neighboring the states with polluting 
production is more likely to effectively reduce environmental harm from entering their 
territory than a state far away. It might be deemed necessary for the neighboring state 
to address the significant cross-border pollution with a ban on imports from 
unsustainable PPMs. A state further away might experience so little pollution from 
across its borders that adopting PPM-criteria for imports might not be deemed 
necessary under a moderately intense review. On the one hand, it might appear arbitrary 
that the distance from the polluting state could become decisive as to whether the 
measure is regarded necessary. This would further strengthen the argument for a 
deferential review. On the other hand, the distance to the polluting state is largely a 
random factor. The state that in reality will be burdened by more pollution will vary on 
a case by case basis and that there will perhaps not exist any systemic bias in favor of 
either state on this ground.738  
3.1.5. The Intensity of the Proportionality Review  
There has been some inconsistency in how the tests of suitability and necessity have 
been applied. It would appear that courts have often structured the tests to reflect a 
moderate degree of intensity. More specifically, test of suitability as a rule appears to 
take the form of a test for expected contribution to the legitimate objective. Moreover, 
there have been indications that under the test of least restrictive measure, the core test 
of the concept of necessity, measures may be declared disproportional already when 
the proposed alternative would not ensure exactly the same but only almost the same 
level of protection. 
However, it could be argued that states should have the right to hinder their population 
from causing long-term damage to their own territory and limiting the demand for 
                                                 
738 It could perhaps be argued that Germany’s central location makes it more vulnerable for cross-border 
pollution as compared to for example Latvia. However, this could be countered with an argument that 
Latvia is more closely situated to less developed states in Eastern Europe, that might currently still pollute 
more. 
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unsustainable energy produced abroad is one of the few actions a state can take to 
address this concern. Although strict PPM-criteria adopted by a single small state may 
not have much effect in practice their importance may lie in that they increase 
incentives for other states to take similar action. In other words, it may be a necessary, 
although not sufficient, step toward decreasing the cross-border harm from the targeted 
PPM. The measure advances the sustainability objective in a broad sense. This purpose 
has been discussed in relation to plans of only one state to restrict the import of nuclear 
power and the incentives it may create for other states to join.739 
There have traditionally existed arguments presented in support of a deferential 
approach, or in other words for granting states broad discretion in designing their 
measures. First, states claim sovereignty to define their level of protection. Secondly, 
interest groups that represent for example environmental concerns may argue that states 
should have the right to advance a very high level of protection. As illustrated in this 
chapter, the risk of bias relating to the size of the state adopting the measure that might 
emerge in very specific circumstances such as when a state adopts a ban on power from 
nuclear fission could form an additional argument in favor of a deferential review. 
A very deferential approach would mean that the existence of alternatives, such as 
labelling, would usually not render the importing state’s preferred measure 
disproportionate, and hence the approach would allow the state to maintain its measure. 
For example, the deferential approach would not encourage labelling to the same extent 
as a stricter or more intense approach would. Whether this would enhance or weaken 
democratic ideals is unclear. Gaines has put forward the question of whether it would 
be more democratic to grant states the right to pursue their objectives, such as 
sustainability, through restrictions enacted on the basis of the values of the majority of 
the domestic society or, alternatively, to increase consumer information and choice 
through labelling.740 On the one hand, there is a certain appeal in delegating the decision 
to consumers so that everyone has a voice. On the other hand, also the state legislature 
                                                 
739 ‘Rechen-Trick: Österreich soll Atomstromfrei worden’ (16 April 2012) 
<http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/economist/749813/RechenTrick_Osterreich-soll-atomstromfrei-
werden> accessed 17 Nov. 2017; Craig Morris, ‘Austria to Discontinue Imports of Nuclear Power’ (25 
April 2012) <www.renewablesinternational.net/austria-to-discontinue-imports-of-nuclear-
power/150/537/38088/> accessed 28 April 2014. 
740 Sanford E Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for 
Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental L. 383, 403. 
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adopting the measure is backed by democratic legitimacy and may conclude, for 
example, that a labelling system would be insufficient for tackling externalities.  
Putting the question of democratic legitimacy on the side for the time being, there is 
the more obvious downside of a deferential review. Namely, the logical capability test 
and the most deferential necessity test do not function as tools to determine the 
necessity of measures in cases where states advance one environmental objective, while 
simultaneously causing other forms of environmental harm. For example, as all energy 
resources have different effects, states would under a very deferential proportionality 
review be presented with an opportunity to defend a ban on electricity from any specific 
resource on health grounds.  
A deferential approach to suitability and necessity would leave the tests without much 
force in cases of de facto discrimination and without a credible proportionality review 
the free trade system will be in danger of collapse. With a deferential suitability and 
necessity review there would therefore need to exist other elements of the 
proportionality review – certain subtests if one will – that would guarantee a genuine 
proportionality review with teeth. Yet, it ought to be emphasized that other tests of 
proportionality are not alternatives but complements to the tests of suitability and least 
restrictive measure. Hence, it is not submitted that they are relevant only when a very 
deferential approach is taken to the more classic tests of suitability and necessity. 
Various proportionality tests that could ensure that PPM-criteria are effectively 
scrutinized in law of justification will be explored in the remaining subsections to 
section 3.1. Some of the tests have already been applied in trade law, while other tests 
have been discussed among academics but have rarely been applied. 
3.1.6. Proportionality Sensu Stricto 
3.1.6.1. The Nature of the Test 
Proportionality sensu stricto is a value balancing test.  As an initial step in the 
application of the test it would be determined how the adopted measure affects different 
values. For example, it may be determined that the measure on the one hand causes 
decrease in free trade and, on the other hand, increases free speech or some form of 
environmental protection. An increase in, for example, free speech or hydropower will 
come with both costs and benefits. Thus, as a second step all costs and benefits related 
to the values would have to be determined. As a final third step, the decrease in one set 
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of values is balanced against the increase in another set of values. The test strives to 
establish the net gain of the measure. The outcome of this value balancing test would 
depend on the importance (weight) of the values and the degree to which they would 
be satisfied (intensity). Due to uncertainties in measurement one would also need to 
take account of a probability distribution.741 
In the context of trade law proportionality sensu stricto requires the court to balance the 
trade restrictive742 or discriminatory effect of the chosen measures against the benefits 
of that same measure. A measure is proportional sensu stricto if the restrictive effects 
on cross-border trade are not too high in relation to the environmental, social or other 
benefits of the measure. Depending on the exact design of the test, the balance could 
be required to be at some predefined acceptable level.743 The test has been described as 
building on a cost benefit analysis744, or even reasonableness.745  
If applicable, the test of proportionality sensu strico would open up the possibility to 
conclude that a measure is necessary despite not perhaps strictly speaking being the 
least restrictive option that achieves the desired level of protection. Reversely, a 
measure could fail the test of proportionality sensu stricto even when it is the least 
restrictive alternative for achieving an objective.  
Let us reflect more in detail on the difference between an intense proportionality review 
and proportionality sensu stricto. Under an intense proportionality review a court may 
declare that a measure is not necessary if there is a less restrictive and more or less 
identically effective alternative. The court will put into question the national objective 
only to a marginal effect. It is a fairly mild challenge on the level of protection that has 
been deemed necessary by the state and subsequently been adopted by it. In turn, under 
a review of proportionality sensu stricto the court will have much more freedom to 
                                                 
741 Francisco J. Urbina, ‘A Critique of Proportionality’ (2012) 57 The American J. Jurisprudence 49, 54-
55; Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford J. Legal Studies 575, 
589-590. 
742 This is not necessarily the same as the degree of discriminatory effect, especially when the measure 
is non-discriminatory but hinders market access. 
743 Portuese appears to have gone so far as to (implicitly) suggest that the net benefit should be 
maximized, indicating that the balance should be optimal. See Aurelien Portuese, ’Principle of 
Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 612. 
744 For a discussion on the cost-benefit analysis see Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law: A Study 
on the Relationship Between the Freedoms (OUP 2002) 200-212. 
745 Damien Geradin, Trade and the Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
28. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   204 31.7.2019   7.15
 205 
question the value of the objective set by the state. The court will essentially consider 
whether the burden and the benefits of the measure are in balance. 
3.1.6.2. Criticism, Defense and Potential Relevance in Cases on PPM-Criteria 
The balancing of different values is highly controversial as it will often be difficult to 
find a common scale for the different values. Estimating the net gain of a measure that 
decreases free trade but increases free speech or environmental protection can be 
regarded as a comparison of apples with oranges. This is the incommensurability 
critique directed at proportionality sensu stricto. There has been debate as to whether 
this is reason enough to reject the test or not.746 How serious of an issue 
incommensurability is regarded to be links in part to the view on how much power 
judges should have in deciding difficult cases. 
The incommensurability criticism directed at proportionality tests has in particular 
concerned the proportionality sensu stricto test, which is a value balancing test. This is 
not to suggest that incommensurability concerns could not also relate to some other 
elements of the proportionality review that in this book have been labelled value 
reconciliation tests. Those concerns should still be much less severe.   
The harsh criticism of proportionality sensu stricto emerged in the context of human 
rights law, where it has been difficult to identify a common unit for comparison of 
different rights.747 Similar challenges would exist in comparing free trade with some 
human rights. Weighing trade restrictive effects against environmental benefits would 
equally be regarded as problematic. Yet, it is argued here that trade restrictiveness and 
environmental benefits could at least in theory be expressed in similar terms. Namely, 
                                                 
746 For arguments against proportionality sensu stricto as a judicial decision-making tool due to 
incommensurability see Francisco J. Urbina, ‘A Critique of Proportionality’ (2012) 57 The American J. 
Jurisprudence 49, 54-55; Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford J. 
Legal Studies 575. For arguments on why incommensurability might not be a decisive problem see Bruce 
Chapman, ‘Incommensurability, Proportionality, and Defeasibility’ (2013) 12 Law, Probability and Risk 
259; Timothy A. O. Endicott, ‘Proportionality and Incommensurability’, in Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. 
Miller and Gregorire Webber, Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights Justifications, Reasoning 
(CUP 2014); Paul-Erik N. Veel, ‘Incommensurability, Proportionality, and Rational Legal Decision-
Making’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 178.  
747 Francisco J. Urbina, ‘A Critique of Proportionality’ (2012) 57 The American J. Jurisprudence 49; 
Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford J. Legal Studies 575. On 
proportionality in economic law and incommensurability see Caroline Henckels, Proportionality and 
Deference in Investor-State Arbitration – Balancing Investment Protection and Regulatory Autonomy 
(CUP 2015) 164. 
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the effects of both discrimination and environmental externalities can, admittedly with 
some difficulty, be transposed into economic costs or, alternatively, loss of utility. 
Admittedly, defining the strength of values with reference to utility or economic 
welfare is in itself a value-laden choice.748 Moreover, it must be noted that in inter-state 
disputes the judge will be ill-equipped to estimate utility or welfare gains of measures. 
In other words, it will be difficult to commensurate the gains of the measure that 
promotes some values with the costs of the restriction on free trade. Yet, the existence 
of a potential common unit of comparison supports the position that proportionality 
sensu stricto should not be outright rejected without a more careful analysis.  
What makes the test of proportionality sensu stricto particularly interesting in the 
context of discussing PPM-criteria, is that it could potentially ease the risk of bias that 
the tests of expected effect and least restrictive measure may otherwise cause. The 
situation where the actual environmental benefits of PPM-criteria will only be 
significant enough to render the measure suitable and necessary if it is a major 
importing state adopting the measure was portrayed as an unlikely but still potentially 
problematic scenario. Under some circumstances states with more market power would 
enjoy an advantage as their restrictions on PPMs of imports would be more likely to 
have an effect on the PPMs used in other states and would thus also be more likely to 
reduce the cross-border environmental harm. Under a test of proportionality sensu 
stricto the advantage that states with more market power enjoy would at least in part be 
outbalanced by the fact that their measures will also be more likely to have significant 
trade restrictive effects, at least if trade restrictiveness would here for the purpose of 
the test be understood in terms of trade volumes and not in terms of discrimination. 
3.1.6.3. Implicit Rejection in WTO Law? 
The test of proportionality sensu stricto would be a third prong of the proportionality 
review that would complement the tests of suitability and necessity. The application of 
proportionality sensu strico would mean that the test of least restrictive measure would 
not offer a definite conclusion on proportionality. Instead it would only form a 
component in the overall balancing test. 
                                                 
748 See Francisco J. Urbina, ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 Oxford J. Legal Studies 575, 
585-586. 
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Under Article XX GATT indications for proportionality sensu stricto should be 
searched for with respect to both the interpretation of the concept of ‘necessary’ as well 
as the chapeau. Let us start with the former. 
The language adopted by panels and ABs in cases on GATT would at times imply an 
application of a test of proportionality sensu stricto. The AB has repeatedly stated that 
the concept of necessary under Article XX and the necessity test applied under that 
concept forms a holistic balancing exercise.749  Factors to be taken into account are the 
trade restrictiveness of the measure, its contribution to the objective and the importance 
of the objective.750 First, the trade restrictiveness should likely be understood as degree 
of discrimination, since the purpose of the agreement is to ensure equality of 
competitive conditions.751 Secondly, as proclaimed in Brazil – Tyres, in case the 
restriction is severe, the contribution would need to be material.752 This could be the 
case with respect to energy sector regulation because the protection of the environment 
and health have been regarded as highly important.753  
It would still often be difficult for WTO bodies to find a justifiable basis for re-
evaluating the importance of an objective that a state pursues. Several scholars have 
rejected the idea of proportionality sensu stricto in WTO law.754 This is supported by 
the details of the reasoning.755 
Despite the language in decisions to some disputes, there are very few signs of any real 
test of proportionality sensu stricto. Worthy of note is that in EC – Seals, and equally 
in Brazil – Tyres, the proclaimed holistic balancing did not deliver any unusually strict 
                                                 
749 See e.g. Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, 
para. 182; EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB 
Report, 22 May 2014, paras 5.214-215. 
750 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB Report, 11 Dec. 
2000, paras 162-166; Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 
Dec. 2007, paras 143, 178-182; EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 22 May 2014, para. 5.169. See also US – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, AB Report, 7 April 2005, para. 306. 
The gambling case related to General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
(1994). 
751 Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, DS75, AB Report, 18 Jan. 1999, para. 120. 
752 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, para. 150. 
753 Id. para. 144. 
754 Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 168; Federico 
Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade – A Comparative Analysis of EC and 
WTO Law (Hart 2004) 205; Tamara Perisin, Free Movement of Goods and Limits to Regulatory 
Autonomy in the EU and WTO (T.M.C. Asser 2009) 200-201.  
755 Donald H. Regan, ’The Moaning of ”Necessity” in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV – The 
Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 347, 348. 
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or intense review of the state measure with respect to the interpretation of the term 
‘necessary’ under Article XX GATT. The review was on the contrary quite deferential. 
In EC – Asbestos the AB noted that a more serious health risk related to a good like 
asbestos would make it easier to argue that a ban was necessary.756 Yet, it might not 
have been an expression related to proportionality sensu stricto, but merely a statement 
of the fact that with very hazardous substances it will be difficult to find a less restrictive 
alternative that guarantees health protection of a high level.757 
In Korea – Beef the AB stated that the balancing exercise was comprehended in the test 
of least restrictive measure and did not engage in any comparison of burden and benefits 
beyond that.758 The approach was thus similar to that adopted in for example EC – 
Seals. Yet, it may be recalled that although the balancing test was referred to in Korea 
– Beef, the AB stated that the objective of Korea cannot have been to eliminate fraud 
completely.759 This could be read to indicate that the AB did question the level of 
protection sought by Korea and that the applied test thus had characteristics of 
proportionality sensu stricto. 
After the test of necessity, the subsequent step in the proportionality review is the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT. The proportionality review under the chapeau has been 
described as a reasonableness test.760 However, the application of the chapeau echoes 
the approach adopted under the test on whether the measure is necessary. The language 
adopted in reports would indicate that the idea of proportionality sensu stricto might 
apply but the details of the reasoning and the outcome of the analysis suggest otherwise. 
The AB has stated that the chapeau includes a test of balancing in casu.761 It has also 
condemned a measure in part because the discriminatory effects were foreseeable.762 
Yet, the ABs normally do not appear to take on the task of putting the chosen 
                                                 
756 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report ,12 March 
2001, para. 172. 
757 On this topic see generally Alan O. Sykes, ‘The Least Restrictive Means’ (2003) 70 University of 
Chicago Law Review 403, 409-411. 
758 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB Report, 11 Dec 
.2000, paras 166-176. 
759 Id. 178-182. 
760 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 249. 
761 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
para. 159. 
762 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 27-
28. 
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environmental objectives into question by weighing their benefit against the burden on 
trade.763  
There has been some speculation on whether the proportionality sensu stricto test could 
apply under the SPS Agreement.764 That does, however, not render any support for a 
similar approach to GATT, because the terms and structure of the provisions in 
respective agreements are different. 
3.1.6.4. Boundaries of Member State Discretion in the EU 
There appears to exist similar hesitance to apply proportionality sensu stricto in EU free 
movement law. Although some have argued for the application of the test,765 the ECJ 
has, however, generally been cautious not to go that far in its scrutiny of the Member 
State objective.766 Krämer argued this to be a justified choice.767 
Danish Bottles is probably the case where the ECJ came closest to applying a test of 
proportionality sensu stricto. In that case the court had to deal with a Danish 
requirement of prior approval for new models of beverage bottles. The number of 
approved bottles was limited because retailers were only capable of handling a limited 
number of bottle types for recycling. In addition to approved bottles, each producer 
could put on the Danish market a limited number of unapproved bottles. The 
unapproved bottles were not to be managed by the official takeback system and the 
number of such bottles was limited in order to ensure that the number of bottles not 
being reused would not increase too much.  
                                                 
763 On the interpretation of proportionality and the least restrictive measure test under the chapeau of 
Article XX GATT see also 3.1.3.2. 
764 See Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade – A Comparative 
Analysis of EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 464-467. The SPS Agreement applies primarily to the 
prevention of risks related to diseases and to food safety. Measures adopted for those purposes should be 
consistent with scientific evidence. See Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, DS245, 
Panel Report, 15 July 2003, para. 8.198. However, it should be noted that states still also under that 
agreement have some flexibility in determining appropriate level of protection. See Australia – Measures 
Affecting Importation of Salmon, DS18, AB Report, 20 Oct. 1998, paras 198-199. 
765 Gjermund Mathisen, ‘Om proporsjonalitet som skranke for tiltak som gjør inngrep i EØS-avtalens 
fire friheter’ (2007) 42 Jussens Venner 80, 87-89; Case C-434/04 Criminal proceedings against Jan-Erik 
Anders Ahokainen and Mati Leppik [2006] ECR I-9171, Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro, paras 23–26. 
See also Case C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-On-Trent and Norwich City Council v. B & Q plc 
[1992] ECR I-6635, para 15. 
766 Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Clarendon 1996) 
102-103; Bram Delvaux, EU Law and the Development of a Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy 
Policy – Opportunities and Shortcomings (KU Leuven 2011) 158-161. 
767 Ludwig Krämer, ‘Environmental Protection and Art. 30 EEC Treaty’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law 
Rev. 111, 122-127. 
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The purpose of the system was to protect the environment. More specifically, the fear 
of Denmark was that because many retailers were unable to accept new models of 
bottles for return, bottles would not be returned and consequently also never be reused. 
The ECJ noted that the level of protection sought by Denmark was exceptionally high. 
It found that although the requirement that there is a system for all bottles to be returned 
and reused was proportionate, limiting the number of unapproved bottles on the market 
was still disproportionate.768  
Denmark was allowed to require that the distributor of any type of bottle must accept 
at least that type of bottle for return. However, all stores were not capable of accepting 
all bottle models circulating on the market when the number of different models became 
significant. As a consequence of the ruling, Denmark had to accept that a large number 
of bottles, not part of the original takeback system, would remain uncollected as 
customers would not return the unapproved bottles to the store they had bought them 
from. 
The Court could be understood to in practice have put into question the Danish 
objective of an exceptionally high degree of recycling. Hence, the approach of the Court 
can be interpreted as a test of proportionality sensu stricto. Be that as it may, the ruling 
in Danish Bottles at least confirms that there, due to Treaty obligations, are some 
boundaries to Member State discretion with respect to the chosen level of protection.769 
More recently the Court has ruled that Member States have a ‘definite margin of 
discretion’ regarding the level of protection that is adopted on moral grounds.770 This 
seems to reaffirm that there is a limit to Member State discretion, although fairly wide 
margins of discretion are accepted. 
The Danish Bottles case is not the rule, but more of an exception. The Court would 
generally appear not to apply proportionality sensu stricto. It should be noted that the 
test of proportionality sensu stricto is rather vague.771 It is not evident what criteria 
                                                 
768 Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles) [1988] ECR 4607, paras 14-22. 
769 See also Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A 
Critical Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 147, 243. In the context of applying 
free movement provisions on public procurement she suggests that the only boundary to member state 
discretion should be that states do not show lack of good faith, i.e. discriminatory intent. 
770 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-505, paras 39-
44. 
771 Andrea Morrone, ‘Constitutional Adjudication and the Principle of Reasonableness’, in Giorgio 
Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini (eds.), Reasonableness and Law (Springer 2009) 
246. 
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should be applied in evaluating whether the state at the expense of free trade has 
adopted a level of protection that is too ambitious. There is a strong subjective element 
in the balancing exercise. Therefore, the legislator might be better suited to take on the 
task.772 This would perhaps explain why the ECJ has been cautious and often refrains 
from applying the test. Admittedly, there is only a fine line between such an intense 
review of state measures and a test that rejects a measure because an alternative 
provides more or less the same level of protection. One may argue that the rejection of 
the test of proportionality sensu stricto similarly casts doubt over the applicability of an 
intense least restrictive measure test. 
3.1.7. Internal Consistency and Policy Consistency 
Recognizing that the test of proportionality sensu stricto is highly contested, the focus 
shifts to some other tests that could ensure a meaningful proportionality review and 
mitigate the risks of bias. In the application of the proportionality review some 
principles have already emerged that suggest proportionality is about more than just 
suitability and the test of least restrictive measure. One such principle is consistency. 
These types of principles may be of particular value in case a very deferential approach 
is adopted in the application of the more classic tests of suitability and necessity. 
The ECJ has frequently ruled that measures can only be proportional if applied so as to 
attain the objective in a ‘consistent and systematic manner’.773  The test of consistency 
has multiple dimensions. At times, it has been linked to the undefined concept of 
coherence or a mere requirement that the measure in general makes sense in light of the 
                                                 
772 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 329. This view has also been presented as a criticism of the Pike test – a balancing test applied in 
the US Dormant Commerce Clause. See Lawrence Fogel, ‘Serving a “Public Function”: Why Regional 
Cap-and-Trade Programs Should Survive a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge’ (2010) Wisconsin 
Law Rev. 1313, 1344-1346. 
773 Case C-169/07 Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landesregierung, Oberösterreichische 
Landesregierung [2009] ECR I-1721, para. 55; Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional 
and Bwin International Ltd v. Departemente de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa [2009] 
ECR I-7633, para. 61; Case C-153/08 Commission v. Spain [2009] ECR I-9735, para. 38; Case C-169/08 
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna [2009] ECR I-10821, para 42; Joined cases 
C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others & Helga Neumann-Seiwert v. 
Saarland and Minsiterium für Justiz, gesundheit und Sociales [2009] ECR I-4171, para. 42; Case C-
531/06 Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, para. 66; Joined cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco 
Pérez and Chao Gómez v. Consejeria de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios [2010] ECR I-4629, para. 94; 
Joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Criminal proceedings against Massimiliano Placanica, 
Christian Palazzese and Angelo Sorricchio [2007] ECR I-1891, para. 53; Case 178/84 Commission v. 
Germany (German Beer) [1987] ECR 1227, para. 49; Case C-243/01 Criminal proceedings against 
Piergiorgio Gambelli and Others [2003] ECR I-13031, para. 67. 
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stated objective.774 The focus has in other cases been on potential exemptions allowed 
under the national measure and their effect on consistency.775 This could be categorized 
as a test on the internal consistency of the measure. The test of internal consistency in 
essence forms the same review that is already part of the tests of suitability and the test 
of least restrictive measure. Each element should be consistent with a legitimate aim or 
otherwise eliminating that element will constitute a less restrictive and equally effective 
alternative. 
Consistency is assessed from a broader perspective when the objective the measure 
pursues is viewed in the light of other measures or even general policy of the state.776  
This can be characterized as a test on policy consistency. For example, a state cannot 
introduce a ban or strict licensing requirements for gambling services while it 
simultaneously increases its own activities in the gambling sector in order to collect 
revenues.777 Similarly, states may not prohibit certain substances in drinks for health 
reasons while allowing them in other drinks.778 In a third case the ECJ rejected a ban 
on dark film for car windows in part because cars readily manufactured with tinted 
windows were not banned, as that created an inconsistent policy.779 Finally, in 
accordance with EU case law it would also appear that applying different rules for small 
and large companies might be inconsistent if the size of the company is not a factor 
affecting the magnitude of the risk that is tackled.780 
Policy inconsistency may be a sign of disguised protectionism.781 Hence, it appears 
appropriate to regard this test on inconsistency to form part of the proportionality 
review. However, the application of the policy consistency test can be difficult in 
practice. This has resulted in some incoherent ECJ case law. For example, France had 
                                                 
774 Joined cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez v Consejeria de Salud y Servicios 
Sanitarios [2010] ECR I-4629, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, paras 23, 31. 
775 Id. paras 36-37. 
776 Case E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v. Norway [2007] EFTA Ct. Rep. 86, para. 51; Gjermund Mathisen, 
‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification of Member State Measures of Restricting 
Free Movement’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Rev. 1021, 1039-1040. 
777 Case C-67/98 Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, para. 36; Case C-243/01 
Criminal proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli and Others [2003] ECR I-13031, para. 69; Joined 
cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Criminal proceedings against Massimiliano Placanica, 
Christian Palazzese and Angelo Sorricchio [2007] ECR I-1891, para. 54. 
778 Case 178/84 Commission v. Germany (German Beer) [1987] ECR 1227, paras 48–49; Joined cases 
C-13/91 and C-113/91 Criminal proceedings against Michel Debus [1992] ECR I-3617, para. 25. 
779 Case C-265/06 Commission v. Portugal ECR [2008] I-2245, paras 43-44. 
780 Case C-79/01 Payroll Data Services (Italy) Srl, ADP Europe SA and ADP GSI SA [2002] ECR I-
8923, para. 37. 
781 Gjermund Mathisen, ‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification of Member State 
Measures of Restricting Free Movement’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Rev. 1021, 1047-1048. 
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introduced restrictions on advertisements of alcohol. These restrictions applied only for 
TV-adverts, including adverts in connection with sporting events. In contrast, the ban 
did not cover other media, sports facilities or film sets.782 Despite these facts the ECJ 
found no inconsistency and viewed the scope of the restrictions as elements within the 
freedom of the Member State to determine its level of protection.783 In contrast, when 
the Court a few years later dealt with a ban on TV-adverts of cosmetic surgery that 
applied to national but not local TV networks, it found the law to be too inconsistent.784  
In WTO law policy consistency could be analysed either under the concept of necessary 
in Article XX GATT or under the chapeau of that same article. Reference to the test 
has been made on a couple of occasions. Korea – Beef concerned the dual retail system 
that directed domestic and imported beef to different shops. The panel took note of the 
fact that there was no dual retail system in place for other types of meat. Yet, the AB 
later deemed it unnecessary to adopt a position on whether the necessity test included 
any requirement of policy consistency. Instead, it found that the lack of dual retail 
system for other types of meat could reveal reasonable alternatives.785 In EC – Seals 
the AB was more straight-forward. It stated that an import ban on seal products could 
be necessary even if no corresponding ban applied to other animals.786 This can be read 
as a rejection of at least any strict policy consistency test.  
The WTO would appear to have been firmer in its rejection of the test than the EU. The 
reason for the potentially stronger relevance of policy consistency in the EU could be 
explained by the fact that the EU is a close union where Member States are expected to 
show loyalty and a will to cooperate. 
Arguments for a policy inconsistency test under WTO law have emerged in the 
discussion of the compatibility of EU biofuels law with WTO rules, despite the 
reluctance by panels and ABs to apply any such test in previous cases. For example, 
Switzer and McMahon have pointed out that the EU had adopted sustainability criteria 
                                                 
782 Case C-262/02 Commission v. France [2004] ECR I-6569, paras 3-4. 
783 Id. para. 33. 
784 Case C-500/06 Corporación Dermoestética SA v. To Me Group Advertising Media [2008] ECR I-
5785, paras 35-40. 
785 Korea –  Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB Report, 11 Dec. 
2000, paras 168-172. 
786 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, para. 5.200. 
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for biofuels but for a long time not for solid biomass787 and that the strategy of EU to 
tackle climate change in general, and the sustainability of bioenergy in particular, is far 
from consistent.788 Erixon has added that the decision to start monitoring indirect land-
use change only for biofuels and not in other sectors is arbitrary.789 Indirect land-use 
change refers to cases where new plantations for the feedstock that is necessary for 
biofuels directly replace agricultural land, which then has an indirect effect on other 
types of land. The concern is here in particular that rain forests are cut down in order to 
make place for new areas of agricultural land. Biodiverse land areas may in this way be 
indirectly affected by the expansion of biofuels feedstock plantations.  
From a broad perspective, some inconsistency may always be detected. It is therefore 
clear that perfect consistency cannot be required.790 States must be able to begin 
somewhere when they wish to promote, for example, more sustainable PPMs. In other 
words, any policy consistency test should at least not be too strict. States should have 
the right to test the application of new environmental criteria in some sector and only 
after some time be expected to decide on whether the model is abandoned or whether 
it is expanded to other sectors. 
What would the application of a policy consistency test in the context of PPM-criteria 
and environmental protection result in? It would probably not be inconsistent for a state 
to introduce harsh restrictions on one type of emissions but not on other types of 
emissions or on biodiversity. States may tackle those externalities they deem most 
severe. In contrast, prohibited policy inconsistency could perhaps be argued to occur 
when a state implements restrictions on certain emissions or some other form of 
environmental harm in one sector, but for a long time refrains from addressing the same 
environmental effect in another sector. This may especially be problematic if the state 
implements the restrictions in a sector where its domestic industry generally has good 
environmental performance and ignores the effects in a sector where its domestic 
                                                 
787 This will change if the new Renewable Energy Directive enters into force in 2021 as planned. See 
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 29 as well as 
recitals 94 and 101. 
788 Stephanie Switzer and Joseph A McMahon, ‘EU Biofuels Policy – Raising the Question of WTO 
Compatibility’ (2011) 60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 713, 732. 
789 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3), 19. 
790 Gjermund Mathisen, ‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification of Member State 
Measures of Restricting Free Movement’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Rev. 1021, 1040-1041, 1046-
1048. 
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environmental performance is poor. Although the approach to policy inconsistency 
appeared to traditionally have been less strict in WTO law than in EU law, it cannot be 
excluded that severe inconsistencies favourable to the domestic economy could be 
deemed arbitrary. 
In sum, the policy consistency test would give the proportionality review some weight. 
Yet, it would likely apply only under quite limited circumstances as the WTO panels 
and ABs have not viewed such test favourably and also the ECJ has rarely applied the 
test. 
3.1.8. Tests on Consistency or Inconsistency with International Science  
3.1.8.1. Scientific Uncertainty and the Real Risk Test in EU Law 
In the previous subsection it was analysed whether or not the proportionality review 
could include tests on the internal consistency of the measure or on the consistency of 
the measure in light of state policy. The consistency of the adopted measure could also 
be tested against other benchmarks. In this subsection it is submitted that international 
science is a suitable benchmark. 
The ECJ has in its application of the necessity test examined the consistency of the 
objective of the measure with international scientific research.791 Consequently, PPM-
criteria with the objective to promote sustainability should not form all too drastic 
deviations from findings of the international scientific community. While the court has 
not elaborated on the concept of findings in international research, it is here understood 
as a fairly high degree of consensus among the international scientific community as a 
whole. In other words, the measure can be deemed inconsistent with international 
science only if there internationally is a sufficiently high degree of scientific consensus 
on what is unsustainable or otherwise negative for health or the environment. 
In case there is genuine uncertainty in international research, a Member State can often 
justify restrictions with reference to the precautionary principle.792 Scientific 
uncertainty should thus generally favour the state defending the measure adopted. It 
would provide states a broad margin of discretion. 
                                                 
791 Case 178/84 Commission v. Germany (German Beer) [1987] ECR 1227, para. 44; Case C-473/98 
Kemikalieinspektionen v. Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR I-5681, paras 41-45. 
792 Case C-192/01 Commission v. Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, paras 42-53; Case C-24/00 Commission 
v. France [2004] ECR I-1277, para. 56. 
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The ECJ has also occasionally stated that a measure is necessary only if it deals with 
risks that are real and not purely hypothetical.793 This principle has been applied in 
cases related to food safety, where scientific uncertainty sometimes prevails regarding 
whether the food has harmful health effects or not. Whether or not a risk is sufficiently 
real will depend both on the probability of the risk materializing and the gravity of the 
outcome.  
In the cases on food the ECJ has at times concluded that the measure was inconsistent 
with international science because there was no real risk.794 Essentially, what the court 
might imply, is that there was a lack of scientific evidence of real risk and therefore it 
was very unlikely that the substance had any adverse health impact at all, and even if 
such risk against all odds would materialize, its magnitude would be minimal. In these 
cases rather theoretical scientific uncertainty was not sufficient to justify the measure. 
There are thus limits to how much EU Member States may benefit from scientific 
uncertainty. 
The test of ‘real risk’ might potentially not have much relevance in the context of PPM-
criteria introduced in the energy sector. The test appears to usually have been applied 
when both probability of any risk materializing and the magnitude of the potential 
effects were small. Fossil fuels and renewables are known with certainty to cause some 
real detrimental effects and the question of how significant the effects are does perhaps 
then not become relevant in the assessment of whether there is a real risk. Moreover, 
even if the magnitude of the negative effects to the environment from renewables would 
be evaluated, it may well be concluded that it is not insignificant.  
Apart from renewables and fossil fuels, also nuclear power may be examined through 
the perspective of a real risk test. The risk of nuclear accidents is real in the sense that 
we know with certainty that at least some risk exists. The uncertainty relates only to the 
probability that the risk will materialize in any given time frame. In addition, the effect 
is enormous when such risk materializes. 
                                                 
793 Case C-41/02 Commission v. The Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, paras 52-54. 
794 Case 178/84 Commission v. Germany (German Beer) [1987] ECR 1227, para. 44; Case C-228/91 
Commission v. Italy [1993] ECR I-2701, para. 28. 
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3.1.8.2. GATT and Science 
Under GATT the justifiable objective of a measure adopted by a state can be quite 
narrow in its scope. For example, a state would be justified in taking measures to protect 
not only animal populations, but even individual animals.795 Moreover, each state can 
set its desired level of protection. This would suggest that states have a fair amount of 
discretion. However, there may exist some important limitations to that discretion. In 
particular, panels and ABs have in a couple of cases stated that international science 
supported the rationale of the measure.796 The relevance of this finding was not 
specified. 
Swinbank has highlighted the importance of credible science in the application of 
GATT.797 The scientific evidence can be either quantitative or qualitative.798 In EC – 
Asbestos the AB stated that states do not need to adopt a level of protection of health 
that corresponds with the view of the majority of the scientific community.799 The AB 
still appeared to look into scientific evidence in order to verify whether it was justifiable 
to define PCG fibres as less hazardous than asbestos. It stressed that states in good faith 
were justified in relying on divergent opinions of qualified and respected sources.  
The decision in EC – Asbestos would suggest that under circumstances of scientific 
uncertainty states are granted a degree of flexibility. A state may rely on its own 
preferences and, for example, the valuation of externalities of its people, in the design 
of sustainability criteria. The primary limitation is the requirement of at least some 
credible scientific support for the approach. This test does not appear too different from 
that applicable in EU free movement law, which requires that the measure does not 
contradict with international science. Under both tests a state will be justified in 
adopting a measure that only a minority of states and scientists find to advance 
                                                 
795 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, 
para. 7.527. 
796 US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, DS406, Panel Report, 2 Sept. 
2011, paras 7.400-417; EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, 
AB Report, 12 March 2001, para. 168. 
797 Alan Swinbank, ‘EU Policies on Bioenergy and their Potential Clash with the WTO’ (2009) 60 J. 
Agricultural Economics 485, 499. 
798 This can be derived from broad meaning given to ‘contribution’. See Brazil – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, para. 151; China – Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, DS363, AB Report, 21 Dec. 2009, paras 253, 294. 
799 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, DS135, AB Report, 12 March 
2001, paras 168, 178. 
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environmental protection, as long as the minority among scientists is not so 
insignificant that it cannot be regarded to constitute credible scientific opinion. 
Provisions of other WTO agreements emphasize explicitly the importance of 
international science. For example, it is stipulated in Article 2.4 TBT that states should 
build on appropriate and effective international standards. In accordance with the case 
law states may at least not implement standards that contradict the international 
benchmark.800 It is not difficult to accept the argument that also under GATT a 
discriminatory measure would be declared arbitrary in case the environmental objective 
would be in outright conflict with international science. Whether or not the requirement 
of scientific evidence under the TBT Agreement, or the SPS Agreement for that matter, 
is stricter than under the GATT falls outside the scope of this study. 
3.1.8.3. Narrow Definitions of Sustainability and International Science 
Some discriminatory measures pursue a narrowly defined environmental objective. 
Unusually narrow definitions of sustainability from an international perspective could 
indicate discriminatory purpose. Environmental objectives as grounds of justification 
should not be tailored and abused for protectionist purposes.  
Favoring a narrow category of PPMs might be in clear conflict with international 
science. Hence, measures to promote a narrowly defined category of sustainable PPMs 
might fail the proportionality review. Moreover, when the narrow definition of 
promoted sustainable PPMs due to scientific uncertainty does not conflict with 
international science but still is highly unorthodox internationally, it could potentially 
trigger a closer review of whether it still forms a disguised restriction on trade.801 
How broad ought the perspective on environmental effects then be when considering 
the relationship between the state’s adopted approach and international science? 
Outside the scope of free movement law, the ECJ has recognized that all interests must 
be taken account of in a proportionality assessment.802 Applied in the context of free 
movement law, this principle would restrict states from justifying their measures with 
reference to some individual benefits recognized in international science when 
                                                 
800 EC – Trade Description of Sardines, DS231, AB Report, 26 Sept. 2002, para. 243-257. 
801 See section 3.1.9. 
802 Joined cases C-96/03 and C-97/03 A. Tempelman and Mr and Mrs T.H.J.M. van Schaijk v. Directeur 
van de Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees [2005] ECR I-1895, para. 48. The case concerned 
the interpretation of a directive on disease control. 
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sustainability as a whole is still harmed according to an almost unanimous international 
scientific consensus. The international scientific community itself defines how narrow 
an approach to environmental sustainability may be justifiable. 
In the context of EU public procurement, where the free movement principles also 
apply, Arrowsmith has gone even further and argued that member states should not 
have the right to justify prima facie prohibited measures with reference only to one 
dimension of environmental protection. Instead, EU Member States would be well 
advised in performing a life-cycle analysis (LCA) before adopting trade restrictive 
measures. Otherwise, she argues, the policy of the Member State could be incoherent 
and arbitrary.803 A life-cycle perspective will indeed likely be regarded as the 
scientifically justifiable approach.  However, there is often much uncertainty 
surrounding the best balance between different effects included in a LCA. The review 
of state measures will thus not become overly strict and states will in most cases have 
considerable room to incorporate their national preferences. Obviously, the line 
between measures that are inconsistent with international science and measures that are 
unconventional but not inconsistent with international science due to the prevailing 
scientific uncertainty would need to be drawn. Tough questions will unavoidably come 
to the fore. 
3.1.8.4. The Electricity Sector and Scientific Uncertainty 
Disputes on PPM-criteria in the electricity sector have not yet emerged in great numbers 
under WTO law. They may arise as more grid interconnections are built and global 
trade in electricity increases. However, as has been the case under EU law, it may be 
that the disputes would initially relate only to de jure discrimination.  
In the EU disputes on de facto discrimination might only be litigated if the ECJ was to 
change course in the future and decide that some de jure discriminatory support 
schemes are no longer justifiable. That being said, the debate on Austria’s plan to ban 
nuclear power revealed that de facto discriminatory bans could face challenges even 
                                                 
803 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical 
Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 167-168, 173-176. Compare with 
Evelyne Clerc, ‘Switzerland’, in Ulla Neergaard, Catherine Jacqueson and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke 
(eds.), Public Procurement Law: Limitations, Opportunities and Paradoxes, The XXVI FIDE Congress 
in Copenhagen, 2014 Congress Publications Vol. 3, 151-152. Clerc explains how a court in Switzerland 
(which is not an EU Member State) found criteria on transportation emissions unjustifiable when they 
focused only on some factors that affect emission levels and ignored other factors. 
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under the current approach to de jure discriminatory support schemes. Would a ban on 
electricity from nuclear power then survive the test on lack of inconsistency with 
international science? Could a ban on some other PPM in the electricity sector be 
inconsistent with international science? 
Various PPMs may have different attributes from the perspective of sustainability in 
general and environmental protection in particular. The interaction of various 
environmental – and perhaps even social – values in a particular set of circumstances 
will make it very difficult to reach international scientific consensus on what actually 
the sustainable solutions would be. In these types of situations, the degree of discretion 
for states would undoubtedly be broad, as the applicable test looks for sufficient 
evidence of inconsistency with international science or requires merely some scientific 
support for the measure. 
The energy sector illustrates well the challenges that arise with different environmental 
and social values pointing in all possible directions. There is little international 
consensus on the optimal solutions for the environment or for sustainability. The 
benefits of PPM-criteria in the field of energy may relate to the effects of the favored 
and disfavored PPMs on GHGs, air quality, water quality, soil quality, biodiversity, 
waste accumulation (e.g. nuclear waste and solar panels), noise levels804 (which may 
perhaps come from wind turbines), accident risks (incl. severity) as well as 
intermittency and risks of power cuts. 
There is no consensus even within the EU on any complete priority list with regards to 
PPMs in the energy sector.805 In fact, the Commission seems to accept that some form 
of diversification is needed.806 The Commission has, however, stressed the negative 
impacts of especially coal in its communications, while taking a more cautious 
approach toward gas and nuclear.807 This might reflect a view on findings in 
international science that also the Court could accept as a starting point.  
                                                 
804 Cf. Case C-389/96 Aher-Waggon GmbH v. Germany [1998] ECR I-4473, paras 18-19. 
805 A possible reason is the requirement of unanimous decisions on such an issue. See Catherine 
Redgwell, ‘Energy, Environment and Trade in the European Community’ (1994) 12 J. Energy & Natural 
Resources Law, 128, 147. 
806 Communication From the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament – An 
Energy Policy For Europe 2007, COM (2007) 1 final, 10-15; Commission Communication, Energy 
Roadmap 2050, COM (2011) 885 final, 2. 
807 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Energy 2020, A strategy for 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM (2010) 639 final, 5; Commission Communication, 
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It is difficult to predict whether courts would find that there is sufficient scientific 
consensus that some PPM, such as power from coal, is undoubtedly worse than nuclear 
power and that a ban on only nuclear power therefore would be inconsistent with 
international science. The risks associated with nuclear fission are of different nature 
than the risks of coal power, which complicates a comparison. In any case, states could 
at least opt to treat nuclear fission less favorably than most fossil fuels without falling 
foul of the test on scientific support. 
There is scientific support for the risks of nuclear fission, but the focus on just those 
risks ignores the problems with GHG emissions from fossil fuels. Assuming that a ban 
on power from nuclear fission would be found not to contradict international science, 
could Austria then justify a full ban on electricity generated with nuclear fission, while 
not applying any severe restrictions on fossil fuels? In other words, would the difference 
in treatment between nuclear fission and other questionable resources for electricity, 
such as fossil fuels and in particular coal power, be so significant that the measure 
would, despite scientific uncertainty on the ranking of energy sector PPMs, be 
inconsistent with international science? Could awarding some PPM significantly more 
favorable treatment than some other PPM contradict with international science in case 
the difference in sustainability between those PPMs is not significant? Courts could 
potentially decide not render measures disproportional on the grounds of this type of 
test. Namely, courts have traditionally not questioned bans on goods that do not meet 
threshold values for toxic substances even if implementing such thresholds leads to 
very different treatment of products that are just below and just over such threshold 
value. It ought to be emphasized that these are hard cases and jurisprudence on the exact 
approach shines with its absence. 
There are complex questions relating to Austria’s past plans to ban power from nuclear 
fission. Plans to ban electricity generated with some other PPM may be easier to 
resolve. For example, a ban on energy from coal would likely not be inconsistent with 
international science. The test in WTO law of some scientific support for the adopted 
measure would warrant a similar conclusion. Coal power might even be regarded as so 
unsustainable by the international scientific community that treating it more favourably 
                                                 
Energy Roadmap 2050, COM (2011) 885 final, 13; Commission Communication, A policy framework 
for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, COM (2014) 15 final, 11-13. 
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than power from some other fossil fuels could contradict too much with environmental 
science. 
Interestingly, at least with respect to the taxation of energy resources (i.e. not the power 
generated from those resources), coal receives more favourable treatment than oil in 
many states. The proportionality of such solutions has been questioned in the 
literature.808 Measures on the treatment of energy resources are, however, not measures 
on PPMs. It should also be recalled that a proportionality review would need to be 
preceded by an analysis of whether the products are like products.809 Different energy 
resources might not be like products and different treatment could therefore escape the 
proportionality review. That question falls outside the scope of this book, which deals 
with PPMs. In any case, the issue may be politically too sensitive to spark any dispute 
in the immediate future. 
Returning to the analysis of PPM-measures, it is argued here that states could not with 
reference to scientific uncertainty justify schemes to ban energy from renewables or 
schemes to promote energy from fossil fuels more than energy from renewables on 
environmental grounds. Namely, at least in the EU there is a broad consensus that 
renewables should be prioritized.810 Less favorable treatment of renewables would thus 
be inconsistent with what in the EU would be considered credible international 
environmental science. Even under WTO law it would be difficult to argue that there 
is some environmental scientific ground for promoting some fossil fuels more than 
renewables. 
The inconsistency of a measure with international environmental science is, however, 
not the end of the matter. States might also present arguments for the application of 
some other ground of justification. In this context reference to security of supply could 
be a reason why states decide to support some category of fossil fuel plants. Security 
of supply may in times of serious local shortages justify temporary export restrictions 
                                                 
808 Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Domestic Taxation of Energy Products and Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This a 
Case of Unlawful Discrimination?’ (2003) 37 J. World Trade 359, 384-385. Zarrilli applies the traditional 
necessity test but under the approach presented in this book the relevant test would be that of ‘policy 
inconsistency’ or ‘inconsistency with international science’. 
809 See discussion in section 2.2. 
810 Bram Delvaux, EU Law and the Development of a Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy Policy 
– Opportunities and Shortcomings (KU Leuven 2011) 162. 
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under GATT811 and the TFEU812 whereas there under U.S. law has been more 
skepticism with respect to this argument.813 The topic discussed in this book is, 
however, not export but import restrictions. There would appear to exist three lines of 
reasoning with respect to the security of supply defense in that context. 
First, security of supply could be necessary for public health.814 However, in EU law 
security of supply forms a legitimate ground of justification only when without the trade 
restrictive measure, the state would not have enough energy access to guarantee the 
basic functions of society.815 Hence, security of supply would rarely justify import 
restrictions in the EU energy sector.816 The same is likely true under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.817 There is also little reason to believe that the approach would be 
any different under Article XX GATT. Public health only becomes threatened when 
there is a serious shortage of supply.  
Secondly, according to Article XX(j) states may adopt measures that are essential to 
the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply. These are 
                                                 
811 See Articles XI:2(a) and XX(j) GATT.  
812 Case C-503/99 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809, paras 46-55. See however also case C-
463/00 Commission v. Spain [2003] ECR I-4581, paras 71-76; Case C-543/08 Commission v. Portugal 
[2010] ECR I-11241, paras 84-92. 
813 Sam Kalen, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Environment’, in James R. May (ed.) Principles 
of Constitutional Environmental Law (ABA 2011) 151. 
814 Henrik Bjørnebye, Investing in EU Energy Security – Exploring the Regulatory Approach to 
Tomorrow’s Electricity Production (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 93-96. 
815 See Case 72/83 Campus Oil limited and others v Minister for Industry and Energy and others [1984] 
ECR 2727, paras 34, 47-49. Compare with Case C-347/88 Commission v. Greece [1990] ECR 4747, 
paras 47-50 and 60; Case C-398/98 Commission v. Greece [2001] ECR I-7915, paras 29-31. See also 
Case 231/83 Henri Cullet and Chambre syndicale des réparateurs automobiles et détaillants de produits 
pétroliers v. Centre Leclerc à Toulouse and Centre Leclerc à Saint-Orens-de-Gameville [1985] ECR 
305, para 33; Carlos Padros and Endrius E. Cocciolo, ‘Security of Energy Supply: When Could National 
Policy Take Precedence Over European Law?’ (2010) 31 Energy L. J., 31, 53-54; Eugene D. Cross, 
Leigh Hancher and Piet J. Slot, ’EC Energy Law’, in Martha Roggenkamp, Anita Rønne, Catherine 
Redgwell and Iñigo del Guayo (eds.), Energy Law in Europe – National, EU and International Law and 
Institutions (OUP 2001) 227. 
816 It was rejected as a ground of justification in a case on a RPS. See Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 
Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, Opinion of AG 
Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2013:294, paras 102-103. 
817 References to security of supply have been rare in the context of dormant Commerce Clause cases on 
energy. See however Allco Finance v. Klee, 16-2946, (2d Cir. 2017). See also Anne Havemann, 
‘Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the 
Federal Constitution’ (2005) 71 Maryland L. Rev. 848, 873-874. 
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measures may, however, only last during the time of shortage.818 Hence, Article XX(j) 
would not justify measures to promote some PPM generally.819 
Finally, under Article XXI GATT measures may be adopted in times of war or 
emergency in international relations if necessary due to threats to essential national 
security interests. There has been discussion as to whether states due to the ambiguity 
of Article XXI GATT could argue that security of supply concerns should allow states 
under specific circumstances to justify for example de jure discriminatory import 
restrictions on oil (which is crucial for military transportation) and export restrictions 
on nuclear technology.820 It is clear that the article should normally not provide any 
defense to measures promoting energy from fossil fuels. 
In sum, states would be unsuccessful in justifying schemes supporting electricity from 
fossil fuel over electricity from renewables. In turn, it is more difficult to assess whether 
bans on electricity from nuclear power or some fossil fuels would survive the test on 
lack of inconsistency with international science. There should be significant room for 
state discretion due to scientific uncertainty but with the treath of climate change 
becoming more and more severe, the scientific community might reach a borad 
consensus that in particular coal power cannot be treated more favorably thany of the 
other options. 
How might then a decision to promote certain renewables more than others be assessed? 
Some EU Member States have opted to treat some renewables more favorably than 
others. The RED encourages favourable treatment of all renewables but does not 
explicitly forbid differentiation outside the scope of the biofuels sector. The 
compromise text on the new Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) includes the 
possibility of Member States to limit support to specific renewable energy technologies 
if it would lead to better results.821 The improved results could in accordance with the 
proposal relate to the long-term potential of some technologies, diversification, grid 
                                                 
818 European Union and its Member States – Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, DS476, 
Panel report, 10 Aug. 2018. The panel concluded that the EU discriminated against Russia by facilitating 
certain infrastructure projects in the netural gas sector and that the discrimination was not justifiable 
because there was no shortage of supply of natural gas in the EU. 
819 On this article see James J. Nedumpara, ‘Energy Security and the WTO Agreements’ in Sajal Mathur 
(ed.) Trade, the WTO and Energy Security (Springer 2014) 48-49. 
820 Donald N. Zillman, ‘Energy Trade and the National Security Exception to the GATT’ (1994) 12 J. 
Energy & Natural Resources L. 117. 
821 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 4(5). 
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integration costs, grid stability or stability on the raw material market. It must be 
emphasized that a reference to these objectives in RED 2 does not guarantee that 
reliance on all of them would survive scrutiny under trade law. 
Whether or not all objectives listed in RED 2 are justifiable under EU free movement 
law might not be of much practical relevance. As illustrated previously, schemes to 
support electricity from renewables may, at least under EU law, include de jure 
discriminatory elements. Under these circumstances the question of whether different 
renewables could be treated differently under such support scheme will currently not 
arise. Assuming that de jure discrimination would no longer be justifiable at some point 
in the future, how would then a decision to promote electricity from some renewables 
more than others be approached if it caused de facto discrimination?  
In the EU the difference between various renewables in terms of environmental benefits 
would likely not be regarded as significant and there would be no clear scientific 
consensus on any ranking. Hence, differences in levels of support would not be 
inconsistent with international science. What follows from the above, is that states 
would at least in most cases be able to successfully justify schemes that include carve 
outs or other forms of differentiation between renewables. Large hydropower822 and 
some first generation solid biomass823 might potentially be exceptions. Even if these 
have been included in the definition of renewables that are to be promoted under the 
RED, they can still generally be regarded as less sustainable renewables. Other 
renewables should generally not be treated less favorably than these two more 
controversial renewables. 
                                                 
822 Some states have left out large hydropower plants. Such states include Sweden, the Netherlands and 
the UK. See Danyel Reiche and Mischa Bechberger, ‘Policy Differences in the Promotion of Renewable 
Energies in the EU Member States’ (2004) 32 Energy Policy 843, 844; Yong Chen and Francis X 
Johnson, ‘Sweden: Greening the Power in a Context of Liberalization and Nuclear Ambivalence’, in 
William M. Lafferty and Audun Ruud (eds.), Promoting Sustainable Electricity in Europe – Challenging 
the Path Dependence of Dominant Energy Systems (Edward Elgar 2008) 219, 240-242; Maarten J. 
Arentsen, ‘The Netherlands: Muddling Through in the Dutch Delta’, in William M. Lafferty and Audun 
Ruud (eds.), Promoting Sustainable Electricity in Europe – Challenging the Path Dependence of 
Dominant Energy Systems (Edward Elgar 2008) 45, 51. 
823 Criticism has been raised regarding the lack of sustainability criteria for solid biomass. Sustainability 
criteria for biomass fuel used for generating electricity or for heating and cooling should enter into force 
in 2021. See Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 
29 as well as recitals 94 and 101. See also Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on sustainability requirements for the use of solid and gaseous biomass sources in electricity, 
heating and cooling, COM (2010) 66, 10. 
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On the basis of the discussion above, it may be concluded that EU Member States have 
the right to differentiate between renewables under free movement law. The EU 
Commission has even emphasized that more technology-specific supports are 
needed.824 Interestingly, the Commission has with respect to the application of EU 
public procurement law occasionally still appeared to argue that Member States would 
not be justified in only promoting wind825 or solar826 energy. It is not evident why the 
approach to differentiation between renewables should be stricter under EU public 
procurement law than under EU free movement law. Public authorities have an 
obligation not to discriminate on the basis of origin as well as an obligation to treat 
bidders equally. Moreover, public authorities have broad discretion in defining what 
they wish to purchase. There should, however, be an objective reason for any criteria 
in the tender and the criteria much be proportional. It would not seem entirely 
impossible to, for example, make the case that awarding more points for companies 
who offer for wind power than those who offer solar power would survive those 
procurement law tests. Therefore, the reasons and legal arguments for the strict scrutiny 
of the design of renewable energy schemes under procurement law, as proposed by the 
Commission, remain unclear. 
In conclusion, some important limits to state discretion stem from the tests on 
consistency with international science.  Yet, with respect to the electricity sector those 
limits would not appear substantial due to the difficulty of comparing different effects 
and the general scientific uncertainty in the field. The same principles ought to apply 
also in the sector for heating and cooling. In general, under EU and WTO law states 
have a wide margin of discretion on what PPMs to support in the energy sector. Most 
measures would be upheld despite potential de facto discrimination. For EU Member 
States this means that they will retain significant flexibility with respect to designing 
national renewable support schemes in the electricity sector even if the ECJ at some 
                                                 
824 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Energy 2020, A strategy for 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM (2010) 639 final, 9. See also Angus Johnston et al., 
‘The Proposed New EU Renewables Directive: Interpretation, Problems and Prospects’ (2008) European 
Energy and Environmental Law Rev. 126, 140-145.  
825 Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to public 
procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public 
procurement, COM (2001) 274 final, footnote 22. 
826 Green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy – Towards a more efficient 
European Procurement Market, COM (2011) 15 final, 39. 
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point in time would reverse course and decide that de jure discriminatory support 
schemes for renewables elements in the electricity sector would no longer be justifiable. 
3.1.8.5. The Transport Sector and Biofuels 
In the transport sector liquid fuel is still currently more commonly relied on than 
electricity, biogas or natural gas. The EU, the U.S. and others promote sustainable 
biofuels over traditional fossil fuels in the transport sector. This has been done by 
drafting sustainability criteria that rank different production paths. The estimated 
emissions for different production paths depend on factors such as the specific biomass 
used and the chemical method applied in production. California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard (LCFS), which includes biofuels sustainability criteria, even takes into 
account in the sustainability calculations the distances for transporting biomass or fuel 
and the source of the electricity used in the production plant.  
Current EU and U.S. biofuels schemes promote biofuels at the expense of fossil fuels. 
Moreover, the schemes strive to create additional incentives for producers to invest in 
second or later generation biofuels that have been produced with much lower GHG 
emissions than first generation biofuels. Schemes with these characteristics will likely 
not contradict international science. In contrast, promoting fossil fuels over second or 
later generation biofuels that can be produced with very low GHG emissions could 
constitute an example of measures that have no scientific support. In turn, when 
comparing the same broad class of natural resources – biomass – utilized for production 
of transport fuel the uncertainties with regards to the estimation of differences in 
environmental effects come to the fore. Yet, there is perhaps consensus within the 
scientific community that most second and later generation biofuels are better than first 
generation biofuels. 
Much of the scientific uncertainty with respect to GHG emissions and sustainability in 
the biofuels sector relates to the emissions from indirect land-use change associated 
with first generation biofuels. Erixon has criticized EU’s calculations of those 
emissions and their divergence from the results of other research. He has even gone so 
far as to suggest that the significant differences in the calculations of different 
researches illustrate a degree of unreliability and that the inclusion of indirect land use 
227
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change (ILUC) emissions in any legal criteria may therefore not be justifiable.827 
However, the uncertainty of the size of the effect should per se not be a valid reason to 
ignore it altogether. 
Mitchell and Tran would accept criteria on land-use change provided that they are 
supported by scientific evidence.828 This position does not contradict the applicable test 
of consistency with science. However, it is important that the requirement is not 
understood to mean that the criteria must comply with the view of any majority of the 
scientific community. Rather, some credible scientific support should be sufficient. The 
high degree of uncertainty on ILUC within a qualified international scientific 
community means that ILUC should survive the test on consistency with international 
science applicable under WTO law. Yet, even if this would suggest that states have 
discretion in making decisions on ILUC criteria, it should be emphasized that those 
criteria would still be subject to other tests under the proportionality review.829 
3.1.9. Arbitrary Discrimination and Disguised Restrictions on Trade 
The proportionality sensu stricto test was above concluded to generally not apply under 
GATT and EU free movement law. Yet, it was revealed that the test has never been 
outright rejected by panels and courts. What is more, there have in both jurisdictions 
been some indications that the test could potentially apply in some unspecified 
circumstances. Hence, it ought to be considered what kind of conditions might trigger 
a test of that character. 
It is recalled that the chapeau of Article XX GATT is formed as a prohibition of 
arbitrary discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade. The ECJ has, on its part, 
rarely applied tests of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade. 
Therefore, some have even declared them dead letters in free movement law.830 Yet, in 
                                                 
827 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3), 9-21. 
828 Andrew D. Mitchell and Christopher Tran, ‘The Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy Directive 
with the WTO Agreements’ (2009) Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law Research Paper 
No. 1485549, 9 (paras 30-31). 
829 See in particular section 4.1.4.3. 
830 Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law: A Study of the Relationship Between the Freedoms (OUP 
2002) 181. For a discussion see Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade: 
A Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 367, 428-432. The court has sometimes 
referred to arbitrary discrimination and disguised restrictions but in fact only applied the traditional tests 
of discrimination and justification. See joined cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad 
Exterior SA and Publivía SAE v. Departamento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de 
Cataluña [1991] ECR I-4151, paras 19-26. 
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some older case law the ECJ stated that measures principally affecting imported goods 
could constitute arbitrary discrimination.831 In turn, a disguised restriction on trade 
occurs according to the ECJ when, even if the measure advances a justifiable objective, 
it is adopted for a discriminatory purpose.832 These statements confirm that the tests 
may apply also under EU free movement law. 
There is some room for the argument that a measure could prima facie form arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade in case the effect is highly 
discriminatory and the approach to environmental protection, albeit supported by some 
credible international science, is still highly unorthodox. In addition, the test could in 
principle also capture cases where there are other strong indications of discriminatory 
purpose. Such indications could come in the form of official governmental statements. 
Any variation of tests of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade, with 
strong elements of proportionality sensu stricto, would undoubtedly be controversial, 
as explained in previous sections of this chapter. 
It is submitted here that even if the tests of arbitrary discrimination or disguised 
restrictions on trade would include characteristics of proportionality sensu stricto, states 
should still be granted a right to present evidence of factors that overturn the prima 
facie presumption of disguised trade restrictions or arbitrary discrimination. As long as 
there is some credible international science supporting the reduction of externalities the 
measure could be upheld. The key question, that currently lacks any clear-cut answer, 
is whether the support from international science would need to be slightly more solid 
when the measure would be unorthodox, it would have significant discriminatory 
effects and/or there would exist dubious government statements on intent. 
The tests of arbitrary discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade would perhaps 
be even more likely to be triggered in cases of policy inconsistency. In particular, the 
measure might be declared to be incompatible with trade law if the inconsistency is 
persistent and there, despite some international scientific support, still is much scientific 
uncertainty as to whether the measure advances the environmental objective. The 
approach would reinforce the idea of a close link between trade law and efficiency 
                                                 
831 Case 152/78 Commission v. France [1980] ECR 2299, paras 17-19; Lorna Woods, Free Movement of 
Goods and Services within the European Community (Ashgate 2004) 112-113.  
832 Case 34/79 Regina v. Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby [1979] ECR 3795, 
paras 18-22; Lorna Woods, Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community 
(Ashgate 2004) 112-113. 
229
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   229 31.7.2019   7.15
 230 
because the measure could be struck down when there is reason to believe that another 
measure would be even more likely to reduce externalities and there are clear 
indications that the real intentions behind the design of the measure relate to 
protectionism. The risk of incompatibility with trade law would be further heightened 
if the discriminatory effects are significant or the government has released statements 
of discriminatory intent. If applicable, this test of arbitrary discrimination and disguised 
restrictions on trade would represent a holistic value balancing test. 
Finally, assuming that the tests of arbitrary discrimination and disguised restrictions on 
trade would come into play in any of the scenarios described above, the question may 
arise as to whether the adopted measure in any case should be found compatible with 
trade law if the measure reflects the genuine environmental preferences of the people 
in the state adopting the measure. In case of indications of disguised protectionism, for 
example due to persistent policy inconsistency, official government statements or due 
to the combination of high discriminatory effects and an internationally unorthodox 
sustainability policy, the state could perhaps defend against claims of disguised 
restrictions on trade by submitting evidence on how it opted for the applied measure. 
In other words, whatever the nature of the test of disguised restrictions on trade, it could 
still include an analysis on how the adopted requirements were chosen. For example, a 
state that has adopted PPM-criteria, such as sustainability criteria for biofuels, could be 
transparent about how they balanced different values in order to arrive at the chosen 
sustainability model. It would in this context seem natural for the state to provide 
evidence that the adopted sustainability criteria are addressing externalities and that the 
criteria are representative of the public perception of sustainability. In other words, the 
criteria would be supported by consumers for environmental reasons and the 
implementation of the criteria would increase local utility. Whether this would be 
sufficient under any jurisdiction has never been confirmed. 
There does not as such exist any requirement of transparency with respect to the process 
of how criteria are designed and chosen by a state. Nevertheless, in circumstances 
where strong indications of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade 
could arise, a state may do wisely in being transparent about its reasoning when 
designing PPM-criteria. Evidence on the motives is likely to be credible if the state 
already in the process of planning the adopted measure has gathered the data on national 
environmental preferences in order to support the measure. That way the state may 
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illustrate that the de facto discriminatory effects of its sustainability policies do not 
reflect any protectionist agenda when prioritizing elements of sustainability. What is 
more, encouraging such actions from states would simultaneously encourage states to 
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the legislative process. 
3.1.10. Beyond the Elimination of Negative Externalities 
3.1.10.1. Environmentalism and Proportionality in Trade Law 
States may rely on grounds of justification in order to justify measures designed to 
tackle externalities. In previous parts of this chapter it was argued that even measures 
with significant de facto discriminatory effects should as a rule be justifiable in case 
they represent the least restrictive method of achieving the pursued level of reduction 
in externalities. Equally, states should have the right to adopt a measure to address 
externalities even when the measure might simultaneously also serve some more 
protectionist objective, such as creating local jobs. In sum, there is a strong defense 
available under trade law for measures designed to tackle externaliies. 
Could states justify de facto discriminatory measures that have been adopted to advance 
an environmental or social objective beyond the elimination of negative externalities? 
In principle, it could be argued that the proportionality review invites states to adopt 
measures that ensure an even higher level of protection than necessary for the 
elimination of externalities. The adopted measures could be the least restrictive measure 
for achieving such a high level of protection. The question is then whether some of the 
other tests introduced in this chapter restrict the possibility of an environmentalist 
agenda beyond the elimination of negative externalities. 
The test on consistency – or lack thereof – with international science requires that the 
measure tackles real risks. In other words, the international science must support the 
existence of the problem. Moreover, there should be some scientific support for the 
adopted measure having positive and not detrimental effects with respect to the 
problem. The measure should at least according to some international science have the 
capability to spur development in the right direction. What is less clear, is whether the 
measure then can go beyond what according to an overwhelming majority of 
international scientists would be necessary for eliminating externalities.  
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It may be recalled that in Danish Bottles833 the ECJ controversially rejected a national 
system of collecting bottles that would have ensured an exceptionally high rate of 
recycling. It is possible that the ECJ implicitly held the view that the system caused an 
economic burden on trade that was clearly excessive of the externalities that would 
have been avoided. Yet, the system that had been originally opted for by Denmark did 
not appear to have gone beyond the elimination of externalities. 
Bundesdruckerei concerned the application of EU free movement law on public 
procurement.834 In a tender for services the German city of Dortmund included a 
requirement that the bidders pay the German minimum wage also for work performed 
outside Germany. The ECJ recognized the need to protect against social dumping but 
concluded that the criterion was disproportional. The lower cost of living in other 
countries, such as Poland, did according to the court constitute a reason for why there 
was not a need for wages of the same standard.835 This could be understood to have 
rested on the view that the German authority would not further any reduction of 
externalities with a requirement of a minimum pay that was disproportional to local 
costs of living. 
All in all, the question of the justifiability of criteria that go beyond the elimination of 
externalities has not been explicitly dealt with in cases on GATT and EU free 
movement law. There is thus limited guidance on the topic. However, there is in 
particular in ECJ jurisprudence some indications that such criteria could be deemed 
disproportional. 
3.1.10.2. Public Procurement as a Policy Tool 
Although some uncertainty has existed in the past, it is today undisputable that under 
WTO law public authorities may in their tenders apply sustainability criteria that 
represent other than purely economic values.836 McCrudden has used the term linkage 
to refer to the implementation of non-economic policies through sustainable public 
                                                 
833 Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles) [1988] ECR 4607. 
834 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235. 
835 Id. paras 31-34. 
836 Luca Tosoni, ‘The Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU 
Procurement Rules from a Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Review 41, 46-47; Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, 
Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 486-487. Earlier some scholars have been 
more reluctant to interpret the GPA to cover non-economic criteria. See e.g. Christoph Spennemann, 
‘The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: A Means of Furtherance of Human Rights?’ (2001) 
Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 43, 60. 
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procurement. He advocates for an approach where procurement could be used also 
partly as a policy tool.837 In this context it is important to identify potential limits to the 
use of procurement as a policy tool and to the implementation of non-economic values 
or policies. 
Public authorities can introduce criteria with the objective of tackling externalities. 
Market failures create inefficiency and outcomes that can be regarded as unfair and the 
state is viewed to have a responsibility to deal with them in order to restore a fair 
balance. Exceptionally public authorities might plan to implement criteria that go 
beyond the elimination of externalities. In the environmental sphere criteria might even 
reflect the idea that the environment has fundamental value of its own regardless of 
how humans perceive its value in terms of utility. This type of criteria would go beyond 
both the elimination of externalities and maximizing utility. Moreover, some authorities 
may wish to implement social criteria that are more redistributive in nature. Those 
criteria would probably be adopted with a view on social fairness in mind. 
Redistribution can to a certain extent mitigate social externalities. However, of interest 
here are redistributive criteria that in the name of fairness go beyond the elimination of 
externalities. Such criteria do not increase welfare and might not even increase total 
utility.  
Could the public authority then apply criteria that would go beyond the elimination of 
externalities? The public sector might be more likely than the private sector to adopt an 
agenda that stretches beyond the elimination of externalities. Emphasizing social and 
societal values in government market interventions can be important in securing 
legitimacy.838 Perhaps the strongest argument for accepting social, environmental and 
other societal criteria beyond the elimination of externalities is more pragmatic. The 
calculation of the value of externalities tends to be subjective. It would therefore be 
hard to determine whether an authority has exceeded any boundaries in this respect. At 
most, a limitation could have practical effect when the sustainability is emphasized to 
                                                 
837 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Using Public Procurement to Achieve Social Outcomes’ (2004) 28 Natural 
Resources Forum 257; Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government 
Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007). 
838 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Farrar & Rinehart 1944); John G. Ruggie, ‘International 
Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’ (1982) 36 
International Organization 379. 
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such a degree that it is obvious that the intention has been to go beyond the elimination 
of externalities. 
In turn, Priess and Pitschas have rejected the idea of criteria that cannot be assigned any 
economic value.839 It could be argued that putting a very high emphasis on 
sustainability by implenting criteria that go beyond the elimination of externalities 
would reflect political choices. A rejection of redistributive sustainability policy in 
procurement could derive its theoretical justification from the view that purchasing 
public authorities should act as far as possible as market participants. The democratic 
legitimacy of regulative environmental or redistributive elements in procurement may 
be questioned on the ground that they would not be adopted through the ordinary 
legislative process involving the parliament. Public authorities that design 
sustainability criteria for procurement represent government administration and not the 
legislature. 
Another argument against environmental and social criteria that do not address 
externalities can be formed by placing procurement in a broader legal context. A form 
of compensation above market value would occur if public authorities put an 
exceptionally high emphasis on environmentally or socially sustainable solutions. A 
prohibition on criteria that go beyond the elimination of externalities would restrict 
authorities from overcompensating bidders and would enhance coherence between 
procurement law and state aid legislation.   
Apart from the more theoretical arguments, also legal texts give some indications of 
potential limitations to the use of PPM-criteria that would go beyond the elimination of 
externalities. This is in particular the case when it comes to the interpretation of the 
provisions on award criteria in the EU procurement directive. Under the EU 
procurement directive authorities should award the contract to the economically most 
advantageous bid.840 The public authority shall define the specific award criteria it 
relies on to compares the bids. Criteria that address externalities add economic value. 
It could be argued that other non-economic criteria in turn may not be applied as award 
criteria because they do not add economic value. It may in this context also be noted 
                                                 
839 Hans-Joachim Priess and Christian Pitschas, ‘Secondary Criteria and their Compatibility with EC and 
WTO Procurement – The Case of the German Scientology Declaration’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement 
Law Review 171, 190. 
840 Art. 67, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
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that Article 68 of the EU procurement directive offers life-cycle costing as an option 
for the implementation of award criteria. The article on life-cycle costing refers merely 
to direct costs and externalities. It does not include the possibility to go beyond 
externalities in promoting sustainability. 
Criteria on the sustainability of the PPM as part of award criteria was analysed by the 
ECJ in Wienstrom. The case concerned a tender by an Austrian authority that had 
decided to favour renewable energy. The weight of this element of sustainability was 
as high as 45 %. The ECJ applied the provisions of the procurement directive and 
concluded that the weight was not excessive in light of the importance of renewable 
energy.841 This part of the ruling could be interpreted to suggest that the weight of 
sustainability criteria cannot be disproportional to the importance of the objective. The 
importance of the objective could in turn be defined as the value of the externality the 
authority aims to address. In some sense such test would put into question the 
environmental objective and would resemble a test of proportionality sensu stricto. 
Keeping in mind the controversial reception of such test in trade law it is hardly 
surprising that the court’s phrasing in Wienstrom has been criticized.842 Despite the 
criticism, the Wienstrom case on EU public procurement law gives some indication that 
criteria that go beyond the elimination of externalities may be problematic under the 
law as it stands today. 
Wienstrom concerned award criteria that are used for comparing bids. In order to be 
compared bids must, however, correspond with the description of the goods or services 
in the call for tenders. The description of what the authority intends to purchase includes 
the technical specifications. In case criteria that reach beyond the elimination of 
externalities are prohibited as award criteria, it would seem logical that they may also 
not be applied as technical specifications. Otherwise an authority would face a situation 
where it could require that all bids comply with some strict environmental or social 
criteria but could not implement a model where complying with those same strict 
criteria would merely result in extra points in the comparison of bids. 
                                                 
841 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, para. 42. 
842 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and directives to horizontal policies: A Critical 
Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 243. 
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There may still be room for the argument that some criteria beyond the immediate 
reduction of externalities would be justifiable. Namely, it could be argued that a more 
long-term perspective should be opted for. Valuing new technologies at the rate they 
can reduce externalities today may underestimate their economic value in the long-
term. For example, in the energy sector old traditional resources like coal, gas and oil 
may benefit from their deep integration in the system and the infrastructure of the 
sector.843 In these circumstances it may be necessary to promote technologies for 
renewable energy beyond their current benefits in terms of the reduction of externalities 
so that the most sustainable solutions can overcome current market barriers. A high 
emphasis on environmental criteria could spur new investments and consequently new 
innovations in the field of environmental protection.844 That in turn could help 
unlocking the full potential of sustainable PPMs and consequently increase future 
welfare and utility. In sum, the long-term elimination of externalities may be 
accelerated by criteria that go beyond the elimination of externalities at the time of 
implementation and such criteria may therefore be justifiable. 
On a final note, it would be difficult to uphold limitations on criteria that go beyond the 
elimination of externalities in case states have the right to adopt some criteria with 
reference to the objective of maximizing utility. Therefore, it must be emphasized that 
the discussion above on sustainability criteria that go beyond the elimination of 
externalities has rested on the assumption that the rules on public procurement as well 
as the grounds of justification in trade law centre around welfare and not utility. 
Although there are good reasons for this assumption, it can still be questioned. The 
complex relationship between the objective of maximizing welfare and the objective of 
maximizing utility will be examined more in detail in chapter 6. 
3.1.11. Conferring Powers 
Some scholars examining EU free movement law have identified a trend toward a more 
strict or intese proportionality review.845 In contrast, other previous research has found 
                                                 
843 Carl Pope, ‘World-Wide Effort on Clean Energy is What’s Needed, Not a Carbon Price’, Inside 
Climate News (17 Nov. 2014) <http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20141117/worldwide-effort-clean-
energy-whats-needed-not-carbon-price> accessed 20 April 2016. 
844 Katriina Parikka-Alhola and Ari Nissinen, ‘Environmental Impacts and the Most Economically 
Advantageous Tender in Public Procurement’ (2012) 12 Journal of Public Procurement 43, 68. 
845 Catherine Barnard, ’Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really 
Protected?’, in Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu, The Outer Limits of European Union Law 
(Hart 2009) 295. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   236 31.7.2019   7.15
 237 
that the ECJ in its application of the proportionality review has relaxed the review to 
find in favor of the party that adopted the environmental regulation on the grounds that 
the proposed alternative measure might not guarantee the same level of environmental 
protection.846 This part of the book formed an attempt to map the current level of 
intensity. 
Intense tests confer (too) much power to the EU. The above analysis of PPM-criteria 
revealed that intensity in the suitability test and the least restrictive measure test, which 
apply within the proportionality review of both EU free movement law and WTO law, 
could in certain exceptional circumstances create unwanted bias. Yet, a very deferential 
approach toward state measures by courts and other dispute resolution institutions in 
their application of classic tests of suitability and necessity could in turn deprive the 
proportionality review of its power. This underlines the importance of other tests within 
the proportionality review. Namely, proportionality tests beyond the suitability test and 
the least restrictive measure test may limit what type of criteria can be adopted. 
Various types of consistency tests have figured in the discussion on proportionality. For 
example, under a policy consistency test a state would struggle to defend a decision to 
apply certain otherwise justifiable criteria only in sectors where those criteria favor the 
in-state industry. It was concluded that there has not been any definite clarity with 
respect to the applicability of a policy consistency test. In turn, the respective versions 
of the test on consistency with international science has been recognized in WTO law 
and EU free movement law. These tests give force to the proportionality principle even 
if there would be cases where the more traditional tests of suitability and least restrictive 
measure would not set out an intense review of state measures but would instead take 
a more deferential form. However, only measures that can be shown to be inconsistent 
with international science have been condemned. In both jurisdictions the tests have 
been applied so that they allow for flexibility under scientific uncertainty. This 
approach takes into account the concerns of scholars who argue that in reviewing state 
measures relating to public health and environmental protection courts should adopt a 
precautionary approach under scientific uncertainty and that it may be seen as a less 
severe mistake to allow a few too many protectionist measures than to strike down too 
                                                 
846 Charles Poncelet, ’Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection in EU Law: A Troubled 
Relationship?’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 171, 196-198. 
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many measures of legitimate environmental protection.847 Despite the threshold for 
finding inconsistency having been fairly high, the tests still sets important limits for the 
design of PPM-criteria and other environmental criteria. Admittedly, difficult cases will 
emerge. For example, it is far from evident how inconsistency should be assessed when 
a state bans nuclear power. 
Despite allowing for flexibility under scientific uncertainty, the application of the tests 
relating to consistency with international science still indicate that states that are part 
of a free trade regime also inevitably confer some power with respect to defining 
legitimate objectives, such as environmental protection, to a higher international level. 
States that are part of a common free trade regime will need to accept a common view 
at least when there is very strong scientific consensus. This would likely be the case 
when it comes to core elements of what is sustainable and environmentally desirable. 
A state that diverges from the international scientific consensus will struggle to defend 
its measure when it is put under trade law scrutiny.   
The test of proportionality sensu stricto was explored as another potential approach. 
Such test would mean that a significant amount of power would be conferred to a higher 
level of decision-making. While inconsistency with international science was identified 
as a crucial test for proportionality in EU and WTO law, proportionality sensu stricto 
has not gained much foothold. Interestingly, the test of proportionality sensu stricto 
relies on a comparison of the burden and the benefits of the measure and an uncertain 
benefit could be viewed as a limited benefit. In case of proportionality sensu stricto, 
scientific uncertainty would thus work to the disadvantage of the state trying to justify 
its measure. The ECJ, for example, has in cases of scientific uncertainty opted for a 
more flexible approach.848 That fact would further indicate the rejection of a strict test 
of proportionality sensu stricto. 
Although proportionality sensu stricto has generally been rejected, some exceptional 
cases still illustrate how measures have been struck down as disproportional when they 
place an unorthodox weight on environmental or social sustainability. It may be that 
                                                 
847 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Law and the Internal Market (OUP 2014) 384-385; Aaron 
Cosbey and Petros C. Mavroidis, ’Heavy Fuel: Trade and Environment in the GATT/WTO Case Law’ 
(2014) 23 Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 288. 
848 Case 174/82 Criminal proceedings against Sandoz BV [1983] ECR 2445, para. 16; Case 97/83 
Criminal proceedings against CMC Melkunie BV [1984] ECR 2367, para. 18; Case 178/84 Commission 
v. Germany (German Beer) [1987] ECR 1227, para. 41. 
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measures clearly pushing an agenda beyond the elimination of externalities are deemed 
disproportional even when the state adopting the measure views it as increasing utility. 
A rejection of criteria that do not tackle externalities or add economic value in any other 
way would be in line with an efficiency rationale. 
Finally, it cannot be excluded that some other test could introduce further limits to state 
discretion. For example, the content of the test of disguised restrictions on trade has 
remained diffuse. Perhaps statements of discriminatory purpose, policy inconsistency 
and high levels of discriminatory effect could form indicators of a disguised restriction. 
Even if such test would be opted for, states could make the case that measures designed 
on the basis of a transparent process of estimating externalities should be found 
proportional and justifiable. Such interpretation would advance efficiency in the sense 
that states could be aggressive in tackling externalities even when the strategy also 
advances the interests of the in-state economy, results in high levels of discriminatory 
effect or is part of a test phase during which criteria are applied in one sector before 
similar criteria are designed for other sectors. 
In conclusion, the proportionality review has gained some teeth from tests relating to 
consistency with international science. In contrast, policy consistency tests and 
proportionality sensu stricto have rarely been applied. Yet, there have been some 
indications of those form of tests. It was submitted that if either test would gain more 
ground, in particular in the form of a test on disguised restrictions on trade, the 
intrusiveness of the test could be somewhat restrained by granting states the right to 
defend their internationally or domestically unusual measure with reference to a 
genuine and credible evaluation of externalities. 
3.2. Proportionality Under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
3.2.1. A System of Two Paths 
The proportionality review under the dormant Commerce Clause differs considerably 
depending on whether there is de jure or de facto discrimination in the case at hand. 
There are in other words two different proportionality tests. The fact that the nature of 
the discrimination has a significant impact on the structure of the proportionality review 
sets the dormant Commerce Clause apart from EU free movement law and the GATT. 
It may be recalled that measures with a de facto discriminatory effect are normally 
concluded by U.S. courts to be prima facie prohibited because they place an undue 
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burden on inter-state commerce. De facto discriminatory measures can still be justified 
if they serve a legitimate objective and are proportional. Under the dormant Commerce 
Clause both the definition of grounds of justification and the proportionality principle 
are incorporated in a test referred to as the Pike balancing test. Under the Pike balancing 
test, a measure is proportional unless the burden on interstate commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to its putative local benefits.849 A clearly excessive burden will 
exist if the measure unreasonably favours the local industry.850 The analysis of whether 
the measure is within the limits of reasonable action calls for balancing the harm on 
interstate commerce with the benefits on, for example, health and environment. Even 
when there is a clear burden on interstate trade in the form of de facto discriminatory 
effect, the court may conclude that it is outweighed by the benefits.851  
It was described in the first section of this chapter how the proportionality reviews in 
EU and WTO law have traditionally been built around the test of suitability and the test 
of least restrictive measure. As will be illustrated in this second section of the chapter, 
under the Pike balancing test there is less emphasis on identifying less restrictive 
alternative measures and more emphasis on holistic value balancing. 
The U.S. system is peculiar in the sense that a different proportionality test applies to 
facially discriminatory measures. In case of facial discrimination, which can roughly 
be equated to de jure discrimination, the measure is disproportionate under the U.S. 
dormant Commerce Clause unless there are no other less discriminatory means to 
‘adequately’ achieve the legitimate objective.852 It has, however, occasionally also been 
stated that the alternative would need to protect the objective ‘as well’.853 
The strict scrutiny test under the dormant Commerce Clause strongly resembles the 
necessity test applied in EU free movement law, which relies on an analysis of least 
restrictive measure. De jure discrimination will almost never be necessary because the 
same objective can be achieved by merely eliminating the de jure discriminatory 
                                                 
849 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
850 Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman, 146 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998). 
851 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 U.S. 456 (1981). This same test could save RPSs. See 
Anne Havemann, ‘Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy 
Laws with the Federal Constitution’ (2005) 71 Maryland L. Rev. 848, 881. 
852 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Oregon Waste Systems, 
Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 353 
(1977); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986). 
853 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
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elements from the measure.854 The courts have applied a scrutiny so strict that measures 
are virtually per se invalid.855 There are barely any cases where a de jure discriminatory 
measure would have survived strict scrutiny.  
The strict scrutiny test may in principle also apply in case a measure has either 
significant discriminatory effects856 or reflects a discriminatory purpose857. It may thus 
apply in some cases of de facto discrimination.858 The application of the tests for 
determining whether strict scrutiny should apply instead of Pike balancing have, 
however, not been fully coherent.859 
This second section of the chapter will provide an overview of proportionality under 
the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause. It will be examined how the different elements of 
the Pike balancing test and strict scrutiny should be interpreted. The objective is 
twofold. First, it is of interest whether the proportionality review might face similar 
challenges as those already identified in previous sections on the EU and the WTO. In 
particular, does the Pike balancing test include elements of proportionality sensu stricto, 
has it been crafted and applied in a manner that grants states a similar flexibility under 
scientific uncertainty as the proportionality review under EU and WTO law and finally, 
does it allow for any risks of state market power bias when applied to review PPM-
criteria? Secondly, it is of equal interest whether the U.S. proportionality review, with 
a system of two different proportionality tests, will face some challenges that are unique 
to it. 
                                                 
854 On cases where de jure discrimination may be justified see section 1.4.3.2. 
855 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). See also City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“…where simple economic protectionism is 
effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected. […] The clearest 
example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's 
borders.”). In that case the Supreme Court declared that the risks from in-state and imported waste were 
identical and did not find any justifiable reason to treat them differently.  
856 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). 
857 The court will look on indicators such as language and preparatory works. See Perry v. Commerce 
Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270-271 (1984); 
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 fn 7 (1981). 
858 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1073 (fn 38); Dan 
T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 220-221; Michael E. 
Smith, ‘State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce’ (1986) 74 California L. Rev. 1203, 1243-
1250; Jennifer L. Larsen, ‘Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 49 South Dakota 
L. Rev. 844. See also Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
859 Puppies ‘N Love et al. v. City of Phoenix, 116 F. Supp. 3d 971 (D. Ariz. 2015) at *9. 
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3.2.2. The Pike Balancing Test 
3.2.2.1. The Suitability of a Measure to Serve a Legitimate Objective 
In cases of even-handed regulations that burden inter-state commerce only incidentally, 
U.S. courts apply the Pike balancing test. These are the cases that in EU and WTO law 
normally are characterized as cases of de facto discrimination. Under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the measure is proportionate as long as the burden on commerce is 
not clearly excessive of the benefit.860 The Pike balancing test is a test under which two 
components are compared with one another. To put it differently, one component is 
balanced against another. On one side, there is the burden on interstate commerce. On 
the other side there are the environmental, social or other justifiable benefits. Pike 
balancing is thus a very different proportionality review than the strict scrutiny 
applicable in cases of facial discrimination. 
The Pike balancing test might appear to be quite different from what is applied in EU 
and WTO law, but it still includes a consideration of suitability. In principle, each state 
has the right to choose its level of environmental protection in areas of no federal pre-
emption. The argument for this form of flexibility is reflected in statements on the 
valuable function of states as laboratories for finding new solutions to common 
problems.861 States are, however, not completely free to define what environmental 
protection or any other legitimate objective may entail or what constitutes suitable 
means to achieve it. For example, Wisconsin had banned long trucks on its roads with 
reference to safety concerns. The Supreme Court concluded that with shorter trucks 
there would be more vehicles on the roads and that it was too uncertain that the law 
would create any safety benefits.862  
How uncertain is too uncertain? The measure has served a legitimate objective when 
there have been conflicting evidence with respect to the benefits of the measure863 and 
even when there were substantial uncertainties surrounded the effects that the measure 
aimed to protect against.864 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that it is sufficient 
                                                 
860 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
861 See e.g. New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), Justice Brandeis dissenting. 
862 See Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). See also Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
863 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
864 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 142-143 (1986). A legitimate objective existed to adopt a ban the 
import of baitfish because the effects were unpredictable and surrounded by substantial uncertainties. 
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that a measure advances or at least slightly contributes to the legitimate objective.865 
The threshold for suitability implies a significant tolerance for states taking action under 
uncertainties. Yet, the added value of a measure may not be too speculative.866  
The case law would generally suggest that the measure must be expected to have an 
effect with some, often unspecified, probability. Hence, the test of suitability would 
roughly correspond with the same test under EU and WTO law. Still, there is some 
room for making the case that a more deferential review applies in the U.S. in the sense 
that states would be given broader discretion in designing their measures. The concept 
of ‘advancing’ an objective used by the courts could be given a broad meaning. This is 
what appeared to have been the case in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, where the 
court declared that the focus should be on what the state is actually trying to achieve.867 
This would support the argument that it is sufficient that the measure is logically 
capable of advancing the objective that the state aims to achieve. The approach may be 
contrasted with the view of one WTO panel, which stated that a measure by one state 
striving for sustainability was not justifiable when its effectiveness was dependent on 
also other states taking action.868 Given that the U.S. is a much more homogenous 
coalition of states than the WTO, it would admittedly appear counter-intuitive that the 
U.S. would adopt the most deferential approach to suitability. 
All in all, as in the case of EU and WTO law, also under the dormant Commerce Clause 
there have been indications of a requirement of expected effect of the measure, but also 
signs of inconsistency in the application of the test. 
3.2.2.2. The Burden on Interstate Commerce 
The suitability test described above has in practice by courts not been applied as a 
separate step in the proportionality review. Instead, it has been integrated into the more 
holistic balancing exercise. To fully appreciate the dynamics of the Pike balancing test 
it is crucial to establish how the two components are defined. I shall begin with the 
burden on interstate commerce. 
                                                 
865 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 522-526 (2007); Oregon Waste 
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 100-101 (1994); New 
Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). 
866 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
867 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) 
868 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) 
(unadopted), paras 5.22-27. 
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A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) with its quotas for electricity from renewables 
and a Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) with a limit on the average carbon-intensity 
of fuels both promote cleaner PPMs in the energy sector. They are, however, even 
without any in-state or other geographical criteria, detrimental to states with a high 
market share in fossil fuels. They may thus not only restrict trade in the sense that all 
parties must comply with certain PPM-criteria, but they may also have discriminatory 
effects. Several scholars have stated that the burden on interstate trade of, for example, 
a RPS scheme would often still be fairly limited.869 But what really determines the 
magnitude of the burden? Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never been all too 
specific on that account. 
The contemporary design of the dormant Commerce Clause is dedicated to the 
elimination of protectionism or discrimination. Some scholars have argued that the 
purpose of Pike balancing is to capture protectionist purpose.870 Linking the test to 
discriminatory intent would suggest that discrimination is a pivotal factor in 
determining the magnitude of the trade burden. 
Discrimination and protectionism occur when a state favours its local production.871 
The effect is generally a change in market shares. The concept of undue burden on 
interstate trade has frequently been linked to cases when less favourable treatment of 
imports allows domestic production to gain market share.872 Consequently, the burden 
on interstate trade in Pike balancing could be assessed with reference to the expected 
change in the conditions on the market resulting in an increased in-state market share. 
The test would capture not only the economic disadvantage to some parts of the out-of-
state industry, but also add into the equation that some out-of-state operators might in 
fact have benefited.873 In short, the burden would often be high when the favoured PPM 
                                                 
869 Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Boarder War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 81-83; Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, 
Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 N.Y.U. Environmental L. J. 507, 603. See also Nathan Endrud, ‘State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation’ (2008) 45 Harvard Journal 
on Legislation 259, 271-272. Endrud highlights the fact that transmission capacity restraints will in any 
case keep levels of cross-border trade at low levels. 
870 Donald H. Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (1986) 84 Michigan L. Rev. 1091, 1092. See also Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 
44 F.3d 591, 593-597 (7th Cir. 1995). 
871 Donald H. Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (1986) 84 Michigan L. Rev. 1091, 1092-1095. 
872 See section 1.3.2.2. 
873 Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 282-283. 
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is a segment of the industry where in-state companies either have a high share or at 
least high potential due to competitive advantages.  
Coenen has argued that the burden should be defined as a cost and not as a degree of 
discrimination.874 It is not fully obvious as to whether this represents a different 
approach. Discrimination results in changes in market shares and a decrease in volumes 
of imports (cross-border trade). There would be lower levels of specialisation exploiting 
local comparative advantages and this has a cost. However, Coenen might have meant 
something different. Namely, the nature of the test on burden changes significantly if 
the level of burden is defined as the estimated total costs that the measure has on trade 
irrespective of its effects on changes in market shares and patterns of cross-border trade. 
Such approach would reflect a broader interpretation of the objectives of a free trade 
regime. In that sense, such test would appear more in line with law of prohibition 
extending beyond mere tests of discrimination and covering, for example, some forms 
of non-discriminatory market access hinders. The argument for this perception of a 
burden is weakened by the fact that normally no such market access test has been 
applied under the dormant Commerce Clause. Discrimination as the basis of estimating 
the burden would therefore appear as the more convincing approach. 
Havemann argues that the burden of a RPS would usually be fairly low.875 In general, 
the fact that renewables can be exploited to a decent degree in most states should limit 
the burden created by measures linked to the energy transition, although there are of 
course some states unusually rich in gas or oil, which may lose even significant market 
share. The impact of a measure will likely be greater if only a narrow category of 
renewables is favoured or if there is a full ban on some PPMs instead of merely 
promoting other PPMs through a RPS. In the U.S. many states have adopted a RPS for 
the electricity sector. The burden on interstate commerce and thus also the 
proportionality of a RPS would not only depend on which types of renewables it covers. 
The geographical scope of the scheme could equally have implications.  
A few things must be emphasized with respect to the burden on commerce created by 
RPSs. A state might stipulate that RECs are granted only if the electricity comes from 
a plant in a state that is interconnected to the grid of the state granting the credits. Under 
                                                 
874 Ibid. 
875 Anne Havemann, ‘Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable 
Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution’ (2012) 71 Maryland L. Rev 848, 879. 
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such RPS the electricity receiving beneficial treatment in the form of RECs could at 
least in theory always be delivered to the state granting the credits. It could be argued 
that the interconnection requirement that results in the rejection of a benefit to power 
suppliers that cannot deliver power to the state market does not create a burden on 
interstate trade. Namely, power without transmission access cannot compete on the 
market of the state that has adopted the RPS in question. The companies that have been 
denied RECs have not lost any market share on the market of the state that adopted the 
RPS. The requirement would thus have good chances to survive the Pike balancing test. 
A state might fear that the interconnection requirement is insufficient to ensure the 
stability of the scheme. As an alternative to the interconnection requirement, the state 
could require that for receiving RECs the electricity must have actually been delivered 
to the state. Again, it could be claimed that companies of a state that do not deliver to 
the market of the regulating state cannot be discriminated on that market. However, 
there is the possibility that as a consequence of the RPS companies generating energy 
from renewables in-state strengthen their position on the domestic market to such an 
extent that they develop significant exporting capacity and thus become enabled to take 
market share from out-of-state energy companies. Importantly, under a delivery 
requirement all electricity from in-state qualifying plants relying on renewable 
resources would receive the benefits while out-of-state plants that despite the 
interconnection do not delivery would be left without the benefits. In other words, the 
requirement would create an in-state advantage directly linked to the geographical 
origin. Hence, it could be viewed as the type of de jure or facial discrimination that 
would trigger strict scrutiny instead of the more lenient Pike balancing test. At the very 
least, the burden on interstate trade would likely be established as significant.876 
While an interconnection requirement might not increase the burden of a RPS on 
interstate trade, a delivery requirement could do so significantly. Instead of an 
interconnection or a delivery requirement states could decide to only grant RECs if it 
is confirmed that the electricity generated from renewables has been consumed within 
the state that grants the RECs. This model would on the one hand make it more difficult 
for producers to receive RECs but would on the other hand not automatically benefit 
the in-state industry in the way that a delivery requirement would. Under a consumption 
                                                 
876 The model might still be preferred over a complete denial of RECs to any out-of-state production. 
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requirement RECs would not be granted to in-state exported production, out-of-state 
production that is not delivered to the state with the scheme and out-of-state production 
that is delivered but directly re-exported. Although a case-by-case analysis would be 
necessary, it seems likely that the scheme with a consumption requirement would have 
de facto discriminatory effects. In comparison to a delivery requirement the burden on 
interstate commerce of the consumption requirement would be lower with with respect 
to discriminatory effects on imports to the regulating state but would at the same time 
be higher with respect to the effects on exports from the regulating state. Namely, the 
consumption requirement model would deter companies from exporting power from 
the regulating state. All this makes it difficult to determine which model has a more 
severe burden on interstate commerce. While it might be that the consumption 
requirement places a less heavy burden, the conclusion on whether it would form a 
reasonable alternative would still depend on the mechanisms for verifying whether 
electricity from renewables has been consumed in-state or whether it was exported. 
Such verification may be difficult. Hence, if the interconnection requirement does not 
provide sufficient stability states may end up with a delivery requirement after all. 
3.2.2.3. The Benefits 
The starting point in an assessment of the benefit ought to be the legitimate objective. 
For example, in cases on sustainable PPMs, it would often be the protection of the 
environment. The magnitude of the benefit depends on its importance and the degree 
to which it is advanced.877 Public health and safety have traditionally been regarded as 
strong grounds of justification.878 Thus, even small advancements may be considered 
significant benefits. This principle should apply also for many forms of environmental 
protection, in particular because of its close link to public health.  
More generally, how is an objective established to form a strong ground of justification 
with significant weight in terms of benefit? Determining the benefit is partly a question 
of scientific uncertainty as to the effects 8and externalities), but also quite simply a 
question of preferences. The value of biodiversity loss, social inequality and climate 
change may vary depending on local preferences. Whose preferences matter and how 
does scientific uncertainty affect the Pike balancing test? 
                                                 
877 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (4th ed., West 2010) 170. 
878 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1100; Dan T. 
Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 278-279. 
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In case federal law already to some extent guarantees protection, the relevant benefit of 
the state measure would only be the additional benefit it provides.879 The question then 
turns to whether it is federal or state preferences that determine exactly how much 
additional benefit the state measure will bring. In a series of cases on rail and road 
safety, the Supreme Court concluded that although safety was a legitimate objective, 
the measure adopted by the states might not have advanced the objective at all or would 
at most create minimal benefit.880 In other words, the benefit was too small with a too 
significant likelihood. The whole probability distribution of the potential benefit may 
be considered. Importantly, the cases seem to suggest that the Court adopts a federal 
perspective when determining the level of benefits measures create. 
The cases on transport safety confirmed that the courts may question the state definition 
of the benefit at least in some respect. Justice Brennan has argued that the Court should 
still not second-guess the benefit as declared by the state unless it is illusory.881 
However, if the court could re-examine whether the measure produces no benefit, it 
should also logically have the power to conclude that the benefit is very insignificant 
or to some other degree lower than what the state claims. 
States adopt safety regulations for the transport sector in order to reduce the number 
accidents and a benefit will exist in case causality can be established between the 
measure and the accident risk. The uncertainty surrounding the magnitude, or even the 
existence, of the claimed benefit relates to something that could in theory be measured 
and verified objectively with statistics. Thus, an argument for flexibility in terms of 
state level discretion would hardly have been convincing in the context of the transport 
safety cases.  
The benefit analysis in the energy sector is multidimensional and more complex than 
in the transport safety cases. There is no objective manner to establish which PPMs 
deliver the environmentally (or socially) optimal aggregate outcome. Thus, in this 
context with more scientific uncertainty there would in principle exist more reason to 
                                                 
879 Dan T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 283-284. Of 
course, in case of preemption by federal law the questions of justification and benefits would never even 
arise. 
880 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 
761 (1945); Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consolidated 
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
881 Justice Brennan (with whom Justice Marshall joins) concurring in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679, 686 (1981). 
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grant some degree of state-level flexibility. A flexible approach would also provide 
states with greater prospects to perform their tasks as laboratories of democracy.882 
The balance between state-level flexibility and federal control could be struck in many 
ways. It is clear that states should not have full freedom to determine the benefit as it 
could result in states implementing measures that promote environmental protection in 
a very narrow sense and that way abuse the grounds of justification. Consistency883 
with the findings of international or American scientists could play a part in estimating 
the level of the benefits. 
The higher the uncertainty of the benefits in terms of a greater divergence of the policy 
from common federal or internationally policy and science, the more difficult it will be 
for the benefit to outweigh negative effects on interstate trade. It is less obvious how 
much weight should be given to genuine and bona fide determined preferences of the 
state population when estimating the magnitude of the benefit. In case genuine state 
sustainability preferences are paid respect to by the courts, they will likely find that a 
wide range of measures with PPM-criteria create benefits, even if some of the measures 
will be controversial from a federal (and perhaps international) perspective. This still 
remains to be seen. 
Another question that still awaits to be confirmed by courts is whether in the application 
of the Pike balancing test the burden on interstate commerce should be balanced against 
the sum of all non-trade benefits or against the net amount of non-trade benefits. 
Namely, a measure that, in some way, serves a legitimate objective, such as 
environmental protection might have effects that are at the same time positive and 
negative to different aspects of that objective. While courts are rarely quite explicit on 
this point, determining net benefits should form a preliminary step in balancing values 
under the Pike test. It is in other words argued that benefits for the legitimate objective 
should in the application of the Pike balancing test be understood as net benefits.884 
                                                 
882 On the idea of states being laboratories of democracy see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932), Justice Brandeis dissenting; Gonzales v. Reich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (Justice 
O’Connor dissenting, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas). See also Robert B. McKinstry 
Jr., ‘Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in 
Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change’ (2004) 12 Penn State 
Environmental L. Rev. 15. 
883 This should not be confused with the test of inconsistency which has applied under the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause for the purposes of striking down de jure discrimination. See Dan T. Coenen, 
Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 289-290.  
884 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). In the case the Supreme Court took into account 
both factors that would increase and decrease accident risks of trains. 
249
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   249 31.7.2019   7.15
 250 
This approach would not only limit the risks of hidden protectionism but would also 
constitute a reasonable rule from a sustainability perspective.  
How should benefits then be estimated for measures in the energy sector? In the field 
of energy, GHG emissions are particularly relevant. GHG emissions are released at the 
phases of extraction of raw material, processing, transportation, manufacturing of 
equipment, use of final product and disposal. Some have even presented the view that 
high emissions of GHG’s dominate all climate effects.885 Global warming might cause 
several detrimental effects on the environment and the health of humans. Changes in 
the climate can cause extreme weather, flooding, droughts and water shortages.886 
Global warming caused by an increase in GHG emissions could also harm ecosystems 
and reduce biodiversity.887 The changes might also increase the risk of diseases and 
pose a threat to agriculture. The total impacts of global warming are complex and 
difficult to predict. 
GHG emissions are problematic because the increase in concentration is so rapid that 
the world cannot adapt.888 In other words, climate change has become a problem as the 
ability of the world to absorb carbon dioxide is consumed too fast.889 Zero GHG 
emissions might still not be necessary, or even ideal, because the world has a natural 
ability to absorb some emissions. Consequently, the marginal benefit of reduced GHG 
emissions will be lower when total emissions are reduced. 
While high levels of GHG emissions can be attributed to fossil fuels, renewables are 
also not fully emissions free. Emissions will likely occur at the stage of production of 
the equipment and the facilities necessary for renewable energy. Renewables, such as 
wind power and hydropower, may also disturb the ecosystem, although in the aggregate 
the effects seem less severe. 890 Further supporting the conclusion that renewables are 
better for the environment than fossil fuels, is the fact that coal mine explosions and oil 
                                                 
885 Thomas R. Karl and Kevin E. Trenberth, ‘Modern Global Climate Change’ (2003) 302 Science 1719, 
1720. 
886 Climate Action Team, Biennial Report, State of California (2010).  
887 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for 
Policy Makers, Observed Changes in Climate and Their Effects (2007). 
888 David R. Hodas, ‘State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally 
and Act Locally?’ (2003) 21 Pace Environmental L. Rev. 53, 60. 
889 Karl S. Coplan, ‘The Intercivilizational Inequities of Nuclear Power Weighed Against the 
Intergenerational Inequities of Carbon Based Energy’ (2006) 17 Fordham Environmental L. Rev. 227, 
228-229. 
890 Steven Ferrey, ‘Power Future’ (2005) 15 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 261, 274. 
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leaks from e.g. tankers are environmental disasters that, even if rare, take place from 
time to time.891  
Similarly as with renewables, the GHG emissions from nuclear power are negligible. 
Yet, like in the case of solar power, hazardous waste is generated from the operations. 
In the short and medium term, nuclear waste is more hazardous, but the extremely long-
term accumulation of waste is more difficult to compare. A further risk associated with 
nuclear power is that of an accident. Nuclear accidents like Tshernobyl and Fukushima 
cause ecological disasters. The probability of an accident is still relatively small.  
The environmental effects of various PPMs in the field of energy, in particular between 
nuclear fission and other options, are difficult to compare and preferences vary greatly. 
The fact that environmental harm often comes with a significant delay, especially in the 
case of climate change, adds further complexity. As if it was not complex enough with 
the broad scope of environmental effects in the energy sector, social effects could 
arguably also weigh in under the Pike balancing test. Otherwise measures restricting 
interstate trade only slightly but with potentially severe detrimental social effects, could 
be declared justifiable. For example, reliability of energy supply has social implications 
and can be linked to the protection of public health.  
While reliability considerations should form part of the Pike balancing test, 
affordability would be a more controversial element. Several federal laws recognize the 
importance of improving sustainability while not endangering affordability. The laws 
thus emphasize environmental cost-efficiency.892 Affordability of energy is clearly of 
social value. Some scholars have viewed the risks of energy poverty among low-income 
households as a factor that could nullify the benefits of a RPS.893 However, PPM-
criteria may not be the only way to tackle social inequality and affordability. Low-
income households, who may struggle to afford essential basic levels of energy as a 
                                                 
891 Anne Havemann, ‘Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable 
Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution’ (2012) 71 Maryland L. Rev 848, 849-850. 
892 First, in the definition of renewables for purposes of foreign aid, the affordability of resources is given 
as a relevant factor for approving the project. See Foreign Relations and Intercourse 22 U.S.C. § 262j(b) 
(2000). Secondly, the Clean Air Act encourages the adoption of best available technology. How good a 
technology is shall depend on both its environmental credits as well as its costs. See Clean Air Act § 
169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). The need for environmental cost-efficiency has also been acknowledged 
on a state-level. For example, the purpose of the cap and trade system of California is to gain cost 
effective reductions of emissions with respect to overall societal effects. See California Health & Safety 
Code § 38501, 38505, 38562. 
893 Andy S. Kydes, ‘Impacts of a Renewable Portfolio Generation Standard on US Energy Markets’ 
(2007) 35 Energy Policy 809, 814. 
251
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   251 31.7.2019   7.15
 252 
consequence of government support for expensive renewable energy technology, could 
be compensated directly from public funds. Hence, it becomes more of an economic 
issue and its inclusion in the benefit analysis is subsequently more controversial.  
Economic interests cannot work as legitimate grounds of justification.894 Nonetheless, 
it has been argued that revenue generation could be given weight in the Pike balancing 
test.895 It is argued here that when avoided costs or revenue generation takes place at 
the expense of out-of-state industry, then they should not weigh in as a benefit. In 
contrast, positive social effects of in-state redistribution of wealth may form a 
legitimate benefit. Likewise, when a cost is a loss for the in-state economy and 
restricting the loss or increasing the revenue does not take place directly at the cost of 
out-of-state wealth, then the benefit should perhaps also be taken into account. For 
example, GHG’s from fossil fuels contributing to global warming is expected to raise 
sea levels, which would constitute a threat to landowners.896 Adopting measures to 
tackle this risk could cause changes in market shares in the energy sector to the benefit 
of in-state industries. These in-state economic benefits would not be benefits under the 
Pike balancing test. However, the measure may also create both economic and 
ecological benefits in-state that would be unrelated to changes in market shares and the 
decrease in out-of-state wealth. For example, avoiding the loss of land on the globe may 
have an economic value. This type of benefit could be included in the balancing. 
3.2.2.4. The Geographical Scope of the Environmental Benefits 
A prima facie prohibited measure may be justifiable only if the burden is not clearly 
excessive of a local legitimate objective. The Pike balancing test can be deconstructed 
into a set of separate and distinct subtests. First, there is the test of whether the objective 
of the measure is a legitimate ground of justification. Secondly, there is the 
proportionality review, which includes the balancing and the test on whether the 
measure serves the objective as well as an alternative measure. 
Non-local, i.e. extraterritorial, benefits appear not to form legitimate objectives as 
grounds of justification under the Pike test. Moreover, it would seem like the traditional 
wording of the test would also not allow for non-local benefits to be taken into account 
                                                 
894 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928). The court in this case rejected local 
employment as a valid ground of justification. 
895 United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 
330, 346 (2007). 
896 See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 518-522 (2007). 
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in the balancing part of the Pike test. Coherence between the test of local legitimate 
objective (i.e. the definition of a ground of justification) and the definition of the 
benefits under the balancing test (i.e. the proportionality review) would mean that 
extraterritorial benefits and harm, whether environmental or of some other sort, would 
not be relevant at any stage of the Pike test.897 A literal interpretation of the test set out 
by the Supreme Court in Pike898 suggests that reducing pollution out-of-state would 
only be of relevance in the balancing test to the extent it creates an in-state 
environmental benefit.  
The narrow focus on merely in-state benefits and harm in the balancing phase could 
cause some controversial outcomes. Let us consider a sequence of events. A state 
decides to ban coal power, including imports, in order to mitigate GHG emissions. As 
a consequence of the new state law coal companies in neighbouring states go bankrupt. 
The state adopting the ban will increase its market share because of great potential in 
natural gas. The measure has thus had discriminatory effect. Yet, this effect is in part 
limited by the fact that neighbouring states with water streams will be incentivized to 
expand their hydropower networks. In considering the net benefits of the measure, we 
note that reduced GHG emissions both in-state and out-of-state likely create local 
benefit. However, the increase in negative environmental effects of a greater number 
of large hydro power stations out-of-state will hardly burden the local environment of 
the state adopting the measure. These negative effects would thus almost not at all be 
accounted for under the Pike balancing test if the analysis of benefits and harm is 
restricted to the in-state effects.  
Measures reducing GHG emissions in a limited geographical area of production will 
benefit a broad geographical area. A trade restrictive measure mitigating GHG 
emissions out-of-state could create even significant in-state benefit for the state 
adopting the measure. Even if the geographical scope of the net benefits taken into 
account in the Pike balancing test would be interpreted as very narrow, the benefits of 
GHG emission reduction action would increase both because of reduction in emissions 
in-state and reduction in emissions in any other state, no matter how distant. In contrast, 
                                                 
897 Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Boarder War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 86-87, See also C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). For 
criticism of this position see Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 346-347. 
898 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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the harm of many other forms of pollution or disturbances to the ecosystem out-of-state 
would occur much less in the state adopting the measure than in the state where the 
harm originates. These other more local effects are common to renewables. Excluding 
out-of-state benefits would not be reasonable from the perspective of environmental 
protection since the net benefits of, for example, renewables would be overestimated. 
Hence, it could even be argued that not only effects on a federal, but also on a global, 
level should be taken into account. 
The geographical scope of the benefits calculations under the Pike balancing test has 
been the subject of academic discussion. Some states give preference to in-state 
companies in awarding permits for building new transmission lines. In this context it 
has been argued that out-of-state benefits should be included in the Pike balancing 
test.899 More generally, a state should according to Tribe not have the right to merely 
adopt a measure to protect its local environment by shifting some externalities of 
production to other states.900 A narrow geographical scope of benefits and harms would 
encourage states to merely shift externalities out-of-state. It would thus also be 
questionable from the perspective of federal loyalty. 
Cross-border harm of unsustainable PPMs usually increases with proximity to the 
source of the harm and states closer to the state with power plants running on coal 
would experience more local benefit from a ban on coal power. The inclusion of global 
and out-of-state benefits to the balancing prong of the Pike test gains further support 
from the observation that such approach would put on an equal footing states that 
neighbor polluting states and states that are further way.  
The broad interpretation of the geographical scope of benefits under the Pike balancing 
test could draw some criticism as it creates incoherence with the test of local legitimate 
objective. A local legitimate objective must be served for a valid ground of justification 
to exist in the first place. Admittedly, including other than local benefits in the 
balancing phase would result in asymmetry. The inclusion of extraterritorial benefits in 
the balancing prong will also likely be criticized because of extraterritoriality. 
However, this might not be all too serious. Namely, any necessary limit to 
extraterritoriality would already be set through the test of confirming that there is a 
                                                 
899 Alexandra B. Klass and Jim Rossi, ‘Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate 
Coordination’ (2015) Minnesota Law Review 129. 
900 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1073-1074. 
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local legitimate objective (i.e. when testing for grounds of justification). The analysis 
would in other words starts with the identification of a local legitimate objective. This 
test provides a safeguard against measures with fully extraterritorial objectives. The 
balancing test should only become relevant once the measure has been determined to 
at least partly serve a legitimate local objective and would thus not have a too strong 
extraterritorial dimension. When Pike balancing is applied as a second step in the 
analysis, it is less problematic that extraterritorial benefits are considered alongside 
local benefits. All in all, there exist reasons for considering adjusting the Pike balancing 
test so that a measure is disproportionate if the burden is clearly excessive of federal or 
even global net benefits. 
3.2.2.5. Balancing the Burden and the Benefits 
The focus in the preceding subsections was separately on the burden on interstate trade 
and on the (environmental) benefits. The balancing exercise brings them together. 
Under the Pike balancing test de facto discriminatory measures will be constitutional 
unless the burden on interstate trade is clearly excessive in comparison to the benefits 
of the measure. The balancing of the burden against the benefits forms the final step of 
the test. This task is daunting. Balancing is complicated when many values or interests 
point in different directions.901 For example, biodiversity loss is difficult to compare 
with GHG emissions and it becomes even more difficult when the environmental 
benefits are to be compared with effects on free trade.902 There are no guidelines with 
respect to the weights of different effects.903 Moreover, there is no obvious common 
unit.904 This problem is familiar from the previous discussion on proportionality sensu 
stricto and incommensurability.905 
Stiles has argued that no price tag can be put on the ability of the Earth to absorb 
GHG’s.906 In principle, externalities could however be monetized. While the degree of 
discrimination is a non-monetary measure, the burden on interstate trade could still also 
be estimated in dollars. Despite this theoretical possibility to construct some form of 
                                                 
901 Boris I. Bittker, Bittker on the regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Aspen 1999) 6-31. 
902 Timothy P. Duane and Kiran H. Griffith, ‘Legal, Technical and Economic Challenges in Integrating 
Renewable Power Generation into the Electricity Grid’ (2013) 4 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 1. 
903 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (4th ed., West 2010) 169. 
904 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1072. 
905 See section 3.1.6.2. 
906 Trevor D. Stiles, ‘Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2009) 4 Environmental 
and Energy Law and Policy J. 34, 55. 
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common scale, it should be emphasized that the courts have never approached 
balancing in such a technical and mathematical fashion. 
The Supreme Court has admitted that it may not be possible to derive any coherent 
conceptual approach from its case law that would incorporate all relevant factors.907 
The Pike balancing test is not firmly bound by principles, but constitutes an analysis 
that is adaptive to the facts of the case.908 While such model grants the court power to 
balance all values and to consider the particularities of each case, it simultaneously 
weakens legal certainty. Without more precise rules and principles governing the 
balancing test states and private traders will face difficulties to predict what measures 
could be in compliance with the Constitution. Furthermore, some Supreme Court 
judges have regarded themselves unsuited for the task of balancing values and stated 
that it should instead be the duty of the democratically elected legislator.909 At least on 
one occasion Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, refused to balance different 
values because he deemed it an exercise of comparing the incomparable.910 
Despite criticism directed at the Pike balancing test, the Supreme Court has regularly 
applied it. Measures have been declared disproportional under conditions where the 
existence of any real benefit was questionable.911 States have, however, tended to 
successfully defend their measures in the majority of cases in modern time.912 It is hard 
to find examples of cases where a reasonably construed benefit would have been 
outweighed even by significant discriminatory effects. This would suggest that the 
assessment of the benefit might be more crucial than the assessment of the burden. 
Importantly, the practical application of the Pike balancing test appears in other words 
to render it fairly deferential. 
                                                 
907 See Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978). 
908 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1102-1105. 
909 Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: 
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 
295, 310. 
910 Bendix Autolite Corp v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988). 
911 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 
520 (1959). Compare with cases where the safety concerns have been deemed sufficient, such as South 
Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Locomotive 
Firemen v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968). On transportation 
licensing see also California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941). 
912 Stephen M. Johnson, ‘From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Common Law 
Remedies for Public Law Failures?’ (2011) 27 Georgia State University L. Rev. 565, 572-573. 
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What explains the significant leeway given to states under Pike balancing? As discussed 
in the context of the suitability test, the Supreme Court has found that it is sufficient 
that the measure advances legitimate objective to some degree and that it may be 
justifiable to take action even under substantial uncertainty with respect to the 
consequences of inaction.913 The threshold for establishing a benefit has not been very 
high. 
Furthermore, the threshold of ‘clearly excessive’ would suggest that states have a right 
to restrict trade even in circumstances of quite high uncertainty. The high threshold of 
‘clearly excessive’ in the Pike balancing test reflects the ideal of encouraging states to 
work as laboratories of democracy experimenting with new legislative solutions. In 
other words, high importance is given to state level experimentation.914 This may be in 
part because at stake are often issues complicated by the multitude of values that all 
should be reconciled at the same time. 
The Pike balancing test also includes the test of least restrictive measure as a factor that 
weighs in the balancing.915 A measure would not survive the test in case there is a less 
trade restrictive alternative that is equally effective.916 How intense would the review 
of state measures then be in the context of the dormant Commerce Clause? Would a 
labelling scheme that provides consumers information about the PPM be equally 
effective as mandatory schemes, such as a RPS?917  
Although some customers may be willing to pay a premium, the labelling scheme 
would strictly speaking not guarantee the same level of protection because of free 
riding. Yet, as under EU law, there is the problem that if the alternative would be 
required to produce a perfectly identical outcome, the test would leave states with so 
much room for discretion that the test would lose most of its relevance in cases of de 
facto discrimination. There are thus those who have implied that the test should be more 
                                                 
913 See section 3.2.2.1. 
914 This applies in particular with respect to environmental regulation. See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 
147, 151 (2d Cir. 1982); Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Robert V. Percival et al, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science 
and Policy (4th ed., Aspen 2003) 101. 
915 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Boris I. Bittker, Bittker on the Regulation of 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Aspen Law 1999) paras 6-45, 6-46. 
916 For such requirement see Northwest Central Pipeline v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 489 U.S. 
493 (1989). 
917 Subsidies would not categorically offer any higher level of benefits than a RPS as the difference in 
level of benefits would depend on the size of the subsidy contra the quota. In addition, the RPS might 
promote the same objectives more efficiently because it allows for trade in the attributes. 
257
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   257 31.7.2019   7.15
 258 
intense. For example, Geradin has argued that for mandatory rules on PPMs there is 
often the alternative to promote green energy through labelling.918 If the alternative 
measure is significantly less of a burden and guarantees practically almost the same 
level of protection, it could tip the balance and allow the court to conclude that the 
original measure is disproportional even if it would have created slightly higher 
benefits. 
It is important to note that in contrast to EU free movement law, the availability of less 
discriminatory and equally effective measures is just a factor in Pike balancing. In other 
words, the least restrictive measure test applied in U.S. trade law is not on its own 
decisive.919 It is not entirely clear how the least restrictive measure test should affect 
the balancing of burden and benefits. However, the Pike balancing test has in practice 
been deferential to such degree that the least restrictive measure component has not 
gained any significant weight.  
All in all, the deferential nature of Pike balancing does in some respect bring it close to 
the test of ‘inconsistency with international science’ applicable in EU free movement 
law. States are granted much discretion under scientific uncertainty in both 
jurisdictions. The similarities identified here between the Pike balancing test and EU 
free movement law proportionality were, however, far from obvious since the core 
structure of Pike as a balancing test actually resembles the characteristics of a test of 
proportionality sensu stricto in the sense that both rely on holistic value balancing.920  
However, in contrast to proportionality sensu stricto the balancing in the Pike test gives 
significant deference to the state.921 The Pike balancing test creates rather different 
dynamics than proportionality sensu stricto because it includes the threshold of ‘clearly 
excessive’.  
On a final note, the findings of close similarities, in terms of flexibility, between EU 
and U.S. proportionality does not support the more general observation of others, that 
                                                 
918 Damien Geradin, Trade and the Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
50-52, 65-66. 
919 Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy 
Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 N.Y.U. Environmental L. J. 507, 
580-581. 
920 Damien Geradin, Trade and the Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
62. 
921 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (4th ed., West 2010) 170-
171. 
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under scientific uncertainty the EU tends to adopt a more precautionary approach, while 
the U.S. more boldly conducts a cost-benefit analysis.922 
3.2.2.6. Quantification and Scaling 
The courts have not been very technical in their comparison of burdens and benefits. 
The balancing has often been more of an overall assessment of fairly deferential 
character. Courts have showed deference by not striking down state measures on light 
grounds.  In taking such approach courts should still be careful not to let any potential 
bias hidden in the dynamics of the test influence the outcome. With this in mind, an 
attempt is here made to identify how the technical details of the Pike balancing test 
could be construed. 
Courts have never been all too specific on how the burden should be defined. The 
emphasis could in principle be on the trade restrictive effects in terms of trade volumes 
or costs. The burden on interstate commerce would in that case be greater when a ban 
is adopted by a state with large quantities of imports. These states would more often 
than not be those with large populations and significant market power. The purpose and 
structure of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, however, suggest that it is the level 
of discrimination and its effects on the conditions of competition that is balanced 
against overall environmental, social and other benefits. The level of discrimination can 
be expressed in terms of changes in market shares. The change in market share could 
be quantified in terms of absolute volumes of trade (i.e. in-state companies’ sales 
increase), in terms of percentage on the relevant market globally (i.e. in-state 
companies’ market share on global market increases) or in terms of percentage on the 
market of the importing state adopting the regulation (i.e. in-state companies’ market 
share on in-state market increases). The choice is of importance because unlike the first 
two, the last alternative would appear to be unaffected by the quantities the regulating 
state imported before adopting the measure.923 
The preferred alternative for quantification of the burden depends on how the benefit is 
quantified. A hypothesis has been developed in this study. More specifically, both the 
                                                 
922 T. Sandra Fung, ’Negotiating Regulatory Coherence: The Costs and Consequences of Disparate 
Regulatory Principles in the Transatlantic Trade and Partnership Agreement Between the United States 
and the European Union’ (2014) 47 Cornell International Law Journal 446, 471. 
923 A populous state is more likely to have larger volumes of imports. Consequently, its measure is also 
more likely to have a significant impact both in terms of volumes of trade and in terms of percentage 
change in global market shares. 
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burden and the benefit should be a function of market power or then neither should be. 
States with large domestic markets are more likely to have significant levels of import 
in absolute terms. When such states, often populous and perhaps also wealthy, adopt 
PPM-criteria on both domestic production and imports, the criteria will be more likely 
to have a significant impact on the demand of the product produced with unsustainable 
PPMs in other states as compared to when a small state adopts identical criteria. In other 
words, the benefit of the measure would tend to be higher when the measure is adopted 
by states with more market power. If the benefit is defined in these terms, then the 
burden should equally be defined so that it becomes higher when a measure is adopted 
by a state with much market power. 
Bittker has pointed out that the Supreme Court has never clarified as to whether the 
benefit estimated under the Pike balancing test should be the total benefit or scaled to 
a benefit per capita.924 The scaling of benefit in relation to population size would at 
least reduce the impact of the size of the state population on the level of benefits of the 
measure. With a model of estimating benefits per capita also the level of burden need 
to be quantified in a manner that is neutral to the population size and market power of 
the regulating state. 
There may exist some weaknesses with scaling the benefits. In particular, if out-of-state 
(environmental or social) harm is included in the model, it would appear illogical to 
divide the total net benefit with the size of the in-state population. It must be 
emphasized that this problem would not arise if relevance is only given to local benefits 
as suggested by the wording of the Supreme Court when it laid out the Pike balancing 
test. It was, however, pointed out previously that such narrow definition of benefits 
when applying the balancing test has its own weaknesses.925 
Finally, the option of scaling benefits to population size would not solve the problems 
of the exceptional cases where a measure does not have any effects when adopted by a 
small state but does have some effects when adopted by a large state.926 While it would 
also not fully solve the dilemma, it is submitted that the preferable option may be that 
                                                 
924 Boris I. Bittker, Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Aspen Law 1999) 
para. 6-34. 
925 See section 3.2.2.4. 
926 See section 3.1.4. 
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of not scaling the benefit and instead focusing on quantifying the burden in a way that 
it becomes equally sensitive to market power and population size as the benefit. 
3.2.2.7. Promoting Renewable Energy and the Pike Balancing Test 
There has been some academic discussion on the application of the Pike balancing test 
to measures promoting renewables and in particular to Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(RPSs). A RPS may have a high or low burden on interstate commerce depending on 
its design. The benefits, in turn, would primarily relate to environmental protection. 
In the energy sector much uncertainty surrounds the benefit of various PPM-criteria. It 
has been pointed out that the intermittency of many renewable sources will require 
some back-up power and that the need to continuously adjust fossil fuel use may even 
have detrimental environmental impacts.927 These effects would need to be deducted 
from the benefit that promoting renewables with, for example, a RPS otherwise 
produces. Moreover, the mechanisms of a RPS have also been claimed ineffective.928 
Thus, the proportionality of a RPS could be put into question.  
Despite some questioning the benefits of a RPS, most scholars have taken the position 
that the burden on interstate commerce would not be clearly excessive in comparison 
with the benefits, as long as the design is not de jure discriminatory.929 It would appear 
that courts agree even with respect to a system with a delivery requirement.930 A 
similarly favorable view would likely apply to other measures promoting sustainable 
energy. The conclusion could be reached by assigning a significant weight to the benefit 
of reduced GHG emissions under the Pike balancing test. The same conclusion could 
be arrived at by determining that there is uncertainty with respect to the magnitude of 
                                                 
927 Patrick R. Jacobi, Note, ‘Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How 
States Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2006) 30 Vermont L. 
Rev. 1079, 1084-1085. 
928 Robert J. Michaels, ‘National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture?’ 
(2008) 29 Energy L. J. 79, 81. 
929 See e.g. Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Boarder War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 81-83; Anne Havemann, ‘Surviving the Commerce 
Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution’ (2012) 
71 Maryland L. Rev. 848, 879-880. For arguments in favor of the compliance of de facto discriminatory 
climate change measures with the Dormant Commerce Clause see also Richard B. Stewart, ‘States and 
Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures’ (2008) 50 Arizona L. 
Rev. 681, 796; Daniel A. Farber, ‘Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution’ (2008) 50 Arizona 
L. Rev. 879, 881. 
930 Allco Finance v. Klee, case no. 16-2946 (2d Cir. 2017). See also Southern California Edison Co. and 
San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 70 FERC 61,215, 61,676 (1995). 
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the benefits and thus applying a deferential proportionality review of the state measure, 
based on the view that room must be left for substantial state discretion. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that not only is promoting renewables in general 
justifiable, but also differentiating between different resources and consequently also 
different PPMs. More specifically, the argument is that a state could reject credits for 
some renewables and award multipliers to others.931 Which renewables could then be 
treated less favorably than others? There is some consensus on the negative effects of 
large hydropower plants as compared to other renewables. Hence, a state could 
probably leave out large hydropower from the category of favored renewables even if 
it would strengthen the discriminatory effect.932  
According to Engel a very significant de facto discriminatory effect might still not 
survive the Pike balancing test.933 Such an effect might have already followed from 
renewable energy schemes adopted by some states, even if the measures have not been 
challenged. For example, New Jersey promotes off shore wind as it has great potential 
in that field and North Carolina promotes bioenergy from swine waste as its industries 
produce a lot of that type of biological resource.934 These measures might reflect 
discriminatory intent and could potentially cross a line. Given that the benefits of these 
resources over other renewables are highly disputable and minor at the most, the burden 
might well be clearly excessive of the benefits.935 
In this context it is in order to also consider measures promoting renewable energy in 
the transport sector. It may be recalled that in the U.S. federal biofuel sustainability 
criteria have been introduced with the Renewable Fuel Standard 2 (RFS2). However, 
California has under the federal Clean Air Act been granted the authority to apply 
instead its own biofuels sustainability criteria and other states may opt to copy the 
Californian model. These schemes are called Low Carbon Fuel Standards (LCFS). 
Under California’s LCFS fuel producers can apply for individual carbon intensity 
values. In the calculations California takes into account various factors, including the 
                                                 
931 Carolyn Elefant and Edward A. Holt, ‘The Commerce Clause and Implications for State Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Programs’ (2011) CleanEnergy States Alliance: State RPS Policy Report, at 11. 
932 Id., at 15. 
933 Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 316. 
934 New Jersey Senate Bill 2036 (2010); North Carolina General Statute § 62-133.8 (2007). 
935 A similar conclusion seems plausible when a state is implementing restrictions on coal plants, but the 
exemptions are designed to save many in-state plants from the new restrictions. 
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feedstock and the chemical processing method used at the plant. In addition, the carbon 
intensity calculations estimate emissions from transport of the fuel as well as emissions 
from the electricity that has been generated in the region of the biofuel plant and is later 
utilized at the plant. Fuel plants that are without individual carbon intensity scores may 
rely on pre-calculated default values that are assigned on the basis of feedstock and 
production method used. Differences in transportation distances and the sustainability 
of local electricity generation were erased from the default value calculations in 2015. 
In other words, after amendments to California’s LCFS default values have been the 
same for corn ethanol providers from both the Midwest and California.  
In 2013 in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found California’s biofuel law to comply with several tests applicable under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.936 The original LCFS was not facially discriminatory and 
it did not constitute prohibited extraterritorial regulation. The Court, however, 
remanded the case back to the district court for it to assess whether the LCFS 
discriminated in purpose or effect. The relevance of this assessment had to do with the 
fact that measures that have a discriminatory purpose are subject to strict scrutiny 
instead of Pike balancing and even measures that merely discriminate in effect without 
any discriminatory purpose may sometimes be subject to strict scrutiny. After the case 
had been remanded back to the district court, it ruled in 2017 that the LCFS did not 
discriminate in purpose, but that it ‘plausibly’ discriminated in effect even if the effects 
of the law were complex and there was insufficient data available.937 Questions with 
respect to strict scrutiny will be tackled more in detail below.938  
Although the district court in 2017 left open the possibility that strict scrutiny could 
apply in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, it still went on to consider the burden and 
the benefits of the scheme under the Pike balancing test. The court noted that California 
had admitted that the LCFS alone could not solve the problem of climate change.939 
                                                 
936 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
937 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
938 See section 3.2.3. 
939 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). Similarly see Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 12-15131 (9th Cir. 2014) (Denial of hearing en banc; Dissent by Judge 
Smith). 
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Consequently, the court concluded that the benefits of the LCFS had to be small and 
that the burden is ‘plausibly’ clearly excessive of the benefits.940  
Some of the statements by the district court appear difficult to reconcile with previous 
cases where the Pike balancing test has been applied. In particular, the fact that the 
LCFS will not solve the problem of climate change does not tell us much about the 
benefits of the measure. The LCFS could potentially significantly contribute to the 
reduction of carbon emissions, in absolute and/or relative terms, even if it alone cannot 
solve the problem of climate change.941 It remains to be seen whether or not future court 
opinions will recognize this. Notably, the Ninth Circuit already in a case on Oregons 
Clean Fuel Program, which is very similar to the California’s LCFS in its original form, 
found that the burden of the scheme was not clearly excessive of the benefits of 
reducing emissions through the sustainability criteria.942 In turn, the application of Pike 
balancing in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was not revisited by the Ninth Circuit in 
2019 when it delivered its second ruling on the case as the plaintiffs had dismissed that 
claim.943 
3.2.2.8. Deferential Balancing with Ambiguous Elements 
In most cases of de facto discrimination U.S. courts will opt to apply the Pike balancing 
test. While it is a well-established test of balancing the burden on inter-state commerce 
against the environmental benefits of the measure, many technical details of the test 
remain unconfirmed. For example, there are questions surrounding the geographical 
scope of the relevant benefits and it is not evident to what extent genuine state 
population preferences should be taken into account when determining the weight of 
the benefits. 
A measure is disproportional under the Pike balancing test only if the burden is clearly 
excessive of the benefits. The overall balancing has consequently formed into a fairly 
deferential test and the exact nature of the technical details may have limited practical 
relevance. While the Pike balancing test with its overall balancing approach may at a 
first look share the structure of a test of proportionality sensu stricto, the high threshold 
                                                 
940 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
941 Similarly see Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 12-15131 (9th Cir. 2014) (Denial of 
hearing en banc; Concurrence by Judge Gould). 
942 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
943 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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of clearly excessive burden grants states a high degree of flexibility to determine their 
policies, especially under scientific uncertainty. The outcome is in other words not too 
different from what was found in the analysis of EU and WTO law. 
Although the high threshold of clearly excessive may save most de facto discriminatory 
measures that include environmental PPM-criteria, the problems of the review should 
not be ignored. In particular, the lack of transparency as to how exactly different factors 
are weighed in creates legal uncertainty. 
3.2.3. Strict Scrutiny 
3.2.3.1. The General Application of the Test 
The Pike balancing test is not the only proportionality review under the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Another review, strict scrutiny, applies as a rule to cases of de jure 
discrimination. Restrictions on exports are almost always de jure discriminatory and 
hence strict scrutiny applies.944 The focus in this book, and consequently also in this 
subsection, is however on import restrictions. 
In comparison to the deferential Pike balancing test generally applicable to cases of de 
facto discrimination, strict scrutiny is a much more intense review from the viewpoint 
of the state that adopted the measure. In other words, state measures will struggle to 
survive strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny it must be determined whether a measure 
is the least restrictive alternative to achieve an adequate level of protection.945 A level 
of protection lower than that chosen by the state could in principle be adequate. The 
review is strict from the viewpoint of the state in the sense that it needs to accept an 
alternative less trade restrictive measure even if the level of protection is much lower 
as long as the level is still adequate from the viewpoint of the federal court. 
                                                 
944 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 
U.S. 322 (1979); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 263 U.S. 350 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 
221 U.S. 229 (1911). In a case on obligatory in-state waste processing the Supreme Court even stated 
that facial discrimination in the context of export could exist even when there may be no commercial 
interest for to import the good for business purposes out-of-state. See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., 
Foundation Press 1999) 1062. For arguments for the application of Pike balancing to export restrictions 
see John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (4th ed., West 2010) 192-
193; Justice Rehnquist dissenting in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
945 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Oregon Waste Systems, 
Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 353 
(1977); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986). 
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Sctrict scrutiny does not fully correspond with the test of least restrictive measure 
applicable in EU free movement law. The benchmark chosen for desired level of 
protection is different. The EU test puts focus on whether the level of protection with 
any less trade restrictive alternative is (almost) the same as offered with the adopted 
measure. In contrast, U.S. strict scrutiny does not appear to compare the level of 
protection of the alternative with that offered by the adopted measure, but with a 
standard deemed adequate by the court. U.S. strict scrutiny indeed appears very strict. 
Worthy of note is that the U.S. Supreme Court still on some occasions has referred to 
a test on whether the alternative would achieve the legitimate objective ‘as well’.946 
This test would be closer to the test applied by the ECJ. 
The Court has stated that the de jure discriminatory elements of a measure would need 
to be justified by an element unrelated to protectionism.947 De jure discriminatory 
measures will rarely survive strict scrutiny because simply eliminating the de jure 
discriminatory element would normally not endanger the desired level of protection of 
the legitimate objective. An exemption to this occurred in a case where restrictions on 
imports of baitfish was declared constitutional because there was no satisfactory 
method to inspect imported baitfish for parasites.948 
3.2.3.2. Cases of De Facto Discrimination under Strict Scrutiny 
The line between cases where strict scrutiny shall be applied and cases that fall under 
the more lenient Pike balancing test has been somewhat blurred according to the 
Supreme Court.949 The Pike test may apply even if facts would suggest de jure 
discrimination.950 And in reverse, strict scrutiny may apply even if the discrimination 
                                                 
946 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
947 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). 
948 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
949 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); C&A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 402 (1994); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 
502 U.S. 437, 455 (fn 12) (1992). See also Nathan E. Endrud, ‘State Renewable Portfolio Standards: 
Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy 
Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation’ (2008) 45 Harvard Journal on Legislation 259, 266; Steven 
Ferrey, ‘Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level’ (2006) 19 The 
Electricity Journal 52, 56-57; Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 
Environmental Law 295, 303; Steven Ferrey, ‘Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ 
Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 12 
N.Y.U. Environmental L. J. 507, 581. 
950 For example, a reciprocity requirement occurs when a state conditions imports on its right to export 
to the other state. Such scheme was at stake in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 
U.S. 366 (1976). Even if the reciprocity requirement explicitly restricted only out-of-state goods, the 
Supreme Court applied the Pike balancing test. A reciprocity requirement would also occur in case a 
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is not as explicit as in the case of facial discrimination or other direct reference to 
geographic origin.951 
In cases of no facial discrimination but only undue burden on interstate commerce the 
Supreme Court will assess both purpose and effects of the measure. Indicators of 
discriminatory purpose will increase the probability of strict scrutiny,952 but is no 
guarantee for strict scrutiny to apply,953 nor is it any requirement for it to apply.954 In 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union courts have considered the application of strict 
scrutiny on the scheme of biofuels sustainability criteria. In examining California’s 
LCFS the district court in 2017, after the case had been remanded back to it, found there 
to be no discriminatory purpose even if lawmakers had recognized that the scheme of 
biofuels sustainability criteria would beside environmental benefits also to some degree 
benefit the in-state industry.955 This was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.956 Equally, 
in reviewing similar biofuels sustainability criteria under the Oregon Clean Fuels 
Program the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided not to put much weight 
on political statements by elected officials and concluded that the program had those 
environmental objectives stated in the legal text.957 Mixed objectives may thus not 
equate to discriminatory purpose. 
Strict scrutiny can in principle apply also in case the discriminatory effect is 
substantial.958 It must be emphasized, however, that the Supreme Court has still rarely 
                                                 
state conditions exports on its right to import from another state. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 
458 U.S. 941 (1982) the court applied strict scrutiny to such scheme explicitly because of the reciprocity 
provision. Similarly, strict scrutiny was applied to Ohio’s tax benefits awarded only to ethanol produced 
in those other states that granted Ohio ethanol similar tax benefits. The court found that the true purpose 
of the measure was not any legitimate objective like health protection, but rather to create in-state 
economic benefits. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988). 
951 Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: 
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 
295, 303; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
952 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999) 1073 (fn 38); Dan 
T. Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 220-221; Michael E. 
Smith, ‘State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce’ (1986) 74 California L. Rev. 1203, 1243-
1250; Jennifer L. Larsen, ‘Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2004) 49 South Dakota 
L. Rev. 844. See also Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
953 See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).  
954 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 352-353 (1977). 
955 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). For similarly rejecting to give 
decisive relevance to the state governor’s and some legilsators’ statements on the benefits of the measure 
to the local economy see Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163-1164 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
956 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
957 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
958 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (3rd ed., Aspen 2006) 436; Dan T. 
Coenen, Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (Foundation Press 2004) 220-221. 
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opted for strict scrutiny in cases of de facto discrimination. The uncertainty and 
incoherence related to the question of whether strict scrutiny or Pike balancing should 
apply is thus limited to rare circumstances. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to state laws that differentiate 
between products on the basis of transport distance.959 Such criteria almost per 
definition create less favorable treatment of out-of-state goods. Worthy of note is that 
the disadvantage in these cases was inflicted upon traders when a maximum distance 
was exceeded. In other words, such criteria focus on distance alone and set a maximum 
threshold. This is in essence very close to applying a disadvantage directly on the basis 
of origin. In contrast, the proportionality review may be different if the disadvantage 
from long transportation is roughly proportional to the transport distance or to transport 
emissions. 
Another case where the Supreme Court appeared to apply strict scrutiny despite the 
lack of facial discrimination concerned quality labelling of apple containers in North 
Carolina. The state only accepted the federal grading system and banned any state 
grades. The court concluded that this had a discriminatory effect on apples from 
Washington. Namely, those apples were marked with a local quality label that was 
highly recognized across the U.S. After this the court went on to state that it had to be 
examined whether there were any non-discriminatory measures that would adequately 
serve the local objective of reducing the risks of consumer confusion. In this context 
the court made reference to both Pike v. Bruce Church as well as case law on strict 
scrutiny. The standard of review referred to did, however, seem close to traditional 
strict scrutiny. In the subsequent analysis the court concluded that the ban was not 
justifiable because it did not reduce the risks of consumer protection. First, the ban 
applied to apple container labelling and thus affected wholesales and not retail. 
Secondly, to receive Washington grades the apples had to be of higher quality than 
under federal grades and the Washington grades therefore did not risk luring consumers 
to buy inferiror apples. Thirdly, under the North Carolina statute more consumer 
                                                 
959 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 
78 (1891). See however American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, Or. App. 517 P.2d 
691, 697 (1973). The state of Oregon had implemented a deposit-and-return system for bottles, which 
resulted in a requirement for out-of-state companies to return their bottles a greater distance from the 
area of purchase and use. The court did not apply strict scrutiny. For analysis of the case see Charles M. 
Moose, ‘American Can: Judicial Response to Oregon’s Nonreturnable Container Legislation’ (1974) 4 
Ecology L. Q. 145. 
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confusion could prevail as many apples would be ungraded. All in all, there were non-
discriminatory alternative measures to achieve the goal.960 
The possibility that courts would at least consider strict scrutiny also in other cases of 
de facto discrimination cannot be excluded. For example, the definition of renewable 
energy under a RPS might on some occasions have very significant discriminatory 
effects. This situation could in particular emerge when some specific form of renewable 
energy is awarded its own quota within the general RPS, called a carve-out. Under such 
circumstances there may potentially emerge arguments that strict scrutiny should apply. 
In turn, when adopting an origin neutral general RPS without preferences for specific 
resources of renewables, there should not be much objection against a decision to apply 
the Pike balancing test.961 
Previously in this chapter962 it was argued that in the application of the Pike balancing 
test the courts might not necessarily require concrete evidence from the justifying state 
that the state measure has had the intended effect. It is perhaps sufficient that the 
measure is logically capable of advancing a legitimate objective, such as environmental 
protection, or expected to have such effect with some probability. In contrast, in the 
application of strict scrutiny the court has been very firm on the point that the 
discriminatory measure can only be justifiable if there is evidence that it has had actual 
positive effects.963 For de facto discriminatory PPM-criteria that target out-of-state 
production as well as the associated cross-border pollution the requirement of actual 
evidence of benefits may pose a significant hurdle to justifiability. This prong of strict 
scrutiny could mean that surviving strict scrutiny would also be exceptionally difficult 
in cases of de facto discrimination that would fall under the test. 
The final sections of this chapter will address the consequences of the potential decision 
to apply strict scrutiny in some cases of de facto discrimination. 
                                                 
960 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 348-354 (1977). 
961 Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Boarder War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 83. 
962 See section 3.2.2.1. 
963 Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 654 (1994). See also Black Star Farms 
LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1232 (9th Cir. 2010); American Fuels and Petrochemicals Manufacturers 
Association, et al. v. Corey, 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2015) at 46. 
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3.2.3.3. Adequate Level of Protection and Proportionality Sensu Stricto 
Perhaps the most serious argument against the application of strict scrutiny on cases of 
de facto discrimination would relate to the realization that the test applied in that context 
would have the characteristics of a test of proportionality sensu stricto. This is so 
because of the test sets focus on whether there is any less discriminatory alternative that 
guarantees an adequate level of protection. The test of adequate level would in 
particular when applied on cases of mere de facto discrimination, regardless of how 
substantial the effect is, invite courts to put into question the level of protection sought 
by the state.  
In case a court would find that a measure that is de facto discriminatory cannot be 
justified because there is a less discriminatory alternative that ensures an adequate level 
of protection, the state would be forced to lower its level of protection. This would be 
controversial from an environmental perspective. It would be particularly controversial 
when there would be scientific uncertainty with respect to the seriousness of the 
environmental effects that the state had addressed with its measure. The state’s view 
might have been backed by some scientific studies, but the court could give more 
weight to other studies. The difficulty to survive strict scrutiny could in this situation 
undermine environmental protection. Admittedly, these risks would perhaps to some 
degree be mitigated by the fact that in its application of strict scrutiny the Supreme 
Court does acknowledge that states should have the right to take action even when there 
is scientific uncertainty surrounding the risks.964 
Moreover, applying strict scrutiny with a focus on whether there is any less 
discriminatory alternative that guarantees an adequate level of protection to cases of de 
facto discrimination would place a limit on the right of states to tackle the harm 
experienced in-state. The state’s own view on the need to tackle the harm and its 
estimate of externalities would be substituted by that of the court. This would not only 
be an issue related to environmental protection, but also to sovereignty. Strict scrutiny 
applied to de facto discrimination would be difficult to reconcile with the idea that states 
                                                 
964 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147-148 (1986). 
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should have enough flexibility to experiment with different solutions and serve as 
laboratories of democracy.965 
Furthermore, with the possibility to apply strict scrutiny on de facto discrimination it 
may be unclear whether the Pike balancing test or strict scrutiny should apply in a 
concrete case. Fairly insignificant changes in the state scheme can result in sufficient 
changes in discriminatory effects, so that one test is applied instead of the other. There 
are good reasons why the Supreme Court has hardly ever extended the application of 
strict scrutiny to cases of de facto discrimination. 
3.2.3.4. Litigation on California’s Original LCFS 
There has not been any major problem with the application of strict scrutiny to de jure 
discrimination and Pike balancing to de facto discrimination. It should also be 
emphasized that so far it has been relatively rare for strict scrutiny to apply in cases of 
only de facto discrimination. Yet, the courts appear in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union 
to seriously have considered the application of strict scrutiny to California’s LCFS in 
its original form, which was difficult to categorize as either de jure discriminatory or 
de facto discriminatory. 
Under California’s LCFS are required to provide fuel with an average carbon intensity 
that does not exceed an annual limit. The LCFS allows biofuel producers to apply for 
certification of individual carbon intensity scores. The scores include transport 
emissions and emissions from electricity generation. The emissions from transport are 
estimated with reference to both transport distance and the expected weight of the 
freight. Taking into account emissions from the locally generated electricity that is later 
utilized in the biofuels plant results in some discriminatory effects. Interestingly, taking 
into account emissions from transport in turn is generally to the disadvantage of 
Californian producers because they often have to rely on out-of-state feedstock and the 
transportation of such heavy loads results in significant emissions. 
Producers that do not wish to apply for an individual carbon intensity score for their 
plant may rely on a default value that is based on the average emissions of a particular 
production pathway. A pathway is defined with reference to, for example, the feedstock 
                                                 
965 On the idea of states being laboratories of democracy see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932), Justice Brandeis dissenting; Gonzales v. Reich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (Justice 
O’Connor dissenting, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas). 
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and the chemical method used as well as the type of biofuel produced. In the original 
version of the LCFS the default values for corn ethanol pathways were different for 
Californian and Midwest producers because of differences in emissions from transport 
and regional electricity generation. In other words, the original version included state 
specific default values. 
The call for the application of strict scrutiny due to discriminatory effects has emerged 
in connection with claims that California’s LCFS is incompatible with the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The original version of the LCFS illustrates the difficulty to draw a 
clear distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination.966 In a classical case of 
de jure discrimination not only like or similar, but even identical, in-state and out-of-
state products are treated differently with explicit reference to the origin. The LCFS 
might potentially be regarded de jure discriminatory because the default values for corn 
ethanol are different explicitly with reference to where the fuel is produced. 
There are some arguments against declaring the LCFS facially discriminatory. It could 
be argued that the different treatment of in-state and out-of-state corn ethanol does not 
target identical products because the PPMs and associated emissions are different. In 
other words, the differentiation under the LCFS is not based on origin but on emissions 
from the PPMs. This argument is weakened by the fact that the Supreme Court has 
previously concluded that it is facially discriminatory to treat in-state and out-of-state 
baitfish differently when the baitfish is identical with the exception of the difference in 
the disease risks.967 Products that are different only with respect to the PPMs could be 
regarded as identical on the basis of the fact that even differences in disease risks did 
not make two products non-identical. 
In 2011 the district court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union concluded that the original 
LCFS was facially discriminatory.968 The district court emphasized the fact that the 
default values were different for similarly produced Californian and Midwest corn 
ethanol. In addition, the court pointed out that there were geography-based factors in 
the calculations of default and individual values. 
                                                 
966 For more analysis of the case see sections 3.2.2.7, 3.2.3.4-3.2.3.5, 5.2., 6.1.5-6.1.6 and 6.2.2.3. See 
also sections 1.4.5.3 and 2.2.4. 
967 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
968 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
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However, in 2013 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the district 
court’s conclusion. First, it argued that the inclusion of geography-related factors in the 
calculation of emissions does in itself not result in facial discrimination. Secondly, in a 
part of the opinion more prone to criticism, the court put significant emphasis on the 
environmental objective behind the decision to have different default values for 
Californian and Midwest corn ethanol and argued that the scheme did not amount to 
facial discrimination. The Circuit Court thus left open the possibility that the Pike 
balancing test may apply instead of strict scrutiny.969 This approach was echoed by 
judge Gould when concurring in a denial of rehearing en banc.970 
In her dissent in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union judge Murguia in 2013 argued that 
the LCFS was facially discriminatory because the default values for otherwise identical 
bioethanol was different explicitly with reference to state origin. This view has also 
expressed in judge Smith’s dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc971 and has been 
shared by some scholars.972 In turn, the majority in 2013 was of the opinion that the 
sustainability criteria did not discriminate on the basis of origin but on the basis of life-
cycle emissions. The same argument was adopted by the Ninth Circuit when revieweing 
similar biofuels sustainability criteria adopted by Oregon.973  
While carbon intensity values are calculated on the basis of life-cycle emissions, it is 
important to note that both the original LCFS and the Oregon Clean Fuels Program 
established state specific default values for different pathways on the basis of average 
emissions. It is submitted here that differentiating on the basis on state averages can 
generally be categorized as facially discriminatory.  The majority in the Ninth Circuit 
appears to have thought differently. The approach adopted by the majority could 
perhaps be read to suggest that facial discrimination would be at hands only when the 
sole reason for differential treatment is state of origin. 
In any event, in 2013 the Circuit Court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union stated that 
even if it did not regard the LCFS to be facially discriminatory, the district court should 
                                                 
969 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
970 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 12-15131 (9th Cir. 2014) (Denial of hearing en banc; 
Concurrence by Judge Gould). 
971 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 12-15131 (9th Cir. 2014) (Denial of hearing en banc; 
Dissent by Judge Smith). 
972 See e.g. Hwi Harold Lee, ‘Dormant Commerce Clause Review: Why the Ninth Circuit Decision in 
Corey Strayed from Precedent and What the Supreme Court Could Have Done About It’ (2015) 42 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 54. 
973 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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examine whether the standard still was discriminatory in purpose or effect. Therefore, 
the case was in part remanded back to the disctrict court. As explained above, the 
position of the district court in 2017 appeared to be that there was no discriminatory 
purpose.974 This was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.975 It is worthy of note that the 
district court seemed open to the application of strict scrutiny when there is merely 
discriminatory effect. According to the district court it was plausible that California’s 
original LCFS has caused such discriminatory effects.976 However, the plaintiffs later 
decided to voluntarily dismiss the claim of discriminatory effects. 
Oregon’s Clean Fuel Program (OCFP) includes biofuels sustainability criteria that have 
been drafted on the basis of California’s LCFS. Unlike the district court in 2017 in 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, the Ninth Circuit in the case on OCFP concluded that 
none of the discriminatory effect resulting from the program could justify the 
application of strict scrutiny. The majority on the court appeared to give significance to 
the fact that the default values for several out-of-state pathways were lower than the 
default values for other in-state pathways.977 The majority might have intended to imply 
that there was insufficient evidence of any market shares being diverted to in-state 
biofuels. Judge Smith, dissenting, seems to have disputed this view, by arguing that the 
scheme had discriminatory effects due to all Oregon biofuel pathways being assigned 
default emission values below the average carbon intensity value that fuel providers 
had to comply with annually.978 
Furthermore, even if no market share would have been shifted to in-state Oregon 
companies in the biofuels sector as a whole, it is difficult to believe that in-state biofuels 
from a specific pathway would not gain a benefit over out-of-state biofuels of the same 
pathway in case the default values are different. Normally in trade law, discrimination 
within a subcategory of the broader category of like products cannot be compensated 
by opposite effects with respect to other subcategories within the broader category of 
                                                 
974 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). See also American Fuels and 
Petrochemicals Manufacturers Association, et al. v. Corey, No. 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 
2015). 
975 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
976 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
977 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
978 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018), judge 
Smith dissenting. 
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like products.979 The OCFP thus appears to be de facto discriminatory and the question 
is rather whether the discriminatory effects were of such a nature that it would be 
enough to trigger strict scrutiny. The threshold for applying strict scrutiny due to de 
facto discrimination did not become any clearer with the ruling. There is a need for 
clarification by the Supreme Court due to the ambiguity regarding the applicable 
standard of review in cases on PPM-criteria. For example, would strict scrutiny only 
apply in the extreme cases where all in-state products achieve a beneficial position in 
comparison with all like products?  
The saga of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union took a new turn in 2019 when the Ninth 
Circuit, among other things, ruled that the claims against the original LCFS were moot 
because that version of the scheme had been repealed.980 There is therefore no further 
clarity on whether strict scrutiny could apply to schemes such as the original version of 
the LCFS. It ought to be emphasized that in the end the standard of review might still 
not be decisive for the outcome. When applying strict scrutiny, the courts could 
conclude that changing the state specific default values to origin neutral default values 
would not ensure an adequate level of protection even if the individual values would 
continue to include geography-related components. Similarly, under the Pike balancing 
tests the burden on interstate trade that comes from implementing state specific instead 
of origin neutral default values should not be clearly excessive of the benefits of more 
exact emission estimates.  
The alternative of abolishing the default values altogether should, however, also be 
considered regardless of which proportionality review applies. Under strict scrutiny it 
could be concluded that such alternative ensures an adequate level of protection. The 
proportionality of the original LCFS would consequently have been dependent on 
whether such alternative would be reasonably available or whether it is too costly. 
There have been diverging views on this.981 Comparably, under the Pike balancing test 
the courts could find that the burden of state specific default values is clearly excessive 
                                                 
979 See section 1.3.2.2. 
980 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
981 Compare judge Murguia dissenting in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th 
Cir. 2013); with Hwi Harold Lee, ‘Dormant Commerce Clause Review: Why the Ninth Circuit Decision 
in Corey Strayed from Precedent and What the Supreme Court Could Have Done About It’ (2015) 42 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 54, 65. 
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of the non-monetary benefits when the option of abolishing default values altogether 
would be available. 
3.2.3.5. Amendments to California’s LCFS in 2015 
In 2015 California amended the LCFS. Under the new version the same default values 
are offered to all producers following a particular pathway regardless of geographical 
location. Although this new version of the LCFS may be de facto discriminatory, it is 
at least not de jure discriminatory. Still, the district court in 2017 found it plausible that 
even the amended 2015 LCFS had such discriminatory effects that strict scrutiny may 
apply.982 It did not take any further decision on the issue as the plaintiffs decided 
voluntarily dismissed that claim.  
There would exist four possible approaches to the call for the application of strict 
scrutiny to schemes like the new version of the LCFS in Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union. Above it was argued that the application of strict scrutiny to de facto 
discrimination could essentially introduce a test with the characteristics of 
proportionality sensu stricto. Thus, the first approach would be to reject the application 
of strict scrutiny to schemes like the 2015 version of the LCFS in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union. This approach would be preferable because it would avoid the 
problems that arise with the application of strict scrutiny to de facto discrimination. 
The second approach would be to apply a rare version of strict scrutiny to the case. The 
Supreme Court has occasionally not assessed whether there is a less trade restrictive 
alternative that would ensure adequate protection. Instead, it has assessed whether there 
is an alternative that ensures the legitimate objective ‘as well’. This would bring the 
test close to the test of least restrictive measure applied under EU and WTO law. An 
intense review would be subject to similar criticism as the test of alternatives ensuring 
‘adequate’ level of protection. However, the test could in principle be more deferential 
for cases of de facto discrimination. This would naturally raise questions as to how such 
a test of strict scrutiny should be applied in order for it to be more intense than the Pike 
balancing test. All in all, this approach seems unlikely. 
As a third alternative, the court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union could have opted to 
apply strict scrutiny to the old and the new version of the LCFS simply with the 
                                                 
982 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
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argument that the discriminatory effects are too significant. Substantial discriminatory 
effects may stem from the use of geography-based factors in the calculations of carbon 
intensity and also from the decision by California to set the yearly carbon-quota for fuel 
suppliers at the specific level it has been set. In applying strict scrutiny, a court could, 
for example, find that the LCFS would offer an adequate level of protection even with 
a lower yearly carbon intensity quota. In other words, even a lower quota might in the 
view of the court sufficiently reduce emissions from in-state PPMs and cross-border 
emissions from out-of-state production. This approach would give the application of 
strict scrutiny to cases of de facto discrimination a broad reach. As explained already 
above, the approach would have the characteristics of proportionality sensu stricto. 
With the application of this type of test the judgment of the regulating state on the need 
for environmental protection is substituted by the judgment of the court.  
Moreover, the approach could lead to an undesirable series of events that may be 
illustrated by an example. To start with, if the court states that the discriminatory effects 
are so substantial that strict scrutiny applies, it might also conclude that the LCFS is 
disproportional. As an alternative that guarantees an adequate level of protection the 
state might be offered a model, with or without geography-related factors, that has 
lower yearly carbon intensity quotas. The adopted model would be declared 
unconstitutional and the state would be forced to amend its LCFS. However, instead of 
the alternative measure that by the court was deemed to guarantee an adequate level of 
protection, the state would undoubtedly be tempted to reduce the quota slightly from 
its original level, but not as far as suggested by the court when it applied strict scrutiny. 
With this manoeuver the state would hope the court to find that the discriminatory effect 
no longer is so substantial that it triggers strict scrutiny. Then the measure could survive 
Pike balancing even if the level of discrimination would be higher than it would be with 
the measure that the court found to guarantee an adequate level of protection under 
strict scrutiny. 
The state might experiment with different quotas to find out through a series of legal 
cases the quota that would escape strict scrutiny and survive the Pike balancing test. I 
am not stating that a system of only one proportionality review would be immune to 
the risk of long series of disputes on the same scheme of sustainability criteria. In fact, 
the tuna-dolphin saga under WTO law is evidence of the contrary. Yet, a system with 
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two different proportionality reviews for de facto discrimination would appear 
particularly prone to prolonged litigation. 
Under a fourth and final approach the court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union could 
have found that substantial discriminatory effects as such is not sufficient to trigger 
strict scrutiny. Instead the court could have established that it is the inclusion of 
geography-based factors in the calculation of the carbon intensity for biofuels that 
results in the application of strict scrutiny. In other words, a court could state that strict 
scrutiny applies for the use of geography-dependent factors in calculating pathway-
specific default values and perhaps even for the use of such factors in the calculations 
of individual plant-specific carbon intensity values. Geography-dependent factors 
would include emissions from transport of biomass and biofuel as well as emissions 
from the electricity fed into the local grid and used at the local fuel plant.  
Strict scrutiny could apply specifically because of the use of geographic factors. The 
reference to the use of geography-dependent factors as a decisive element would clearly 
differentiate cases where strict scrutiny applies from cases where Pike balancing 
applies. The formalism could be criticized for its lack of link to economic theory and 
an efficiency rationale. At the same time, the formalism would at least avoid a couple 
of the problems that would follow from the application of strict scrutiny to a broader 
scope of cases where the de facto discriminatory effect is substantial. 
In 2019 the Ninth Circuit did not rule on discriminatory effects and the applicability of 
strict scrutiny. It, however, emphasized that the argument that the scheme was facially 
discriminatory had weakened as the state specific default values had been abolished. 
The Court eventually rejected the dormant Commerce Clause challenge on the grounds 
that the scheme was not facially discriminatory and that there was no underlying 
discriminatory purpose.983 
It is submitted that should the Supreme Court hear the case on the 2015 LCFS, it should 
not apply strict scrutiny. However, if the court still opts to apply strict scrutiny in the 
case, it should be explicit in stating that the reason is not substantial discriminatory 
effects as such, but those effects in combination with the fact that some elements of 
California’s LCFS include geography-based factors.  
                                                 
983 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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Would it then make any decisive difference whether strict scrutiny or the Pike balancing 
test applies to the 2015 LCFS? The geography-based factors have undeniable added 
value in terms of environmental protection and the reduction of externalities. Thus, 
including the geography-related factors in the individual value calculations would 
likely survive even strict scrutiny because sustainability criteria that do not take into 
consideration emissions from those factors would not ensure adequate protection. The 
assessment of the origin neutral default values would be more dependent on the 
standard of review. The proportionality of the default values would only be 
questionable under the assumption that abolishing default values from the model forms 
a reasonably available alternative. Under such circumstances the LCFS would likely 
not survive strict scrutiny if the default values increase discriminatory effects. The 
conclusion would seem to be the same under the Pike balancing test. The primary 
benefits of the default values would relate to financial costs for the state and those do 
not form benefits of relevance under Pike. When the default values increase 
discriminatory effects, their burden on interstate commcerce would be clearly excessive 
of any legitimate benefits.  
A more detailed analysis of the general trade law proportionality of default value 
solutions in biofuels sustainability schemes, including the LCFS, is provided in chapter 
5. In that context no differentiation will be made with respect to the applicable standard 
of review given that the outcome for the case might still be identical. 
3.2.4. Comparative Law and the Elimination of Externalities 
The structure of the proportionality review under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause 
is substantially different from EU free movement law and WTO law. The U.S. doctrine 
includes two proportionality tests. Pike balancing, the test commonly applied to de facto 
discrimination, is a holistic value balancing test. Strict scrutiny is in turn, as the name 
already suggests, a stricter review of state measures. It applies to cases of facial 
discrimination and exceptionally even to de facto discrimination. Although measures 
that fall under strict scrutiny are generally struck down as unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court has still showed restraint when the state measure under scrutiny has been the least 
restrictive reasonably available alternative for achieving a legitimate environmental 
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objective.984 The consequences of there existing two different proportionality reviews 
should therefore not be exaggerated. 
While proportionality under the dormant Commerce Clause differs from the suitability 
and necessity tests applicable in EU and WTO law, two important commonalities 
between the U.S. model and the model of the two other jurisdictions were identified. 
First, the proportionality review under the dormant Commerce Clause has also been 
deferential under scientific uncertainty. All three jurisdictions allow for broad state 
discretion under scientific uncertainty. The proportionality review in practice allows 
states to give a lot of consideration to in-state preferences and estimates of externalities 
when designing measures for addressing externalities. This means that states have much 
freedom to structure their energy policy and PPM-criteria. Schemes promoting 
renewable energy that are merely de facto discriminatory would be expected to have 
good chances of surviving proportionality in all three jurisdictions if carefully designed. 
Secondly, there are in all jurisdictions even fundamental elements of the tests that are 
unclear. For example, the lack of detailed reasoning has lead to incoherence in the EU 
as illustrated by the inconsistent application of the policy consistency test and the 
surprisingly strict scrutiny in Danish Bottles.985 In the U.S. the consequence of the 
many open questions with respect to both the choice of proportionality test and the 
interpretation of the different elements in Pike balancing become evident in cases such 
as Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. The incoherence in the proportionality review is 
bound to lead to unexpected outcomes. 
As was the case under EU free movement law and GATT, there is also under the 
dormant Commerce Clause no precedent on whether a state measure that goes beyond 
the elimination of externalities could survive any proportionality review. Under strict 
scrutiny, there would be room for the argument that a less ambitious environmental 
objective would be adequate. In turn, under the Pike balancing test it may or may not 
be concluded that the burden becomes clearly excessive of the benefits as a result of 
the additional burden stemming from extending the scope of the measure beyond the 
elimination of externalities. This type of dilemma has probably not arised frequently as 
states rarely adopt an overly environmentalist agenda. That being said, with the 
                                                 
984 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
985 Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles) [1988] ECR 4607. 
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increasingly imminent threats of climate change state policies could take new directions 
fast. 
In general, the proportionality review carried out by courts would benefit from more 
transparency. For example, it should be specified whether suitability in EU and WTO 
law requires expected effect with some probability, or whether theoretically possible 
effect is sufficient. In addition, the intensity of the least restrictive measure test ought 
to be clarified. In turn, in the U.S. the predictability and coherence of the proportionality 
review is hampered by the fact that strict scrutiny might apply instead of Pike balancing 
in some cases of de facto discrimination. The incoherence in this respect is in part due 
to the occasional difficulties to determine whether there is either de jure or de facto 
discrimination. What is more, U.S. courts have regrettably been too unspecific as to 
how the test of least restrictive measure affects the balancing in the Pike test. In 
addition, under the Pike balancing test it is not evident how the courts define the burden 
and the benefits. An attempt in this part of the book to construct definitions pointed to 
incoherence. In conclusion, while the U.S. proportionality review has the potential of 
offering some relief to the problems identified with the suitability and least restrictive 
measure tests that have had a prominent role in EU and WTO law, many other questions 
and problems arise in the application of U.S. tests.   
281
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Conclusions on Proportionality and Tackling Externalities 
Unlike the SCM Agreement, trade law includes grounds of justification. Tackling 
negative externalities can be justified with reference to environmental protection as a 
ground of justification, without any need for a narrow likeness test or market 
participation and creation exemptions. The test of proportionality that is to be applied 
in those cases confirms that efficiency is at the heart of trade law and other fields of 
economic law. A measure can only be proportional if there is no less restrictive 
alternative measure that would serve the same purpose. Measures that are inefficient 
because they include some unnecessary discriminatory element will not survive a 
proportionality review. The proportionality review often follows the same logic as an 
examination of whether a state measure and all its elements promote efficiency through 
reduction of (environmental) externalities. 
With many questions relating to the specific elements of the proportionality tests 
unanswered, it is also difficult at this point to provide any definite view on the nature 
of the efficiency that the trade law regimes advance. It is somewhat surprising how little 
there is explicit reliance on economic theory in trade law, for example in comparison 
with competition law. A more economic approach in economic law across jurisdictions 
could, or even should, strengthen environmental arguments. An emphasis on the 
importance of limiting externalities for genuine efficiency would steer the focus from 
balancing trade and environment – a view that feeds the impression of conflicting 
values – toward ensuring that the costs of environmental harm are fully taken into 
account in trade law. For example, a deferential approach toward state measures in the 
application of tests of suitability and least restrictive measure would allow states to 
adopt PPM-criteria that are necessary, albeit perhaps not sufficient, to tackle 
environmental problems. What is more, amid harsh criticism toward free trade 
agreements like TTIP, the legitimacy of free trade may be improved among the general 
population if it becomes more explicit that the objective of the agreements is to advance 
a perception of efficiency that takes into account externalities. 
What forms of proportionality review would be in line with the idea of allowing for 
tackling externalities effectively? A deferential approach toward state measures would 
allow states to take effective steps to tackle externalities as they have been estimated 
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by the state.986 A more intense or strict review would not necessarily divert from the 
objective of efficiency, but would replace the state perspective with a union, federal or 
international perspective. As Shuibhne and Maci have noted, there is a tension between 
free trade and national autonomy present in trade law.987 The question is thus perhaps 
not whether trade law furthers efficiency and the limitation of externalities. Instead, the 
question is about whose perspective on estimated externalities that should be given 
priority under trade law. This question is relevant when examining the competence 
division between states on the one hand and unions or international organizations on 
the other hand. There is some appeal in putting the emphasis on the state’s evaluation 
of externalities instead of on the perspective of higher-level unions or organizations 
because a more local perspective would strengthen democratic legitimacy and reduce 
the risk that some local interests are fully ignored. 
An efficiency perspective on trade law does not offer all the answers. Other values must 
also be considered. These do not necessarily contradict the efficiency ideal, but at the 
very least they should complement it, as will be illustrated in subsequent chapters of 
this book.  
  
                                                 
986 Charles Poncelet, ’Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection in EU Law: A Troubled 
Relationship?’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 171, 200. 
987 Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Marsela Maci, ’Proving Public Interest: The Growing Impact of Evidence 
in Free Movement Case Law’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Rev. 965, 969. 
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Chapter 4 – Value Reconciliation Tests in Law of Justification: Values 
Beyond Free Trade and Environmental Protection 
Previous chapters of this book already provided reflections on the proportionality 
review of PPM-criteria in general. In contrast, the emphasis in this chapter will be more 
firmly on specific elements of PPM-legislation, or in other words the proportionality of 
the detailed design of PPM-criteria.  With increasing efforts to advance the 
sustainability of PPMs and with new sustainability models being introduced, new 
dimensions of the proportionality review might gain more emphasis in the review.  
It is recalled that both non-discrimination and environmental protection may be 
interpreted to reflect a common ideal of market efficiency. The premise is, however, 
that non-discrimination and environmental protection might not be the only values 
relevant in trade law cases on environmental protection measures.988 Of interest is 
whether any additional values might influence the reconciliation of free trade and 
environmental protection. The objective of this chapter is thus to find out to what extent 
elements in the proportionality review might reflect values beyond the efficiency values 
linked to non-discrimination and the elimination of externalities. 
Values or objectives beyond the elimination of externalities in cases on environmental 
protection should here not be understood as separate legitimate grounds of justification 
that are reconciled with free trade through traditional tests of proportionality. Instead, 
the values or objectives are interests that potentially affect the balance between free 
trade and environmental protection. They might be found outside the scope of 
traditional core proportionality tests, such as suitability and necessity, but still within 
the realm of the broadest dimensions of a proportionality review. Moreover, the values 
not related to the reduction of (environmental) externalities might advance societal 
efficiency, in the sense that the society as a whole could become more efficient. 





                                                 
988 The idea has previously been briefly touched upon in Andrew D. Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, 
’Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of ”Necessity” in International Investment Law and 
WTO Law’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of International Law 93, 101-102. 
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4.1. The Scope of Sustainability Criteria 
4.1.1. Designing Environmental PPM-Criteria 
In trade law a discriminatory measure may be justifiable if it is suitable and necessary 
for environmental protection. It was illustrated in the previous chapter of this book that 
some international scientific support must be presented for the objective of 
environmental protection to be legitimate. This requirement is not that strict. Hence, 
states have a broad discretion with respect to what environmental effects they tackle. 
Defining the types of pollution and other environmental harm to be tackled with the 
sustainability criteria is only one step in the design process. The state must also decide 
what stages of the life-cycle will be covered. For example, would criteria on GHG 
emissions include only emissions from producing fuel in the production plant or would 
they also count for emissions arising from generating electricity to the plant and from 
transporting the fuel? 
Furthermore, the state has to establish which products have to be sustainably produced. 
PPM-criteria could be limited to products produced in-state and products that are 
actually imported. Alternatively, the importing state could require that imported 
products only come from producers that produce all of their products in accordance 
with the PPM-criteria. It might even be that the state decides to require that producers 
only have sustainable business partners or do business in sustainable states. Some 
importing state might also consider requiring imports to come from states where all 
production is sustainable. 
There are various models for designing and adopting PPM-criteria, as the above 
considerations already reveal. This raises questions with respect to the limits of the 
scope of sustainability criteria. For example, must the application of PPM-criteria be 
restrained to imported products or could they apply also to other products? Can PPM-
criteria address even effects of which the producer has little control?  
The purpose with the discussion on the limits of the scope of sustainability criteria in 
this first section of the chapter is to point out issues where there still prevails some 
uncertainty on the compatibility of criteria with the legal tests in economic law. This 
serves the more general objective of shedding some light on what values, other than 
non-discrimination and environmental protection, that may have to be reconciled when 
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evaluating the compatibility with economic law of criteria on the environmental 
sustainability of PPMs.  
4.1.2. The Scope of Products Covered  
4.1.2.1. Product Sustainability Versus Producer Sustainability 
Sustainability criteria may target harmful physical properties of products. This type of 
criteria adopted by importing states will normally apply only to in-state production and 
imported products. Applying the criteria also for products that are never imported 
would not enhance public health or environmental protection in the importing state. 
However, the situation becomes different with PPM-criteria. PPM-criteria could target 
the company and its processes as a whole, covering the production of both goods that 
are intended for the market of the state adopting the criteria and goods sold elsewhere. 
Extending the application of PPM-criteria so that they target also products that are not 
imported could arguably increase the level of protection against the cross-border 
environmental harm of unsustainable PPMs. 
It is not unimaginable that a state implements PPM-criteria for market access so that 
products only get market access if the full selection of the producer’s different products 
comply with the PPM-criteria. A similar approach could apply also when compliance 
with the PPM-criteria is not necessary for market access but makes the producer eligible 
for some benefits. These criteria that apply to the production of all of the producer’s 
products could be described as targeting general corporate practice and policy. The 
criteria address company (producer) sustainability, while criteria applying only to 
products introduced on the market of the regulating state address product sustainability. 
Would it then be compatible with trade law for the importing state to require that the 
full selection of the producer’s products is sustainable or should criteria that apply also 
to imports address only the effects associated with the individual products that are 
actually imported? This question has to date not received much attention in the 
discussion on the fate of PPM-criteria under trade law regimes. 
Less favorable treatment of products on the grounds that the producer does not meet 
the PPM-criteria in all of its production could have discriminatory effects if in-state 
companies commonly comply with the criteria, but out-of-state companies do not. 
Would company (producer) sustainability criteria then advance a legitimate objective? 
There could in principle be significant cross-border environmental effects also from 
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out-of-state production of products that are not imported to the regulating state. Already 
this confirms that company (producer) sustainability criteria could serve a legitimate 
objective. In addition, such criteria could address moral concerns and out-of-state 
environmental harm. I shall return to the question of whether legitimate objectives 
under trade law include mitigation of cross-border environmental effects, out-of-state 
environmental effects and various moral objectives in chapter 6 of this book.989  
After confirming that there is a legitimate objective behind the discriminatory company 
(producer) sustainability criteria, it has to be determined whether or not they are 
proportional. Product sustainability criteria could form a less discriminatory alternative 
to company (producer) sustainability criteria. However, product sustainability criteria 
might often not ensure the same level of protection as they address the sustainability of 
production of a narrower set of products. This would indicate that company (i.e. 
producer) sustainability criteria could survive the proportionality review.  
Out-of-state companies might still put forward the argument that company (producer) 
sustainability criteria form arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. The situation with 
the implemented PPM-criteria might be such that the difference in treatment of products 
does not stem from any differences in the sustainability of the products or their PPMs, 
but from differences in compliance with the sustainability standard on a corporate level. 
For example, one type of sustainably produced products of an out-of-state company 
might face less favorable treatment on the market of the regulating state for the reason 
that the company produces another type of products with unsustainable methods. This 
could potentially be viewed as arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because a 
specific type of products produced by out-of-state companies receive less favorable 
treatment than some of the regulating states’ own producer’s similar products, even if 
the products of that specific type are equally sustainable.  
There is no clear guidance on how the above arguments of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination would be perceived by panels and courts. It will be argued in the 
subsections below that particularly criteria on such aspects of sustainability that 
companies have no direct control over are vulnerable to claims of arbitrariness.990 With 
respect to company (producer) sustainability criteria the companies have full control, 
as it would be fully up to the producers treated less favorably to change their business 
                                                 
989 See sections 6.2-6.3. 
990 See sections 4.1.3.1 and 4.1.4.3. 
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and comply with the sustainability standard in all of their production. It is thus possible 
that the company (producer) criteria are justifiable since they both enable a higher level 
of protection than product sustainability criteria and address aspects within the control 
of the companies. Moreover, in the next section it will be illustrated how in EU public 
procurement law a separate test has been developed to render producer criteria illegal. 
The existence of such test supports the conclusion that producer criteria may be legal 
under EU free movement law, because were they not, no separate test would be needed 
under procurement law. 
4.1.2.2. The Subject-Matter Test in Public Procurement Law 
The analysis of the compliance of company (producer) sustainability criteria with trade 
law can be considered against the development in public procurement law. EU 
procurement directives require that criteria at different stages of the procurement 
process must be linked to the subject matter of the contract.991  Criteria on the general 
corporate policy of the supplier are not linked to the subject matter of the specific 
contract that is awarded.992 Thus, in public procurement the criteria can neither relate 
to the general management of the company nor to the general capacity or quality of 
company operations.  
Requirements on recycling or energy efficiency in all premises and for all vehicles of 
the company would fall into the category of general policy. Wienstrom was a case 
where an Austrian public authority had required that the supplier would generate a 
certain share of all of its annual electricity output from renewable resources. The 
requirement thus covered more than merely the share of electricity delivered under the 
procured contract. Hence, the requirement was not linked to the subject matter of the 
contract.993 Under EU procurement law criteria can be set for the sustainability of the 
                                                 
991 Art. 42(1), 58, 67(2) and 70 as well as recitals 75 and 92, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 60(1), 80(2) and 82(2), Directive 2014/25/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 
243; Art. 36(1), 38(1) and 41(2), Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014,1; Case C-513/99 
Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-
Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, paras 57-59; Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria 
[2003] ECR I-14527, para. 66. 
992 Recitals 97 and 104, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
993 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, paras 60-71. 
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purchased goods but should not extend to the sustainability of companies and their 
production as a whole. 
The subject matter test applicable in EU public procurement law results in the rejection 
of criteria on other products than those that are purchased. Hence, the public authority 
cannot apply PPM-criteria on products that are produced out-of-state but are not 
purchased and imported by the authority. EU public procurement law would appear 
stricter than trade law on this account. 
While the subject-matter test applies in the EU, there is more uncertainty as to whether 
the subject-matter test applies under the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). 
McCrudden has argued that technical specifications should not cover general policy 
requirements and should be related to the subject matter.994 There are fewer indications 
that award criteria would need to relate to the subject matter or to contract 
performance.995 There have, moreover, been divergent opinions on the exclusion of 
bidders with reference to general policy criteria.996 
The subject matter test is particular to the field of public procurement and does not 
apply generally under trade law. What is then the rationale of the subject-matter test in 
EU public procurement law? The European Commission has argued that general policy 
criteria would run the risk of transforming the procurement into illegal state aid if the 
criteria do not increase value for money.997 In some respect the subject matter test 
would then ensure coherence between the fields of law. However, it submitted here that 
also general policy criteria can in fact increase value for money. Namely, such criteria 
may often reduce even more externalities and would thus create value for the general 
public that the authority serves. Therefore, general policy criteria should not 
automatically be viewed as problematic in the context of state aid legislation. 
                                                 
994 Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change (OUP 2007) 483. 
995 Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer 2003) 344. 
996 Compare Sue Arrowsmith, ‘The Revised Agreement on Government Procurement: Changes to the 
Procedural Rules and Other Transparency Provision’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Robert D. Anderson (eds.), 
The WTO Regime on Government Procurement:  Challenge and Reform (CUP 2011) 309-311; with 
Christopher McCrudden, ‘International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework 
for Discussion of the Legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement’ (1999) Journal of International Economic Law’ 3, 42; and Christopher McCrudden, Buying 
Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 479-489. 
997 Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy – Towards a more efficient 
European Procurement Market COM (2011) 15 final, 39-40. 
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As discussed previously in this book,998 the idea of differentiating between the state as 
market participant and market regulator has been developed under the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause. Public purchasing is generally market participation. The U.S. 
market participant test grants state market participants more freedom to act. In turn, the 
subject matter test in EU public procurement law could reflect the idea that market 
participants should not engage in market regulation.  
Could the strict limits on public purchasing in the EU be linked to the idea that the 
legislative power lies with the legislature? An important element of democracy is the 
distribution of powers as outlined by Montesquieu.999 In accordance with the doctrine 
nowadays referred to as the separation of powers the legislature should enact the laws, 
the executive should enforce the laws and the judiciary should interpret the laws when 
ruling on individual cases. The state legislates through legal acts adopted by a 
democratically elected institution. Reserving the legislative competence for one 
institution creates some pressure for limitations on the ability of other state or public 
authorities to adopt measures that aim to impose regulation comparable to legislation. 
In particular, a state or other public authority that buys or sells goods or services on the 
market does not have any legitimacy to regulate. Public authorities should also not take 
on the regulatory role of the legislative branch through policy-making that the state 
legislature is traditionally responsible for in its capacity as a market regulator. 
Separating between market regulation and participation is, however, difficult.  
There is admittedly no clear distinction between when a public authority participates 
on the market and when it regulates the market. It could be argued that already adopting 
criteria to tackle externalities is a form of market regulation as private market 
participants would often not advance such objectives. Yet, criteria to tackle externalities 
are legal under public procurement law. The legal status of environmental and social 
criteria that go beyond the elimination of externalities is less clear. The regulatory 
element of such criteria could be viewed to be even stronger and their proportionality 
could be questioned.  
How can we depict the regulatory elements of criteria on general corporate policy and 
criteria on other products than those that are purchased? It should be recalled that 
authorities with significant purchasing power can have a strong influence on the general 
                                                 
998 See section 2.3. 
999 Charles de Secondant, Baron de Montesquieu, De l'esprit des loix (1748). 
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policy of companies. Criteria on general corporate policy and criteria on other products 
than those that are purchased could therefore gain elements of market regulation. The 
significant purchasing power of many public authorities would enable them to take up 
a role that resembles the market regulating role of the legislator if it were not for the 
subject matter test.1000 This is not to suggest that clear cut lines can be drawn. For 
example, sustainability criteria that apply only to products and services under the 
procured contract, and thus comply with the subject matter test, might in practice also 
force changes in the company policy and operations as a whole.1001 
There are some reasons to believe that the rationale of the subject matter test might lie 
somewhere else than in the idea that contracting authorities shall act as market 
participants and that such activities can be distinguished from market regulation. 
Namely, there is no general distinction between the state as a market regulator and as a 
participant in EU free movement law or under the GATT. In EU and international trade 
law measures attributable to the state may be prima facie prohibited and no stricter 
limitations apply for market participation and other non-legislative measures as 
compared to measures adopted in the form of legislation. Therefore, the fact that the 
subject matter test feeds into the idea of reserving regulatory powers with the legislature 
is perhaps more of an incidental outcome than the result of conscious policy-making. 
As the distinction between state market regulation and participation is not crucial in 
WTO law and EU economic law in general, the rationale behind the subject matter test 
in procurement law might be more multifaceted. A rationale for the subject matter test 
could be found in the fact that, viewed from one perspective, the test serves the 
procurement law principle of equal treatment of all companies. Namely, companies of 
different sizes might all be capable of performing the procured contract but might have 
different abilities to fulfil some requirement unrelated to the procured contract. PPM-
                                                 
1000 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical 
Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 212-213. See also Interpretative 
communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to public procurement and the 
possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public procurement, COM (2001) 274 
final, 19. The Commission raised concerns that authorities would apply non-economic considerations in 
award criteria, i.e. use procurement for regulative purposes and not act as market participants. 
1001 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘A Taxonomy of Horizontal Policies in Public Procurement’, in Sue Arrowsmith 
and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives 
and New Directions (CUP 2009) 127; Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to 
Horizontal Policies: A Critical Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and 
Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 173-
174. 
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criteria on the production of all products may be harder to fulfill for larger companies. 
In contrast, criteria on generating a certain quantity of electricity from renewables 
above the actual purchased quantities would in turn favor larger companies. Equal 
treatment by public authorities of all companies regardless of size is part of good 
governance.  
There are some downsides to restricting the application of sustainability criteria that 
would cover corporate policy more in general. For example, the carbon emission profile 
of the company as a whole would seem more relevant from an environmental 
perspective than the emissions that can be linked to the production for fulfilling a single 
contract. Perhaps paradoxically, in public procurement a company that has a much 
better environmental performance generally in its operations can as a consequence of 
the application of sustainability criteria be treated less favorably than a company that 
merely has exceptionally good environmental performance when it comes to the 
environmental characteristics of the specific purchased good, the emissions in the 
production of only those purchased individual products, the emissions in the 
consumption of those products and the disposal of only those products. This illustrates 
that the test of a link to the subject matter may improve equal treatment from one 
perspective, but perhaps undermine it from another. For example, companies with equal 
carbon footprints may be treated differently with reference to the sustainability of the 
production of merely one product. 
All in all, uniformity across economic law is not a value in itself. The approach to 
criteria on company (producer) sustainability may be stricter in public procurement law 
due to the particularities of public procurement as a field within international trade. The 
introduction of the subject matter test would best be regarded as an outcome of 
balancing various competing interests. While the test may partly restrict the potential 
to address externalities in some respect, it will advance equal treatment in the sense that 
the size of the company affects the chances of winning a bid to a lesser degree. This 
invites more intense competition on the market. In practice it will often be realized in 
terms of increased opportunities for small and midsized enterprises. 
The balancing of the environmental and the economic interests does, however, not 
reflect the full picture. Namely, the test also furthers democratic interests by advancing 
good governance. In addition, the test, perhaps incidentally, ensures that state agencies 
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are not awarded too much regulatory power. In this context the democratic and the 
economic interests seem to be aligned and may outweigh the environmental interests. 
4.1.3. The Scope of Companies Covered 
4.1.3.1. State-of-Origin Legislation as a Proxy for Sustainability 
Sustainable PPMs may be offered a beneficial status on the market. The state 
implementing sustainability criteria might decide to grant the benefits to individual 
products or producers that have been certified to comply with sustainability criteria. 
Unsustainable PPMs of products or producers could even be banned and denied market 
access altogether. In some sustainability schemes it might not be sufficient for the 
producer to comply with the sustainability criteria. Namely, the importing state that 
implements PPM-criteria might condition the benefits, or market access, upon the 
existence of similar PPM-criteria in the exporting state’s legislation. In other words, a 
state that bans unsustainable PPMs might require that also exporting states have banned 
them in-state. Imports would only be allowed from states with a fully sustainable 
industry. This use of state-of-origin law and policy as a proxy for product or producer 
sustainability may be referred to as country certification or state certification. 
The compatibility of country certification with GATT was at stake in US – Shrimp. The 
case concerned U.S. legislation restricting imports of shrimp that had been caught 
without the use of turtle exclusion devices. The objective of the law was to protect 
turtles. Imports were allowed from foreign countries that had been certified as 
sustainable. This certification was available provided that the country required fishing 
vessels in their waters to use turtle exclusion devices. In other words, the U.S. required 
exporting countries to apply laws on turtle protection similar of its own.  
The U.S. Department of State had in 1996 published guidelines on the interpretation of 
the law. In accordance with those guidelines shrimps could be imported even from un-
certified countries provided that the individual trawler had not used fishing methods 
harmful for turtles. However, the possibility of certification of individual batches of 
shrimp from un-certified countries was initially struck down by a U.S. court and 
became the issue of a long series of litigation. At the time of the decisions taken by the 
panel and the AB in US – Shrimp, individual certification was not granted in 
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practice.1002  Hence, the law as applied did not accept certification of producers or their 
products and rendered certification of countries compulsory. The law declared a whole 
nation as unsustainable regardless of the actions of individual companies. 
The implementation of the U.S. turtle protection legislation was very intrusive in the 
sense that it did not target PPMs of fishing vessels directly, but governmental policies. 
The measure was in some sense a case very close to de jure discrimination because 
individual trawlers were treated differently solely on the basis of country of origin and 
despite using identical sustainable PPMs. In its decision in US – Shrimp the AB 
classified the measure as unjustifiable discrimination.1003 In its reasoning the AB 
seemed to expect on the one hand that the U.S. would accept PPMs that are equally 
effective as using the turtle exclusion devices that the U.S. required for vessels fishing 
in U.S. waters, and on the other hand a possibility for sustainability certification of 
individual shrimp trawlers.1004 
Shrimp trawlers that followed sustainable methods were under the U.S. system 
punished for the content of their home state legislation, which was something outside 
their control. A consequence of the law and how it was implemented was that vessels 
from countries with no ban on the use of turtle exclusion devices could not gain access 
to the U.S. market, or at least not unless they caught shrimp in the waters of a certified 
country. Fishing in foreign waters would presumably have required new fishing permits 
and perhaps even re-registering the company and the vessel in a new state. The AB in 
the original proceedings did not give this possibility any thought. 
After the decision delivered by the AB, the U.S. made some changes to the 
implementation of its national law. Among other things, the U.S. allowed countries to 
be certified as sustainable even if they did not have an identical turtle protection 
program as the U.S. as long as they had a program that was equally effective taking 
into account local conditions. For example, a state that requires the use of certain fishing 
devices in order to protect turtles should exempt from any such requirements vessels 
fishing in waters where no turtles live.  
                                                 
1002 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
para. 5. 
1003 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 161-165, 176. 
1004 Ibid. 
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Malaysia challenged the U.S. law and the revised implementation policy in compliance 
proceedings. The AB in US – Shrimp (Art. 21.5) concluded that the law was no longer 
unjustifiably or arbitrarily discriminatory since country certification took into account 
other equally effective methods than that preferred by the U.S.1005 With respect to the 
option of importing sustainably caught shrimp from uncertified countries the AB in the 
compliance proceedings merely concluded that the U.S. law had not been changed to 
prohibit individual certification and an on-going litigation in the U.S. on the 
interpretation of the law did not warrant an analysis of a scenario in which individual 
certification would become unlawful.1006 
There are a few important lessons that can be drawn from the various decisions in US 
– Shrimp. The cases confirm that country certification can be inconsistent with GATT 
unless the state takes into account two important aspects in the design. First, when 
country of origin law and policy is used as a proxy for the default level of sustainability, 
the importing state may not in its criteria require the use of a specific PPM without also 
accepting PPMs that serve the environmental objective with equal effectiveness. 
Secondly, given the statements by the original AB, the silence of the AB in the 
compliance proceedings should not be read as an invitation to states to leave out the 
possibility of sustainability certification of individual trawlers. In other words, for the 
importing state to be able to use a system of certifying imports as sustainable on the 
basis of country of origin law and policy, the importing state must likely also accept 
individual sustainability certification of imports. In other words, states must 
complement country certification with the option of individual sustainability 
certification for producers.1007 The laws and policies of the exporting state where 
production has taken place shall not constitute an irreversible indication of 
unsustainability. 
McCrudden argues that in a procurement law context the differentiation between 
country-based measures and other PPM-criteria is difficult to uphold because both can 
in practice be equally discriminatory.1008 However, it is submitted here that country-
                                                 
1005 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, para. 140-152. 
1006 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 93-96. 
1007 Similarly see Renata Benedini, ‘Complying with the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Decision’, in Edith Brown 
Weiss and John H. Jackson (eds.) Reconciling Environment and Trade (Transnational 2001) 433. 
1008 Christopher McCrudden, ‘International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A 
Framework for Discussion of the Legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO Government 
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based PPM-criteria as a rule become less discriminatory when there is at least the option 
of certifying the sustainability of the methods of individual bidders. Therefore, in case 
the U.S. had implemented an in-state ban on unsustainable PPMs and in public 
procurement required that bidders come from states with a similar ban in their 
legislation, the conclusion under the Government Procurement Agreement would likely 
have been the same as in US – Shrimp.  
The question of whether international trade law requires country certification to be 
complemented by individual product or producer sustainability certification has been 
the subject of much academic debate. Howse has argued that country certification is 
economically inefficient and prohibited under GATT at least when there is no 
possibility for certification of individual products.1009 Gaines, in turn, has adopted a 
more lenient position on country certification. In his view the tests of unjustifiable and 
arbitrary discrimination should be more deferential and take into account that country 
certification may be the only path to ensure sufficient effectiveness of the PPM-
criteria.1010  
The claim that a model with only country certification and no individual certification 
would be more effective might relate to concerns about the reliability of certification. 
A country could be unconvinced that individual product or producer certification in 
some other country is reliable. It might consequently attempt to argue that country 
certification is necessary and justifiable because of the problems related to the 
credibility of certification and labelling of individual imported products. However, a 
mere suspicion that the foreign certification system is unreliable is not sufficient for 
less favorable treatment. Even with evidence of risks of inaccuracy in the certification 
process in some places the regulating state may not condition importation on the whole 
industry of the exporting state being sustainable. Risks of inaccuracy in the certification 
process of individual product or producer sustainability can instead be addressed by 
adjusting factors in the certification process itself, as will be explained more in detail 
                                                 
Procurement Agreement’ (1999) Journal of International Economic Law 3, 42; Christopher McCrudden, 
Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 479-489. 
1009 Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 104-105. See 
however also page 171 for a more positive view on country certification. See also Robert Howse and 
Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in 
Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European J. International Law 249, 269-272. 
1010 Sanford E. Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for 
Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental L. 383, 420-421 
and 431-432. 
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further below.1011 Importantly, problems with reliability in the certification process in 
some states is not a valid reason to ignore reliable certification in other states. Country 
certification without individual certification may be justifiable only in the exceptional 
case where reliable individual certification is so difficult that there are no economically 
and technically reasonable certification methods that reduce the risks of imported 
products entering the market with a false sustainability certification to a level 
comparable to that of in-state products being placed on the market with a false 
sustainability certification.1012 
The effectiveness of PPM-criteria that allow for individual product or producer 
certification might be questioned with reference to the substantial effects country 
certification could have. To put it differently, country certification might be argued to 
ensure a higher level of protection against the harmful environmental effects as it would 
not only require out-of-state producers to change the PPMs for the products exported 
to the regulating state, but also pressure the state where production takes place to 
change its laws and transform the PPMs of its whole industry. Cross-border effects on 
biodiversity or cross-border pollution will decrease even more if the whole industry 
changes its PPMs. Yet, there are several reasons why country certification will still 
struggle to survive trade law scrutiny. As already described above, country certification 
could create arbitrary situations in the sense that individual sustainable producers are 
denied market access only on the basis of country of origin. In addition, the applicable 
home state legislation is outside the control of individual producers. Finally, country 
certification is specifically designed to put pressure on the sovereign legislator of 
another state. This is controversial in particular under WTO law as large developed 
states with a lot of market power might be better equipped to use the strategy 
successfully. In the value reconciliation process that is behind a decision on the legality 
of country certification the above three aspects are pinned against the interest in high-
levels of environmental protection. While not unequivocal, US – Shrimp suggests that 
the concerns relating to country certification weigh more heavily here. As explained 
                                                 
1011 See section 4.3.3. 
1012 Even if unsustainable PPMs are prohibited in-state, some unsustainable production might still occur 
due to errors or fraud. These risks are often mitigated, but not completely eliminated, through random 
checks and surveillance. 
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later, some parallels can be drawn with the interpretation of the extraterritoriality test 
in law of prohibition of the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause.1013 
4.1.3.2. Business in Unsustainable States or with Unsustainable Business Partners 
In accordance with the conclusions above, country certification would as a rule seem 
incompatible with trade law. States will in other words struggle to justify schemes that 
automatically and irreversibly render products from states lacking certain PPM-
legislation unsustainable. This raises the question of whether the situation would be any 
different in case the individual company is not treated less favorably because of the 
policies of its home state, but instead because of the policies of the state in which it is 
doing business? This issue has not been litigated but at least one occasion it was a 
relevant aspect of a legal case. 
A Massachusetts law introduced a fairly strict disadvantage to all bidders with activities 
in Burma (today known as Myanmar) because of human rights violations in the 
country.1014 In essence, the law declared all companies present in Burma to have chosen 
an unsustainable path (with respect to human rights) regardless of their individual 
actions and potential non-involvement with human rights violators.  
The Massachusetts procurement law provisions on Burma sparked much legal debate 
on its compatibility with U.S. and WTO law.1015 Japan and the EU initiated 
consultations under the WTO regime.1016 At another front the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that Massachusetts’ Burma law was pre-empted by federal law and thus not in 
                                                 
1013 See section 6.1.4. 
1014 An Act Regulating Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma (Myanmar), ch 130, 
1996 Session Laws, Mass. Gen. Laws Abb., ch 7, 223 (West 1997). 
1015 See David Schmahmann and James Finch, ‘The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments 
in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar)’ (1997) 30 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 2; Daniel M. Price and John P. Hannah, ‘The Constitutionality of United States State 
and Local Sanctions’ (1998) 39 Harvard International Law Journal 443; David R. Schmahmann, James 
Finch and Tia Chapman, ‘Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Expands Its Foreign Policy Expedition from 
Burma to Indonesia’ (1997) 30 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1021; Christopher McCrudden, 
‘International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the 
Legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement’ (1999) 
2 Journal of International Economic Law 3, 25-26; Michael S. Lelyveld, ‘Weld Letter a New Wrinkle in 
EU-Massachusetts Spat’ (13 March 1997) Journal of Commerce 5A; Alejandra Carvajal, ‘State and 
Local “Free Burma” Laws: The Case for Sub-national Trade Sanctions’ (1998) 29 Law and Policy 
International Business 257, 265. See also Hans-Joachim Priess and Christian Pitschas, ‘Secondary 
Criteria and their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement – The Case of the German Scientology 
Declaration’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement Law Review 171, 188-189. 
1016 US – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, DS88, Request for Consultations by the 
European Communities, 20 June 1997; US – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, DS95, 
Request for Consultations by Japan, 18 July 1997. 
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compliance with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.1017 As the challenge 
in U.S. courts was successful, Massachusetts changed its state law and the challenge 
under WTO law was dropped. 
There are a number of legal questions relating to the Massachusetts’ Burma case that 
cannot be discussed here in detail. For example, the law evidently addressed concerns 
of the immorality of actions out-of-state. Whether this type of extraterritorial concerns 
may form legitimate objectives in trade law is dealt with later in this book.1018 
Moreover, since the case concerned criteria in public procurement, there is the question 
of whether criteria that target human rights conditions in states where the bidding 
company has business activities constitute criteria that the GPA permits at one or 
several stages of the procurement process.1019 That assessment falls outside the scope 
of this book. Similarly, it will here not be discussed whether a test on a link to the 
subject matter of the contract could apply under the GPA and be relevant for cases such 
as that on the Burma Law. Instead, the focus will be on the potential discrimination and 
proportionality of the type of criteria introduced with the Burma Law. 
The principle of non-discrimination applies both under GATT and the GPA. The Burma 
Law would seem to have discriminated against states that were more active in Burma 
than the U.S. The U.S. would likely have relied on public morals as a ground of 
justification. Assuming the objective was legitimate, could the measure then have 
survived a proportionality review? 
The shrimp-fishing law in its original form directly targeted the ‘unsustainable’ state 
by restricting the economic opportunities of companies of that state, whereas the Burma 
Law restricted the economic opportunities of companies doing business in the 
‘unsustainable’ state. The Burma law appears to have captured not only companies 
registered in Burma or with production in Burma, but also companies entering into 
transactions with Burmese parties. However, unlike under the U.S. law challenged in 
US – Shrimp, under Massachusetts’ Burma Law all in-state companies were not 
automatically ‘sustainable’. Both U.S. and out-of-state companies had to be 
individually assessed with respect to their potential business involvement in Burma. 
                                                 
1017 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 (2000); Christopher McCrudden, 
Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 295-296. 
1018 See sections 6.2-6.3. 
1019 Generally on the use of PPM-criteria and other sustainability criteria in public procurement see 
section 6.3.2. 
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The discrimination was thus not of fully identical arbitrary nature as in US – Shrimp. 
Yet, the Burma Law was bound to lead to situations where an out-of-state company not 
involved in any human rights violations would be treated less favorably than an equally 
‘sustainable’ in-state company. The reason for the different treatment would merely be 
based on the country where the companies conduct business.  Could this render the 
measure arbitrary in the same way as it was argued that country certification in the U.S. 
law on shrimp-fishing was arbitrary?  
From the perspective of human rights, Massachusetts likely strived to advance its 
objective more effectively by applying criteria that punished all companies doing 
business in Burma. It could be argued that denying market access for companies active 
in ‘unsustainable’ states is justifiable because it cuts some indirect financial 
contributions to the ‘unsustainable’ practices in states like Burma and consequently 
increases the level of protection. However, it is uncertain whether this would actually 
be the effect of the measure.1020 Moreover, even if the measure would have some effect, 
it is not evident that it would be proportional and justifiable to treat companies less 
favorably on the grounds of such uncertain and indirect consequences. One possible 
approach would be to test whether international economic science gives some support 
to the argument that the measure increases the level of protection.  
The less favorable treatment of companies doing business in Burma might increase the 
level of protection against human rights violation in Burma, as the Massachusetts’ law 
intended. Similarly, the less favorable treatment of companies active in an 
environmentally unsustainable state could be beneficial for the protection against the 
harm of environmentally unsustainable PPMs. This forms the argument in favor of the 
proportionality of such measures. The remaining arguments against such measures can 
be summarized in three points. 
First, even if the out-of-state companies would not in any way be involved in the human 
rights violations or in environmentally unsustainable PPMs, they would still be treated 
less favorably than some in-state companies. In fact, the out-of-state companies could 
be present in a state like Burma with the explicit objective to improve the human rights 
situation.  
                                                 
1020 McCrudden has pointed out that it is unsure whether the provisions on Burma were capable of 
promoting any level of protection. See Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, 
Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 503-504. 
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Secondly, the policies in a state where the company conducts business is outside its 
immediate sphere of influence. Hence, it may appear arbitrary to penalize the company 
for the effects of that policy much like it would appear arbitrary to penalize it for the 
law and policy of its home state. Naturally, each company is free to avoid doing 
business in states like Burma, where the government at the time pushed for 
unsustainable or otherwise morally dubious policies. However, much like in the case 
of country certification that was litigated in US – Shrimp, the alternative of moving out 
of a state would for many companies, in particular those with factories in Burma, entail 
significant difficulties and costs. 
Thirdly, much like the U.S. country certification model on sustainable shrimp-fishing, 
also Massachusetts’ Burma Law constituted a trade measures that was designed with 
the intention to pressure not only businesses that do not follow a sustainable policy, but 
also to pressure another state to change its state policies. 
There is hardly any guidance on how the dilemma presented in this subsection would 
be approached in trade law disputes. Thus, it cannot be excluded that restrictions on 
imports from companies conducting business in states with unsustainable policies 
would clash with some elements of the proportionality review. This of course would 
lead to the follow-up question of whether the importing state could instead restrict 
merely the importation of products from companies that themselves violate human 
rights, use unsustainable PPMs or that are directly doing business with those that violate 
human rights or use unsustainable PPMs? With no precedent on the matter only some 
general observations may be offered. Restricting the importation of companies that are 
sustainable but do business with unsustainable parties would raise similar issues as 
Massachusetts’ Burma Law. One difference would be that the unsustainable practice 
the model would penalize the company for would be an unsustainable practice that the 
company at least more directly and to a somewhat higher degree contributes to. It would 
also be an unsustainable practice within the scope of what the company likely could 
have an influence on through its own conduct. 
4.1.4. The Scope of the Life-Cycle Covered 
4.1.4.1. Criteria on the Effects of Long-Distance Transport and Transmission 
May states implement criteria with reference to transportation distance and how should 
such criteria be designed? The ECJ has a couple of decades ago gone so far as to suggest 
301
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that there was no proof of environmental harm from transport.1021 This approach should 
be rejected. Emission and pollution from transportation can be significant. There is a 
legitimate objective behind tackling emissions from transportation. The question is 
rather how those criteria should be designed. 
The long-distance transport of any good is bound to cause more pollution and have a 
more severe environmental effect than local trade. Although the environmental effects 
of transport cannot in most cases be denied, the national origin is still a bad proxy for 
the level of transport pollution.1022 The distance for imports could in some cases be 
shorter than the distance for in-state transport. Hence, states can, for example, not 
justify beneficial treatment of local food merely on the grounds that transportation 
distances are shorter. De jure discrimination justified on transport distances would 
nullify the whole idea of an internal market. 
An alternative to de jure discrimination would be restrictions with reference to the 
distance, instead of the state of origin. The distance would in other words serve as a 
proxy for pollution. The U.S. Supreme Court has examined a case where a municipality 
required that all milk sold in the municipality had been pasteurized within five miles of 
the city. The Court concluded that this discriminatory criterion breached the dormant 
Commerce Clause.1023 The municipality could potentially had made the argument that 
such criterion decreased transport emissions and thus enhanced environmental 
protection. The outcome would still have been the same. Transport distance is one 
factor that affects the level of those emissions. However, on its own it is a problematic 
proxy for sustainability of transportation. Such criterion is bound to result in less 
favorable treatment of some out-of-state products even if the emissions from transport 
may have been lower than for some in-state products. 
While using transport distance as a proxy for emissions would not be justifiable, the 
emissions from transport distance have detrimental effects and states should under EU 
and WTO law be justified in taking them into account. This conclusion should under 
the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause not be any different even if strict scrutiny would 
apply. Namely, there is a rational relationship between transport emissions and the 
                                                 
1021 Case C-203/96 Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v. Minister van Volkshuisvesting, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] ECR I-4075, paras 46-47. 
1022 Eleanor Stein, ‘Regional Initiatives to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, in Michael Gerrard and 
Jody Freeman (eds.) Global Climate Change and US Law (ABA 2014) 291. 
1023 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
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protection of the environment. A conclusion to the contrary would put the right of states 
to tackle externalities at risk. 
There are, however, two crucial elements that the state likely has to incorporate in a 
model with criteria on transport emissions. First, criteria on one type of emissions 
should not merely focus on the emissions that arise from transportation. Similar 
emissions that arise at other stages of the life-cycle should also be included in the 
model. The model could otherwise raise suspicion of disguised restrictions on trade. 
Generally, in addressing some effects states should not limit the calculation of the 
effects to some narrow parts of the life-cycle in case a broader life-cycle analysis of the 
same effects would be less discriminatory. Secondly, it is crucial that each importer has 
the opportunity to certify an individual value for transport emissions and is not 
automatically burdened by the fact that emissions on average tend to be higher when 
the transport distance is long. Namely, some imports might be transported long 
distances with low emissions. 
It may be recalled that California’s Low-Carbon Fuel Standard lays out sustainability 
criteria for biofuels. Sustainability is in part defined in terms of life-cycle GHG 
emissions. Each biofuel plant may apply for an estimation of an individual carbon 
intensity value. Plants that have not applied for an individual value will be assigned a 
default value. The assigned default value depends, among other things, on the feedstock 
used in production, the chemical method and the type of biofuel that forms the end-
product.1024 
Distance and load weight are factors that affect the level of emissions from 
transportation. The calculations of individual plant specific carbon intensity take into 
account the transport distance and the estimated weight of long-distance deliveries of 
either feedstock or fuel. In other words, emissions from transportation are accounted 
for in life-cycle criteria for which compliance is assessed on an individual basis. A 
different question is whether transport emissions should be accounted for in the 
calculation of default values.  
The original version of the LCFS assigned different default values for fuels produced 
in different states due to differences in estimated emissions from transportation.1025 The 
                                                 
1024 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079-1087 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
1025 Ibid. 
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estimate relied on both information on transport distances and the weight of the 
transport. Some fuels are produced out-of-state and transported in-state as fuels. Other 
fuels are produced in-state but from feedstock that has been imported. The emissions 
from the transportation of fuel and feedstock is different per distance covered. The 
estimated transport emissions were higher for in-state corn ethanol than for Midwest 
corn ethanol because in-state ethanol was produced from Midwest feedstock that was 
heavy to transport. Overall, with other regional factors taken into account, out-of-state 
corn ethanol was still assigned higher default values than in-state corn ethanol. In 2015, 
in the midst of litigation on the compatibility of the LCFS with the dormant Commerce 
Clause, California changed the model so that default values are identical regardless of 
fuel origin.1026 
Unlike in the case of California’s LCFS, including transport emissions in a default value 
would almost always be beneficial for in-state products. It would at the same time 
address a genuine environmental harm. While it may thus appear like transport 
emissions would form a valid reason for state specific default values, it is crucial to 
reflect on the total effects of the model with state specific default values alongside 
individual values contra alternative models. I will return later in this book to the 
question about whether it at all is justifiable to complement the calculation of individual 
emission values with default values.1027 In that context it will also be analyzed whether 
transport emissions could be included in default values, essentially making the default 
values state specific. 
The discussion on transportation normally centers around the transport of physical 
goods. Electricity is a special case as it is not transported with lorries, airplanes or ships 
that consume energy. Instead, electricity is loaded on transmission lines that run across 
state boarders. Long-distance transmissions can result in the loss of energy along the 
power lines. Alcorn’s conclusion that states like California should be justified in taking 
into account energy loss of transmission in its cap and trade system would appear in 
line with this theory.1028 The question of energy loss has been discussed also in the 
context of de jure discriminatory European schemes for promoting electricity generated 
                                                 
1026 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
1027 See section 5.2.3. 
1028 Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 161-162. 
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with renewables. In his opinion in PreussenElektra Advocate General Jacobs stated 
that he would have left it to the national court to evaluate whether or not electricity was 
lost along the power lines to such an extent that the discriminatory effects of the 
renewable energy support scheme would be necessary and justified.1029 In other words, 
Jacobs viewed it as justifiable to award beneficial treatment with reference to the 
environmental benefits of proximity. Interestingly, Advocate General Bot in turn did in 
his opinion in Essent Belgium appear to give no weight to the principle of proximity in 
a largely similar case on de jure discriminatory elements in a scheme promoting 
electricity from renewable sources.1030 The ECJ upheld the schemes in both cases for 
reasons unrelated to potential energy loss in long distance transmissions.  The 
discussion, however, further exemplifies how the effects of transport can become 
relevant in trade law analysis. 
4.1.4.2. PPMs of Products used in the Production of the End Product 
States have broad discretion in deciding what environmental effects they address 
through PPM-criteria. The life-cycle analysis of those effects can, however, not be 
designed so that production stages where the in-state industry does well are included 
whereas stages where the in-state industry performs poorly are excluded. This in turn 
raises the question of whether there are some limits to how extensive the life-cycle 
analysis may become. 
The biofuels sustainability criteria in California’s LCFS is an example of very far-
reaching PPM-criteria. Namely, in the calculation of GHG emissions from biofuels the 
state has included estimations of emissions from generating the electricity that is used 
in the biofuels plant. How far back in the supply chain can the sustainability criteria 
reach?1031 Can or should the criteria apply to the production of the different components 
or elements needed for the construction of the final good? Can or should they apply to 
the production methods applied in producing the tools that are later used to produce the 
final good? For example, could the authority require that production machines needed 
                                                 
1029 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, Opinion of AG Jacobs, 
paras 235-237. 
1030 Joined cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, Opinion of AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2013:294. 
1031 For discussion see Gareth Davies, ‘’Process and Production Method’ – based Trade Restrictions in 
the EU’, in Catherine Barnard (ed.) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008 (Hart 
2008) 81-83. 
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in the manufacture of the end product have been produced in factories that run on 
renewable energy? 
Guidance to the analysis of trade law compatibility of this type of criteria can be found 
in public procurement law. Namely, the discussion on whether it could be required that 
the energy used in the production of the good has been generated with renewables is 
not new to procurement law.1032 This is in essence a discussion on whether there in 
procurement of some end product can be included criteria on the PPMs of another good 
– such as a tool – that is needed for the production of the purchased end product. 
Equally, the question could arise whether PPM-criteria could apply to each nut and bolt 
that are used in compiling the end product. 
Life-cycle criteria have received increased attention in the context of public 
procurement. In accordance with EU public procurement directives award criteria may 
relate to the delivery process or any other stage of the life-cycle, such as the process of 
production, provision or trading.1033 For example, the pollution profile of fuels does not 
have to be limited to the environmental effects during consumption but can cover also 
the collection of raw material and the refinery process. The criteria may also relate to 
disposal and recycling.1034 The EU directives even include specific provisions on the 
right of authorities to design criteria for life-cycle costing.1035 
                                                 
1032 Peter Kunzlik, ‘The Procurement of ‘Green’ Energy’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), 
Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 402-406. 
1033 Art. 67, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 82, Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Art. 41, Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. 
1034 European Commission, EU GPP Criteria for Transport (2012) 10-13; Marc Martens and Stanislas de 
Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green and Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 
European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 8, 14; Opinion of the Commission 
pursuant to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament's 
amendments to the Council's common position regarding the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts, COM (2003) 503 final. 
1035 Art. 68 and recitals 95-97, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; 
Art. 83 and recitals 100-102, Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Recital 64, Directive 2014/23/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, 
OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. See also Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., 
European Commission 2011) 42-45. For an analysis of the provisions see Dacian Dragos and Bogdana 
Neamtu, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement: Life-Cycle Costing in the New EU Directive Proposal’ (2013) 
8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 19. 
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In the seminal Wienstrom case the Austrian authority purchased electricity. The criteria 
for the award of the contract favoured companies generating electricity from renewable 
resources. However, no mechanism of verifying compliance with such criteria had been 
put in place by the authority. Consequently, the procurement process was in breach of 
the procurement law principles of equal treatment and transparency.1036 Sustainability 
criteria at any stage of the procurement process must be such that compliance can be 
verified.1037  
As the test of verifiability can be derived from core public procurement principles, it 
can be presumed that it would apply also under the GPA. In fact, even in accordance 
with trade law, as applied for example under GATT and the TFEU, sustainability 
criteria should be designed so that compliance can be verified. The application of 
criteria that do not allow for verification of compliance could result in unjustifiable 
discrimination. The claim that some in-state producer comply with the criteria and some 
out-of-state producer does not cannot be upheld without reliable verification. 
Verification can be challenging due to the fact that the PPMs are often not reflected in 
the final characteristics of the product or service that is delivered. Similarly, it may be 
difficult to know from where the material utilized in the production of a good came 
from.1038 Normally some form of label or certificate would need to be required as proof 
of compliance. For example, in Wienstrom the authority could perhaps have specified 
in the call for tenders that the chosen supplier of electricity would on an annual basis 
need to illustrate compliance with the renewable energy requirement by submitting 
Guarantees of Origin.1039 
                                                 
1036 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, paras. 44-52. 
1037 Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to public 
procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public 
procurement, COM (2001) 274 final, 20; Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd 
ed., European Commission 2011) 25. See also Peter Kunzlik, ‘From Suspect Practice to Market-Based 
Instrument: Policy Alignment and the Evolution of EU Law’s Approach to “Green” Public Procurement’ 
(2013) 22 Public Procurement Law Review 97, 112; Antti Palmujoki, Katriina Parikka-Alhola, and Ari 
Ekroos, ‘Green Public Procurement: Analysis on the Use of Environmental Criteria in Contracts’ (2010) 
19 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 250, 253; Luca Tosoni, ‘The 
Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU Procurement Rules from a 
Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 41, 
45; Peter Kunzlik, ‘International Procurement Regimes and the Scope for Inclusion of Environmental 
Factors in Public Procurement’ (2004) OECD Journal on Budgeting 109. 
1038 Katriina Parikka-Alhola, ‘Promoting Environmentally Sound Furniture by Green Public 
Procurement’ (2008) 68 Ecological Economics 472, 481. 
1039 European Commission, EU GPP for Electricity (2012) 3-5; Peter Kunzlik, ‘The Procurement of 
‘Green’ Energy’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 379. 
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It is submitted that under trade law states may apply extensive life-cycle criteria 
provided that there exists some possibility to verify compliance. California included in 
the sustainability criteria for biofuels a certification process. Taking into account in the 
calculations of GHG emissions also the emissions emitted already at the stage of 
generating the electricity that is eventually used in the fuel plants was not problematic 
as the certification process ensured verifiability.1040 The access to verification might 
naturally not be equal for producers in different states. The discriminatory effects that 
arise from verification difficulties out-of-state would still not restrain states from 
adopting extensive life-cycle criteria. Efforts by the state to facilitate verification 
should, however, not unduly favour in-state production. 
The legality of extensive life-cycle criteria depends on the application of various legal 
tests. The test of verifiability may apply to sustainability criteria under both trade law 
and public procurement law. This test is important for the analysis of the legality of 
extensive life-cycle criteria that target the PPMs of products that are necessary in the 
later production of the end product. In EU and international public procurement law, 
however, additional requirements and tests apply. 
Extensive life-cycle criteria target early stages of the production process. Such criteria 
will address the PPMs of the bidder and often also stages for which the suppliers of the 
bidder are responsible. Sometimes the subcontractors may be responsible for producing 
physical components of the final product that the contracting party delivers to the 
authority. In other circumstances the subcontractors only produce electricity or other 
products that are not physically part of the final product but are still inputs or tools 
necessary for making the end product.  
In accordance with the principle of equal treatment each bidder must be treated equally 
in public procurement.  When criteria on the PPMs of producers are introduced in a 
tender, the same criteria have to apply regardless of whether the bidder is the producer 
or whether it relies on production by subcontractors. In other words, sustainability 
criteria applied in a public tender cannot apply merely for stages performed by 
companies that submit the bids and offer to supply the public authority. The criteria 
                                                 
1040 Assembly Bill 32, 2006 Leg. Regular Session (California 2006) (amended Nov. 2015); California, 
Governor’s Executive Order S-01-07 (2007). See also section 5.2. 
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must apply also to subcontrators of the bidders. Not extending the criteria to 
subcontractors would constitute a breach of the equal treatment principle.  
In Max Havelaar a Dutch authority had purchased coffee machines from a supplier that 
in turn had purchased ingredients such as milk, sugar and cocoa from farmers. The 
public authority included in the call criteria on social and environmental sustainability.  
In accordance with the criteria bidders received extra points if the ingredients complied 
with labels for fair trade and organic farming. The criteria on organic farming targeted 
the methods adopted by the farmers. The fair trade label in turn appears to have been 
awarded provided that the producers, i.e. the farmers in developing countries that 
supplied the bidder, received fair compensation for their products and work.1041 
The criteria on organic farming concerned the production methods of the producers, 
whereas the fair trade criteria in part concerned the payments to the producers. Criteria 
that concern the payments from the main supplier to its subcontractors can be regarded 
as linked to the subject matter of the contract, although such interpretation has sparked 
some discussion.1042 In any event, if introduced, both the eco-criteria and the fair trade 
criteria should apply equally regardless of whether the producers will be employees of 
the bidding company or employees of the subcontractors of that company. 
As expected, the ECJ did in Max Havelaar not point to any problem with the fact that 
the criteria on organic farming concerned the methods of those supplying the bidder.1043 
Indeed, it should not make a difference whether the bidder has employed the producers 
of milk, sugar and cocoa or if the farmers are independent subcontractors that supply 
the bidder. Each business model should be treated equally under procurement 
principles. 
The fact that many bidders rely on subcontracting complicate the process of verifying 
sustainability. Bidders are often able to provide the public authority with documentation 
and certification of its own production methods, working conditions of its employees 
and the end-of-life treatment of the products it produces or uses. However, a bidder that 
relies heavily on subcontractors might face a greater burden in providing verification 
with respect to these aspects because some crucial parts of the production process are 
                                                 
1041 Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, para. 37. 
1042 Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green 
and Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 8, 15. 
1043 Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, paras 29, 89-97. 
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governed by other legal entities. For example, a supplier of cars might purchase the 
tyres from another company. It might not have access to documentation of the working 
conditions at the tyre factory, the sources of the electricity used in that factory or the 
source of the materials in the tyres. The car supplier could of course, with the intention 
to later take part in a call for tenders, ask the tyre factory to provide documentation 
already when it places its orders for tyres. In practice, however, the order for tyres might 
have been placed long before the decision to submit a bid. Hence, there is little 
guarantee that the car supplier will have access to the information about the operations 
at the tyre factory and the sustainability of its activities. 
It is evident that the verification of the sustainability of an extensive life-cycle will 
place a high burden on bidders that rely on many subcontractors. It might frequently be 
small companies that rely on subcontractors for most stages of the production. Be that 
as it may, criteria that extend to the early stages of the life-cycle should not breach the 
equal treatment principle. Each company can in principle decide to what degree it relies 
on subcontractors. With the increased reliance on sustainability criteria in public 
procurement, companies will know to include provisions in their contracts that allow 
them access to information and certification of different elements of sustainability at 
the production line of the subcontractor. All companies have this opportunity and thus 
no bidder could claim unequal treatment when the sustainability criteria also cover 
elements that in their production process would be dependent on the practices governed 
by subcontractors.  
Life-cycle criteria that target the PPMs of electricity and other goods that are needed in 
the production of the final purchased product do not appear to stand in inherent conflict 
with the principle of equal treatment even if the burden might be heavier on economic 
operators that extensively rely on subcontractors. This leads us to the question of 
whether some limitations may stem from other tests applicable in procurement law. 
In the literature, scholars have argued that it can be legal to introduce criteria on the 
PPMs for a product that is merely needed to produce the final product.1044 These criteria 
are not directly linked to the subject matter, but probably still sufficiently linked. Thus, 
                                                 
1044 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical 
Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law (CUP 2009) 219-220, 239; Peter Kunzlik, ‘The Procurement of ‘Green’ Energy’, in 
Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law 
(CUP 2009) 402-406. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   310 31.7.2019   7.15
 311 
they would, according to Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, be justifiable provided that a 
process for verifying compliance with the criteria is established.1045 Similarly, 
according to Alhola it would be compatible with the procurement directives to apply 
criteria that assert favourable treatment of products that have been produced with 
energy that was generated from renewable resources. Admittedly, it might often be 
difficult for companies to provide proof for the verification that the electricity used in 
the production of the good had been generated with renewables.1046 Therefore, even if 
extensive life-cycle criteria may be legal, public authorities should be conscious about 
the fact that very strict and extensive criteria could significantly reduce the number of 
potential bidders and may thus be problematic from the perspective of market 
competition. 
Could under EU procurement law criteria on, for example, the use of renewable 
electricity in the production plants then be implemented at any stage of procurement, 
including technical specifications and award criteria? And what legal relevance could 
be given to verification difficulties? The procurement directives are unfortunately far 
from clear with respect to these questions. 
The minimum requirements for the purchased products are described in technical 
specifications. While these may under EU directives include criteria on the PPMs of 
the purchased works, supplies or services,1047 it is not clear whether this extends even 
to the PPMs of electricity or other goods that are needed for making the ordered final 
works, supplies or services. 
The bids submitted in a tender are compared in accordance with award criteria. The 
public authority shall choose the economically most advantageous tender.1048 A lot of 
discretion has been left for the authority and it may adopt award criteria that define how 
the economically most advantageous tender is singled out. Life-cycle costing is in the 
EU public procurement directive described as a model for award criteria that public 
authorities may opt to apply. The method for assessing the costs for environmental 
externalities in life-cycle costing should be such that normally diligent economic 
                                                 
1045 Ibid. 
1046 Katriina Alhola, Environmental Criteria in Public Procurement – Focus on Tender Documents (Edita 
2012) 49-50. 
1047 Art. 42, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1048 Art. 67, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
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operators in all countries party to the GPA can provide the data with a reasonable 
effort.1049 This partly restricts the possibility to apply unusually extensive life-cycle 
criteria. It is not evident whether a normally diligent company in a GPA member such 
as Armenia would reasonably be able to provide data on whether the electricity that 
was used for producing its goods was generated from renewables. 
At the moment sustainability criteria are implemented to a very limited extent and when 
they are applied, they often only link to the production of the final product that is 
procured. The internalization of externalities is thus often left incomplete. The lack of 
emphasis on the sustainability of PPMs also means that the market for independent 
sustainability certification remains underdeveloped. Consequently, many corporations 
in several sectors will not have access to independent certification of the PPMs in the 
early stages of the production process. 
A separate problem is that the rarity of criteria on the early stages of the production 
process means that companies will often not have taken such aspects into account in 
dealing with their suppliers. In the current state of affairs companies might argue that 
even a normally diligent company would not require PPM-certification from its 
suppliers. However, with increased emphasis on sustainability, it is perhaps in the 
future not unreasonable to expect suppliers to have the readiness to present 
documentation on the production process of at least the most significant components of 
the product or service they provide. Naturally, this market development requires a lot 
of skills from the corporate lawyers drafting agreements with subcontractors. The right 
of the company to acquire verified information on sustainability from its suppliers must 
be fairly broad and general in order for it to cover as many as possible of the aspects 
that might later be included by a public authority in a call for tenders. 
Public authorities should gradually be able to introduce more far-reaching PPM-criteria 
in the tenders as more independent certification schemes emerge on the market and the 
culture among bidding companies to include requirements of documentation of PPM-
criteria in their contracts with suppliers grows. A shift in societal policy in the direction 
of more emphasis on sustainability could also come through legislation. For example, 
                                                 
1049 Art. 68, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. See also Dacian 
Dragos and Bogdana Neamtu, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement: Life-Cycle Costing in the New EU 
Directive Proposal’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 19, 22. 
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in Sweden the law on biofuels sustainability criteria stipulates that in order to be eligible 
for certain tax benefits the company must ensure that it fulfils the criteria. The company 
must ensure this through agreements with suppliers and the taking of samples. 
Independent reviewers are then to verify that all obligations have been complied 
with.1050 
The test of a normally diligent economic operator applies when the public authority 
applies life-cycle costing. It is less clear how the situation should be assessed where the 
authority does not adopt that method but still introduces criteria for the PPMs of goods 
that are used for producing the end product purchased by the authority. The definition 
of acceptable award criteria does at least as such not rule out the possibility to take into 
account the sustainability of the early stage PPMs. There must exist some method to 
get verification of compliance with the criteria, but it is in principle up to the bidders to 
ensure they have access to that method. Yet, it is not clear whether the ECJ would view 
it proportional to implement award criteria on such early stages of the PPMs for which 
most bidders would not have the relevant data. The argument for disproportionality 
may be strong in case the authority assigns significant weight to such criteria, but with 
modest and reasonable weight on such aspects the outcome is hard to predict. On the 
one hand, the article on life-cycle costing would imply that these criteria might be 
strictly scrutinized. On the other hand, there would be value in authorities having 
discretion to apply criteria of genuine value for environmental protection even if a 
significant number of economic operators do not have access to certification with 
reasonable efforts. 
The ECJ in Max Havelaar1051 gave no indication that it would have been unreasonable 
or disproportional for the authority to expect bidders to include in long-term contracts 
with farmers requirements that the farmers provide certification on organic farming. 
Without such certificates bidders were unable to illustrate compliance with the criteria 
in tenders. The case of course concerned the legality of criteria on organic farming and 
not criteria on the PPMs for electricity or tools used when building coffee machines or 
harvesting natural resources. That difference might, however, not necessarily be crucial 
                                                 
1050 Lagen (2010:598) om hållbarhetskriterier för biodrivmedel och flytande biobränslen, chapter 3, para. 
1a. 
1051 Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284. 
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in this context. It will hence likely be possible to adopt PPM-criteria that extende to the 
early stages of the production process.  
4.1.4.3. Indirect Land Use Change Criteria 
In designing sustainability criteria states might decide to take into account emissions or 
other effects that arise indirectly from the production. This can be illustrated by the 
example of biofuels production. The production of biofuels requires feedstock. Various 
biomass ranging from algae to animal waste can be used for this purpose. It is, however, 
common that the feedstock comes from agricultural crops grown on fields. An increase 
in biofuels would thus result in an increased use of land for agricultural purposes. This 
is referred to as land use change. Direct land use change (DLUC) occurs when 
biodiverse or other sensitive land is cultivated for growing biofuel feedstock. Indirect 
land use change (ILUC) in turn occurs when fields previously utilized for growing food 
crops is turned into plantations for growing biofuels feedstock and as a consequence of 
that change biodiverse land elsewhere is modified into land suitable for the cultivation 
of food crops. In this case biofuels would indirectly contribute to the loss of forests and 
biodiversity. Land use change is in other words one of the negative effects of biofuels. 
Previously in this chapter it was hinted that criteria targeting the sustainability of other 
companies than the producer of the product could potentially be scrutinized more 
strictly under the proportionality review in part because the individual producers have 
limited influence over the sustainability of other companies in countries or states where 
they have been founded or where they do business.1052 That theory outlined in this study 
has never been confirmed. However, in examining ILUC criteria applied for biofuels 
similar questions arise in my view with respect to the fairness of applying criteria on 
effects that the producer has limited influence over. 
U.S. federal biofuels criteria have been drafted in the form of RFS2. The scheme 
includes an estimation of GHG emissions from indirect land use change as part of the 
sustainability criteria.1053 The EU, in turn, has taken a more indirect approach. All 
Member States should achieve a share of 10 % of final energy consumption in the 
transport sector from renewables sector by 2020.1054 However, the share of biofuels 
                                                 
1052 See section 4.1.3. 
1053 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H). 
1054 Articles 3(1) and 3(4), Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
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from feedstock associated with land use change, so called first generation biofuels, 
taken into account in reaching the overall target has been capped at 7 %.1055 In order to 
reach the 10 % target Member States will thus likely need some biofuels that are 
produced with other feedstock than food and feed crops. These biofuels are known as 
advanced biofuels. Capping first generation biofuels encourages states to provide 
additional support to biofuels from feedstock associated with no land use change. 
The EU has reacted to environmental criticism against its approach to ILUC. The new 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) should enter into force in 2021. Under that 
directive the target for energy from renewables in the transport sector has been set at 
14 % by 2030 for each Member States. The consumption of first generation biofuels 
from food and feed crops is only accounted for up until the national consumption level 
in 2020 plus an additional percentage point. The cap for first generation biofuels must, 
however, be within the range of 2-7 % of energy consumed in the road and rail transport 
sector. Furthermore, the RED 2 introduces a quota for advanced biofuels with low 
ILUC impacts. This quota will increase annually and reach 3,5 % by 2030. However, 
the directive authorizes double counting, which means that the actual share will likely 
be lower.1056 Advanced biofuels has been defined in Annex IX as biofuels produced 
from curtained listed feedstock that are not food and feed crops. 
The objective with the cap on first generation biofuels and the separate quota for 
advanced is to promote biofuels with lower ILUC effects.1057 Member States will even 
be given a renewable energy target lower than 14 % for the transport sector in case the 
share of advanced biofuels exceeds the target. In order to achieve the renewable energy 
target in the transport sector Member States shall introduce quotas for fuel suppliers 
but they have much flexibility in how those quotas are implemented. 
An additional measure to reduce ILUC has been included in the RED 2. Namely, when 
calculating contribution toward the overall 32 % renewable energy target for 2030 as 
                                                 
1055 Directive 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, 1. See in particular 
recital 7, annex II (adding a new annex IX) and Article 2(2) amending Article 3 of Directive 2009/28/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
1056 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Art. 27(2). 
1057 Id. recitals 80, 85 and 91. 
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well as the 14 % target in the transport sector, a cap is set for biofuels and other 
bioenergy produced from high ILUC risk bioenergy. Biofuels with high ILUC risk are 
produced from food and feed crops for which production areas have been observed 
expanding significantly into land with high carbon stock. The level of contribution from 
biofuels with risks of high ILUC effects shall not be above national 2019 consumption 
levels and the limit will decrease to zero by the end of 2030. The Commission was 
tasked with determinining both high ILUC-risk feedstock and the certification process 
for low-risk biofuels in a delegated act.1058  
In accordance with the delegated regulation, feedstock is categorized as having high 
ILUC-risk in case the average annual expansion of the global production area since 
2008 exceeds 1 % and has affected more than 100.000 hectares. Additionally, more 
than 10 % of the expansion must have been at the expense of land with high-carbon 
stock. The data collected by the Commission indicates that in 2019 only palm oil is 
classified as high-risk. Some palm oil could still be certified as low-ILUC risk if 
produced with new methods that ensure increased productivity or if the feedstock has 
been cultivated on previously unused, abandoned or degraded land.1059 
Erixon has criticized the decision not to include GHG emissions from indirect land use 
change directly in the calculations of GHG emissions under the original EU RED from 
2009.1060 It would appear that the calculations of GHG emissions will not change with 
the new RED 2. However, while there may be some room for environmental criticism, 
it must be kept separate from a trade law analysis. Elements can hardly be arbitrarily 
discriminatory if they do not increase the discriminatory effect of the scheme. While 
ILUC is a valid concern shared by many, not including its effects in sustainability 
criteria might not cause arbitrary discrimination against third country importers. 
Namely, the decision not to include emissions from ILUC can actually be expected to 
generally be to the disadvantage of EU producers. The objective of both limitations on 
the use of feedstock from sensitive land (i.e. land with high biodiversity value) and 
                                                 
1058 Id. Article 26(2) and recital 81. 
1059 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/807 of 13 March 2019 supplementing Directive (EU) 
2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the determination of high indirect 
land-use change-risk feedstock for which a significant expansion of the production area into land with 
high carbon stock is observed and the certification of low indirect land-use change-risk biofuels, 
bioliquids and biomass fuels (C/2019/2055) OJ L 133, 21.5.2019, 1. 
1060 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 14. 
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criteria on land use change is to protect vulnerable land with high carbon stock. This 
form of land can to a high degree be found outside the EU in developing countries. 
Arguably some states could claim that the lack of ILUC emissions in the EU model 
causes discrimination in the sense that some foreign states may be expected to benefit 
over others. At a first glance, such an outcome may seem problematic in light of the 
most favored nation (MFN) principle under Article I GATT. However, trade law has 
never been confirmed to prohibit (arbitrary) discrimination that stems from a failure to 
tackle environmental problems.1061 Furthermore, a broad interpretation of de facto 
discrimination under the MFN-principle would render almost any measure (or in this 
case inaction) prima facie prohibited. Finally, there is no international consensus on 
ILUC and how to estimate its magnitude. For all these reasons inaction on ILUC does 
not appear to breach GATT. 
Turning Erixon’s argument on its head, including ILUC emissions in the EU 
calculations could in fact increase the discriminatory effects of the life-cycle analysis 
for calculating GHG emissions and consequently the biofuels sustainability criteria as 
a whole. This is because land use change might be more severe in developing countries 
with rainforests. Some authors have already pointed out that DLUC criteria may have 
discriminatory effects1062 and there is no reason to believe that the situation would be 
any different for ILUC criteria. There would, however, exist environmental 
justifications. Both DLUC and ILUC criteria would likely survive the traditional least 
restrictive measure test since they advance a higher level of protection. 
There still exists concerns with respect to land use change criteria that could be 
examined from the perspective of the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination. ILUC 
criteria serve an environmental objective indirectly. A loss of biodiversity that is not 
directly linked to biofuels production might still indirectly be linked to the growth of 
the biofuels industry. However, one could ask whether it is fair – or reasonable – to 
penalize biofuels producers for ILUC effects that they do not have complete control 
                                                 
1061 See sections 2.1.3-2.1.4. 
1062 See Andrew D. Mitchell and Christopher Tran, ‘The Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy 
Directive with the WTO Agreements’ (Oct. 2009) Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law 
Research Paper No. 1485549, para. 18; Haniff Ahamat and Nasarudin Rahman, ’Restricting Biofuels 
Imports in the Name of the Environment: How Does the Application of WTO Rules Affect Developing 
Countries?’ (2014) 7 J. East Asia & International L. 51, 60-61. 
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over and that partly depend on the choices made in other sectors.1063 Even without the 
option of penalizing biofuels producers that have an indirect responsibility for land use 
change, states could still always apply criteria on those directly responsible for the land 
use change. 
The calculation of emissions from ILUC is not the only aspect of biofuels law that raises 
questions with respect to the fairness of penalizing those that only indirectly might 
contribute to an environmental problem. Namely, similar questions can be raised in 
connection with some elements of provisions that stipulate that feedstock grown on 
land of high biodiversity cannot be used for sustainable biofuels. For example, under 
Article 17 of the EU RED feedstock is classified as unsuitable biofuels if it comes from 
land that has lost its high biodiversity after January 2008.1064 Under this provision it is 
irrelevant as to whether the biodiversity loss can be attributed to the biofuels industry 
or not. Mitchell and Tran argue that the directive should be amended so that biofuel 
would belong to the sustainable category provided that the loss of biodiversity was 
unrelated to biofuels production.1065 
ILUC criteria and some other similar criteria could potentially be challenged from the 
perspective of fairness with respect to assigning companies responsibility for factors 
outside their immediate control. This value could become relevant in the value 
reconciliation carried out in law of justification. If given weight under trade law, the 
fairness of ILUC criteria would represent a value that would not fall under free trade 
(non-discrimination) or environmental protection. However, it should still be 
emphasized that previous cases in WTO law do not offer indications that elements of 
laws that target those only indirectly responsible for the environmental harm would be 
scrutinized this strictly.  
Incorporating ILUC criteria would benefit companies that utilize other feedstock than 
food and feed crops. It is possible to identify these companies. In other words, a test 
that puts limitations on the use of ILUC criteria due to concerns related to fairness 
would thus burden and benefit companies that can be identified in advance. Later in 
                                                 
1063 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 17-18. 
1064 The provision might prove to be more restrictive on developing countries that still have large forests 
with high biodiversity. 
1065 Andrew D. Mitchell and Christopher Tran, ‘The Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy Directive 
with the WTO Agreements’ (Oct. 2009) Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law Research 
Paper No. 1485549, para. 31. 
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this book it will be illustrated how other tests in trade law have been formed on the 
basis of values such as transparency, due process and regulatory certainty.1066 These 
are different in the sense that it is not possible in advance to identify which companies 
that will benefit from such tests. Those values in general serve the interests of all biofuel 
companies in the long term. 
4.1.5. Values Underlying the Limitations to State Discretion 
Under trade law states have quite broad discretion to define what restrictions to adopt 
in order to tackle environmental harm and to promote what the state perceives as 
sustainable development. The broad discretion of states is further reflected in the right 
of states to adopt criteria for any stage of the product life-cycle as long as the targeted 
PPMs or effects are verifiable. For example, states may in sustainability criteria include 
calculations of emissions from transportation or emissions from generating the 
electricity that is used in the final phase of producing the end product. 
Some limitations to the broad discretion states have in targeting externalities were still 
identified in this section of the book. First, criteria on emissions or other environmental 
effects cannot be tailored to apply for only one stage of the product life-cycle, such as 
transport, if that would result in discrimination and if the same type of emissions or 
environmental effects also arise from other stages of the product life-cycle. Secondly, 
at least in WTO law there has been indications that importing states cannot rely on the 
applicable PPM laws in the state-of-origin of the product as an irreversible proxy for 
sustainability of individual producers or products. In other words, country or state 
certification might not comply with trade law and states should therefore allow 
individual sustainable producers to illustrate compliance with PPM-criteria even if the 
home state of the producer has not implemented any laws on the PPMs in that field. 
Country certification is problematic in part because it reflects an intention to put 
pressure on other states to change their laws. Wealthy large developed states with 
significant market power could benefit the most from such possibility. Exerting such 
pressure may prove controversial in particular in the context of WTO law. It is 
submitted that the equality between powerful and less powerful states is a value that is 
reconciled in the analysis of the proportionality of PPM-criteria. 
                                                 
1066 On the relevance of these values see section 4.2. 
319
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   319 31.7.2019   7.15
 320 
Moreover, it is argued that country certification could be viewed to have consequences 
perceived as unfair since individual sustainable companies would be penalized for the 
laws and policies of their home state even if the companies have very limited influence 
over the content of such laws and policies. On the basis of the analysis of country 
certification and various other models of PPM-criteria it may be concluded that bearing 
responsibility of only things that one has control over and can affect represents a 
perception of fairness that also may need to be reconciled in the interpretation of 
proportionality in trade law. The weight assigned to this aspect could, for example, have 
a decisive impact on the legality of criteria on indirect land use change in biofuels 
sustainability schemes. 
Furthermore, states might be successful in defending the trade law compatibility of 
import restrictions on products from producers that do not comply with sustainability 
criteria in all of their production activities even when the actual imported products have 
been sustainably produced. This has, however, not been confirmed in judicial decisions. 
All in all, the discussion above revealed that the proportionality review of 
environmental criteria in trade law is not necessarily only about the efficiency of non-
discrimination and of tackling externalities. Another field of economic law, public 
procurement law, introduces some stricter tests on PPM-criteria and other sustainability 
criteria as compared to trade law. These stricter tests may be viewed as the outcome of 
a more complex value reconciliation process. For example, one test in public 
procurement is set to establish whether the applied criteria have a link to the subject 
matter of the contract. This test may be seen to reflect the values of coherence with state 
aid law and the good governance principle of equal treatment in administrative law. In 
addition, the test seems to advance the principle of the legislator as the entity primarily 
responsible for regulating markets, although economic law more generally has not been 
shaped with this doctrine in mind. 
4.2. Reconciling General Interests of Private Market Participants 
4.2.1. Interests of All Companies 
The proportionality review in trade law allows for the reconciliation of non-
discrimination and the objective to tackling externalities in order to promote efficiency. 
In this equation the principle of non-discrimination protects the interests of out-of-state 
companies. Companies will, however, have interests that go beyond non-
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discrimination. These interests are not held merely by out-of-state companies but by 
companies more in general. In this second section of chapter 4 the focus will be on the 
reconciliation of values that serve the interests of private market participants generally. 
A general interest is held is held by all private market participants and it is not possible 
to know in advance which companies will need to rely on rights linked to the interest 
in the future.  
Disputed elements of sustainability criteria will reveal situations where the interaction 
between the legislator and private market participants may become part of 
considerations of what is arbitrary discrimination. The purpose of this section is thus to 
identify the interests and values that may potentially affect the reconciliation under the 
proportionality review of free trade on the one hand and the objective of limiting 
environmental externalities on the other hand. How are the potential interest and values 
held by companies related to efficiency? 
The focus is largely on WTO law for the simple reasons that it is the legal context where 
PPM-cases, and thus also new value clashes, have so far emerged and, as the example 
of biofuels will illustrate, it may be the legal context where similar disputes will 
continue to arise. However, comparable developments in particular in EU law are 
presented where relevant, in order to illustrate that similar expansive perceptions of 
justice and proportionality have also emerged there. 
4.2.2. The Transparency Principle 
4.2.2.1. Economic Law, Transparency and Proportionality 
Many state regulations, such as those on biofuels sustainability criteria, are very 
complex. Companies producing and exporting biofuels or feedstock necessary for 
production of the fuel need, however, transparency with respect to what the applicable 
criteria are and how they are applied in practice. Transparency will serve the interest of 
out-of-state companies in that it reduces the risks of disguised discrimination. In 
addition, transparency improves legal certainty, which is in the interest of companies 
more generally regardless of home state. Could transparency then be relevant for 
proportionality? 
Transparency is one of the core principles of public procurement law. A public 
authority that intends to purchase must be transparent with respect to what it will buy, 
when it will buy and on what terms it will buy. In addition, transparency is required 
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with respect to the award criteria used for comparing bids. In sum, the criteria in a 
procurement process and the process itself should comply with requirements of 
transparency. 
The principle of transparency could perhaps also be of value for the traditional trade 
law doctrine. The case will be made that the transparency principle has already to some 
extent been recognized in WTO, EU and U.S. under the proportionality review. Before 
presenting those arguments, it is, however, necessary to provide some more detail on 
the transparency principle in public procurement law. 
4.2.2.2. Transparency under Public Procurement Law 
Public authorities regularly purchase goods, services and construction works. The 
procurement by public authorities is regulated in public procurement law. While there 
are federal procurement norms applicable to federal agencies in the U.S.,1067 there are 
no federal rules applicable to states and cities. Since U.S. federal regulation of state 
procurement is lacking, the discussion here on public procurement will focus on the EU 
and the WTO regimes. 
In accordance with the preamble of the GPA and Article 18(1) of the EU Procurement 
Directive, transparency is a core principle in public procurement law. Unsurprisingly, 
transparency is referred to repeatedly also elsewhere throughout the GPA1068 and the 
directive1069. Transparency is strengthened by the fact that in accordance with Article 
X(7) GPA, as well as articles in the EU public procurement directive,1070 the technical 
specifications, award criteria and any contract performance clauses must be published 
                                                 
1067 Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. 31 (Contract Cost Principles and Procedures); 
Competition in Contracting Act, 41 U.S.C. 253 (Public Contracts, Competition Requirements). See also 
Kate M. Manuel, ‘Competition in Federal Contracting: An Overview of the Legal Requirements’ (2011) 
Congressional Research Service, R40516. 
1068 Articles IV(4), V(3), XVI and XVIII(1), Agreement on Government Procurement, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
508 (Text available at 1915 U.N.T.S. 103), with Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, Geneva 30.3.2012 (amendments entered into force 2014). 
1069 See e.g. recitals 1, 45, 58, 68, 80, 82, 90, 110, 114 and 126 as well as articles 40, 56(2) and 58(3) and 
the heading of section 2, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65 
1070 Art. 42(1) and 67(5), Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; 
Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, paras 31, 36; Case C-513/99 
Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-
Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 62; Case C-225/98 Commission v. France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) 
[2000] ECR I-7445, para. 51; Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-
14527, para. 34. Similarly required for the selection criteria as stipulated in Art. 58(5), Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
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in advance in the tender documents. In addition, authorities must also indicate the 
importance of each evaluation (i.e. award) criterion. EU directives even require that 
weights or at least a range of values are assigned, unless not possible for objective 
reasons.1071  
A number of legal tests that give further meaning to the transparency principle have 
been developed. For example, criteria applied at any stage of the procurement process 
must also be precise in accordance with EU directives.1072 The criteria are sufficiently 
precise in case all parties would interpret them similarly.1073 Precise criteria published 
in advance serve the objective of transparency. Moreover, award criteria must be 
objectively quantifiable in order to guarantee transparency, clarity and precision.1074  
It should be pointed out that even if the lack of precision reduces transparency, it allows 
public authorities to benefit more from professional judgment.1075 In other words, a 
more lenient precision requirement leaves the public authority with a degree of 
flexibility. Flexibility can be beneficial when determining which bid offers most value 
for money. For example, some bids may offer innovative sustainability benefits that the 
authority did not realize to ask for in the call. Given the fact that precision has both pros 
and cons, the precision requirement might not necessarily be equally strict under the 
GPA as it has been in EU law. This interpretation is supported by the fact that efficient 
management of resources is an objective referred to in the preamble of the GPA. That 
objective could benefit from an approach that is sufficiently flexible.  
                                                 
1071 Art. 67(5), Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1072 For reference to the requirement of precise technical specifications see Art. 42(3), Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. See also Art. 26(4)(a)(iv), 29(1) and 31(1). 
With reference to precision of award criteria see Peter Kunzlik, ‘Making the Market Work for the 
Environment - The Acceptance of (Some) Environmental Award Criteria in Public Procurement’ (2003) 
15 Journal of Environmental Law 175, 198. 
1073 Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction Ltd v. County Council of the County of Mayo [2001] ECR I-7725, 
para. 42; Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, para. 88; 
Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 2011) 38.  
1074 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin 
kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 66; Katriina Alhola, Environmental Criteria 
in Public Procurement – Focus on Tender Documents (Edita 2012) 23. 
1075 Simon J. Evenett, ‘Is There a Case for New Multilateral Rules on Transparency in Government 
Procurement?’, in Simon J. Evenett (ed.) The Singapore Issues and the World Trading System: The Road 
to Cancun and Beyond (Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft 2003) 169; Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Transparency in 
Government Procurement: The Objectives of Regulation and the Boundaries of the World Trade 
Organization’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 283; Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Reviewing the GPA: The Role 
and Development of the Plurilateral Agreement After Doha’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic 
Law 761. 
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The principle of transparency, along with the principles of equal treatment 
(impartiality) and non-discrimination, has been interpreted to require that criteria at any 
stage of the procurement process must be such that compliance can be verified.1076 In 
the seminal Wienstrom case the Austrian authority purchased electricity. The criteria 
for the award of the contract favored companies generating the energy from renewable 
resources. However, no mechanism of verifying compliance with such criteria had been 
put in place by the authority. Consequently, the procurement process was in breach of 
the principles of equal treatment and transparency.1077 
The ECJ has stated that sustainability criteria cannot be designed so as to leave the 
public authority with an unrestricted freedom of discretion.1078 It is specified in the 
recital of the Public Procurement Directive that unrestricted freedom of discretion is to 
be avoided in order to ensure effective and fair competition.1079 The principles of 
transparency and equal treatment shall guarantee that competition is effective and 
fair.1080 The two principles are in other words mutually supportive.  
During the negotiations resulting in the draft of the new GPA, countries had decided to 
focus on questions of transparency and not to deal with non-discrimination and market 
access. 1081 The decision was however questionable because of the strong links between 
the principles. The requirements of advance information, precision and verifiability will 
promote transparency and thus also improve equal treatment and reduce the risk of 
discrimination. Consequently, competition between market participants will be more 
                                                 
1076 Luca Tosoni, ‘The Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU 
Procurement Rules from a Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Rev. 41, 45. See also Peter Kunzlik, ‘International Procurement Regimes and the Scope 
for Inclusion of Environmental Factors in Public Procurement’ (2004) OECD Journal on Budgeting 109. 
1077 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, paras 44-52. 
1078 On award criteria see Art. 67(4), Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 
28.3.2014, 65. See also Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, para. 26; 
Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin 
kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 61; Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom 
GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, para. 37; Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction Ltd v. County Council 
of the County of Mayo [2001] ECR I-7725, paras 36-37; Christopher Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law 
(2nd ed., Edward Elgar 2012) 414-415. 
1079 Recital 92, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1080 Recitals 90 and 92, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1081 Simon J. Evenett, ‘Is There a Case for New Multilateral Rules on Transparency in Government 
Procurement?’ in Simon J. Evenett (ed.) The Singapore Issues and the World Trading System: The Road 
to Cancun and Beyond (Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft 2003) 169. 
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efficient. In other words, the tests of verifiability and precision would seem to be closely 
linked to free trade. 
The verifiability and precision tests in procurement law ensure that the adopted criteria 
are clear and are applied transparently. Public procurement thus serves to illustrate that 
the transparency principle can be, and has already been, integrated into economic law. 
It has been applied to limit the risks of discriminatory design of for example PPM-
criteria and other sustainability criteria. Could the transparency principle, and more 
specifically the requirements of precise and verifiable criteria, also apply in trade law? 
4.2.2.3. The GATT – Unambigous Criteria with Transparent Application 
GATT-jurisprudence would suggest that the principles of transparency and objectivity 
are viewed as general principles of international trade law. For example, in EC – 
Conditions for granting Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries the AB examined 
the decision by the EU to rely on the Enabling Clause in offering lower tariffs for some, 
but not all developing states. The conclusion was that despite the requirement under 
Article I GATT to award all states the same benefits awarded to any other state, the 
Enabling Clause still granted states the option to differentiate between developing 
states, provided that the criteria for receiving the preferential treatment were transparent 
and objective.1082 The case appeared to establish a requirement of transparency in the 
application of criteria. 
The application of the principles of transparency and objectivity in the decision in EC 
– Conditions for granting Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries resulted in a 
requirement that criteria included in laws differentiating between different developing 
countries are applied in a transparent and objective manner. There have been additional 
cases that have touched upon either the question of whether the criteria themselves are 
transparent and unambiguous or upon the question of whether the criteria are applied 
in a transparent way. As illustrated below, the principle would appear to be generally 
applicable under GATT and thus not merely a principle applied in connection to the 
Enabling Clause. 
Article XI:1 GATT prohibits restrictions on imports and exports with the exception of 
duties, taxes and other charges. Recently in Indonesia – Chicken the panel, among other 
                                                 
1082 EC – Conditions for granting Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, DS246, AB Report, 7 April 
2004, paras 162-163, 183. 
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things, assessed whether a requirement of “direct importation” was in breach of Article 
XI:1. The panel found that the Indonesian requirement should not be interpreted to 
mean that imports from Brazil to Indonesia could not transit through ports in third 
countries. It concluded that there was not uncertainty as to how the Indonesian law was 
applied. Therefore, the panel did not rule on the question as to whether murky language 
in importation criteria could create a breach of Article XI.1083 
Earlier, in 2014, a panel had applied Article XI on an Argentinian system of sworn 
import declarations. Importers had to make a declaration and certain Argentinian 
authorities could enter observations that halted the importation process until further 
information was provided by the importer. The panel found that the declaration 
procedure applied by Argentina was in breach of Article XI GATT because there were 
no specific provisions or limitations to what information or documents the authorities 
could require. In the view of the panel this created too much uncertainty for 
importers.1084 The case may be understood to indicate that GATT includes some 
expectation of transparency. Criteria for market access and trade states must be 
sufficiently precise and transparent. 
The case law described above would suggest that the proportionality review includes a 
requirement that sustainability criteria introduced by states are transparent and 
sufficiently clear to enable objective application. In addition, the model of verifying 
compliance with the criteria must also be carried out in a transparent way and on the 
basis of predetermined objective criteria. The potential requirement for clarity of 
applicable criteria and transparency in their application is important.1085 Namely, 
transparency makes it easier to identify any discrimination in the implementation and 
application of measures adopted with the objective of tackling externalities.  
                                                 
1083 Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken Meat and Chicken Products, DS484, 
Panel Report, 17 Oct. 2017, paras 7.601-611. 
1084 Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, DS438, DS444 and DS445, Panel Report, 
22 Aug. 2014, paras 6.465-469, 6.474 and 6.479. 
1085 Brühwiler and Hauser argue that the criteria must be transparent and that informed consumers should 
be able to associate the distinction between sustainable and unsustainable PPMs with a particular product. 
They also argue that more extensive and complicated criteria could be more problematic from the 
perspective of GATT. See Claudia Franziska Brühwiler and Heinz Hauser, ‘Biofuels and WTO 
Disciplines’ (2008) 63 Aussenwirtschaft 7, 26-27. Yet, it is submitted here that credible science would 
support models with more factors. 
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4.2.2.4. Transparency as Part of EU Free Movement Law 
There has been discussion in the context of EU law on whether the principle of 
transparency would apply even to EU public procurement that falls outside the scope 
of the procurement directives, despite the fact that this principle is traditionally a 
principle specific to procurement law. The debated question is in other words whether 
the transparency principle also can be derived from the TFEU. In case the principle 
could be derived from the Treaty, it would apply to public procurement outside the 
scope of the directives at least when there is a cross-border interest.  
In a number of cases on the interpretation of free movement law in the context of public 
procurement decisions not falling under the directives, the ECJ has concluded that 
transparency as a principle can be dervied from the non-discrimination principle and 
that direct award of contracts without prior publication of a call for tenders would 
breach the transparency principle.1086 The Commission has endorsed this approach.1087 
The application of procurement principles to contracts not covered by the directives is 
fairly controversial,1088 as it is not evident which Treaty provisions such interpretation 
would rely on. Some have argued that while the transparency principle might apply to 
some cases of procurement that fall outside the scope of the directives, it would not 
apply other cases, such as when the value of the contract is below the thresholds in the 
directives or when procurement is explicitly exempted from the application of the 
directives.1089 Advocate General Sharpston has accepted the relevance of the 
                                                 
1086 Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, joined 
party: Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745, paras 60-62. See also Case C-458/03 Parking 
Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585, paras 48-50; Case C-
412/04 Commission v. Italy [2008] ECR I-619, para. 66; Case C-220/06 Asociación Profesional de 
Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia v. Administración General del Estado 
(Correos) [2007] ECR I-12175, para. 76; C-260/04 Commission v. Italy (Horse-race betting) [2007] 
ECR I-7083, para. 25; Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d’Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale [2008] ECR I-8457, para. 25. See also case C-250/07 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECR I-
4369, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, para. 10. 
1087 Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not 
or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives [2006] OJ C 179, 1.8.2006, 2. 
1088 Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik, ‘EC Regulation of Public Procurement’, in Sue Arrowsmith and 
Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and 
New Directions (CUP 2009) 83-86. 
1089 Case C-525/03 Commission v. Italy [2005] ECR I-9405, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para. 47; Berend Jan 
Drijber and Hélène Stergiou, ‘Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law’ (2009) 46 Common 
Market Law Rev. 805, 844. 
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transparency principle under free movement provisions but criticized the Commission 
for failing to explain how it is derived from free movement rules. 1090  
The principle of transparency might be a principle of not only trade and procurement 
law, but EU law in general. Some argue that good governance is part of the acquis 
communautaire despite a lack of any reference in the Treaties.1091 The principle of good 
governance could be said to cover transparency1092 in the work of public authorities. 
In any case, it is undeniable that transparency occasionally has been recognized as a 
principle of EU free movement law due to its close relationship with the non-
discrimination principle. Since all cases cited above concerned public procurement 
decisions, could the principle be referred to in the interpretation of free movement 
provisions also outside that specific context? Indeed, the ECJ has ruled that criteria for 
the reimbursement of cross-border health care must be objective, non-discriminatory 
and transparent.1093 Similarly, when reviewing the proportionality of requirements of 
government approval for certain activities, the ECJ has stated that there must be a 
transparent procedure with precise criteria for receiving approval.1094 As was the case 
under GATT, the transparency principle has in the case law occasionally been applied 
as creating a requirement of unambiguous criteria and transparent application of the 
criteria.  
To sum up, no matter what criteria are adopted by a state, they should be clear, precise 
and compliance with the criteria should be verifiable. It is submitted that the tests, 
which are already very familiar to procurement law, have through the application of the 
transparency principle given additional force to the proportionality review in trade law. 
                                                 
1090 Case C-195/04 Commission v. Finland [2007] ECR I-3351, Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 52-56, 
83-87. Sharpston also argues that the scope of the transparency and equal treatment principles is 
sometimes more limited than for cases where the directives apply. In other words, the requirement on 
publication of a low value contract would be less strict than for contract reaching the thresholds set in 
the directives. 
1091 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 235, 242-243. 
1092 Friedl Weiss and Silke Steiner, ‘Transparency as an Element of Good Governance in the Practice of 
the EU and the WTO: Overview and Comparison’ (2006) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 1545. 
1093 Case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA 
and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509, 
para. 107; Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust 
and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 142. 
1094 Case C-483/99 Commission v. France [2002] ECR I-4781, para. 50; Case C-250/06 United Pan-
Europe Communications Belgium SA and Others v. Belgian State [2007] ECR I-11135, para. 46. See 
also Berend Jan Drijber and Hélène Stergiou, ‘Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law’ (2009) 
46 Common Market Law Rev. 805, 817-821. 
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4.2.3. Due Process Requirements 
During the legislative process biofuels sustainability criteria companies in the sector 
will have used their voice to influence the legislator. Drafting the PPM-criteria for the 
market is, however, merely an initial step. After the criteria have been drafted they need 
still to be applied or, in case they are criteria mandatory for market access, enforced. 
Economic operators will want to verify that the criteria are applied in an identical 
manner to them as to other operators. This is in part an interest furthered by government 
transparency, as discussed already above. 
Fair and equal application and enforcement of the criteria is also advanced by the 
existence of due process rights. In other words, biofuels companies on the market will 
have an interest in participation in the process of evaluating compliance with the 
criteria. Could due process form an element of relevance in the proportionality review 
in trade law? 
The proportionality review primarily ensures the justifiability of the design of adopted 
state measures. The test is often applied to strike a balance between on the one hand the 
objective of facilitating non-discriminatory trade and on the other hand environmental 
protection or some other non-trade objective. However, the test could also form 
expectations with regards to the procedural rights in the implementation and 
enforcement of the adopted PPM criteria.1095 For example, it could be argued that 
schemes applicable under EU RED for certification of sustainable biofuels should 
award traders of biofuel sufficient procedural rights, in particular when the trader has 
been denied sustainability certificates.1096 This type of due process requirements would 
not as such limit the possibility to use strict and far-reaching PPM-criteria. 
The idea that measures may only be proportional if they contain some minimum 
procedural rights is not unfamiliar to the ECJ. Mandatory certification must be 
accompanied by fair procedural elements. This can be derived from Dynamic Medien, 
which concerned import of cartoons that had been labelled in the UK as suitable for 
                                                 
1095 Christiane R. Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law – Interfacing trade 
and social goals (CUP 2011) 359-360. 
1096 The biofuels producer may seek certification of compliance with the EU sustainability criteria by 
providing independently audited data and evidence to the Member State in question or, more commonly, 
by participating in an often privately administered voluntary sustainability verification scheme that has 
been approved by the Commission. See Article 18, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and 
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
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over 15-year olds. On moral grounds Germany implemented a requirement of national 
examination and re-certification of appropriate age limit. According to the ruling by the 
ECJ, the measure could be proportionate provided that certification was accessible for 
imports, could be assigned within reasonable time and could be appealed.1097 These 
procedural requirements should equally apply for any criteria on PPM certification. 
A similar pattern can be found in WTO jurisprudence. First, let us recall that the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT requires that no measures result in arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination. Wiers has characterized this form of proportionality 
review as a reasonableness test.1098 What is then arbitrary, unjustifiable or 
unreasonable? The AB has merely outlined that it must be evaluated in casu.1099  
In US – Shrimp the AB found that the principle of proportionality is linked to such 
ideals as transparency, predictability and procedural fairness. The AB concluded that 
the test of arbitrary discrimination creates a requirement that producers with interest in 
sustainability certification should have the right to be heard, get a decision in writing 
and should have the option to appeal.1100 It may be pointed out that that due process 
requirements apply also in public procurement law,1101 which is another field of 
economic law. Procurement law includes, among other things, the right to get a decision 
in writing and the right to appeal.1102 
These requirements applied in US – Shrimp under Article XX GATT also reflect similar 
ideals as Article X GATT.1103 In that article it has been stipulated, among other things, 
that states shall administer laws and regulations in a uniform, impartial and reasonable 
manner. A right to a review in customs matters is also included in the article, equally 
reflecting the ideal of due process. 
                                                 
1097 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-505, para. 50. 
See also Case C-344/90 Commission v. France [1992] ECR I-4719, para. 9; Case C-95/01 Criminal 
Proceedings against John Greenham and Léonard Abel [2004] ECR I-1333, para. 35.  
1098 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 249. 
1099 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12. Oct. 1998, 
para. 159. 
1100 Id. paras 177-183. 
1101 Geert van Calster, ‘Green Procurement and the WTO – Shades of Grey’ (2002) 11 Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 298, 305. See also Sue Arrowsmith, 
Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer 2003) 348. 
1102 See e.g. Articles XVI and XVIII GPA. 
1103 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12. Oct. 1998, 
paras 182-183. 
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It could be argued that Article X GATT and the values it reflects is not per se a sufficient 
ground for reading the principles of transparency and procedural fairness as part of the 
chapeau of Article XX. It could therefore perhaps be questioned whether there is a basis 
for these values to be factors in the review of measures such as PPM sustainability 
verification implemented at the border.1104 Moreover, due process requirements may 
stem from the application of other fields of law. Therefore, it could be argued that there 
is no need to consider them in the value reconciliation of proportionality in trade law. 
However, case law referred to above support the conclusion that due process rights have 
made their way into the proportionality review in international trade law despite the 
fact that the legal basis for it is unclear. This development has taken place even if norms 
outside the scope of trade law might also provide guarantees for due process.  Trade 
law simply reinforces the status of due process in law. 
All in all, in law of justification non-discrimination and the ground of justification, such 
as environmental protection, are to be reconciled and they may both serve an efficiency 
objective. The values underlying non-discrimination and the ground of justification are, 
however, not the only values reconciled in law of justification. Values underlying due 
process rights, such as transparency, predictability and procedural fairness, may also 
have to be taken into account. 
4.2.4. Transitional Provisions 
Companies have interests and expectations toward the legislating state beyond due 
process rights. One such interest is regulatory certainty. Regulatory certainty is a 
narrower concept than legal certainty. Legal certainty relates to the expectation that the 
interpretation of the law does not change from case to case and is a core value as part 
of rule of law, which in turn is a fundamental element of modern democracies. 
Regulatory certainty, in turn, merely represents expectations that the content of written 
statutes, including any rules on sustainability criteria, do not change all too frequently 
and suddenly. In other words, the statutes should have a sufficient degree of stability.  
Regulatory certainty is valuable for the protection of property. Sudden and major 
changes in the rules on PPMs could deprive investments of their value. Regulatory 
certainty ensures trust in the legislator and is important for companies making long-
                                                 
1104 Dale Arthur Oesterle, ‘Just Say ‘I Don’t Know’: A Recommendation for WTO Panels Dealing with 
Environmental Regulations’ (2001) 3 Environmental L. Rev. 113, 127-128. 
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term investments. Hence, it is beneficial for the society as a whole. Regulatory certainty 
is advanced by inserting transitional provisions into new legislation. A transitional 
provision allows for a reasonable transition period between the date to of adopting new 
PPM-criteria and the date from which onwards the new criteria apply. 
In US – Shrimp the AB emphasized that the phase-in period could at least not be 
different for various countries.1105 The ECJ has gone even further when it found that 
without transitional provisions a law may be disproportional. For example, new strict 
requirements with reference to morals or environmental protection shall not be 
implemented without a sufficient transitional period for companies to be able to 
adapt.1106  In other words, there must be sufficient time between adopting the new 
criteria and the date when the new criteria become applicable. 
In conclusion, in trade law the reconciliation of the objectives of non-discrimination 
and the elimination of externalities includes also considerations of regulatory certainty. 
As with due process requirements, these considerations enhance societal efficiency 
beyond the elimination of the targeted externalities. 
4.2.5. Grandfathering Provisions and Secondary Objectives 
Transitional provisions might differentiate between old facilities and new facilities. The 
new criteria might apply immediately to new production facilities, whereas old facilities 
might be grandfathered. Could a very long, perhaps even indefinite, transitional period 
for some pre-existing facilities or operations be disproportional? 
Erixon has highlighted a number of elements of the EU biofuels sustainability scheme 
that he claims may increase discriminatory effects, have barely any link to the 
environmental objective and could therefore form arbitrary discrimination.1107  
Grandfathering provisions, which exempt old facilities from new stricter GHG savings 
requirements, are among the examples mentioned by Erixon. However, in cases where 
some elements of the sustainability criteria cannot be defended purely on environmental 
                                                 
1105 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12. Oct. 1998, 
paras 173-174. 
1106 Case C-463/01 Commission v. Germany [2004] ECR I-11705, para. 79; Case C-320/03 Commission 
v. Austria [2005] ECR I-9871, para. 90. See also Ioannis Lianos, 'Shifting Narratives in the European 
Internal Market: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the Nature of “Economic” Integration' (2010) 21 
European Business L. Rev. 705, 748; Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti (eds.), 
European Union Law – Text and Materials (3rd ed., CUP 2014) 785. 
1107 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 20-22. 
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grounds, it could be that states offer other reasons for introducing them. The objective 
with grandfathering provisions is to protect the expectations and confidence of 
investors. Could it not be that such secondary objective would be sufficient to justify 
grandfathering and form a valid defense against claims of an arbitrarily designed 
sustainability scheme? 
Legitimate secondary objectives were discussed in EC – Seals. While the primary 
objective was not environmental but moral protection, it still illustrates the key 
principles. EC – Seals concerned an EU ban on sales and imports of seal products. The 
EU accepted three exemptions to the ban. First, seals caught for marine resource 
management purposes could be imported. This exemption was unlikely to increase any 
discriminatory effects and was in any case related to a legitimate environmental 
objective. Secondly, there was hardly any discriminatory effect in allowing travelers to 
bring seal products with them as part of their personal goods. The third and final 
exemption, however, raised objections from Norway and Canada. Namely, seals caught 
by indigenous people were allowed on the market. In practice, the provision was 
applied to primarily to ensure market access for seals sold by Greenlandic Inuits.  
The EU admitted that the rationale behind the exemption for seals caught by indigenous 
people was neither moral protection nor animal welfare. It, however, argued that the 
secondary objectives of protecting the indigenous culture and assisting the transition of 
the Inuit community economically to modern society justified the exemption. While the 
AB appeared to accept the idea that elements of a law could be justified on the basis of 
a rational connection to some secondary objectives, it concluded that the reasons in this 
specific case were too closely linked to economic and not to legitimate objectives. In 
the view of the AB it would be too difficult in the enforcement procedure to differentiate 
between seal trade that is part of a cultural tradition and seal trade that is 
commercial.1108 Therefore, the measure did not comply with the GATT. 
There is great merit in the recognition of multiple legitimate objectives. Laws are rarely 
designed with only one objective in mind. This is particularly evident in the field of 
energy. That being said, EC – Seals leaves questions unanswered. What is the scope of 
legitimate secondary objectives? There should be no difficulty to argue that the grounds 
                                                 
1108 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.320-327. 
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of justification listed in Article XX are all relevant. Yet, the AB did not seem to view 
it necessary to link the protection of indigenous cultures to any of those objectives. 
As highlighted by Oesterle already long before the case of EC – Seals, it is far from 
apparent how one should tackle cases of mixed motives.1109 At this point, with no real 
precedent, it is perhaps sufficient to note that the AB has proclaimed that the chapeau 
is guided by the principle of sustainable development.1110 Thus, it could be argued that 
apart from the environmental dimension, also social and economic sustainability could 
be taken into account. Yet, the AB appeared to quite explicitly reject the economic 
dimension in EC – Seals. 
Returning to the example of biofuels sustainability criteria, what secondary objectives 
could potentially be presented in defense of discriminatory elements? A common 
secondary objective in the field of energy has been security of supply. In fact, it would 
seem to form part of at least U.S. and Brazilian biofuels policy.1111 While it may 
constitute a legitimate objective within the framework of GATT,1112 its scope of 
application may be too limited to justify any elements of biofuels sustainability criteria. 
It is plausible that security of supply would justify discriminatory measures in the 
energy sector only in case the state without the application of the measure would not 
have enough energy to guarantee the basic functions of society.1113 Schemes promoting 
biofuels through the application of sustainability criteria will likely not be necessary 
for ensuring that the state has access to in-state energy of a magnitude that covers the 
absolute minimum supply of energy necessary to ensure only the most basic functions 
of society. The U.S., the EU and Brazil likely have such minimum in-state access 
without any biofuels schemes, at least if the level is estimated to be perhaps around 15-
                                                 
1109 Dale Arthur Oesterle, ‘Just Say ‘I Don’t Know’: A Recommendation for WTO Panels Dealing with 
Environmental Regulations’ (2001) 3 Environmental L. Rev. 113, 119-122. 
1110 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 153-155. 
1111 Doaa Abdel Motaal, ‘The Biofuels Landscape: Is There a Role for the WTO?’ (2008) 42 J. World 
Trade 61, 62-63. 
1112 See section 3.1.8.4. 
1113 In EU law security of supply has been regarded as a legitimate ground of justification only in the 
extremely rare case that without the trade restrictive measure the state would not have enough energy 
access to guarantee the basic functions of society. See Case 72/83 Campus Oil limited and others v 
Minister for Industry and Energy and others [1984] ECR 2727, paras 34, 47-49. See also Carlos Padros 
and Endrius E. Cocciolo, ‘Security of Energy Supply: When Could National Policy Take Precedence 
Over European Law?’ (2010) 31 Energy L. J., 31; Eugene D. Cross, Leigh Hancher and Piet J. Slot, ’EC 
Energy Law’, in Martha Roggenkamp, Anita Rønne, Catherine Redgwell and Iñigo del Guayo (eds.), 
Energy Law in Europe – National, EU and International Law and Institutions (OUP 2001) 227. 
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20 % of normal consumption.1114 The lack of access to imported biofuels may not be 
expected to contribute to any public health crisis. Thus, any objective of security of 
supply in justifying a biofuels policy with discriminatory effects, would risk crossing 
the line of prohibited protectionist intentions with no rational relation to legitimate 
objectives. 
Regulatory certainty might in turn form a legitimate secondary objective. It protects 
legitimate expectations and investor confidence. Thus, it would likely be invoked when 
justifying grandfathering provisions. At a first glance, grandfathering provisions might 
appear to set limitations on the environmental objectives. However, without 
grandfathering provisions operators may in the long-term become more risk averse and 
not invest in new environmentally beneficial technology. In other words, with frequent 
changes in law there may be too much uncertainty for new environmentally beneficial 
projects to be launched. Despite their partially economic character, the secondary 
objectives of regulatory certainty and investor confidence appear legitimate because 
they may be linked to environmental protection. The fact that with grandfathering 
provisions the transitional period will be shorter for new facilities than for old facilities 
may in turn be justified with reference to the environmental benefits of applying the 
new stricter rules on new facilities sooner rather than later.  
Regulatory certainty could form a legitimate secondary objective also in EU free 
movement law in particular as it will enhance the stability of the system. The ECJ has 
introduced the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security 
system as a legitimate objective for limits on the reimbursement of hospital care 
services purchased out-of-state.1115 More recently, the idea of system stability as a 
                                                 
1114 Article 8(4), Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 September 
1996, concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ L27, 13.1.1997, 20. See also 
Eugene D. Cross – Leigh Hancher – Piet J. Slot, EC Energy Law, in Martha Roggenkamp – Anita Rønne 
– Catherine Redgwell – Iñigo del Guayo (eds.), Energy Law in Europe – National, EU and International 
Law and Institutions (OUP, 2001) 227.  
1115 Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 41; Case 
C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v. Alliance nationale des mutualités chrétiennes (ANMC) 
[2001] ECR I-5363, para. 47; Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and 
H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, paras. 72–81; Case C-
385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. 
van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509, paras. 77–
82; Case C-56/01 Patricia Inizan v. Caisse primaire d'assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2003] 
E.C.R. I-12403, para. 56; Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v. Bedford 
Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I- 4325, paras. 112–113. Compare 
with case C-204/90 Hanns-Martin Bachmann v. Belgium [1992] ECR I-249, paras. 21–28. In this latter 
case, the need for cohesion of the tax system justified a restriction on the free movement of workers. See 
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ground of justification has in cases on electricity trade become an important ally to the 
objective of environmental protection.1116 This idea can be transposed to the analysis 
of grandfathering clauses. Without grandfathering clauses, investors may become 
careful and the financial markets would become dysfunctional, resulting in less 
investments in sustainable solutions. Ideally grandfathering would still not be indefinite 
but would instead be phased out during a sufficient transitional period. It may also be 
noted that while grandfathering provisions in a particular case will favor old facilities 
over new facilities, from a long-term perspective the regulatory certainty advanced by 
grandfathering will constitute an interest of all operators. 
4.2.6. Trade, Environment, Societal Efficiency and Values Beyond Efficiency 
Transparency and due process rights improve the possibility to hold states accountable 
for disguised restrictions on trade and other illegal protectionism. Accountability, in 
turn, is a fundamental element of democracy. The fact that transparency and due 
process rights have become part of the proportionality review both under GATT and 
TFEU can be viewed as strengthening the democratic legitimacy of trade law. This 
concerns also WTO law, applicable to the relationship between nation states, even if 
there is no democracy within some of the nation states that are members. 
States that introduce discriminatory criteria do not only need to show that the measure 
is necessary for a legitimate objective. The states must also design the criteria carefully 
so that they are clear and precise and apply the criteria in a transparent manner. In 
addition, states must ensure that the measure has been accompanied with certain 
procedural guarantees for private market participants. For example, in decisions on 
whether the products of importers comply with sustainability criteria they should have 
the right to be heard, get a decision in writing and have the option to appeal. These 
rights ensure an effective access to justice and allows private market participants to 
participate in decisions that affect them. The procedural guarantees also increase 
transparency, equal treatment and a sense of fair treatment, which at least in theory 
should reduce the risks of arbitrary decisions. Transparency and equal treatment are 
                                                 
also Max S. Jansson, ‘EU’s kompetens i fråga om hälsovårdstjänster’ (2011) 3-4 Nordisk Socialrättslig 
Tidskrift 95. 
1116 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, paras 99, 103; 
Joined cases C-204/12 to 208/12 Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits - en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192, paras 101-102, 109; See also Max S. Jansson, ‘Free 
Movement of Electricity and the Revival of System Stability Justifications’ (2017) 18 German Law 
Journal 595, 611-614. 
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already established principles in procurement law and their emergence in trade law 
would indicate some similarities across economic law. 
Apart from transparency and due process rights it was also argued that regulatory 
certainty is a value that ought to be reconciled with the objectives of non-discrimination 
and the elimination of (environmental) externalities. The interest in regulatory certainty 
that biofuel companies possess is linked to their right to property.1117 From a societal 
perspective the same interest is important for the reason that without some regulatory 
certainty investments will diminish and both market growth and stability may be 
endangered. 
Furthermore, since insufficient protection of rights of private market participants could 
render state measures arbitrary, it appears logical that the objective to protect rights of 
that nature also forms a valid secondary objective that serves to justify elements of state 
laws that cannot be justified by the primary legitimate objective of the measure. For 
example, when new biofuels sustainability criteria are introduced states have decided 
to exempt old facilities. The objective of this so called grandfathering is to protect the 
expectations that market participants likely have had when they invested in production 
that complied with the sustainability criteria that were in force at the time of investment. 
Grandfathering should still not be indefinite. 
Transparency, transition periods and due process rights all strengthen predictability, 
which in turn is valuable for a well-functioning and efficient society. Predictability and 
grandfathering both improve investor confidence. All this would suggest that the 
reconciliation of non-discrimination and grounds of justification under the 
proportionality review takes into account efficiency from a broad societal perspective. 
That being said, transparency, due process and regulatory certainty may also be 
perceived to represent other societal values than efficiency. These elements represent 
values of good governance, which in turn is linked to rule of law and a widely accepted 
view on fair and just treatment in administrative proceedings. Moreover, it was already 
noted above that transparency and due process could be linked to democratic ideals. 
                                                 
1117 The status of the right to property as a fundamental right held by even legal persons is very much 
contested. However, Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (Paris 
20.3.1952) still sets out that legal persons shall not be deprived of their possessions unless there is a 
public interest. 
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Thus, efficiency from a broad societal perspective is closely intertwined with other core 
societal values. 
4.3. Methods for Certification and Verification of Sustainability 
4.3.1. Certification and Verification of Compliance with PPM-Criteria 
In designing sustainability criteria states will define what is to be considered sustainable 
and what is to be considered unsustainable. The scope of the environmental effects and 
the phases of the life-cycle that are targeted with the sustainability criteria relate to the 
definition of products that are to be classified as sustainable. The relationship between 
trade law and different models for defining sustainability were discussed in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. However, sustainability criteria include not only 
elements that determine the scope of what is sustainable, but also who should comply 
with the criteria. Hence, some thoughts were offered on what groups of producers that 
could be required to comply with the sustainability criteria. 
Yet, criteria on the sustainability of PPMs also require a model for the certification of 
the level of effects or the compliance with criteria on the characteristics of the PPMs. 
The certification of sustainability can be carried out by state officials. Some models, 
however, rely on certification by independent private companies. This leaves for the 
state only the task of surveillance and verification that certificates are authentic and 
have been produced correctly. 
The focus of this third and final section of the chapter will be on different models for 
the certification and verification of sustainability. It will in particular be examined 
under what circumstances different methods of sustainability certification can be 
applied for products of different origin. The objective with the analysis is to identify 
the values underlying the principles on sustainability certification methods that have 
been developed from the application of trade law tests. 
4.3.2. Irreversible Geographical Proxies for Level of Sustainability 
4.3.2.1. Product Average Value for Imports 
A state that develops criteria for the characteristics of the PPMs will likely certify or 
verify that individual in-state producers or products comply with the criteria. Similarly, 
with criteria on the level of environmental effects the state will certify or verify the 
exact level of effects attributed to individual in-state producers or products. In turn, due 
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to the administrative costs and difficulties of verifying the PPMs or the level of effects 
for imports, the state might decide to assign imports a benefit that corresponds with the 
benefits awarded to products with an average level of sustainability. This represents a 
form of average value model. 
There have been significant variety among implemented average value models. 
California’s regulation of the electricity sector represents one example of an average 
value model. Under California’s model imported electricity may be confirmed to come 
from a specific source if certain stringent, perhaps even too stringent, conditions are 
met, whereas imports of unspecified source will be assigned an emissions value that is 
slightly below the average value.1118 Another average value model in connection to the 
sustainability of PPMs was examined by the ECJ in Outokumpu. Finland had adopted 
different tax rates for electricity from renewable resources and non-renewables. In turn, 
an average tax rate was applied for electricity imported to Finland because of 
difficulties verifying the PPM. The system, however, treated exactly identically 
generated domestic and imported power differently. The ECJ stated that such system 
was in breach of EU free movement law at least when individual certification was 
categorically denied for imported power.1119  
In the case of electricity, reliable individual certification may of course be difficult in 
practice. Still, models which build on presumptions linked to state origin need to be 
complemented by a possibility for individual sustainability certification. The ECJ in 
Outokumpu did not consider it impossible to verify the PPM of imported electricity. 
This is even more so now when Article 15 of the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive1120 
requires states to issue guarantees of origin for electricity from renewable energy 
resources and Article 19 of RED 2 will require GOs to be issued for not just electricity, 
but any energy from renewables1121.  
                                                 
1118 Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 111-120 and 162-164. In the article Alcorn also discusses various methods to verify 
the source of the electricity that California has taken into account and others that it perhaps should have 
taken into account. 
1119 Case C-213/96 Outokumpu Oy [1998] ECR I-1777, paras 37-41. 
1120 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
1121 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 19(2). 
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A slightly different type of average value model was the subject of dispute in US – 
Gasoline. The U.S. had adopted a scheme to improve the quality (i.e. sustainability) of 
gasoline. The quality of both U.S. and imported gasoline was calculated on an 
individual basis for each refiner, blender and importer. However, instead of requiring 
that all gasoline meet the same standard of quality, the U.S. established a system where 
refiners, blenders and importers were assigned an individual sustainability benchmark. 
In other words, the definition of sustainable gasoline was different for each company. 
The quality of gasoline that each party offered on the U.S. market had to be better than 
what the same party had offered in 1990. In case data was not available, domestic 
refiners could rely on data from their blenders and if that data was also not available 
they could rely on an estimation made on the basis of newer data. In contrast, importers 
with no own 1990 data were assigned a value corresponding to the U.S. market average 
of 1990. Importers had to meet the U.S. average in respect of several elements. Only 3 
per cent of domestic U.S. refiners actually met the average on each account. The system 
was thus clearly discriminatory.  
The panel in US – Gasoline concluded that the measure did not pass the proportionality 
review as importers did not have an equal opportunity to rely on individual calculations 
instead of average values.1122 The analysis of the AB differed to some extent. However, 
in the end the AB also found that it was in breach of the chapeau of Article XX GATT 
to deny importers calculations of individual benchmarks on the same conditions as was 
granted for other parties. The alternative of granting similar benchmarks for all was 
reasonably available because, despite some practical challenges, there are techniques 
to check, verify and assess data relating to imported goods.1123 
Outokumpu and US – Gasoline highlight the need for the option of individual 
certification of the sustainability of the PPMs at least when such certification is offered 
to in-state products. Yet, the average benefits or emissions might still serve as a default 
value. This default value can be relied on by companies when the individual 
sustainability level of a product or producers cannot be verified. The state must 
                                                 
1122 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 January 1996, 
paras 6.25-29. 
1123 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 
25-29. 
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naturally be careful in how it calculates the average.1124 In other words, the average 
cannot be calculated so that only a few per cent actually meet the average, as was the 
case in US – Gasoline. 
The problematic characteristics of average value models have also been discussed in 
the context of U.S. law.1125 The same approach might well apply under the dormant 
Commerce Clause as under EU and WTO law, although it is difficult to find any case 
that would specifically confirm it. Alcorn has argued, in line with the EU and WTO 
approach, that there is as a rule at least no need to abolish individual values and apply 
the average value for all products merely because of the difficulty to certify the 
sustainability level of some imports.1126 Alcorn has also put forward the argument that 
states may use average values for the emissions associated with imported electricity 
because it may be necessary due to the difficulty to verify individual emission 
values.1127 When the average values are used as default values because verification of 
some imports is not possible, it may still be that the state has to accept individual value 
certification of imports when it is reliably presented. 
While not in the context of sustainability criteria on PPMs, there have in the U.S. been 
litigation on the decision to award imports a value close to an average. In Lohman, the 
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a measure that was drafted on the basis of an average 
calculation. The state taxed in-state production and applied a compensatory tax on 
imports at a rate of 1,5 %. The tax on in-state products varied within the state from 
locality to locality and 53 % of the localities had a lower tax than 1,5 %. However, 93 
% of the domestic trade value paid a higher tax than 1,5 %. It is therefore likely that the 
mean tax burden on out-of-state products actually was below the mean burden on in-
state products. The Court in Lohman still concluded that there was discrimination and 
that the model was incompatible with the dormant Commerce Clause.1128 The lessons 
that can be taken from the case are admittedly limited since it did not concern average 
                                                 
1124 Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 153-159. 
1125 Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L.Q. 243, 309. 
1126 Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 151-152. 
1127 Id. 141-142. 
1128 Associated Indus. of Missouri v. Lohman 511 U.S. 641 (1994). 
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sustainability. Yet, the case highlights how also the U.S. Supreme Court appears critical 
of regulatory measures that strive to place a burden on all out-of-state products that 
would correspond to the average burden on in-state products. 
4.3.2.2. Certification on the Basis of State-of-Origin Laws 
It may be recalled that US – Shrimp1129 concerned a dispute over a U.S. law on the 
sustainability of catching shrimp. Importation was possible from states that had been 
certified to advance a sustainable shrimp-fishing policy. The U.S. granted foreign states 
the status as an origin of sustainable shrimp only in case the foreign state in its laws 
had introduced a requirement that fishing vessels use devices that ensure turtles are not 
harmed when harvesting the shrimp.  
Determining sustainability on the basis of the laws applicable in the state-of-origin 
expands the scope of the sustainability criteria in the sense that it applies to all products 
produced in the exporting state. In other words, the criteria would not only target the 
imported products. Country certification was approached from this perspective in the 
first section of this chapter. It was argued that country certification would comply with 
trade law only in case it is complemented by a possibility of individual value 
certification.1130 
Country certification is approached from an alternative perspective in this section. In 
country certification the country of origin law can serve as a proxy for the lack of 
unsustainable effects. It constitutes a model for defining sustainability. However, the 
model could be modified so that products from countries with certain laws are 
sustainable per default, while products from countries without the required legal 
provisions must rely on individual sustainability certification. In this alternative model 
country certification transfers into merely an element in the certification of 
sustainability. 
Some parallels may be drawn between country certification and several of the average 
value models discussed above. The certification of individual sustainability of in-state 
products or producers while denying similar individual sustainability certification for 
imports would constitute different treatment on the basis of state-of-origin. In case 
                                                 
1129 See US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 
1998. 
1130 See section 4.1.3.1. 
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imports are always assumed to be of average sustainability, the level of sustainability 
will be directly determined by the state-of-origin. Comparably, also under country 
certification the actual sustainability level of individual products or producers is not 
given any relevance as the level of sustainability is determined on the basis of the laws 
of the state-of-origin.  
Cases on average value models and on country certification both illustrate risks with 
certifying sustainability fully on the basis of geographical proxies. Moreover, the cases 
highlight the value of incorporating the right to certification of individual product or 
producer sustainability. Determining the level of sustainability of products with 
reference to the state-of-origin or the laws applicable in the state-of-origin is not 
compatible with trade law if there is no possibility for individual sustainability 
certification. In other words, the state-of-origin or the laws applicable in the state-of-
origin may not serve as an irreversible proxy for unsustainability. 
It is interesting to note that the EU appears to have acknowledged the problems of 
country certification in the design of new sustainability criteria for bioenergy. Namely, 
the new Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) that is planned to enter into force in 2021 
sets down criteria that feedstock from forest biomass must meet in order for the biofuel 
or other bioenergy to be considered sustainable. The bioenergy from forest biomass is 
deemed sustainable in case the country or region where the feedstock is harvested has 
in place certain legal provisions on forest management and complies with specific parts 
of the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Importantly, however, forest biomass from countries that do not comply with 
all the criteria on a country-level may still be used for producing sustainable bioenergy 
as long as the feedstock has been harvested from forest sourcing areas where 
management systems are in place to ensure sustainability. The Commission will publish 
guidelines on what evidence is necessary for proving compliance on the forest sourcing 
area level.1131 The option of certification on the forest sourcing area level is crucial for 
minimizing the risks of incompatibility with trade law. 
It could be that a state instead of state laws and policies would use the natural conditions 
present in each country as a proxy for (the level of) sustainability. Such approach may 
                                                 
1131 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 29(6) and 
(7). 
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be somewhat less intrusive than the U.S. model of certifying on the basis of state laws 
that was struck down in US – Shrimp. It is still submitted that also certifying on the 
basis on natural conditions would need to be complemented by the possibility of 
individual certification of sustainability on product or producer level. Namely, without 
such possibility, a producer in the low-risk country that adopts the criteria could be 
treated more favorably than a producer that in reality is much more sustainable but 
happens to be situated in a high-risk country. 
Relying fully on state-of-origin, state-of-origin natural conditions or state-of-origin 
laws as proxies for sustainability results in the state-of-origin forming a direct 
irreversible indication of the level of sustainability. Sustainability criteria might also 
include other geographical areas than countries or states as proxies. That should still 
not make the model defensible as the sole determining factor would still be directly 
related to the geographical origin. 
4.3.3. Geographical Factors Determining the Method of Certifying Sustainability 
4.3.3.1. Risk Calibration with Respect to Differences in Traditions or Natural 
Conditions 
Given that the geographical origin should not fully and irreversible determine the level 
of sustainability, the question arises whether the geographical origin could still 
determine the method for certifying sustainability. In other words, while imported 
products cannot be outright denied the same individual sustainability certification 
offered for in-state products, could the certification method still be stricter for imports 
under some conditions? The area or state of origin and the conditions in the area or state 
would in such case not form a direct proxy for sustainability but instead work as a factor 
determining the process or method of certifying or verifying sustainability. The trade 
law compatibility of this was put to test in US – Tuna (Mexico II). The case was a 
continuation of a saga that had begin with US – Tuna (Mexico I) and US – Tuna (EC). 
The case US – Tuna (Mexico II) concerned U.S. legislation on the requirements for 
using dolphin-safe labels for tuna products sold on the U.S. market. The law excluded 
setting on dolphins from tuna-safe (i.e. sustainable) fishing methods. In addition, the 
law introduced other conditions for using the dolphin-safe label and these conditions 
were stricter for tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP). Mexico challenged 
the U.S. law as discriminatory and claimed it breached both the GATT and the TBT 
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Agreement. Mexico was particularly affected by the U.S. law because many of its 
vessels used the technique of setting on dolphins and were also mainly active in the 
ETP. In the original proceedings the U.S. was found to have been in breach of its WTO 
obligations in 2012.1132 Some amendments were made to the U.S. law before the law 
in its amended form was yet again challenged by Mexico in compliance proceedings.  
Even after amendments the U.S. law still excluded setting on dolphins from the scope 
of fishing-methods that could be utilized in catching dolphin-safe tuna. In the 
compliance proceedings this exclusion was found to be justifiable by two separate 
panels, in 2015 and 2017 respectively, due to the observed injury and unobservable 
distress setting on the dolphins causes them.1133 Here in this part of the study other 
elements of the law are of more interest. 
The U.S. law established a process for certifying that the tuna had been caught in a 
dolphin-safe manner. It was in other words recognized that also other methods than 
setting on dolphins could seriously harm the dolphins. The captain on board the vessel 
had to certify that no nets had been intentionally set on dolphins and that no dolphins 
had been killed or seriously injured. This requirement applied both for fishing inside 
and outside the ETP tuna fishery. However, inside the ETP the certification by the 
captain had to be complemented by similar certification from an independent observer. 
In addition, the tracking and verification requirements were stricter for vessels within 
the ETP.  
The reasons for the differences in the requirements with respect to the methods of 
certifying tuna caught inside and outside the ETP were twofold. First, inside the ETP 
tuna tend to swim close to dolphins more frequently than in other areas, and secondly, 
traditionally fishing-methods that harm dolphins have been frequently used in the ETP. 
All in all, the risks of tuna-fishing causing harm to dolphins were higher inside the ETP 
than in other areas. 
                                                 
1132 US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, DS381 
(US – Tuna, Mexico II), AB Report, 16 May 2012. 
1133 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, 
paras 7.579 and 7.584; US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States and 
second recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 26 Oct. 2017, paras 7.539-
547. 
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In US – Tuna (Mexico II) it had to be determined whether the different requirements 
for ETP and non-ETP waters were justifiable and proportional. Both the GATT and 
Article 2.1 TBT Agreement were applied in the dispute. The proportionality review was 
quite similar under both agreements in this particular case.1134 The focus is here put on 
the analysis under GATT.  
In accordance with Article XX GATT arbitrary discrimination between countries where 
the ‘same conditions’ prevail is prohibited. Under Article XX GATT the test of same 
conditions concerns the similarity of circumstances in the state. The test thus differs 
from the test of likeness in law of prohibition, under which the comparison in turn 
relates to the similarity of the products and their competitive relationship. 
Different treatment of products from different states or areas cannot constitute arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination in case the same conditions do not prevail. In the first 
round of compliance proceedings in US – Tuna (Mexico II) the AB analyzed whether 
there was arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. The AB concluded that the same 
conditions prevailed inside and outside the ETP because some risk to dolphins existed 
in both areas even if the risk was not universally equal.1135  
With the conclusion that the same conditions prevailed within and outside the ETP, the 
subsequent step was to determine whether the stricter conditions applied on the 
sustainability certification methods inside the ETP could constitute arbitrary 
discrimination. As an alternative measure the U.S. could have required the 
sustainability of all tuna sold on the U.S. market as dolphin-safe to have been certified 
by an independent observer regardless of whether the vessel caught tuna in the ETP or 
in other waters. The certification process would then essentially have been the same for 
in-state products and all imports. This would be a less discriminatory measure1136 and 
it would guarantee the highest level of protection. An emphasis on the least 
discriminatory measure test would point to the conclusion that in-state production could 
                                                 
1134 Although there are differences between Article 2.1 TBT and the chapeau of Article XX GATT, the 
proportionality review may still be almost identical in many cases. See in particular US – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna, Mexico II): 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States and second recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU 
by Mexico, DS381, AB report, 14 Dec. 2018, para. 6.272. 
1135 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, AB Report, 20 Nov. 2015, 
paras 7.308 and 7.342. 
1136 A requirement of self-declaration from all in-state producers and all importers would equally ensure 
the lowest level of discrimination but it would ensure a much lower level of protection. 
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not be treated more favorably with respect to a more relaxed certification process, even 
if the environmental risks would be lower in-state.  
The decisions in the compliance proceedings of US – Tuna (Mexico II) would seem to 
suggest that the analysis should be different. Namely, the difference in risks to dolphins 
inside and outside the ETP was given relevance in the application of the chapeau of 
Article XX GATT. In fact, the AB in the first round of compliance proceedings declared 
that failing to calibrate for the difference could amount to arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination.1137 In other words, stricter conditions may be included in the 
sustainability certification of products produced in geographical areas where the 
likelihood of harm to the objective is higher. However, the difference in strictness of 
the certification method must be proportional to the difference in the risk profiles of the 
geographical areas. In the case at hand the AB in the first round of compliance 
proceedings concluded that the requirement of an independent observer in vessels 
catching tuna in the ETP constituted arbitrary discrimination because even in cases 
where the risks to dolphins would be deemed comparable, no similar requirement 
applied outside the ETP.1138  
As noted above, despite giving relevance to the differences in risk profiles, the AB in 
the first round of compliance proceedings in US – Tuna (Mexico II) concluded that the 
requirements for sustainability certification of tuna caught within the ETP were 
disproportionally strict in comparison with the requirements for tuna caught outside the 
ETP. Subsequently the U.S. amended its laws once again. This time independent 
observers were required also outside the ETP if the risks were similar to those in the 
ETP. In addition, captains that wanted to fish outside the ETP had to attend a course in 
order to improve their ability to identify situations where dolphins had been harmed. In 
the second round of compliance proceedings the panel found that the requirements for 
fishing inside and outside the ETP had now been calibrated to the risks involved. It was 
not arbitrary to exempt most fishing activities outside the ETP from the requirement of 
                                                 
1137 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, AB Report, 20 Nov. 2015, 
paras 7.330-332 and 7.344. 
1138 Id., paras 7.355 and 7.359. 
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an independent observer because the resulting higher degree of inaccuracy in the 
dolphin-safe labelling was acceptable given the lower risks outside the ETP.1139 
The risk calibration test applied in US – Tuna (Mexico II) for the assessment of 
differences in requirements on the sustainability certification methods relied on a 
comparison of the risk profiles of catching tuna in different geographical areas. The 
decision by the panel in the second round of compliance proceedings built on the 
analysis already carried out in the first round of compliance proceedings. The panel in 
the first round of compliance proceedings had indicated that two rather different factors 
could be given weight in determining whether stricter requirements may apply for the 
ETP. First, the risks in the ETP were considered higher because of natural conditions 
as tuna in the ETP more frequently swim together with dolphins. This was fairly 
uncontroversial because in waters with a lot of dolphins swimming close to tuna the 
expected harm of an inaccurate sustainability label would be higher. Secondly, the risks 
were higher due to human behavior, as harmful fishing techniques involving chasing 
and encircling dolphins were traditionally common in the ETP.1140 In other words, 
stricter certification requirements were justifiable for products from areas where out-
of-state producers traditionally had used unsustainable PPMs. Giving relevance to local 
traditions was somewhat controversial since sustainable fishers were penalized for the 
actions of other fishers in the same region in the past. It is submitted here that difference 
in treatment on the basis of local traditions should not be justifiable for more than a 
transition period. After such period the difference between the requirements on 
certification would need to be reconsidered as the use of unsustainable methods would 
potentially decline. 
The lesson from the compliance proceedings in the latest episode of the dispute between 
the U.S. and Mexico on tuna fishing ought to be that under WTO law the conditions 
and related risks in a geographical area can justify stricter requirements in the process 
of verifying or certifying the sustainability of the PPMs. The AB in the second 
                                                 
1139 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States and second recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 26 Oct. 2017, paras 7.123-126 and 7.736-740. 
1140 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, 
paras 7.582 and 7.592. 
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compliance proceedings of US – Tuna (Mexico II) confirmed this interpretation of 
GATT.1141 
The risk calibration test is relevant also for biofuels sustainability criteria. The 
geographical origin of the feedstock or the fuel cannot serve as a direct proxy for 
(un)sustainability without the availability of individual certification. However, states 
may be justified in applying somewhat stricter certification or verification requirements 
for areas where the risks of unsustainability are higher. For example, the risks of 
biodiversity loss are different in exporting states where the biomass used as feedstock 
to a significant degree can be found in sensitive forests, such as rainforests. The risks 
may be higher in areas with a lot of rainforests and biodiverse land since the effects of 
land-use change in those areas would be more severe. 
The risk calibration test ensures that states can require strict sustainability certification 
methods where that is needed for the desired level of protection, all while requiring less 
rigorous methods for products from areas where the risks are lower. Even when 
requiring less rigorous and less costly methods for certifying PPMs in low risk areas, 
the state can still ensure that the environmental harm of using unsustainable PPMs will 
be at the same level as in high risk areas. It would be economically unreasonable to 
require identical methods of certification for production in areas where the risks are 
much lower. Administrative costs will be saved as the requirements for certification do 
not need to be raised to an unnecessarily high level in low risks areas. All in all, the 
approach seems to enhance efficiency. 
4.3.3.2. A Proportional Difference in the Certification Methods 
The decisions in the compliance proceedings in US – Tuna (Mexico II) suggest that the 
certification and verification of sustainability in-state can be more lenient than for 
imports provided that the in-state risks are lower. However, the difference in 
certification methods must be proportional. It was implied in the decisions in the 
compliance proceedings in US – Tuna (Mexico II) that the severity of the restriction or 
requirement has to be proportional to the difference in risk profiles. How should the 
difference in risk profiles then be estimated and how significant can the difference be 
without becoming disproportional? Given a certain difference in risks with PPMs in-
                                                 
1141 US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States and second recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, AB report, 14 Dec. 2018. 
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state and out-of-state two, how should states calibrate the difference in inaccuracy of, 
for example, sustainability labelling? 
It is my understanding that the AB in the first compliance proceedings used expected 
harm to dolphins as a common measurable indicator when weighing the options. In 
low-risk areas requirements for sustainability certification may be less strict and 
accuracy may be lower since it would result in a level of harm to dolphins that is 
comparable to the level of harm in high-risk areas where stricter conditions in the 
certification methods ensure higher level of accuracy. The risks would likely be 
calibrated to proportional levels when the expected environmental harm per producer 
output would be equal for in-state and out-of-state fishing or production. Yet, it must 
be emphasized that there was no sign of any mathematical exercise in the decisions. 
What is more, there was no further calibration. The risks to dolphins in terms of 
expected dolphin mortality and injury appear in US – Tuna (Mexico II) to have been 
balanced against neither the costs of accuracy (in dollars) nor the costs of reduced free 
trade. In other words, in the compliance proceedings in US – Tuna (Mexico II) there 
was no indication that the panels or the AB adhered to any value balancing tests. 
In US – Tuna (Mexico II) some insight was provided to the assessment of 
proportionality in practice. In the second round of compliance proceedings the panel 
concluded that the difference in risks in different waters justified the U.S. approach 
under which vessels harvesting shrimp in the ETP and areas with a similar risk profile 
had to provide a certification from an independent observer, whereas vessels harvesting 
outside the ETP where the risks were lower merely had to submit a declaration by the 
captain. The requirement that the captain of the vessel certified the sustainability of the 
catch was essentially a form of self-declaration. This was sufficient for most U.S. 
vessels since they, unlike Mexican vessels, were generally active outside the ETP.  
The self-declaration requirement was combined with elements facilitating enforcement. 
Dolphin-safe catches and other catches had to be separated on-board and the captain 
had to fill out forms to enable tracking. Authorities could make inspections on-board 
U.S. vessels, although admittedly not on vessels operating under the flag of other 
countries outside U.S. waters. There were also fines for false labelling.1142 The panel 
                                                 
1142 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States and second recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 26 Oct. 2017, paras 7.64-7.66. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   350 31.7.2019   7.15
 351 
in the second compliance proceedings found that these verification and enforcement 
measures were sufficient to ensure that the differences in certification for tuna from the 
ETP and outside the ETP were proportional.1143 
The panel should have elaborated on how it assessed the effectiveness of enforcement. 
Inside the ETP enforcement was likely effective as a result of the requirement of 
independent observers. It is submitted here that the level of effectiveness of 
enforcement outside the ETP in turn was questionable. The U.S. did not completely ban 
unsustainable tuna fishing methods.1144 Hence, for the surveillance to be effective the 
surveillance authorities approaching a fishing vessel would not only need to observe 
that during the fishing trip a certain amount of tuna was caught with methods that 
harmed dolphins, but also later see from documentation that too small amounts of tuna 
had been recorded as unsustainably caught. However, the fishing vessel would during 
that trip likely have noticed the surveillance vessel. Hence, during that particular trip, 
the captain would likely not have committed labelling fraud. Similar risks do not exist 
inside the ETP where independent observers are always present on-board the fishing 
vessel. For these reasons it seems reasonable to presume that the risks of inaccuracies 
in sustainability labelling were much more substantial for tuna caught by vessels 
without independent observers. Subsequently, the risks of inaccuracy would likely be 
higher for in-state tuna. 
In accordance with the decisions in the compliance proceedings in US – Tuna (Mexico 
II) more inaccuracy of PPM-certification can be justifiable for products from areas 
where the likelihood and severity of the environmental harm is lower. If the natural 
conditions with respect to the risks in the states are very different, the required methods 
for PPM-certification could be very different. The decision by the panel in the second 
compliance proceedings can be read to suggest that in the case of tuna fishing inside 
and outside the ETP the differences in risks to dolphins were quite substantial due to 
the differences in natural conditions (i.e. the frequency of dolphins and tuna swimming 
close together). This significant difference in risks stemming from differences in natural 
conditions allowed the U.S. to apply certification methods that were very different in 
their effectiveness to prevent inaccuracies and fraud. In sum, it was proportional to 
                                                 
1143 Id., paras 7.675-7.676. 
1144 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 14 April 2015, 
para. 3.2. 
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require a strict measure (independent observer certification) in the high-risk area and 
only self-declaration (captain certification) with weak enforcement mechanisms in the 
low-risk areas. 
The conditions will often be different from those in US – Tuna (Mexico II). For 
example, the relevant natural conditions might be identical in all states. The difference 
in the risk profiles of in-state products and imports might solely relate to the differences 
in what PPMs are traditionally used in the region. When the natural conditions are equal 
in two different geographical areas where production takes place, the environmental 
harm of inaccuracy in the labelling will also be equal for production in the two areas. 
The state should in those circumstances calibrate the methods of PPM-certification with 
the objective to make the risk of inaccuracy in PPM-labelling of imports equal to the 
risk of inaccuracy (including fraud) in labelling in-state products.  
What type of regulations may then be expected from a state when the natural conditions 
are equal in-state and out-of-state but there is a difference between states with respect 
to the traditional PPMs relied on? As in US – Tuna (Mexico II), the state might decide 
not to require independent observers for in-state products because it views it too costly 
to require certification that each in-state product has been produced sustainably. The 
sustainability of in-state products would instead be subject to a requirement of self-
declaration, random checks and penalties for fraud. The level of inaccuracy in the 
sustainability labelling of in-state products would likely still be noteworthy because 
supervision and verification of compliance is difficult with respect to the methods used 
by fishing vessels. What follows from this is that imports could not be subject to strict 
requirements. Requiring certification by independent observers on most out-of-state 
vessels and practically never on in-state vessels would lead to more inaccurate labels 
for in-state products and the scheme would be disproportional when the natural 
conditions would be equal. Instead, what the importing state at least could require, is 
that the importer gives a declaration that the vessel has followed sustainable PPMs and 
that the vessel is subject to surveillance and random checks conducted out-of-state by 
either the local out-of-state authorities or by private independent certifiers. The 
emergence of a private certification industry may often be crucial as out-of-state 
authorities may be hesitant to cooperate in implementing the schemes of other states. 
As out-of-state public certification will be rare, fishing vessels would likely have to rely 
on private independent certifiers that through contractual agreements would have the 
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right to carry out random checks on vessels in order to issue certification. The frequency 
of the random checks can likely be required to be slightly higher out-of-state when 
factors such as the traditional PPMs used in the region or the lack of penalties for non-
compliance make the risks of unsustainability and fraud higher out-of-state. 
The level of sustainability of the PPMs in fishing vessels can be adjusted easily 
whenever an inspector shows up to perform independent certification. In contrast, an 
electricity producer that relies on coal power cannot suddenly change to wind power 
when it is time for certification. More generally, the risk of inaccurate labelling is a 
significantly more prevalent problem with respect to sustainable fishing as compared 
to production that requires major investments in property and often takes place in large 
factories. The risk of inaccuracy in labelling the PPMs at an energy plant or a factory 
would be relatively low even with only requirements of self-declaration coupled with 
occasional random checks. A state would likely have to accept imports certified as 
sustainable under an out-of-state scheme as long as the out-of-state plants have been 
subject to random checks of approximately similar frequency. It would be 
disproportional to require that there are permanently independent observers inspecting 
the production process out-of-state. 
All in all, when the natural conditions are different in-state and out-of-state the 
difference in the certification method can be quite significant. In turn, when the natural 
conditions are similar the sustainability certification methods should be largely 
identical. Naturally, the certification for in-state products and imports may be 
conducted by different certifiers for reasons of territorial competence. 
4.3.3.3. State Laws as a Risk Factor 
States adopting PPM-criteria may apply different requirements on the methods of 
sustainability certification for products of different origin if there are differences in 
risks in the areas where production takes place. The difference in risks can stem from 
differences in natural conditions or in traditional local PPMs. With more sensitive 
natural conditions each false labelling will pose a more severe risk for the environment. 
In turn, when it is traditionally common to rely on unsustainable PPMs, the risk of false 
labelling occurring will be greater. Could there then be other factors than natural 
conditions and traditional methods that affect the local environmental risks? 
353
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Some importing states might implement laws that provide incentives for sustainable 
PPMs. Laws creating such incentives could potentially lead to unsustainable PPMs 
becoming less common in the state. It was implied in the compliance proceedings of 
US – Tuna (Mexico II) that the sustainability certification can be slightly less rigorous 
in areas where the PPMs have generally been observed to be more sustainable. 
It can be noted that US – Tuna (Mexico II) concerned differences in risks in the ETP 
and outside the ETP. The differential treatment was thus not explicitly linked to 
country-of-origin. In contrast, when the sustainability laws of two states are different, 
the difference in risks will be directly related to the country-of-origin. While there will 
be more apparent discriminatory effects when calibrating for risks that stem from the 
applicable sustainability laws in the state where production takes place, there should 
nonetheless be the possibility to justify differential treatment because of the difference 
in risks. 
States sometimes in their legislation ban unsustainable PPMs altogether. The question 
of whether sustainability laws in the state where production takes place may affect the 
chosen methods of sustainability certification has not been analyzed in WTO 
proceedings. It may be recalled that the decision by the AB in US – Shrimp implied that 
states may not use the laws in force in other countries as a direct and irreversible proxy 
for the sustainability of products imported from respective country.1145 Such conclusion 
does, however, not exclude the possibility that the laws in force in the countries where 
production takes place could be of relevance for determining what process to rely on 
when certifying or verifying sustainability. Unlike in US – Shrimp, the question is here 
whether a state that has banned products produced with unsustainable PPMs could 
apply stricter methods for certifying or verifying sustainability of imports from states 
that have not implemented a similar ban. 
The system under which the sustainability of the product is determined directly and 
irreversibly by the law in force in the country-of-origin was referred to as country 
certification. The decisions in US – Shrimp seemed to imply that it must be 
complemented by the possibility to apply for individual sustainability certification for 
imports. A combination of country certification and the option of individual 
certification for imports from states that have not banned the unsustainable PPMs is in 
                                                 
1145 See sections 4.1.3.1. and 4.3.2.2. 
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essence one way to implement different requirements on the methods of sustainability 
certification for states with different sustainability laws. The method of sustainability 
certification would be chosen on the basis of whether the products that enter the market 
have been produced in a state where unsustainable PPMs through legislation have been 
banned or not. 
In what respect would the risks be different in a state that has banned unsustainable 
PPMs as compared to states where no such ban has been introduced? The risks of harm 
to the environment can be reduced significantly in the state of production with laws 
banning the unsustainable PPMs. In-state products would be presumed to comply with 
those laws. Compliance with the laws would of course have to be effectively enforced. 
The risks are different with respect to the sustainability of the PPMs in states without a 
ban on unsustainable PPMs because no comparable legal regime and enforcement of 
sustainable PPMs would be in place and there would thus be no reason to establish a 
presumption of compliance with the sustainability criteria. The risks of non-compliance 
with the sustainability criteria would in other words be higher in states without a ban. 
Hence, the state can require that imports from states where the unsustainable PPMs 
have not been banned are subject to a system of sustainability certification as well as 
the verification of the reliability of the certification.  
All in all, the risks in a country that has not banned unsustainable PPMs can be said to 
be different than in those countries that have adopted such ban. If the risk calibration 
test is upheld, it would invite the argument that local laws in the country of production 
forms a factor that can be given relevance when the importing state implements 
methods for certifying and verifying that products have complied with PPM-criteria. 
How might a state then in practice design the sustainability certification requirements 
for states with and without bans on unsustainable PPMs? A state that has banned 
unsustainable PPMs is unlikely to require separate certification of the sustainability of 
products produced in-state. In order to save some costs, the importing state could make 
random unexpected inspections at in-state production facilities. Compliance with the 
law could further be enhanced by introducing a fine for breaches of the in-state PPM-
criteria. What method could the state then apply to verify compliance with the PPM-
standard when it comes to imports? 
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When it comes to imports from states that have adopted a similar ban on unsustainable 
PPMs the importing state would have to grant the same presumption of sustainability 
that it grants to in-state products. The importing state would of course be dependent on 
the competent authorities in the exporting state making inspections within its 
jurisdiction to enforce the ban. In case the exporting state would not enforce it equally 
effectively, the importing state would, under the most favored nation principle 
stemming from Article I GATT, be obliged to revoke the sustainability status of that 
country and subsequently apply to imports of that country the method of certifying 
sustainability and verifying the sustainability certification that it applies to countries 
that have not banned the unsustainable PPMs. 
What method of certification of sustainability could then be applied to imports from 
states that have not adopted any ban? Let us first consider the option that the importing 
state requires imports from such states to be accompanied with a declaration by the 
producer and importer that the products have been produced in accordance with the 
PPM-criteria. In this context it may be recalled that US – Shrimp concerned U.S. 
legislation that banned shrimp-fishing methods that posed a threat to turtles. 
Importation of shrimp required that the country where the shrimp had been harvested 
had adopted similar PPM-criteria in its laws. In accordance with U.S. guidelines from 
1996 as well as later guidelines from 1999 imports of shrimp should also have been 
allowed from uncertified countries when the individual batches of shrimp were 
accompanied by a declaration by the importer or the exporter that the shrimp had been 
harvested with turtle-safe methods.1146 There were on-going domestic litigation in the 
U.S. on whether the U.S. government’s guidelines were in accordance with the actual 
U.S. legislation on the point of allowing imports from states that had not banned fishing 
shrimp with methods unsafe for turtles. The AB in the compliance proceedings did not 
make any judgment on the hypothetical scenario where the guidelines would become 
null and void.1147 Hence, the AB should be understood to have taken its decision on the 
assumption that the guidelines would be upheld. In the end, it found the U.S. law and 
its implementation to comply with GATT. It is submitted here that the AB in other 
                                                 
1146 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, Panel Report, 15 May 1998, 
para. 2.11; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12. Oct. 
1998, para. 5; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by Malaysia, DS58, Panel Report, 15 June 2001, paras. 2.15, 2.26. 
1147 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 93-96. 
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words found it justifiable to require importer or exporter declarations from imports 
originating in states without a ban while not requiring such declarations to accompany 
in-state products or products imported from states with similar bans on unsustainable 
PPMs. This appears reasonable because such requirement was perhaps not even 
discriminatory. Namely, the requirement of an importer or exporter declaration could 
be even less of a burden on the commercial operations than the enforcement measures 
that were in place for U.S. products in the form of surveillance of fishing practices. 
The state might seek higher levels of protection than what would be offered by a system 
granting market access on the basis of merely self-declarations on the utilized PPMs. 
Imports from states that have not adopted a ban could at the border be required to be 
accompanied by documentation that prove the sustainability of the PPMs of the 
imports. Since the authorities of the exporting state are unlikely to be issuing such 
documentation (i.e. certification or labels) it would in most cases need to have been 
issued by an independent private certifier. The checks at the border of the existence of 
PPM-documentation (labels) may be routine or random. Either way the importer would 
always need to accompany the imports with documentation. A more crucial factor for 
the burden on imported products would be the frequency of checks at the production 
facilities. The importing state could potentially require that those checks are somewhat 
more frequent than the checks the state itself conducts on in-state production. The 
reason for this is that the risk of false labelling in-between checks would likely be 
slightly higher in states where there is no ban on unsustainable PPMs because in those 
states no fine would be imposed when the checks result in a finding that the PPMs have 
not fulfilled the PPM-criteria. 
In sum, state laws may serve as a factor in the risk calibration test in the particular 
scenario where the importing state has banned unsustainable PPMs in its laws. Some 
conclusions may be offered here on the methods of PPM-certification that states can 
apply to in-state and imported products under circumstances where the in-state and out-
of-state natural conditions are similar. The importing state might decide to implement 
surveillance, occasional random checks and hefty fines for in-state products. The 
importing state could in order to ensure equal levels of accuracy require imports from 
states with no ban and no fines to be accompanied by certification that the products 
have been sustainably produced. This could include a requirement that the checks of 
the out of state production facilities are somewhat more frequent than in-state. In 
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addition, requirements on the private independent certifiers could be implemented in 
order to ensure that the certificates are credible. 
4.3.4. Justifiable Discrimination in Methods of PPM-Certification 
The introduction of PPM-criteria will be coupled with a process of certifying or 
verifying the sustainability of the PPMs. There are numerous different models that may 
be applied for the certification and verification process. Only a few models have so far 
been the subject of WTO litigation. However, from those cases some key principles 
have already emerged, as illustrated above. 
States cannot decide to certify the individual sustainability of PPMs of in-state products 
while at the same time assign imports the average sustainability value for the relevant 
product type. Also, importing states may not judge the sustainability of the PPMs of 
products from any given exporting state solely on the basis of the laws applicable in 
that exporting state. These two models for certification of the sustainability of PPMs 
are prohibited under trade law in part because they result in the geographical origin of 
the product becoming an irreversible indicator of the level of sustainability. The 
sustainability certification of individual products should be offered as an option. 
The geographical origin of the product cannot irreversibly determine the sustainability 
of the PPMs, but it can affect the method of certifying or verifying the sustainability of 
the PPMs. The certification method may be different for products from different states 
or different areas when the environmental risks arising from inaccurate labelling differ 
due to differences in the local nature. For example, the risks resulting from false 
labelling would be lower in states where there is less ecological sensitivity and it would 
be acceptable to allow for more inaccuracy in the labelling of products from such areas. 
Moreover, the certification method can be different when differences in local laws or 
traditional PPMs cause differences in the risks of certification inaccuracies. It would be 
acceptable to conduct less frequent verification of the correctness of the certification in 
areas where unsustainable PPMs are uncommon due to laws or traditions. 
The differences in the certification model must be proportional to the difference in the 
risks. It was submitted that the certification model should be designed so that the 
expected environmental harm per product introduced on the market is equal for 
products from all areas. For example, when there due to different local natural 
conditions is a significant difference in the environmental risks of PPMs in-state and 
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out-of-state, the importing state could decide that in-state products are only subject to 
a requirement of self-declarations of compliance with the PPM-criteria and some 
occasional random checks, whereas imported products could be required to have been 
certified as sustainably produced by a certifier that conducts frequent checks of the 
production process of the out-of-state producer. 
All in all, the risk calibration test introduced in WTO proceedings allows for different 
sustainability certification methods of products from different areas. If the harm of 
inaccurate sustainability labelling or the risk of inaccurate labelling is lower in-state, 
the sustainability certification or verification requirements may be less strict for the in-
state products than for imports. This approach was not self-evident. The proportionality 
review and more specifically the least restrictive measure test could have been 
interpreted to require that states apply the same strict certification method for all 
products as it would ensure the highest level of protection against environmental risks 
and would appear less discriminatory in the sense that there would be no difference in 
treatment linked to geographical origin. The risk calibration test opted for in WTO 
proceedings however allows states to apply a less burdensome certification method 
when the risks are lower. The possibility to apply a less burdensome certification 
method for some products gives room for more efficient use of state resources. Thus, 
in the interpretation of GATT the costs of certification have at least implicitly been 
given some weight. 
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Conclusions on Reconciling Values Beyond Free Trade and Environmental 
Protection 
In this chapter of the book it was found that the values of transparency, regulatory 
certainty and due process have been factors in the value reconciliation under the 
proportionality review at least in EU economic law and WTO law. The transparency 
principle ensures that laws are clear and their application is predictable. Regulatory 
certainty, in turn, introduces a requirement of transitional periods for new sustainability 
criteria and might even allow for grandfathering of old facilities. Finally, the 
requirement to implement due process rights means that private market participants that 
seek sustainability certification, shall have the right to a decision in writing without 
delay, shall have access to an appeal process and must be heard in the process 
While several values have been reconciled in the EU and the WTO, similar observations 
were not made with respect to the U.S. The reason for this might be that the method of 
overall value reconciliation in the U.S. due to its holistic nature makes it more difficult 
to identify the different values or elements that are given weight in court. 
What is then the relationship between the values that were identified as relevant for the 
proportionality review and efficiency? Many of the measures discussed in this book 
promote renewable energy or introduce PPM-criteria. The primary legitimate objective 
of the measures is related to addressing the problem of environmental externalities. 
Transparency, due process rights and regulatory certainty reflect values beyond the 
primary objective of tackling the environmental externalities, even if they might be 
linked to also that objective. These values can be argued to advance societal efficiency. 
The objective of societal efficiency has shaped the proportionality review in trade law 
to include requirements on how states design their trade restrictive measures. Namely, 
transparency, due process rights and regulatory certainty all strengthen the trust in the 
government. This trust improves the capability of companies to plan their business 
operations and take calculated risks. The perspective on efficiency is here rather 
different than when it comes to non-discrimination and the objective of reducing 
environmental externalities. 
It was also argued that besides transparency, due process rights and regulatory certainty 
also some understanding of fairness could weigh in as a factor in the reconciliation of 
values in law of justification. For example, it could at least in some circumstances 
potentially be regarded as unfair, and thus also disproportional, in case sustainability 
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criteria that companies should comply with include elements that the companies have 
practically no influence over. There is little guidance with respect to this question and 
it was left to future research to consider it more in depth. 
Finally, administrative costs were identified to have been given weight under the 
proportionality review. Namely, in implementing the cerification and verification of the 
sustainability of PPMs states may decide to apply a different process for in-state goods 
and imports in case there are differences in the risks associated with products of 
different origin. The state may develop a costly and complex certification and 
verification process for products that originate from high-risk areas. In these 
circumstances the verification and certification process for low-risk in-state products 
does not need to be identical but can also not be disproportionately different. The idea 
is that the state does not have to waste resources on the certification and verification of 
low-risk products. It is worthy of note, that taking into account administrative costs will 
thus increase the room of maneuver for the regulating state. This is in contrast to 
transparency, due process rights and regulatory certainty, which all place requirements 
on the regulating state.  
361
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   361 31.7.2019   7.15
 362 
Chapter 5 – Thresholds and Proxies: A Case Study on Biofuels 
Sustainability Criteria 
A central theme of this book is the reconciliation of free trade and environmental 
protection in trade law. Free trade and environmental protection may both be linked to 
an efficiency rationale. That being said, it was illustrated in the previous chapter that 
the reconciliation of free trade and environmental protection may be affected by values 
stemming from other ideals, such as transparency, due process and regulatory certainty. 
In this fifth chapter the aim is to further explore the ways in which the objective to keep 
administrative costs under control may affect the reconciliation of free trade and 
environmental protection and consequently the design of PPM-criteria. 
Promoting the sustainability of PPMs can be a complex task. There will often exist 
several aspects that ideally should be addressed. States have, however, adopted 
simplified models in order to save administrative costs. For example, most schemes to 
promote sustainable biofuels do not require producers to certify the GHG emissions of 
their own plant. Instead, the producer may certify merely a few characteristics of the 
plant, such as the feedstock used and the chemical production method. In other words, 
the GHG emissions for fuel from the plant is determined on the basis on a few proxies. 
Some biofuel schemes simply further, by implementing a threshold value for GHG 
emissions savings. Under such scheme biofuels are either sustainable or unsustainable 
depending on whether they have been produced with emissions below or above the 
threshold. These simplifications facilitate the certification and verification process of 
sustainable biofuels. 
The design of PPM-criteria will often include several elements that together make up a 
scheme supporting sustainable solutions. The focus in this chapter will be on threshold 
values that define sustainability as well as proxies for environmental effects. Both a 
design relying on criteria on the characteristics of the PPMs as a proxy for 
environmental performance and a design with sustainability thresholds have the 
potential to convert the complex reality of sustainability verification into a simplified 
model. Reducing administrative costs may improve efficiency. The simplifications 
may, however, lead to trade conflicts. Therefore, it will in this chapter be examined 
under what conditions it may be justifiable to rely on sustainability thresholds or use 
criteria on the characteristics of the PPMs instead of criteria on the environmental 
effects. 
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The first section of this chapter will serve as an introduction to the application of 
sustainability thresholds and proxies for environmental effects in various forms. It will 
also be discussed how these types of measures have generally been approached in 
economic law. Thereafter, in the subsequent sections, the biofuels sustainability criteria 
applicable in the EU and the U.S. will be relied on as a case study for reviewing the 
problems that states in practice may face when designing PPM-criteria with 
sustainability thresholds and proxies. In particular, it will be examined how the different 
biofuels sustainability schemes differ, whether EU or U.S. schemes might have 
discriminatory effects and whether they still could be justifiable under trade law. The 
chapter will through such an analysis offer insights into the reconciliation of the burden 
of administrative costs with other values in trade law. 
The case study on EU and U.S. biofuels sustainability criteria will be carried out from 
the perspective of WTO law and the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause. The emphasis 
will be slightly more on WTO law in all three sections of this chapter because the 
judicial reasoning relating to the relevance of the burden of administrative costs in the 
proportionality review has been more detailed in WTO proceedings. EU free movement 
law will be given the least attention because the high-level of harmonization of the 
criteria in the EU leaves limited room for national sustainability criteria. 
This chapter differs from other parts of the book in that it includes less of detailed 
analysis of past cases. Instead, it to a large extent builds on the analysis already 
presented in previous chapters of the book. This allows for more free consideration on 
how concrete cases may be resolved if they would end up before a panel or court. 
Moreover, the analysis will shed some light on the practical implications of the trade 
law principles and tests for sustainability criteria introduced in biofuels sustainability 
schemes.  
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5.1. Sustainability Thresholds and Proxies under Economic Law 
5.1.1. Simplifications to Sustainability Criteria 
The process of designing sustainability criteria consists of several steps. As part of 
designing sustainability criteria states take decisions on what type of effects they want 
to address, what stages of the life-cycle that should be sustainable, which products 
should be sustainably produced, and which companies should comply with the criteria. 
It was already examined in chapter 4 how broad the scope of the sustainability criteria 
could be. 
PPMs may cause a variety of environmental effects and the state could decide to adopt 
criteria on one or several of these effects. After having determined what scope the 
sustainability criteria should have, the state would decide how to define the level of 
sustainability. For example, the level of sustainability could be defined in terms of an 
environmental effect, such as GHG emissions. That type of criteria on emissions would 
focus on the outcome of the production process.  In essence, they would constitute 
criteria on environmental performance. When opting for this approach the state could 
either grant benefits in exact proportion to the environmental performance or establish 
a threshold for the GHG emissions and award the benefits to all production that meets 
the threshold. In other words, after having determined the scope of the criteria that 
should be applied, the subsequent step for the state will often be to establish a threshold 
for sustainability. 
The alternative to defining sustainability in terms of environmental effects would be to 
define it in terms of the characteristics of the PPMs. In other words, instead of 
estimating the magnitude of some effects, such as the level of GHG emissions, the 
criteria would instead simply require that PPMs with specific characteristics are 
adopted. Requirements that electricity is generated from renewable resources or that 
turtle exclusion devices are used when fishing shrimp form examples of this type of 
model. The PPM serves as a proxy for sustainability and the exact effects or emissions 
during production or during the whole life-cycle would not be calculated for each and 
every producer. In other models the characteristics of the PPMs do not serve as a direct 
proxy for sustainability, but instead serve as a proxy for environmental effects that are 
then relevant for determining the level of sustainability. Proxies for both effects and for 
sustainability represent simplifications to the sustainability models as it would be easier 
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to verify the characteristics of the PPM than to calculate the environmental effects for 
each case separately. 
Relying on thresholds, proxies and other simplifications to sustainability model may or 
may not form efficient solutions. Importantly, economic law does not force states to 
opt for efficient measures. However, it should be acknowledged that there is a risk that 
states use administrative simplification as an excuse for discriminatory objectives. 
Under trade law any discriminatory measures will need to be justifiable. The review of 
justifiability is at least implicitly receptive of efficiency considerations. 
5.1.2. Thresholds for Market Access and for Awarding Benefits 
In the design of many sustainability criteria the state will implement a threshold for 
sustainable effects. Products that have been produced with emissions or other effects 
above the threshold will be deemed unsustainable. Unsustainably produced products 
that do not meet the threshold for emissions or other effects will be denied the benefits 
awarded to sustainable products. Sometimes unsustainable products are even denied 
market access altogether.1148 The claim might sometimes arise that the choice of 
threshold has discriminatory effects and is not compatible with trade law. The 
proportionality, and hence the compatibility with trade law, of a threshold that causes 
discriminatory effects would often depend on whether there is any less trade restrictive 
alternative sustainability threshold that ensures the same level of protection. 
The concept of ‘less trade restrictive’ must be defined before analyzing the existence 
of any alternative less trade restrictive measure. There are at least three different ways 
the concept could be understood. It could refer to measures that are less discriminatory, 
measures that allow for greater volumes of trade of regulated products of any origin or 
measures that allow for greater volumes of trade in out-of-state products. It should be 
recalled that the principle of non-discrimination lies at the core of trade law regimes. 
Hence, it is submitted here that even if an alternative measure would reduce barriers to 
trade in the sense that trade volumes would increase, it should not be considered ‘less 
trade restrictive’ if it would simultaneously increase discriminatory effects. The 
hypothesis in this study is therefore that an alternative measure may only be less trade 
restrictive if it is less discriminatory. A different question is whether the test of ‘less 
                                                 
1148 This was the case with for example the U.S. law that denied market access for shrimp that had not 
been caught with fishing methods that were safe for turtles. See US – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, Panel Report, 15 May 1998. 
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trade restrictive’ measure would additionally introduce a requirement under which the 
proposed alternative may not be more trade restrictive with respect to trade volumes. 
The answer to that question is here left open, as it will rarely be actualized.  
A lower, more easily reachable, sustainability threshold could be viewed as a less trade 
restrictive measure in terms of barriers to trade volumes. However, such lower more 
easily reachable threshold for sustainability (e.g. lower requirement of emission 
savings) would likely not ensure the same level of protection. In contrast, the alternative 
of a higher threshold (i.e. a requirement of higher emission savings) could ensure a 
higher level of protection. Could a higher threshold that is more difficult to reach then 
serve as an alternative measure to the adopted measure? The higher threshold could 
potentially be regarded to form a less trade restrictive alternative in case it would be 
less discriminatory than the adopted threshold. The proportionality of the chosen 
threshold would then come down to whether it would have less discriminatory effects 
than the alternative higher threshold. Disputes on the compatibility with trade law of 
adopted sustainability thresholds do not appear to arise frequently. It is perhaps unusual 
that when the threshold opted for by the state has discriminatory effects, an alternative 
higher (i.e. stricter) sustainability threshold requiring emissions (or other harmful 
effects) to be even lower would have less discriminatory effects. What is more, 
presenting sufficient evidence may often be challenging. 
In a proportionality review of discriminatory sustainability thresholds, it ought also to 
be considered whether there exists some alternative measure that would not involve the 
adoption of any threshold at all. Whether such alternative exists depends on the specific 
circumstances. For example, introducing a sustainability threshold is unavoidable when 
the state intends to deny market access for products produced with unsustainably high 
negative effects. The threshold for targeted effects such as GHG emissions, harm to 
endangered animals or loss of biodiversity could of course be set at zero. In other words, 
when the negative effects that the state targets are very serious or difficult to quantify 
the sustainability criteria could be designed in the form of a requirement that production 
has taken place without any of the effects that are determined to be harmful. 
States can decide not to ban market access of products that do not meet the threshold 
value. Instead, some beneficial treatment may be awarded to the products that meet the 
threshold. In the case of awarding benefits for sustainably produced products the state 
may have the option of not adopting any sustainability threshold. The alternative to a 
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sustainability threshold would be to award benefits in proportion to the estimated 
environmental effects of the PPMs. PPMs would not be divided into sustainable and 
unsustainable. Instead, in a model without a sustainability threshold sustainability 
would be viewed as a continuum that can be expressed on a scale. 
The implementation of a model in which benefits are awarded in proportion to the level 
of sustainability requires, first of all, that the targeted effects are quantifiable. The 
quantification of some effects, such as loss of biodiversity, will often be unreasonably 
difficult. In comparison, GHG emissions are more easily quantifiable. Moreover, the 
model of awarding benefits in proportion to performance also requires that the awarded 
benefits are quantifiable. For example, sustainable products may be granted subsidies. 
Similarly, it is possible to establish a quota for GHG emissions attributed to the 
products that are sold on the market. Like subsidies, also the degree to which a quota is 
filled up can be quantified. 
In turn, quantification of the awarded benefit is rarely relied on when introducing 
criteria for the use sustainability labels. The right to market products with the use of a 
sustainability label is instead simply restricted to producers that in their production have 
relied on sustainable PPMs with sufficiently low negative effects.1149 However, in 
principle quantification could be integrated into sustainability labels by requiring that 
claims of sustainability marked on products are accompanied with information on the 
exact level of the effects. For example, instead of implementing a threshold for GHG 
emissions for the use of a sustainability label the state could require that sustainability 
labels expressly indicate the level of GHG emissions attributed to the production of the 
product. 
5.1.3. Criteria on the Characteristics of the PPMs 
5.1.3.1. The Appropriateness Test and the Test of Equal Effectiveness 
Determining the level of sustainability of products can be a complicated task for several 
reasons. Environmental effects take place during the whole life-cycle. Different raw 
materials may be extracted, processed and utilized in putting together the final product. 
Thereafter the product will be consumed and finally some end-of-life treatment may be 
necessary. The estimation of life-cycle effects is further complicated by the fact that 
                                                 
1149 This was the case with U.S. legislation on the use of dolphin-safe labelling of tuna products. See US 
–  Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, Mexico I) (unadopted); 
US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) (unadopted). 
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there may be many companies that have been involved in some stage of the lengthy 
life-cycle. Moreover, the environmental effects arising during the life-cycle will be of 
various forms. 
The estimation and verification of the environmental effects of various PPMs can be 
technically burdensome. The complexity of the task will give rise to high costs that will 
either be borne by the state or the producer. For these reasons states often consider 
adopting simplified models with some form of proxies for sustainability. 
Simplifications to the methods of determining the level of sustainability will lower 
administrative costs. For example, the characteristics of the PPMs might be adopted as 
a proxy for environmental effects of a sustainable level. 
Simplifications and the use of proxies may under certain circumstances increase 
discriminatory effect without improving environmental protection. Cost reduction 
would not form a valid ground of justification for any discriminatory effects.1150 The 
potential grounds for justifying criteria on the characteristics of PPMs must therefore 
be found elsewhere.  
The TBT Agreement furthers the objectives of GATT by setting out rules on the 
adoption of technical regulations. Article 2.8 TBT merely requires the use of 
performance criteria instead of criteria in terms of design or descriptive characteristics 
“wherever appropriate”. This reflects a strong preference for performance criteria. 
Under the TBT Agreement criteria on the specific characteristics of PPM could be 
applied when performance criteria would not be appropriate. There is, however, very 
little guidance on when this would be the case. 
Unlike the TBT Agreement, the GATT does not include a similarly explicit reference 
to the conditions on when performance criteria should be relied on. Still, models relying 
on criteria on specific characteristics of the PPMs as an alternative to performance 
criteria must survive the proportionality review. The decision in US – Shrimp forms a 
good starting point for the analysis. It may be recalled that the dispute concerned a U.S. 
                                                 
1150 See e.g. Case 7/61 Commission v. Italy (special edition) ECR 317, 329; Case 95/81 Commission v. 
Italy [1982] ECR 2187, para. 27; Case 216/84 Commission v. France [1988] ECR 793, para. 12; Case 
C-398/98 Commission v. Greece [2001] ECR I-7915, para. 30; EC – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 22 May 2014, paras 5.320-327. 
See however United Haulers Association Inc v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 
550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court found that while in-state economic interest could not 
justify discrimination, revenue generation was still a benefit that had to be taken into account under the 
Pike balancing test. 
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law that required turtle exclusion devices to be used when catching shrimp in U.S. 
waters and also restricted imports of shrimp from states that had not in their legislation 
required shrimp trawlers to use turtle exclusion devices. The law on sustainable shrimp-
fishing restricted imports with reference to the laws in force in the state-of-origin. As 
discussed already previously,1151 the difficulties exporters of sustainably caught shrimp 
from states without such laws faced to get their shrimp on the U.S. market made the 
proportionality of the law questionable. This was, however, not the only controversial 
element of the law. Namely, the AB struck down the law as incompatible with GATT 
in part because it did not grant the presumption of state-wide sustainability to states that 
had turtle protection programs that were equally effective but technically different from 
the program on turtle exclusion devices relied on in the U.S.1152 The U.S. should only 
have required that exporting states had adopted laws on shrimp-fishing methods that 
ensured a similarly low level of turtle mortality as in the U.S.1153  
In US – Shrimp (Art. 21.5) the AB upheld an amended law that required trawlers fishing 
for shrimp to use U.S. model turtle-excluding devices or devices equal in 
effectiveness.1154 The amended law still technically aimed at the input – i.e. the use of 
certain devices. However, the law also allowed for equally effective PPMs. In other 
words, the U.S. accepted turtle-excluding methods that were not identical in 
characteristics, but still comparable in effect (performance) to those used by U.S. 
vessels.1155   
The original AB and the AB in the compliance proceedings confirmed that the U.S. 
could not deny sustainability certification of countries that could ensure equal turtle 
protection even without implementing a requirement to use certain devices. Although 
the case concerned a requirement to implement criteria on specific characteristics of the 
PPMs in the legislation of other states, the line of argumentation would perhaps not 
have been any different if the U.S. had required imports to come from out-of-state 
                                                 
1151 See section 4.1.3.1. 
1152 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
para 165. 
1153 Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European J. International Law 249, 284. 
1154 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 115-134. 
1155 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 162-163; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 135-152. 
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trawlers that use the same specific PPM (i.e. fishing with turtle exclusion devices) that 
in-state trawlers were required to use. Adopting criteria on the specific characteristics 
of the PPMs instead of performance criteria would also appear arbitrary under such 
circumstances.1156 A requirement on the use of certain specific PPMs could create 
circumstances where out-of-state producers employing other PPMs will not receive 
similar treatment even when they achieve the same or even better environmental 
performance. There would in such a case not exist any rational relationship between the 
design of the measure and its environmental objective. What is more, accepting 
importation of shrimp caught with methods equally effective as the use of the American 
devices would form a less discriminatory alternative that ensures the same level of turtle 
protection. 
In sum, in their decisions on the dispute concerning U.S. sustainability criteria for 
shrimp-fishing the ABs condemned criteria on the specific characteristics of PPMs and 
established that states should instead apply criteria that define sustainability in terms of 
effects. PPM-criteria may still refer to some characteristics as an example of a 
sustainable solution, but no equally effective alternative PPM should be rejected.  
5.1.3.2. Public Procurement Law and Requirements of Energy from Renewables 
Criteria on environmental performance can be burdensome to implement as identifying 
and estimating all environmental effects during the production process is often 
complicated. While not environmentally optimal, there is the option to limit costs by 
relying on the characteristics of the PPM as a proxy for sustainability. This strategy has 
been relied on also in public procurement. 
In accordance with Article X(2) GPA public authorities shall, where appropriate, set 
out technical specifications in terms of performance and functional requirements rather 
than design or descriptive characteristics. The nature of the test of appropriateness has 
not been determined.1157 Importantly, however, Article X(3) GPA specifies that even 
with descriptive criteria the authority should accept equivalent solutions. 
                                                 
1156 Even if performance criteria may also be discriminatory, they would appear less arbitrary. See also 
Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon, ‘Regulating Tobacco Flavors: Implications of WTO Law’ (2011) 29 
Boston University International Law J. 383, 419. 
1157 Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘The World Trade Organization's Agreement on 
Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?’ (1995) Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 1429, The World Bank, 7. 
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The EU public procurement directive equally grants authorities the possibility to 
implement technical specifications with reference to the specific process or method of 
production.1158 It would appear that alternative solutions with equal performance must 
always be accepted although the directive is somewhat ambiguous on this point. 
Moreover, the criteria should be proportionate and generally not refer to a PPM that 
characterizes the products of a specific company. 
Bids in a public tender are compared in accordance with award criteria. The EU 
Commission has published models for green criteria suitable for the procurement of 
transport services. These model criteria would seem to encourage the adoption of 
systems of scoring bids that award points in proportion to improved performance.1159 
Under such approach one unit of less pollution would improve the score for the bid 
with one unit. This would seem fair from an environmental and an economic point of 
view as bidders are rewarded exactly in proportion to their performance. It should still 
be acknowledged that in exceptional circumstances benefits in terms of reduced 
externalities will not accrue linearly with improved performance in terms of reduced 
emissions or other environmental harm. In such circumstances benefits should in theory 
be awarded in proportion to the benefits and not in proportion to performance in terms 
of emissions or other harm. Yet, that may be complicated in practice. 
The model of awarding points in exact proportion to the benefits would lead to the true 
cost of externalities being reflected in the criteria as exactly as possible. The approach 
would be in line with the principles of proportionality and precision, which both have 
been confirmed as relevant in EU procurement law. That being said, the model criteria 
drafted by the Commission are still merely recommendations for implementing 
proportional scales on performance in award criteria.  
The authority could decide to award the bidder extra points if it adopts a specific 
environmentally friendly PPM. A public authority in Austria did just this when it in 
procurement of electricity awarded extra points if the electricity was generated from 
renewables. Whether this was in compliance with EU law was put to test in Wienstrom. 
In its decision the ECJ confirmed that a public authority may under the procurement 
                                                 
1158 Art. 42, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1159 European Commission, EU GPP Criteria for Transport (2012) 12. 
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directives give preference to electricity from renewable energy.1160 In other words, 
award criteria that include criteria on the specific characteristics of the PPMs instead of 
focusing on the effects in terms of emissions can be fully in accordance with EU public 
procurement law. 
The decision in Wienstrom that the award criteria on specific characteristics of the 
PPMs complied with EU public procurement law should not be read to grant public 
authorities an unconditional right to implement such criteria. As noted already above, 
it was decided in US – Shrimp that GATT requires the description of specific 
characteristics of a PPM to only serve as a benchmark and that equally effective 
alternatives must be accepted. The same principle should therefore apply under EU free 
movement law since free movement law in turn should not breach the provisions and 
principles of GATT. Public procurement in the EU is governed by both the public 
procurement directives and by EU free movement law. Thus, the principle would seem 
relevant for public procurement in the EU even if the GATT is not directly applicable.  
All in all, criteria on the specific PPMs can be integrated into the award criteria as long 
as also solutions with equal environmental performance are awarded the same points. 
The next subsection will strive to provide an explanation to why in Wienstrom no 
particular emphasis was put on the need to accept equally effective alternative PPMs 
and what lessons that provides for designing both legislative measures and 
procurement. 
5.1.3.3. Addressing Multiple Effects with Criteria on the Characteristics of PPMs  
In US – Shrimp it was confirmed that criteria on specific characteristics of the PPMs 
may be compatible with trade law despite discriminatory effects provided that the same 
treatment is awarded to other PPMs that are equally effective. What can be derived 
from this is that states can define sustainability in terms of the characteristics of the 
PPMs but need to accept solutions that would be equally effective in terms of reducing 
the negative effects. 
The U.S. criteria on sustainable shrimp fishing only targeted one effect, namely the 
death of turtles. In many other circumstances PPM-criteria are set to target a wide range 
of environmental – and perhaps even some social – effects. They are thus quite different 
from the PPM-criteria in US – Shrimp. PPM-criteria with discriminatory effects may 
                                                 
1160 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527. 
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be justified with reference to the protection against numerous environmental effects at 
once. A state adopting PPM-criteria in the energy sector might advance the argument 
that the positive effects of the promoted PPMs are so multifaceted that there are no 
other PPMs that are equally effective. For example, promoting energy from renewables 
could be argued to reduce GHG emissions. However, nuclear fission could potentially 
be equally effective in reducing GHG emissions. Hence, in justifying the preference for 
electricity from renewable resources the state could instead rely on the argument that 
such methods are the most effective to reduce GHG emissions and nuclear waste.  
With criteria on the specific characteristics of the PPMs the state might strive to reduce 
several harmful environmental and social effects. Each of the effects that the state 
claims to address with the criteria on PPM characteristics must be backed up by some 
support from credible international science. The more there are of these effects that the 
state with reference to international science can argue that the PPM-criteria address, the 
more difficult and burdensome it will be for producers to prove that their methods are 
equally effective as the PPM that the state legislation has adopted as a benchmark. 
Alternative methods for generating electricity will unlikely be regarded as equally 
effective as reliance on renewables given the variety of scientifically recognized 
environmental effects that the state may aim to address with criteria on the PPMs in the 
electricity sector and the flexibility awarded to states in designing measures under 
scientific uncertainty. 
All in all, criteria on specific characteristics of the PPMs that cause discriminatory 
effects will likely be incompatible with trade law when there are other PPMs that are 
equally effective with respect to the targeted effects. The test of equal effectiveness will 
primarily have bite when the objective of the measure is to address one single harm, as 
in US – Shrimp. If the PPM-criteria target only one effect, it will be more likely that 
there exist equally effective alternatives, as compared to when the state adopts PPM-
criteria in order to address multiple effects. Consequently, under trade law states will 
often face difficulties in justifying criteria on the use of specific PPMs when those 
criteria target only one effect. However, it is not unusual that states aim to target 
multiple effects. In particular in these cases the complexity of verifying the level of the 
various emissions and effects in the life-cycle of products entering the market will often 
lead to the state adopting criteria on the specific characteristics of the PPMs instead of 
adopting criteria on the actual environmental effects. In other words, states adopt a 
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simplified model for determining which methods are sustainable. The simplified model 
might survive the proportionality review as there might not exist any PPMs that are 
equally effective with respect to all environmental and social objectives. 
5.1.4. The Design of Biofuels Sustainability Criteria 
It was argued in the previous sections that sustainability thresholds have rarely been 
challenged and that relying on proxies for environmental effects may be justifiable in 
some circumstances. Both these two elements have been implemented as part of PPM-
criteria applied in the biofuel sector. 
The sustainability of PPMs has been given a lot of attention in the energy sector because 
of the significant detrimental effects reliance on traditional fossil fuels will have on the 
climate. In the transport sector states have gradually been starting to shape their policies 
with the objective to encourage a move away from the use of traditional fossil fuels. 
Biofuels and other forms of bioenergy form alternatives to fossil fuels. For example, in 
the transportation sector bioethanol and biodiesel have been regarded as valid 
alternatives to gasoline. There is, however, a lot of uncertainty as to whether biofuels 
form a sustainable option or not. Hence, schemes have been adopted for promoting 
sustainable PPMs. Sustainability criteria for biofuels and other bioenergy have been 
designed in order to ensure that the promoted forms of energy areactually sustainable.  
The EU, in its Renewable Energy Directive,1161 and the U.S., in its scheme called the 
Renewable Fuel Standard 2,1162 have developed sustainability criteria for biofuels. 
Preferential treatment is granted only to fuel that meet the sustainability criteria. 
Unsustainable fuels are put at disadvantage but are as a rule not denied market access 
altogether. 
The sustainability of biofuels depends in part on the estimated life-cycle GHG 
emissions. Thus, biofuels sustainability criteria in both the EU Renewable Energy 
Directive and the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard 2 include sustainability thresholds for 
                                                 
1161 Articles 17-19, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently 
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. Similar criteria can be found 
in the Fuel Quality Directive. See Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil 
and introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council 
Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland waterway vessels and repealing 
Directive 93/12/EEC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 88. 
1162 40 C.F.R. § 80.1405 (2015). 
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GHG emissions. In other words, biofuels produced with life-cycle GHG emissions 
below a threshold are considered sustainable. The threshold is expressed in terms of 
GHG emission savings with reference to a benchmark calculated on the basis of 
emissions that normally are estimated to be caused by gasoline. 
The GHG emission savings threshold constitutes a model that targets performance, or 
effects in other words, but that does not award benefits in proportion to the level of 
performance. Under the EU RED and the U.S. RFS2 what matters is whether or not the 
emissions savings level meets the GHG emission savings threshold that is set to 
separate sustainable from unsustainable biofuels. Beyond that no relevance is given to 
differences in levels of GHG emissions, with some minor exceptions. 
In the U.S. the State of California does not apply the criteria in the federal Renewable 
Fuel Standard 2 but has developed its own Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS).1163 
Oregon1164 has replicated the Californian model and at least Washington1165 has had 
similar plans. Unlike under the RFS2, under California’s LCFS biofuels are assigned a 
carbon intensity score. The carbon intensity of the fuels of providers may on average 
during each calendar year not exceed a limit confirmed in advance by the state. This 
means that the lower the carbon intensity score, the more sustainable the fuel and the 
more valuable will the fuel be for fuel providers. Fuel providers with high averages 
may purchase credits from those with low averages. 
There are also similarities between the different biofuel sustainability schemes. In all 
three schemes GHG emissions values have been pre-calculated for various production 
pathways. The pathway is defined with reference to certain characteristics of the PPM, 
such as the (biomass) feedstock and the (chemical) production technique utilized. Each 
pathway is assigned a GHG emission value on the basis of estimated averages for that 
pathway. Producers, refiners, importers, retailers and other parties that may need to 
comply with the sustainability criteria can rely on the pathway value that has been 
calculated for the fuel that they own. 
Under the EU RED and California’s LCFS producers may instead of the pathway value 
also choose the costlier option of certifying an individual GHG emissions value. The 
                                                 
1163 Assembly Bill 32, 2006 Leg. Regular Session (California 2006) (amended Nov. 2015); California, 
Governor’s Executive Order S-01-07 (2007). 
1164 Oregon Administrative Rules Chapter 340 Division 253 (2017) (Oregon Clean Fuels Program); 2009 
Oregon Legislature HB 2186; 2015 Oregon Legislature SB 324. 
1165 2018 Washington Legislature HB 2338. 
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individual value is calculated on the basis of the circumstances at the production plant 
in question. In these schemes, the pathway value only functions as a default value 
available for producers without individual certification. In contrast, the U.S. RFS2 does 
not offer the possibility for producers to certify their individual emissions value and all 
companies must accept pathway values. 
Pathway values form an inherent part of current biofuels sustainability schemes. They 
serve as either the only available proxy for sustainability with respect to GHG 
emissions or serve as a default value for GHG emissions that is complemented by the 
option of certifying an individual producer-specific value for GHG emissions. Either 
way, the pathway values form sustainability indicators that rely on calculations of 
averages. 
Both thresholds and the pathway values might lower administrative costs of the 
sustainability schemes. However, the schemes for promoting sustainable biofuels are 
still prone to trade law challenges. The introduction of biofuels sustainability criteria 
will favor some fuels over other fuels. The criteria could consequently also have 
discriminatory effects. In fact, there have been concerns that the design of currently 
applied schemes with thresholds, and in particular the choice of certain thresholds, 
might even have been driven by a protectionist agenda.1166 The interests of free trade 
and environmental protection may in other words clash and may subsequently need to 
be reconciled.  
The argument may arise that a less trade restrictive alternative design for the biofuels 
sustainability criteria should have been preferred despite it being technically complex 
or economically burdensome. This raises the question of whether such an alternative 
may be considered in the proportionality review. Hence, biofuels legislation forms a 
good case study for examining the relevance of administrative costs for the 
proportionality review. In the remaining sections of this chapter it will analyzed 
whether the EU, U.S. and Californian models might have discriminatory effects and 
whether they despite such potential effects may survive the tests applicable in trade law. 
                                                 
1166 Claudia Franziska Brühwiler and Heinz Hauser, ‘Biofuels and WTO Disciplines’ (2008) 63 
Aussenwirtschaft 7, 17; Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road Towards Sustainable 
Biofuels? EU and U.S. Approaches to Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental 
and Public Health Law 104, 119-120, 157. 
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5.2. California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
5.2.1. The Design of the Scheme 
Under California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) fuel providers are required to 
provide fuel with carbon intensity that should on average annually not exceed the limit 
set for each year. Unlike the federal RFS2 and the EU RED, the LCFS does not establish 
any GHG threshold for biofuels to be considered sustainable. Instead, the sustainability 
of the fuel can be expressed on a sliding scale of carbon intensity. Each small difference 
in emissions levels is of relevance. The lower the carbon intensity of the batch of fuel, 
the greater the premium fuel providers will be prepared to pay for it. The model awards 
benefits in proportion to performance. 
Biofuel producers receive credits corresponding to produced fuel volumes and the 
carbon intensity of that fuel. When receiving credits, producers can either ask for 
certification of an individual carbon score or rely on a default value. In other words, the 
carbon intensity of a fuel may be calculated in one of two ways. The first option for the 
producer is to apply for individual GHG emissions values. In-state and out-of-state fuel 
must have equal opportunity to the available individual sustainability certification.1167 
The other option available to producers is to use the default value that has been assigned 
for the production pathway that the producer relies on. Various pathways defined in 
terms of feedstock and chemical methods for production have been assigned default 
values for GHG emissions. These values have been calculated on the basis of average 
emissions for respective pathway. 
The compatibility of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard with the dormant 
Commerce Clause has been challenged in court.1168 It has been argued that the scheme 
is discriminatory and burdens out-of-state commerce. Below it will be analyzed 
whether there may exist any less trade restrictive alternative model that California may 
adopt and that could render the implemented versions of LCFS disproportional. 
 
                                                 
1167 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, Panel Report, 29 Jan. 1996, para. 
6.28. See also section 4.3.2.1. 
1168 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013); American Fuels and Petrochemicals 
Manufacturers Association, et al. v. Corey, No. 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2015); Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
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5.2.2. Origin Neutral Versus Geography-Related Default Values 
The life-cycle analysis (LCA) adopted under California’s LCFS for determining the 
default and individual values includes factors related to feedstock and chemical 
production methods. The calculations of individual values also take into account 
emissions from transport distance and the estimated GHG emissions attributable to the 
electricity from the local grid. These factors relate to geographical origin.  
The implementation of the LCFS in California started in 2011. The original default 
value calculations took into account for the same geography-related factors as the 
calculations for the individual values. This resulted in, for example, a higher default 
value for Midwest corn ethanol than for the same product from California’s own plants. 
The geographically-related factors were in 2015 deleted from factors taken into account 
in the calculation of default values. For the purposes of default values transport 
emissions and emissions from generating the power used in biofuel plants are now 
estimated to an equal level for all production. In other words, default values are no 
longer state specific. The calculations of individual emission values still continue to 
acknowledge differences in emissions on the basis of both transportation distance and 
the PPMs used to generate the electricity relied on in the biofuels plant. Transport 
distances and local conditions thus continue to affect individual values. 
How might the 2015 version of the LCFS then be scrutinized under trade law? It is 
plausible that the Californian industry under the current amended model still gains an 
advantage over out-of-state biofuel in part as a result of the factors relating to 
geographical origin in the individual value calculation model.1169 In the calculation of 
individual values producers have the possibility to illustrate that they, for example, use 
electricity in their plants that has been generated with low emissions (e.g. electricity 
from renewables) and that emissions in the transport of the feedstock and the fuel has 
been low. These types of geographically related elements in the calculations do, 
however, not appear problematic when part of individual values. While adding 
geographically related elements to individual values will in many cases increase the 
discriminatory effects, they will at the same time ensure a higher level of protection. It 
is therefore submitted here that the fact that the scheme allows for geographically 
                                                 
1169 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
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related factors to be given weight in the calculations of individual values should not as 
such render it disproportional. 
Would California’s original LCFS from 2011 then be more vulnerable under a 
proportionality review? More specifically, would the alternative of origin neutral 
default values render a model with state specific default values disproportionate?  
Under the original Californian LCFS, before the amendments introduced in 2015, 
different default values were awarded to biofuels of the same pathway depending on 
what state it had been produced in. Midwest corn ethanol was assigned a worse default 
value than in-state corn ethanol. This was the result of including emissions from local 
generation of electricity in the model. Normally, calculating emissions from 
transportation would also burden the out-of-state industry more. Peculiarly, however, 
Californian corn ethanol was disadvantaged by the inclusion of emissions from 
transport. This was because emissions from transporting the feedstock long distances 
to Californian fuel plants were estimated as higher than the emissions from transporting 
to California finished fuel produced out-of-state. 
The justifiability of California’s original model of individual values complemented by 
state specific default values can be assessed under GATT. Biofuels sustainability 
criteria with state specific or otherwise geography-related default values will often 
create a more significant discriminatory effect than a model with origin neutral values 
because importers will on average be penalized more. However, even if origin neutral 
values are often less discriminatory, the state specific or otherwise geography-related 
values incorporate more exact data on the environmental effects of the biofuel and 
therefore serve the objective of environmental protection to a higher degree. For 
example, emissions from transportation could be significant and it would distort the 
environmental purpose if they could not form part of the calculated values. Moreover, 
the fact that the models of state specific or otherwise geography-related default values 
include also the option of individual values means that they are not similarly arbitrarily 
discriminatory as they might be without individual value certification. Each sustainable 
producer can get sustainability certification regardless of how unsustainable the 
pathway is on average. 
The proportionality of a model with state specific or otherwise geography-related 
default values complemented with individual values cannot under GATT be questioned 
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with reference to the alternative of origin neutral default values complemented with 
individual values. Might there exist some other alternative measure to the original 
Californian model with state specific default values? A model with default values that 
are categorized with reference to transportation distance instead of state origin is an 
alternative that deserves to be analyzed. This approach has already in part been adopted 
by the EU in its new Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2) that will enter into force in 
2021. RED 2 will introduce sustainability criteria for solid biomass fuel used for 
heating, cooling and electricity. While the default values for biofuels remain origin 
neutral, the default values for biomass fuels (solid biomass) will be different depending 
on transportation distances. For most pathways relying on agricultural and wood 
biomass there are three or four different default values. The longer the distance the 
higher the default value.1170 While these will not be state specific default values, they 
will still be geography-related. 
Determining the transport distance may be slightly more complex as compared to 
determining the state of origin. The fact that different default values for different 
transport distances will be adopted under the RED for biomass fuels would indicate that 
such models might not be unreasonably costly. Moreover, at least in some 
circumstances a model with default values tied to transport distance could have less 
discriminatory effects than state specific default values. However, assigning default 
values on the basis of transport distance might not necessarily guarantee the same level 
of protection against emissions as assigning default values on the basis of state origin. 
State specific default values will admittedly be less exact in terms of capturing the 
relevance of transport distance for emission levels. Despite that fact, the state specific 
values could potentially ensure a higher level of protection because they can incorporate 
also other state specific factors, such as the emissions from generating the local power 
used for fuel production at the energy plants. 
What follows from the above is that not only the fate of origin neutral default values 
under GATT, but also the fate of state specific or otherwise geography-related default 
values would depend on whether a model with only individual values could be regarded 
as a reasonable less discriminatory alternative. This question is addressed in the next 
subsection. 
                                                 
1170 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Annex VI. 
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California’s LCFS must be compatible with both GATT and the U.S. Constitution. The 
general approach to the trade law compatibility a model of individual values 
complemented by state specific default values will likely be no different under the U.S. 
dormant Commerce Clause than under GATT despite the differences in the structure of 
the proportionality reviews. The reasoning leading to this conclusion may be laid out 
with reference to the developments that have already taken place in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union, a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California’s LCFS. 
Although the criteria in the default values of the original LCFS explicitly referred to 
geographical origin, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has refused to 
declare the scheme facially (i.e. de jure) discriminatory.1171 The first time, in 2013, the 
Ninth Circuit however remanded the case back to the district court for it to consider 
whether the scheme reflected a discriminatory purpose or was discriminatory in effect 
in a way that would justify the application of strict scrutiny in the case. In a 
memorandum decision and an order on the motion to dismiss the district court in 2017 
concluded that there was no discriminatory purpose behind the LCFS.1172 It, however, 
added that discriminatory effects were plausible, and that strict scrutiny could 
potentially come to apply.1173 It can thus not be excluded that strict scrutiny could come 
to apply to systems with default values when different states are assigned different 
values.1174 Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit took up the question of 
discriminatory effects after 2017 as the plaintiffs themselves opted to dismiss that claim 
What is more, the Ninth Circuit found that any challenge against the original LCFS was 
moot by its repeal.1175 
Even in the event that courts in the future would decide to apply strict scrutiny to 
schemes similar to that of California’s original LCFS, they might still conclude that 
changing to a model with origin neutral default values would not form an alternative to 
achieve an adequate level of protection. Origin neutral values capture the environmental 
                                                 
1171 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013); Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). Similarly on Oregon’s sustainability criteria see 
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
1172 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). This was affirmed in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). Similarly on Oregon’s sustainability criteria 
see American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
1173 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
1174 See section 3.2.3.5. 
1175 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019).  
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effects with less precision, which means that the system could excessively promote 
unsustainable biofuels and insufficiently promote sustainable biofuels. This is a 
problem of over and under inclusion. Given that under schemes like the LCFS 
sustainable producers can apply for individual values, the problem of under inclusion 
would be mitigated. Yet, the problem of over inclusion would remain. Hence, the origin 
neutral model would advance a lower level of protection. A similar conclusion could in 
principle come to apply for the alternative model with default values tied to transport 
distance. 
If strict scrutiny would not apply, then the Pike balancing test would instead apply to 
cases on the types of schemes that the LCFS represents. After Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union had been remanded back to the district court by the Courts of Appeals, the district 
court also addressed this issue in 2017 in its memorandum decision and an order on the 
motion to dismiss. The district court found that it at least was plausible that neither the 
old nor the amended version of the LCFS would survive the Pike balancing test.1176 
The statements by the court accepting the plaintiffs argument that benefits of the LCFS 
could plausibly be marginal merely because it cannot solve climate change alone are 
difficult to reconcile with settled case law on Pike balancing.1177  
The issue was not subject to the appeal decided on by the Ninth Circuit in 2019 as the 
plaintiffs dismissed their claims related to Pike balancing and the original LCFS had 
already been amended. Hence, U.S. courts will have to clarify their position in future 
rulings. Indeed, in a case on Oregon’s Clean Fuel Program, which is very similar to 
California’s original LCFS, the Ninth Circuit in 2018 already found the biofuels 
sustainability scheme to survive the Pike balancing test.1178 
California and Oregon should under the Pike balancing test only have to make the case 
that the burden of the system as a whole, including the state specific values, is not 
clearly excessive of the benefit.1179 The state specific default values as well as 
geographically related indicators in the individual value calculations will likely have 
more significant discriminatory effects than any origin neutral model. There is some 
room to argue the opposite, but that would require a quite unorthodox approach. This 
                                                 
1176 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
1177 For a view on the application of Pike balancing in the case see sections 3.2.3.4-3.2.3.5. 
1178 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
1179 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   382 31.7.2019   7.15
 383 
approach would be based on the view that, first, it is discriminatory to treat different 
cases similarly and, secondly, differences in emissions from transportation and from 
generating the electricity relied on in fuel plants would make the cases of, on the one 
hand, Midwest and, on the other hand, California or Oregon biofuel production so 
different that they should not be treated similarly. Treating them similarly would 
subsequently be regarded as discriminatory and creating a high burden on inter-state 
commerce. If such a position would be adopted, the case could be made that the origin 
neutral model, under which the relevance of transport distances for emission levels are 
not taken account of, actually has a higher burden on inter-state commerce. A parallel 
can here be drawn to the discussion on the decision by states not to take action against 
polluting activities.1180 Admittedly, there are hardly any indications that the burden 
under the Pike balancing test would be applied in this manner. 
Even if the state specific default values and the geographically related individual values 
likely would be concluded to create a higher burden on interstate trade, the more 
specific criteria make the model more exact than models with either origin neutral 
default values or default values tied to transport distance. Hence, the state specific 
default values increase environmental benefits. Importantly, the Pike balancing test has 
been very deferential by allowing measures that ensure a genuine benefit to be 
upheld.1181 State specific default values could therefore well survive the Pike balancing 
test. That being said, the outcome of the weighing may be affected by the potential 
alternative model of only having individual value certification and no default values. 
Despite the fact that arguments exist in favor of state specific default values, California 
opted in 2015 to change the default values to origin neutral. The origin sensitive 
elements were still left in the calculations of individual values. The main objection 
against state specific default values, or default values at all for that matter, might be 
based on the option of eliminating default values altogether. This alternative will be 
discussed in the next subsection. 
5.2.3. The Option of Abolishing Default Values Altogether 
Biofuels sustainability criteria applicable under the LCFS include the calculation of 
GHG emission savings values for different pathways on the basis of the average 
                                                 
1180 See section 2.1.3. 
1181 See section 3.2.2. 
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performance of respective pathway. The model offers producers the option between 
these pathway default values and individually calculated values. Could then a model 
completely without default values form a reasonably available less trade restrictive 
alternative that would ensures an equal level of protection? In other words, could such 
alternative measure render the LCFS, which includes both individual and default 
values, incompatible with trade law?  
As part of the proportionality review the Californian LCFS should be compared with 
alternative measures in order to determine whether there exists some less trade 
restrictive measure that ensures the same level of protection. The alternative measures 
considered must, however, be technically and economically reasonably available. In 
other words, biofuels sustainability scheme with only individual certification can render 
schemes with default values disproportional only if a model without default values 
forms a reasonably available option for the state. 
In EC – Seals the panel, and later the AB, had to consider whether certifying and 
labelling seal products as humanely killed would have offered an alternative to the 
general import ban on all seal products. The import ban adopted by the EU allowed for 
only limited exceptions unrelated to the ‘sustainability’ of the hunting method. In 
principle, it could have been argued that an import ban on merely seal products that 
were not certified would have served the European objectives of protecting public 
morals equally well. However, the almost complete ban on seal products was much 
easier to implement than a certification scheme for sustainable seal products.  
For an alternative not to be reasonably available there must be substantial technical 
difficulties or the costs must be significant.1182 Some additional administrative costs 
would not render the alternative unreasonable.1183 In the view of the AB in EC – Seals 
the certification was not reasonably available from an economic and technical 
perspective due to the difficulty and the high costs of enforcing a reliable labelling 
                                                 
1182 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.270-279. In the context of GATS see US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, AB Report, 7 April 2005, para. 304. In the context of 
Art. 2.2 TBT Agreement see US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements: Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, DS384, AB Report, 18 May 2015, para. 5.330. 
1183 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB Report, 11 Dec. 
2000, para. 181; China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, DS363, AB Report, 21 Dec 2009, paras 327-328. 
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scheme for each individual product.1184 Thus, the EU could in principle have been 
justified in banning all products as ‘immoral’ or ‘unsustainable’ by default. However, 
due to the design of the measure with some exemptions to the ban on seal products, the 
measure was in the end found to have breached the chapeau of Article XX GATT.1185 
EC – Seals could arguably offer some arguments in favor of the conclusion that a 
system with individual verification of the sustainability of each biofuels producer 
would not be a reasonable alternative for California when designing sustainability 
schemes. The cases of biofuels sustainability schemes are still in many respects 
different from EC – Seals. For example, a major challenge in certifying seal products 
is the fact that hunters do not have full control of whether the kill will be humane or 
not. With the same methods of hunting, some kills will proceed more humanely than 
others. Thus, each hunt would require an observer, and even then, hunters would be 
encouraged to hunt excessively because after unsustainable kills they would have 
incentives to make a new effort to get a sustainable kill. In contrast, biofuels production 
is a fairly consistent process where the producer has more control over different 
sustainability variables. Individual certification is consequently much more reliable. 
The argument that models with only individual values are not reasonably available in 
the biofuels sector can therefore not be confirmed on the basis of EC – Seals. The 
proportionality of biofuels sustainability schemes with default values need to be 
scrutinized more in detail. 
At least for the EU and California introducing individual values to complement default 
values has not created a too heavy administrative burden. The existence of individual 
value certification as a complement to default values under California’s LCFS and 
under EU RED would suggest that even a model with only individual values could 
potentially also be reasonably available.  Admittedly, the costs would increase if the 
option of default values would be eliminated altogether. However, the state would not 
have to bare all costs itself as the scheme could rely on private certifiers. It still appears 
unavoidable that some costs would be incurred as the state would need to have some 
system for the surveillance of certification practices and for verifying that presented 
certificates are genuine. 
                                                 
1184 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, paras 5.270-279. 
1185 See section 4.2.5. 
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Models may be technically and economically reasonable even if they have not yet been 
implemented anywhere. The case law offers little guidance as to when the technical and 
economic burden becomes too high. The question on the reasonable availability of the 
model is thus put aside for now. Instead, the focus turns to whether a model without 
default values could ensure the same level of protection as the Californian model that 
includes both individual values and default values. 
California’s LCFS includes default values for several pathways. Considering that 
individual values generally better reflect true sustainability, eliminating the default 
values from the model would not seem to threaten the level of environmental protection 
sought for. However, a model with only individual values would not ensure the same 
level of protection in case many sustainable producers do not have access to individual 
value certification due to legal, technical or economic obstacles. In other words, the 
current model relying on individual values complemented by default values could be 
disproportional if individual value certification would be affordable for more or less all 
producers. 
The test of reasonable availability leads to the conclusion that the costs cannot be too 
high for the state or union adopting the measure. In turn, the test of equal level of 
protection leads to the conclusion that the costs cannot become too high for the 
producers. Hence, schemes with default values could be deemed disproportional only 
when it would be reasonable to expect states to have the technical and economic 
capacity to structure an alternative model with only individual value certification and 
that model would ensure access to individual value certification for more or less all 
producers. The success of the argument that California’s sustainability model is 
disproportional because leaving out default values would be a reasonably available 
alternative would in other words depend on how expensive individual value 
certification would be for respective party when costs have been divided in an optimal 
way between on the one hand the producer and on the other hand the state or union 
adopting the model. The question of costs is complex and would require a careful in-
depth economic analysis of the market for sustainability certification. 
The above analysis of the test on reasonable availability was anchored in principles 
developed in WTO law. Similar questions of reasonably available alternative measures 
could equally well arise in the application of proportionality tests under the U.S. 
dormant Commerce Clause. In fact, in her dissenting opinion for the Ninth Circuit in 
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Rocky Mountain Farmers Union in 2013 judge Murguia already argued that the original 
LCFS was unconstitutional because abolishing the default values would in her opinion 
have been an available option.1186 As the above discussion revealed, that position is 
highly contentious. For example, Lee has later concluded that abolishing default values 
altogether would be too costly.1187 
It is unclear whether or not a model with only individual value certification could be 
implemented in a way that ensures the same level of environmental protection as the 
LCFS, while at the same time does not render it economically unreasonable. Models 
with a combination of both individual and default values can be disproportional due to 
the alternative of implementing a model built on only individual value certification only 
if the costs of individual certification would be fairly modest. Additional conditions 
must, however, also be fulfilled for it to be incompatible with trade law to adopt default 
values. Importantly, the alternative model of abolishing the default values altogether 
could render the LCFS disproportional only if it is less trade restrictive. 
It has been argued in this chapter that the test on trade restrictiveness should always 
include an assessment of whether the proposed alternative measure would be less 
discriminatory. In the review of a model with no default values any comparison of 
discriminatory effects between the measure and alternatives would naturally be 
redundant in case the proportionality review would, first of all, include a test on trade 
restrictiveness in terms of trade volumes and, secondly, the model without default 
values would be deemed to be more trade restrictive in that respect. 
A model without default values would be more, not less, trade restrictive in the sense 
that it would be more difficult for biofuels to gain sustainability certification and thus 
also more difficult to get access to the benefits of sustainability status. The consequence 
would likely be that trade in biofuels would decrease. It should, however, be 
acknowledged that while abolishing default values might have a hampering effect on 
trade in biofuels, such effects would largely stem from a corresponding increase in the 
market share of fossil fuels. Hence, it would appear far from evident that a model 
without default values would be considered more trade restrictive under the 
                                                 
1186 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), judge Murguia dissenting. 
1187 Hwi Harold Lee, ‘Dormant Commerce Clause Review: Why the Ninth Circuit Decision in Corey 
Strayed from Precedent and What the Supreme Court Could Have Done About It’ (2015) 42 Boston 
College Environmental Affairs Law Review 54, 65. 
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proportionality review, even if the review would include some form of test on trade 
restrictiveness in terms of trade volumes. Be that as it may, a further analysis on whether 
a model without default values would constitute a less discriminatory alternative 
measure is still called for. 
The original LCFS had state specific default values. State specific default values, even 
in combination with individual values, will often have discriminatory effects as in-state 
producers receive better default values. While this would suggest that states should be 
cautious in opting for models with state specific default values as complements to 
individual values, it is not necessarily always the case that a model with only individual 
values forms a less discriminatory alternative. Namely, the existence of default values 
also benefits those with poor access to individual value certification. The lack of access 
may be due to financial issues or due to the lack of a local market for sustainability 
certification. It has been suspected that individual certification could prove to be very 
expensive and difficult to access especially for producers in developing countries.1188 
If this problem is serious enough, state specific default values in developed country 
sustainability schemes may actually reduce the discriminatory effect of the scheme. 
In the analysis of whether the model with only individual value certification is 
reasonably available for states and whether it ensures the same level of protection as 
the implemented versions of the LCFS, it was concluded that so may be the case only 
when the costs of a system with individual value certification is sufficiently low for 
both the state and producers. When that would be the case, it seems plausible that 
producers from different states would all have good access to individual value 
certification and that the model with only individual values would be less 
discriminatory than the model with state specific default values. This is further 
indication that the analysis of the proportionality of the original LCFS would require 
detailed data on the costs of biofuels sustainability certification. 
After amendments in 2015 the default values in California’s LCFS have been origin 
neutral. With this current LCFS, in which individual values are complemented with 
                                                 
1188 Robert Ackrill and Adrian Kay, ‘EU Biofuels Sustainability Standards and Certification Systems – 
How to Seek WTO-Compatibility’ (2011) 62 J. Agricultural Economics 551, 560; Sanford E. Gaines, 
‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade 
Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental L. 383, 407. Cf. similar issues in the context of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (UNEP 1987) 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. The 
protocol contains provisions on restriction on the use of ozone depleting substances in the PPMs. 
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origin neutral default values, California could attempt to rely on the same defense as 
laid out above for schemes with state specific default values in combination with 
individual value certification. The potential lack of means for producers in less 
developed countries to access individual certification could form a reason why 
eliminating default values as complements would not necessarily decrease 
discrimination. Let us, however, assume that costs of individual certification would be 
low and that there would be no significant differences in the accessibility of individual 
certification in different states. A model with geography-related individual values and 
origin neutral default values could still be argued to have discriminatory effects as 
illustrated by Rocky Mountain Farmers Union.1189 Could eliminating origin-neutral 
default values from California’s LCFS and subsequently relying on only individual 
value certification decrease any such discriminatory effect? 
A biofuels sustainability scheme might have been implemented by a developed state or 
country, in which the biofuels plants with respect to a pathway specific comparison 
perform better than state, union or global averages that may have been used for the 
calculations of the default values. Eliminating origin neutral default values as a 
complement to individual value certification might in that case not decrease the 
discriminatory effects of the scheme. This is because the introduction of origin neutral 
default values as complements to a model with individual value certification would be 
beneficial for states that pollute more when producing biofuels with the same feedstock 
and chemical production method. Less developed countries or states will likely often 
use older technologies when producing fuel with the same feedstock and chemical 
methods. Hence, their production will result in more pollution. This in turn means that 
the less developed states or countries would benefit from default values that rely on 
union or global averages or averages of states with better performance. 
The above observations would suggest that California’s current LCFS with origin 
neutral default values might not become less discriminatory if the origin neutral default 
values were to be abolished. Similarly, developed countries could likely use origin 
neutral default values as complements to individual value certification because such 
models normally have beneficial consequences for less developed states. Origin neutral 
                                                 
1189 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
389
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   389 31.7.2019   7.15
 390 
default values would in other words as a rule appear justifiable even if individual value 
certification would already be, or in the future become, inexpensive. 
In conclusion, as for the situation today, it is doubtful as to whether a model without 
default values could be both reasonably available and ensure an equal level of 
protection at the same time due to the costs of the process of individual certification. 
Hence, it is plausible that complementing individual values even with state specific 
default values, such as California’s original model, would survive the proportionality 
review. However, it could at least in the future, with the development of more cost-
efficient technical solutions, become economically feasible for the state to implement 
a model with only individual values without the costs for access to individual values 
for out-of-state producers becoming very high, even if this would not be determined to 
be the case today. Models with only individual values would be sufficiently inexpensive 
when a system with only individual certification is both reasonable for the state to 
implement and economically an alternative for enough sustainable producers so that 
the level of environmental protection does not drop. Modest costs for producers to 
certify individual values would mean that more or less all out-of-state producers, even 
those from less developed countries, would have access to individual value 
certification.  
When a model of only individual value certification that ensures the same level of 
protection as current models is reasonably available, it would still have to be determined 
whether it would be less discriminatory than current models. It is submitted that a model 
introduced by a state with highly developed sustainable technology should have good 
chances of surviving the proportionality review when the default values are origin 
neutral and the model does not include sustainability thresholds but instead follows the 
sliding scale model of California’s LCFS. The likely justifiability of origin neutral 
default values even when sustainability certification becomes inexpensive is good news 
for the new 2015 version of California’s LCFS. At the same time, it should be pointed 
out that models with state specific default values may face difficulties in surviving the 
proportionality review if the costs of implementing a model with only individual values 
become modest. 
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5.3. Biofuels Sustainability Criteria in EU RED 
5.3.1. The Design of the Scheme and Alleged Discriminatory Effects 
Biofuels sustainability criteria have been established by the EU in the Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED). The EU RED stipulates that only biofuels that are sustainable 
may be promoted through financial support or quotas. There is, however, no annual 
quota for sustainable biofuels. It is up to each Member States whether it implements 
any quota and how it decides to promote sustainable biofuels. The new Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED 2) will specify that Member States must introduce obligations 
for suppliers of transport fuel but leaves it to each state to design the details.1190 
The sustainability criteria define which biofuels are to be considered sustainable. Fuels 
are automatically deemed unsustainable if produced from feedstock that comes from 
certain types vulnerable land or land with high biodiversity. These vulnerable lands 
include peatland, biodiverse land and lands protected for their high carbon stock.  
The criteria that render unsustainable biofuels from feedstock grown on certain 
vulnerable lands are not shaped with reference to the final effect.1191 Sustainability is 
not determined in terms of biodiversity loss, but in terms of the land on which the 
feedstock is grown, which serves as a proxy for, for example, biodiversity loss and loss 
of land with high carbon stock. The reason for this solution is likely that the loss of 
biodiversity linked to the production of fuel at some specific plant would be difficult to 
quantify and verify. 
Requirements that feedstock has been grown on some specific lands or has not been 
grown on sensitive land could have discriminatory effects. The requirements may be 
easier to justify when producers collecting also some biomass from sensitive lands have 
the right to illustrate that doing so has had no effect on the biodiversity interest that is 
being protected. For example, the sustainability criteria in the EU RED include the 
possibility for producers to provide evidence that collecting feedstock from the 
vulnerable land has not interfered with the nature protection purposes.1192 Obviously, 
                                                 
1190 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Art. 25(1). 
1191 Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. 
Approaches to Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health 
Law 104, 114-118. 
1192 See Article 17, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently 
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. For similar provisions in the 
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providing evidence of no detrimental effects on biodiversity will in many cases be 
almost an impossible task. The exemption is still important since collecting some 
feedstock might even improve protection if it helps to prevent wildfires. 
Apart from criteria with respect to where the feedstock is cultivated, the sustainability 
criteria also require that the GHG emissions are sufficiently low. This is an example of 
a criterion on quantifiable effects. However, unlike under California’s LCFS, 
sustainability is under EU RED not regarded as a sliding scale. GHG emissions are 
estimated in order to categorize the fuel either as sustainable or unsustainable. There is 
no difference if the GHG emission savings are, for example, 70 % or 90 % as long as 
they pass the applicable sustainability threshold.  
Originally Article 17 of the 2009 EU RED had established that for biofuels to be 
sustainable the life-cycle GHG emissions savings should be 35 per cent compared to 
the benchmark of emissions from gasoline. The claim has been made that the scheme 
was purposefully designed to serve the union’s agricultural policy.1193 Regardless of 
intent, the threshold for emission savings might have had discriminatory effects. Hence, 
several scholars have discussed the risk that the original choice of a 35 per cent 
threshold in the EU might constitute arbitrary discrimination.1194  
Argentina’s challenge against the RED echoes the claim of discriminatory design.1195 
Soybean biodiesel exported by Argentina to the EU is offered a default value of 31 per 
cent emissions savings, just barely missing the original threshold. In turn rapeseed, 
which is a common feedstock in intra-EU production, was under the 2009 version of 
the directive estimated to reduce emissions sufficiently in order to be labelled 
sustainable.  
                                                 
new directive see Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 
82, Article 29(3)-(5). 
1193 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 10-11. 
1194 Stephanie Switzer and Joseph A. McMahon, ‘EU Biofuels Policy – Raising the Question of WTO 
Compatibility’ (2011) 60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 713, 729-734; Alan Swinbank, 
‘EU Policies on Bioenergy and their Potential Clash with the WTO’ (2009) 60 J. Agricultural Economics 
485, 499; Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will 
Reinforce the WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 15-
16. 
1195 European Union and Certain Member States — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing 
of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, DS459, Request for consultations by 
Argentina, 15 May 2013. 
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In late 2015 the GHG emission savings threshold under the RED was raised to 60 per 
cent. However, older facilities already in operation at that time may still rely on a lower 
threshold.1196 That lower threshold for old facilities went up from 35 to 50 per cent in 
2018. Rapeseed biodiesel is consequently now unsustainable when default values are 
applied. The risks of discriminatory effects would in other words appeared to have at 
least declined somewhat in recent years. 
The new RED 2 will enter into force in 2021. Under the renewed directive the GHG 
emission savings thresholds for biofuels made in old facilities will remain at the 50-60 
% level. However, the threshold for new biofuel plants entering into operation after 
2020 will be 65 %. The threshold for biomass fuel relied on for heating and cooling or 
for generating electricity will in turn be 70 % in 2021 and 80 % for plants starting to 
operate in 2026 or later.1197 
There are several different methods to estimate whether or not fuel from a plant 
complies with the GHG emission savings threshold. The EU model, similarly to 
California’s LCFS, offers GHG emission savings values for different pathways on the 
basis of the average performance of respective pathway. However, in estimating default 
values the EU has generally avoided components that are linked to geographic 
origin.1198 
Producers have under EU sustainability criteria the option between pathway default 
values and individually calculated values. Those likely to decide to apply for individual 
certification are producers that believe they are more effective than the average 
producer with a similar pathway. Those producers can get a value lower than the 
applicable default value. The incentives to apply for an individual value depend on the 
                                                 
1196 Directive 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, 1. See Article 1.3(a) 
amending Article 7b(2) of Directive 98/70/EC (the Fuel Quality Directive) and Article 2.5(a) amending 
Article 17(2) of the RED. For older provisions see Article 17(2), Directive 2009/28/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 
5.6.2009, 16. 
1197 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Art. 29(10). 
1198 A notable exception is the fact that a default value is available only for corn ethanol produced in the 
EU. See Annex V, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
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costs of the process and whether a lower GHG emission value is necessary for receiving 
the desired benefits. 
Producers may rely on individual value certification for some stages of the life-cycle 
analysis, while relying on default values for other stages.1199 On the one hand, such 
approach allows for environmentally unjustifiable “cherry picking” and could therefore 
lower the level of environmental protection.1200 On the other hand, it allows producers 
that do not have the capacity to certify emissions from all elements of the production 
phase to still gain an advantage for having some highly sustainable elements in their 
process, which in turn would improve the level of sustainability advanced by the model. 
At the outset it would seem plausible that the risks of allowing cherry picking are 
greater than the environmental benefits, but it would require more detailed research of 
the market. 
5.3.2. The Approach to ILUC 
The EU has in recent years recognized the need to create incentives to increase the 
market share of the more advanced and less controversial biofuels. Consequently, 
already in 2015 the EU RED was amended so that that conventional first generation 
biofuels from agricultural crops may take up no more than seven percentage points of 
the ten percent renewables target set for the transport sector to be reached in 2020.1201  
With the new RED 2, the 2030 target for renewable energy consumption in the transport 
sector will be raised to 14 % and the national cap for first generation biofuels in 
fulfilling the overall transport sector target will be between 2 and 7 percent for each 
Member State depending on the share of such fuels in 2020.1202  Moreover, the RED 2 
will take an additional step in the direction of the U.S. approach by introducing a target 
quota for advanced biofuels. Although the gradually increasing target will reach 3,5 % 
                                                 
1199 Article 19(1), Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16. 
1200 Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. 
Approaches on Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health 
Law 106, 127. 
1201 Directive 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, 1. 
1202 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Art. 25(1) and 
26(1). 
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by 2030,1203 the share will in reality be lower as the directive authorizes double-
counting.1204 
Furthermore, the contribution from high ILUC risk food and feed crop-based bioenergy 
to the EU renewable energy targets may in the future not rise above 2019 levels. 
Bioenergy is considered under the directive to constitute a high risk with respect to 
ILUC in case it has been produced from a food and feed crop feedstock for which 
significant expansion of the production area into land with high carbon stock has 
already been observed. The Commission has the task to determine the criteria for high-
risk feedstock in a delegated act.1205  
High-risk ILUC was defined in a delegated act in 2019.1206 The global annual average 
expansion area for maize and soybean were estimated as several times higher than for 
palm oil. However, the percentage of the expansion taking place into land with high 
carbon stock has been estimated by the Commission to be 68 % for palm oil and only 
eight percent for soybean and four percent for maize. For sugar cane, in turn, five 
percent of the expansion takes place at the expense of wetlands, continuously forested 
areas and other land with high carbon stock. The threshold for high ILUC-risk has been 
set at ten percent, which means that only palm oil is a high-risk feedstock. Bioenergy 
from a prima facie high-risk feedstock can under the delegated act still be certified as 
low ILUC-risk fuel in case it can be verified that the feedstock has been grown with 
methods of increased productivity or has been cultivated on abandoned, severly 
degraded or for the last five years unused land. In addition, feedstock delivered by small 
farmers, can be categorized sustainable under the delegated act. This exception may 
benefit even some bioenergy from palm oil. 
As discussed earlier, criteria on the sustainability of PPMs should as a rule be expressed 
in the form of requirements on an effect. However, characteristics of the PPMs (e.g. a 
pathway) may serve as a proxy for either sustainability or for some level of an effect 
provided that alternative PPMs that cause the same level of effects are granted the same 
                                                 
1203 Id., Art. 25(1). 
1204 Id., Art. 27(2). 
1205 Id., Article 26(2). 
1206 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/807 of 13 March 2019 supplementing Directive (EU) 
2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the determination of high indirect 
land-use change-risk feedstock for which a significant expansion of the production area into land with 
high carbon stock is observed and the certification of low indirect land-use change-risk biofuels, 
bioliquids and biomass fuels (C/2019/2055) OJ L 133, 21.5.2019, 1. 
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benefits. It will likely often be the case that no alternative equally effective PPM exists 
when the objective of the criteria is to address multiple effects. States have to accept 
equally effective alternative methods, but by declaring multiple objectives for criteria 
on the characteristics of the PPMs the state makes it much easier to conclude that the 
presented alternative PPM cannot be accepted as equally effective.  
Palm oil is generally in the EU regarded as a high ILUC risk feedstock.1207 This view 
now appears to become confirmed through the adoption of the delegated act on high 
ILUC-risk feedstock. It would be advisable to justify the inclusion of palm oil on a list 
of high ILUC risk feedstock with reference not merely to a high estimation of GHG 
emissions from cultivation expansion into land with high carbon stock, but instead to 
multiple negative effects of palm oil as a feedstock. 
5.3.3. GHG Emissions Savings Thresholds and the Least Restrictive Measure Test 
5.3.3.1. Alternative Higher and Lower Thresholds 
EU biofuels sustainability criteria are more favorable for rapeseed biodiesel, which is 
commonly produced in the EU, than for biodiesel made out of palm oil, which is a 
feedstock grown largely in Malaysia and Indonesia. This will likely be viewed as 
causing discriminatory effect. What is more, the GHG emission thresholds could 
potentially cause discriminatory effects also in other respects. However, the criteria 
advance a legitimate environmental objective. The familiar test of least trade restrictive 
measure may therefore be pivotal for the analysis of whether biofuels sustainability 
criteria are proportional and compatible with GATT. The threshold for GHG emissions 
will be proportional in case there is no less trade restrictive model that ensures an equal 
level of protection. Hence, it is necessary to consider potential alternatives to the 
thresholds adopted in the EU RED. 
Lowering the GHG savings threshold would facilitate access to the benefits awarded to 
sustainable biofuels. Yet, that is not sufficient for the measure to be less trade 
restrictive. Whether lowering the GHG emissions savings threshold would be a less 
trade restrictive alternative in the sense that it would decrease the discriminatory effects 
depends on the specifics of the case as well as how much lower the threshold would be. 
It would seem plausible that a significantly lower threshold for GHG emission savings, 
                                                 
1207 See Dave Keating, ‘Palm Oil to be Phased Out in EU by 2030’ (14 June 2018) 
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-of-mobility/news/palm-oil-to-be-phased-out-in-eu-by-
2030/> accessed 15 Sept. 2018. 
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a threshold that would almost be zero, would not have any discriminatory effects. 
However, it would be difficult to establish that a lower GHG emission savings threshold 
would ensure the same level of protection as less sustainable biofuels would start to 
receive the same benefits. 
Another alternative measure would be to raise the GHG emission savings threshold. 
While the higher threshold would be more restrictive on trade in biofuels, it could 
potentially be considered a valid alternative measure when less discriminatory. Even 
after a potential finding that a higher threshold would be less discriminatory, it would 
have to be examined whether the threshold ensures at least an equal level of protection. 
In the case of denying market access of all products (fuels) that do not meet the 
threshold it could be argued that a higher GHG emissions savings threshold raises the 
level of protection. However, the situation is much more complex when the market 
access of unsustainable products has not been banned and the sustainability threshold 
is instead used to determine which products receive benefits. 
In the case of implementing schemes to promote biofuels that meet a GHG emission 
savings threshold it is uncertain whether raising the threshold would improve the level 
of environmental protection. On the one hand, raising the threshold would ensure that 
biofuels receiving a beneficial status are more sustainable. On the other hand, when 
there is no ban on fuels with high emissions, the act of raising the GHG emissions 
savings threshold for beneficial treatment would result in less biofuels receiving 
benefits, which in turn could result in the least sustainable fuels gaining market share. 
In other words, there is the risk that with a higher emissions savings threshold dirty 
gasoline, that otherwise would have been replaced by some biofuels, now due to a 
stricter sustainability threshold will not be replaced by biofuels, even if the biofuels 
would have much lower GHG emissions than gasoline. 
In sum, it would be difficult to prove that a higher GHG emissions savings threshold 
would ensure an equal level of protection. There is therefore in this context no need to 
consider whether a higher threshold could actually be considered a less trade restrictive 
measure. Biofuels sustainability models will in any event likely not be deemed 
disproportional with reference to the alternative of increasing the GHG emissions 
savings threshold. 
397
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5.3.3.2. The Sliding Scale Model as an Alternative Measure 
A challenge against the EU RED could rely on the argument that instead of a GHG 
emission savings threshold there is the alternative of implementing a sliding scale with 
benefits awarded in proportion to the level of emissions. This alternative model has 
already been adopted by California in its LCFS. The fuel that fuel providers deliver 
must on average, during any given year, not exceed a pre-determined level of carbon 
intensity. There is no threshold for sustainability in the LCFS. Instead sustainability is 
defined on a sliding scale of carbon intensity. In other words, the carbon intensity of 
the fuel reflects the level of sustainability on a continuum. Each small difference in 
carbon intensity will consequently be of relevance. 
The LCFS may be more desirable than the thresholds model of the EU RED for several 
reasons, ranging from environmental1208 to legal coherence.1209 In this book it will, 
however, only be examined whether the EU model with thresholds could be more 
vulnerable to a challenge under GATT. 
The chapeau of Article XX GATT prohibits arbitrary discrimination. The test has been 
described as having the nature of a cost-benefit test.1210 It includes an assessment of 
whether there would exist some alternative measure that would be less discriminatory 
and would still enable the state to achieve a similar level of protection of the legitimate 
objective. The alternative offered must be reasonably available and such that the state 
could reasonably be expected to employ it.1211 Both economic and technical constraints 
should be acknowledged.1212  
                                                 
1208 Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. 
Approaches to Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health 
Law 104, 120-121. In the article it is recognized that many non-GHG related environmental effects 
equally relevant as GHG emissions are difficult to incorporate into such a scale. 
1209 Max S. Jansson, ‘Public Procurement and Biofuels Sustainability Criteria – Is There a Link?’ (2016) 
6 Climate Law 296. 
1210 Andrew D. Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, ’Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of 
”Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of International 
Law 93, 134. 
1211 US – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Panel Report, L/6439, 16 Jan. 1989 (adopted), para. 5.26; 
Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10, Panel Report, 15 Oct. 
1990, para. 74; Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, DS161, AB 
Report, 11 Dec. 2000, para. 166. 
1212 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, DS332, AB Report, 3 Dec. 2007, paras 
156, 171; EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB 
Report, 22 May 2014, para. 5.277; EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, 
DS135, Panel Report, 18 Sept 2000, paras 8.207-211. 
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The existence of California’s LCFS would speak in favor of the conclusion that a 
sliding scale model could reasonably be adopted in the EU. The additional burden on 
the state from introducing a sliding scale may not be unreasonable. Under a threshold 
model without any sliding scale the costs of sustainability certification may be very low 
in cases where the GHG emissions are so minimal that it is obvious that the fuel 
complies with the threshold. In turn, introducing a sliding scale could increase the costs 
of certifiers as emissions would in every case of individual value certification have to 
be estimated with high precision. However, these costs would not burden the state 
government when the task of certification is fully left to private markets. Admittedly, 
some increase in costs for the state adopting the scheme may still result from the 
increased risks of fraud when importance is given to even small differences in GHG 
emissions. Namely, the state adopting the scheme might incur some additional costs in 
the process of verifying that producers and certifiers do not engage in fraudulent acts. 
If the sliding scale model is reasonably available, would it then be less trade restrictive 
than the EU RED? A sliding scale model could be implemented in combination with a 
minimum GHG emission savings threshold. In other words, the current threshold might 
be kept and biofuels with too high levels of GHG emissions would not be offered any 
benefits. The difference with the EU RED would be that instead of offering all biofuels 
reaching the required savings threshold equal levels of benefits, the benefits would 
instead be relative to the GHG emission savings. Whether or not this model would be 
less trade restrictive than current models is difficult to assess in abstract and would 
depend highly on the specifics of the case. 
Yet another alternative to the current EU model would be to either lower or raise current 
thresholds and at the same time introduce a sliding scale for GHG emission savings 
exceeding the threshold. Whether this solution would decrease or even remove potential 
discriminatory effects would again require a careful analysis of the market. There are 
indications that the original thresholds may have been tailored to benefit the in-state 
biofuel industries. The fact that the threshold was raised may thus already have 
decreased or even eliminated any potential discriminatory effects. That being said, if 
current thresholds are found to have discriminatory effects, it would seem probable that 
the discriminatory effects would decrease at least if the GHG emissions savings 
thresholds would be lowered considerably, perhaps even close to zero per cent.  
399
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It is difficult to estimate whether the sliding scale model would decrease trade 
restrictiveness also in the sense that barriers to trade volumes would diminish. Any such 
evidence might, however, not be necessary for it to be considered a valid alternative 
measure under the proportionality review. As the alternative of the sliding scale model 
does not form a measure that would clearly restrict trade volumes to a greater extent, it 
would likely be regarded as less trade restrictive without much controversy already if 
it could be determined that it is a less discriminatory measure. 
On the basis of the above observations, there could potentially exist less discriminatory 
alternatives to the current EU model. Of particular interest is the alternative of 
significantly lowering the GHG emissions savings thresholds and simultaneously 
introducing a system of awarding benefits to biofuels that reach the GHG emission 
savings threshold in proportion to the GHG emissions attributed to the biofuel batch. 
Yet, while a model with a sliding scale could be less discriminatory than the current 
EU model, it would also under the proportionality review have to be analyzed whether 
the alternative model would offer at least the same level of protection as the EU RED 
with respect to a justifiable objective. The subsequent analysis will thus explore 
whether a sliding scale model combined with some GHG emission savings threshold 
could ensure a level of environmental protection equal to that of currently applicable 
EU model. 
What justifiable objectives could the EU refer to in an attempt to defend its model 
against a trade law challenge? The EU could put forward at least three different 
objectives in its efforts to make the case for the proportionality of a model without a 
sliding scale. The first objective would simply be to reduce GHG emissions as much as 
possible. The second objective would be to avoid climate change disaster and 
irreversible environmental harm. This objective could be expressed as minimizing the 
probability that global temperatures increase by more than two degrees Celcius from 
current levels. Finally, the third objective could be to reduce social problems and 
environmental issues unrelated to GHG emissions. Below the proportionality of 
threshold models without any sliding scale will be assessed against the backdrop of 
each of those three objectives. 
The proportionality review could begin with the observation that a sliding scale model 
would advance sustainable biofuels in proportion to their GHG emission savings and 
the most sustainable alternatives would gain significantly more benefits than fuels that 
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only barely exceed any current GHG emission savings threshold. This could be 
expected to increase the market share of biofuels that can be produced with 
exceptionally low levels of GHG emissions and the consequence of that would be a 
decrease in GHG emissions. In other words, the alternative model would seem to have 
environmental benefits in terms of GHG emission reduction in this respect. 
Admittedly, if the threshold for GHG emission savings is lowered, the proposed 
alternative sliding scale model would offer some benefits even to biofuels with very 
low GHG emissions savings. The GHG emissions of those fuels would still have been 
estimated to be lower than for the gasoline alternative. Thus, the alternative model 
would appear to not add any benefits to biofuels performing worse than gasoline, while 
at the same time increasing incentives for biofuels that perform exceptionally well. The 
expected level of GHG emissions in the transport fuel sector might therefore be lower 
with the alternative model than with current models. If true, then the proportionality of 
the EU RED and subsequently their compatibility with GATT could be questioned. 
The EU would attempt to point to factors that indicate that the alternative model of a 
sliding scale with lower or no thresholds would despite of the above not actually ensure 
an equal level of protection. Something else than the reduction of GHG emissions could 
be put forward as a justification for the models with GHG emissions savings thresholds. 
The EU could present the argument that biofuels with GHG emission savings below 
current thresholds is less sustainable than gasoline due to other environmental effects 
than GHG emissions, or even due to social effects. In other words, the state might argue 
that its current threshold is justifiable because it serves as a proxy for social effects and 
for other environmental effects than GHG emissions.  
It is indeed true that biofuels, no matter how high or low their GHG emission savings, 
will have other environmentally and socially detrimental effects. However, that does 
not justify the implementation of some specific threshold for GHG emissions savings. 
There does not exist any rational relationship between the environmental or social 
objective and the use of some thresholds for GHG emission savings. The use of a GHG 
emission savings threshold would be an arbitrary and unjustifiable proxy for other 
environmental or social effects.1213  
                                                 
1213 Another example of the use of unjustifiable proxies would be when transport distances are used as 
proxies for transport emissions without considering the type of transport truck used, the number of stops 
and the weight of the cargo. 
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The EU biofuels sustainability criteria include criteria that address other effects of 
biofuels than the GHG emissions. For example, under the scheme biofuels processed 
from feedstock that has been collected on biodiverse or other sensitive land will not be 
considered sustainable. Criteria could be developed also for other negative effects 
linked to biofuels instead of applying the GHG threshold as a proxy for those effects. 
Below it is assumed that the reduction of the levels of life-cycle GHG emissions from 
transport fuel forms the ultimate objective of the adopted models. When declaring that 
as the objective, the EU could present a few arguments for adopting its thresholds. The 
first argument may be that under the alternative sliding scale model GHG emissions in 
the transport fuel sector could increase under certain conditions. Current models with 
no sliding scale have been designed to increase the share of any sustainable biofuel at 
the expense of gasoline. Establishing a quota for sustainable biofuel or awarding 
sustainable biofuel financial incentives is expected to lead to sustainable biofuel, 
including barely sustainable biofuel, cutting market share from gasoline. The 
consequences of the proposed alternative model may be difficult to predict. If financial 
incentives would be awarded in proportion to GHG emission savings and we assume 
that the overall government spending on biofuel sustainability would not be increased 
from current levels, then the benefits to barely sustainable biofuels would be reduced. 
Consequently, gasoline could in principle take back market share from the barely 
sustainable biofuels. At the same time, the production of exceptionally sustainable 
biofuels might be very expensive. Hence, their market share might not increase 
significantly. The overall result of the proposed alternative model could therefore 
potentially be an increase in GHG emissions. Facing uncertainties surrounding the 
market effects, the EU might argue that the precautionary principle supports the model 
it has opted for. Whether or not the proposed alternative would ensure an equal level of 
protection would under the above approach would require a careful analysis of market 
conditions and the likelihood of different outcomes. That analysis may, however, not 
be necessary. Instead of awarding financial support for sustainable biofuels EU 
Member States would have the option of replicating the Californian LCFS and establish 
a quota for GHG emissions. The level of protection against GHG emissions would be 
the same or better under this alternative model if fuel suppliers would be required to 
comply with an average carbon intensity value (i.e. GHG emission quota) that as a 
starting point is the same or lower than current emission levels. For these reasons it 
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would appear that the level of environmental protection in terms of mitigating GHG 
emissions could be the same or higher with an alternative model. 
A second argument could be put forward by the EU in defense against the alternative 
of a model with a low threshold and a sliding scale. Due to inaccuracy in estimations 
of GHG emissions from biofuels a lower GHG emission savings threshold could be 
claimed to result in the risk being higher that some benefits also go to biofuels that 
cause higher emissions than gasoline. The EU might feel tempted to argue that 
precaution is needed against such risk and that current thresholds serve that purpose. It 
is submitted, however, that a broader perspective would have to be adopted in the 
application of the precautionary principle. It would not be genuine precaution to 
minimize the risk of awarding small benefits to some biofuels with slightly higher 
emissions than gasoline when as a consequence a lot of biofuels that are more 
sustainable than gasoline would be left without any benefits. Although the alternative 
model would mean that biofuels with low GHG emissions savings are awarded a 
somewhat more beneficial status than gasoline and that there is a heightened risk that 
some small benefits even go to biofuels with higher emissions than gasoline, these 
negative aspects should likely in normal market conditions be considered outweighed 
by the increased incentives to produce biofuels with very low GHG emissions. 
A third argument for lowering thresholds significantly while also introducing a sliding 
scale could equally rely on the observation that there are uncertainties with respect to 
the estimations of life-cycle GHG emissions for biofuels. Life-cycle GHG emissions of 
fuels are expressed as an average (i.e. mean or median) of various estimations. 
However, there is a higher uncertainty with respect to the estimation of GHG emissions 
for biofuels than for gasoline. In particular, it is difficult to estimate direct and indirect 
land-use change.1214 The greater uncertainty with respect to correct values for biofuels 
would mean that there is a higher likelihood for biofuels to in reality be much less 
sustainable in terms of GHG emissions than the estimated average would suggest. In 
other words, the standard deviation for emissions in the production of biofuels may be 
higher than for gasoline and the risk profile for biofuels may thus be worse. Yet, it is 
not clear whether the level of protection against GHG emissions could be said to be the 
                                                 
1214 The reliance on the argument developed here as a defense of EU RED and U.S. RFS becomes 
significantly weaker in case criteria on ILUC are in themselves not compliant with the proportionality 
principle. For a discussion on that see section 4.1.4.3. 
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same with the alternative model of lower thresholds and a sliding scale even if the 
expected level of emissions in terms of an arithmetic average would be the same in case 
the risk of extreme outcomes would at the same time be higher. Perhaps the level of 
protection could be said to be lower with the alternative measure only through the claim 
that the environmental protection objective is something else than the simple reduction 
of GHG emissions? This issue is explored more in detail below. 
It would appear possible that the alternative of a significantly lower, i.e. almost zero, 
GHG emission savings threshold combined with a sliding scale could ensure at least 
the same level of protection against GHG emissions as the current EU RED. However, 
the EU could argue that the objective with the scheme is not the reduction of GHG 
emissions in itself. Instead, the legitimate objective would be framed in terms of 
avoiding temperature increases above a certain limit and securing livable conditions on 
the planet. In other words, the ultimate environmental objective of the biofuels 
sustainability scheme could be the mitigation of climate change and keeping 
temperature increases at some specific level so that they do not exceed a critical limit 
that would lead to unprecedented and irreversible environmental harm. For example, if 
an increase of two degrees Celcius is regarded as a critical limit, then the objective with 
a biofuels scheme could be to minimize the likelihood that said limit is exceeded. 
The alternative model with a significantly lower GHG emission savings threshold 
together with a sliding scale model (in the form of a requirement on producers that their 
average GHG emissions do not exceed a strict limit) could be expected to increase the 
share of biofuels on the transport fuel market, including the share of low GHG 
emissions savings biofuels. Hence, GHG emissions might under the alternative model 
be expected to be lower. However, due to the uncertainties with respect to the 
calculations of emissions attributable to the life-cycle of biofuels, the risk that GHG 
emissions unexpectedly increase significantly from current levels could be higher with 
the proposed alternative model. In other words, although GHG emissions on average 
might be lower under the alternative model, the likelihood of extreme outcomes could 
still be higher. The higher standard deviation of the estimated GHG emissions for 
certain biofuels could in principle translate into the biofuels posing a greater 
environmental threat than gasoline even when the GHG emission average (i.e. mean or 
median) for the biofuel at hand is identical or even better than the average for gasoline. 
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The above argument can be illustrated with a fully fictive example. Let us say global 
temperatures are expected to increase by 2,5 degrees under the current EU biofuels 
scheme. A version of the proposed alternative model might be expected to reduce GHG 
emissions, which would result in only an increase of 2,1 degrees. Under both models 
the likelihood will be fairly high that the critical limit of 2 degrees will be exceeded. 
However, the likelihood might be somewhat higher under the alternative model even if 
the estimated average is lower. This is because of greater uncertainties in the 
estimations of GHG emissions under the alternative model, which would be expected 
to increase the total amount of different biofuels on the market. Thus, even if the 
likelihood might be much higher that the GHG emissions decrease significantly with 
the adoption of the alternative model, the argument could be made that the alternative 
model would not be equally effective in terms of the environmental protection goal of 
avoiding temperature increases exceeding a critical limit. 
How would the theoretical argument that was presented above fare in reality? In the 
proportionality review it would be examined whether there is sufficient support from 
international science for the claim that the level of protection against the risk of 
environmental disaster would be equal or higher with the alternative model. As a 
preliminary step it would have to be determined whether the risk of temperature 
increase above a critical limit would be higher with a lower GHG emissions savings 
threshold. It may be a difficult case to make given that already currently temperatures 
are expected to increase to unsustainable levels. With serious effects of GHG emissions 
and climate change becoming more and more imminent, continuing with the quite 
significant reliance on gasoline could form a greater environmental threat than taking 
some risks with biofuels for which the actual magnitude of GHG emissions is highly 
uncertain but still estimated to be, for example, around 20 per cent lower than the 
emissions from gasoline. This framing of the problem highlights the importance of the 
input from environmental sciences in trade law analysis. 
Let us assume, perhaps controversially in light of the above, that it would be concluded 
that the risks of environmental disaster would increase with the lower GHG emissions 
savings threshold of the alternative model. In the proportionality review it would then 
have to be determined whether the risks of climate change posed by the alternative 
model in its entirety would be lower than with current models. Current models ensure 
some level of protection against the serious risks of rising global temperatures. One 
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element of the alternative model, lowering the thresholds that is, could increase the 
risks. The disaster risk may in turn decrease to some extent as a consequence of the 
sliding scale creating incentives to develop and commercialize biofuels with very high 
GHG emissions savings. In other words, there would be elements in the alternative 
model pointing in opposite directions. The alternative model could be found to improve 
the protection against climate change disaster in some respect but to increase risks in 
other respects. It is obviously very difficult to determine how much temperatures would 
increase with the implementation of different models of biofuels sustainability criteria. 
Given the scientific uncertainty, the state having adopted the scheme would likely be 
given the benefit of the doubt. 
On the basis of the above, a challenge against the current EU biofuel sustainability 
threshold model as such could hinge upon providing evidence that the risks of 
irreversible environmental disaster would not increase with the adoption of a lower 
GHG emissions savings threshold combined with a sliding scale. A pivotal point in the 
analysis would be the determination of whether the risk of irreversible environmental 
harm from rising temperatures and climate change would become more likely with the 
proposed alternative lower threshold. The challenge would build on evidence that the 
estimates of GHG emissions from biofuels are fairly accurate and that shifts from 
gasoline to sustainable biofuels with current are so modest that temperature increases 
are expected to soon become dangerously high without bold new policies. It is not 
possible to here predict the chances of success of a challenge. While the argument that 
the risk profile of GHG emissions from biofuels and gasoline could be defined in terms 
of standard deviation alongside averages would be controversial, it may be the best 
argument available for defending the reliance on thresholds in case the scheme has 
discriminatory effects. 
Biofuels with estimated average emissions that are substantially lower than gasoline 
would appear more sustainable than gasoline despite the uncertainties in the evaluation 
models for biofuels GHG emissions. In other words, GHG emissions savings thresholds 
of 35, 50 or 60 per cent when not accounting for ILUC could potentially exceed what 
is necessary for a buffer for estimation errors. It would, however, be for climate science 
to determine whether adopting much lower thresholds in alternative less discriminatory 
models, and subsequently reducing the buffer, would be problematic with respect to the 
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risks of severe climate change from increased temperatures and irreversible 
environmental harm. 
5.3.4. Future EU Strategies with Respect to Thresholds 
The EU Renewable Energy Directive may well have discriminatory effects. In 
particular, discriminatory effects might stem from the adopted GHG emissions savings 
thresholds. Thus, the GATT compatibility of a model with sustainability thresholds and 
no sliding scale, like the one adopted by the EU, requires careful analysis. Such analysis 
will need input from economic, environmental and perhaps even mathematical 
sciences. Although not analyzed in detail here, it should also be noted that further legal 
obstacles could arise from the TBT Agreement. 
No definite answer to the question of whether the threshold model with no sliding scale 
would survive a proportionality review applicable under GATT can be provided in this 
book. Yet, the elaborate discussion in this chapter on the topic revealed that the EU will 
at least not easily defend the choice of thresholds against the potentially less 
discriminatory alternative of combining substantially lower thresholds with a sliding 
scale. 
It may be that the objective of GHG emissions savings thresholds has been to reduce 
the level of expected GHG emissions and that the level of protection of various models 
should therefore be compared with reference to the average estimate of GHG emissions 
under alternative models. It was, however, submitted that the EU could improve the 
chances of successfully fending off a challenge under GATT by claiming that the 
ultimate objective is not to minimize the expected level of GHG emissions in terms of 
an arithmetic average, but instead to minimize the risk that global temperatures rise 
above some critical limit, such as 2 degrees Celcius. A comparison of arithmetic 
averages of estimated GHG emissions would be insufficient for the comparison of the 
effectiveness of models to achieve the objective of global temperatures remaining 
within critical limits. Namely, the standard deviation of GHG emissions would also be 
of relevance for such risks. This complicates the analysis of whether an alternative 
model with a low threshold in combination with a sliding scale would be equally 
effective. The alternative model could increase the share of biofuels on the market and 
lower the arithmetic average of estimated emissions from fuels on the market, while 
simultaneously elevating the standard deviation of estimated emissions. The scientific 
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uncertainty with respect to which model should be considered more effective to address 
the environmental harm would likely play in the favor of the EU defending its current 
model. 
Although a potential defense for adopting thresholds has been identified, there are still 
amendments to the sustainability criteria that the EU could adopt to further improve the 
chances of compatibility with GATT. One option would be to design the sustainability 
criteria so that all biofuels that meet a relatively low threshold gain benefits in 
proportion to the life-cycle GHG emissions. Another option would be for the EU to 
calibrate the thresholds so that there would no longer be any discriminatory effects. 
Indeed, it should be noted that the EU has been raising its threshold in recent years. On 
the one hand, the risk that the scheme will be found to have discriminatory effects could 
be lower with a higher threshold. On the other hand, if the model with a high threshold 
and without a sliding scale is found to still cause discrimination, it may be more difficult 
to justify than a model with a lower threshold.1215 
5.3.5. Future EU Strategies with Respect to Default Values 
The alternative of abolishing the GHG emission savings thresholds might not form a 
measure that renders EU biofuels sustainability criteria disproportional. How about 
then the alternative of abolishing the default values? It should be pointed out that states 
will likely hesitate to bring forward the argument that default values as complements 
to individual values would not be compatible with trade law. Many developing 
countries may realize that even if default values might work against them in relation to 
competing biofuels producers in Europe and the U.S., the access to default values may 
still be important for the producers, especially as potential high costs of individual value 
certification could hurt them in competition with fossil fuels 
                                                 
1215 When the threshold is higher, there will be more lower thresholds available that could be less 
discriminatory and some of the less discriminatory thresholds could, when combined with a sliding scale, 
potentially ensure an equal level of protection. If the GHG emissions savings threshold of the less 
discriminatory alternative model proposed by the plaintiff would still be quite high, it would be difficult 
to argue that the risk of disastrous irreversible environmental effects would be higher with that alternative 
model. It would be unlikely that the errors in estimations of life-cycle GHG emissions from biofuels 
would be so significant that the lower, but still relatively high, threshold of the alternative model would 
form an insufficient buffer. The probability would be very low that the promoted biofuels would cause 
much higher GHG emissions than gasoline. Thus, the probability would also be very low that climate 
change would accelerate, and that the risk of irreversible environmental disaster would increase in 
comparison with the original adopted model. 
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Schemes without default values were analyzed already previously in this chapter as 
alternatives to California’s LCFS. It was argued that abolishing the origin neutral 
default values of the current scheme would likely not constitute a less trade restrictive 
alternative that would ensure an equal level of environmental protection. However, the 
biofuels sustainability criteria in the EU RED differ from California’s LCFS in that 
they establish a sustainability threshold for GHG emissions savings. How might that 
affect the analysis? Could the option of abolishing all default values form a less trade 
restrictive alternative that ensures an equal level of protection when the adopted model 
is based on a combination of thresholds and origin neutral default values? 
Much of the discussion on California’s LCFS is relevant also for the analysis of the EU 
RED. The alternative of abolishing default values could be both reasonably available 
and ensure an equal level of environmental protection only under circumstances where 
the costs of individual value certification would be modest. Assuming such state of 
affairs would be achieved, the next step of the proportionality review would be to assess 
whether abolishing the default values could be considered less trade restrictive. 
The feedstock and pathways utilized in different states vary greatly. Future challenges 
directed at the idea of having default values are likely to come from countries with large 
biofuel production from palm oil. The GHG emissions estimated for biofuels from palm 
oil have generally been high and above GHG emissions thresholds. Countries with 
substantial exports of palm oil or biofuels from palm oil will rarely benefit from the 
default values as their main pathway will be unsustainable by default. These countries 
may question a scheme under which they must always apply for individual certification, 
whereas biofuels from other states produced through other pathways may benefit from 
good default values even if the actual real emissions have been very high. Including 
default values, either origin neutral or state specific, in a model with thresholds might 
thus increase discriminatory effects under the assumption that fuels from the different 
pathways are like products. 
What follows from the above, is that the EU might struggle to uphold a model with 
both thresholds and default values if the costs of individual certification were to become 
sufficiently low. This may be viewed as an additional reason to review the decision to 
apply a model with thresholds. 
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5.4. The U.S. Federal Renewable Fuel Standard 2 
5.4.1. The Design and the Discriminatory Effects 
The U.S. has adopted sustainability criteria for biofurls in what is called the Renewable 
Fuel Standard 2 (RFS2). The federal RFS2 is applicable in all states that have not opted 
for the Low Carbon Fuel Standard as designed by California. Under the RFS2 refiners 
and importers of gasoline and diesel fuel need to comply with a quota for sustainable 
biofuels. There is an annual gallon quota for sustainable biofuels and in order to fulfill 
it the obligated parties can either blend sustainable biofuel or purchase credits from 
those with a surplus of sustainable biofuels.1216  
The benefit sustainable biofuels enjoy is that only such fuels may be counted toward 
the annual gallon quota. As in the case of the EU RED, biofuels made out of feedstock 
cultivated on certain vulnerable lands cannot classify as sustainable. In addition, the 
GHG emission savings need to meet the applicable threshold value. 
The main threshold for sustainable biofuels in the U.S. RFS2 is 20 per cent GHG 
emissions savings. The reason that the U.S. threshold is lower than the one applied 
under EU RED is at least in part that U.S. calculations of biofuels life-cycle GHG 
emissions have even included emissions from ILUC. Hence, there is no need to 
similarly raise the GHG emission savings threshold just in order to create a buffer for 
ILUC estimation errors. 
A separate threshold and quota has been adopted for the most sustainable biofuels, 
referred to as advanced biofuels. These are categories of biofuel that have been 
produced with specific methods and that meet a higher GHG emissions savings 
threshold. 
The RFS2 differs from the EU RED and California’s LCFS in that there is no option 
for producers to get certification of an individual GHG emission savings value. Instead, 
the scheme only offers pathway values. Pathways are defined with reference to the 
characteristics of the PPMs, such as the feedstock, the chemical processing technique 
as well as by the type of biofuel that is produced; the two most common being biodiesel 
                                                 
1216 For more on the different models see Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘On a Common Road 
Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. Approaches to Regulating Biofuels’ (2014) 8 Pittsburgh 
Journal of Environmental and Public Health Law 104. 
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and bioethanol. Sustainability of the biofuel is directly and irreversibly determined on 
the basis of the applicable pathway value. 
Companies may submit a petition for a new pathway to be assessed. The pathway value 
will, however, not have taken into account all the factors that affect the actual GHG 
emissions from production in various individual plants. Yet, producers do not have the 
option to certify that their individual PPM, despite relying on a pathway that in terms 
of GHG emission savings on average has been deemed unsustainable, is equally 
sustainable as pathways that have already been declared sustainable under the RFS2. 
The RFS2 might have discriminatory effect as a consequence of the choice of threshold 
value for GHG emission savings. The discriminatory effect of the RFS2 is escalated by 
the calculation methods of the pathway values. In the original calculations made in the 
preparatory stages of designing the RFS2, corn ethanol, the fuel that has ensured U.S. 
dominance in the global biofuels sector, was found not to reach the 20 per cent threshold 
that was to apply under the RFS2. In the end after some recalibration and – one dare 
say – manipulating the mathematical model for calculating the GHG savings value, it 
was, however, concluded that corn ethanol exceeded the required GHG emissions 
savings with a minimal margin.1217 By choosing a 20 per cent threshold and with some 
dubious mathematical modelling the U.S. ensured beneficial treatment of its domestic 
production. A large share of U.S. biofuels will receive beneficial treatment while the 
imports from some countries, like Indonesia and Malaysia where oil palms are grown, 
will rarely enjoy the beneficial status of sustainable biofuels. 
The pathways constitute proxies for the level of GHG emissions and thus also for 
sustainability. Below it will be explored whether these criteria on the characteristics of 
the PPMs may be justifiable under the principles of trade law.  
5.4.2. The Absence of Individual Value Certification 
The U.S. RFS2 assigns GHG emission savings for predetermined pathways. As 
explained above, unlike the EU and the Californian biofuels sustainability schemes, the 
federal U.S. RFS2 does not include any possibility for individual producers to get an 
individual assessment of their sustainability in the form of GHG emission value 
                                                 
1217 Daniel A. Farber, ‘Indirect Land Use Change, Uncertainty, and Biofuels Policy’ (2011) University 
of Illinois L. Rev. 381. On the calculation of GHG savings of U.S. corn ethanol see also Melissa Powers, 
‘King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard Eventually End Corn Ethanol's Reign?’ (2011) 11 
Vermont J. Environmental L. 667, 706. 
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certification. Whether or not the biofuel reaches the applicable emissions savings 
threshold, and thus is sustainable and is granted preferential status, depends on the 
pathway and not on local or individual circumstances.  
Is the RFS2 in compliance with WTO law? At the outset, it may be noted that a model, 
such as the RFS2, which assigns origin neutral pathway values for biofuels produced 
anywhere in the world but does not allow for individual value certification will exert 
some extraterritorial pressure. Producers in the exporting country utilizing biofuels 
pathways determined unsustainable on average will face difficulties to find buyers for 
those biofuels in the U.S. as there is no access to individual sustainability values due to 
that option not being legally recognized under the scheme. There are strong incentives 
for the producers to switch to pathways that have been declared sustainable on average. 
The extraterritorial pressure could be more limited if there was an option of individual 
value certification. How much lower would in part depend on how economically and 
technically burdensome it would be for producers to attain individual values.  
Under the U.S. RFS2 out-of-state producers can serve their in-state markets with 
biofuels produced in accordance with a pathway that has been categorized as 
unsustainable and still get full benefits for exports to the U.S. of biofuels from a 
sustainable pathway. Similarly, out-of-state producers that only rely on a sustainable 
pathway will get full benefits. The extraterritorial pressure against producers in the 
RFS2 is thus arguably less serious than the extraterritorial pressure in cases where 
country of origin is used as a proxy for the sustainability of all PPMs that can be relied 
on to make a particular product (e.g. shrimp or biofuel). In this so called country 
certification model the pressure is not directed merely at producers but also against the 
states. 
GATT compatibility must still be examined from the perspective of the non-
discrimination principle, the grounds of justification and the proportionality review. 
The RFS2 may serve a justifiable environmental objective. Would the original-neutral 
RFS2 with its GHG savings thresholds then survive the proportionality review? It may 
be recalled that under Article XX GATT prima facie prohibited measures will not be 
justifiable in case they are arbitrarily discriminatory. As part of this proportionality test 
it is examined whether there is any reasonably available less trade restrictive alternative 
measure that ensures the same level of protection. The EU RED and the LCFS illustrate 
that it is, at least for developed countries, not technically unreasonable to employ 
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individual sustainability certification as a complement to average values, such as 
pathway values. 
Introducing individual value certification would also clearly not endanger the level of 
protection. It is submitted that the introduction of an option to apply for individual 
sustainability values would in fact likely even improve environmental protection. 
Although it would not hinder the use of pathway values by producers who would on a 
closer look be revealed to produce unsustainable biofuel, the individual values would 
grant the benefits of sustainable biofuel to producers who in reality are sustainable even 
if they apply a pathway that more in general (i.e. on average nationally or globally) has 
been estimated as unsustainable. 
Turning the pathway values into default values by introducing individual values as a 
complement would improve the access to favorable treatment for biofuels producers. 
In this sense it would form a less trade restrictive measure. Yet, it is submitted here that 
under the proportionality review the adoption of a model with individual value 
certification could not constitute a less trade restrictive measure in case it would 
simultaneously also increase the discriminatory effects of the scheme. 
With GHG emission thresholds in the model there are circumstances where the 
introduction of individual values would reduce discrimination. Since most U.S. 
producers will not need individual values to reach the threshold, foreign producers are 
the ones with most to gain from a possibility to get individual sustainability assessment. 
Namely, a situation where the introduction of individual values in a developed country 
sustainability scheme would reduce discrimination occurs when developing countries 
have a large share in production pathways that for genuine environmental reasons have 
been classified as unsustainable. This is perhaps the case with biofuels, as for example 
Indonesia and Malaysia rely on palm oil. Palm oil is a controversial feedstock in part 
because of oil palm plantations diminishing areas of rainforests. Currently, palm oil 
fuels are unsustainable per default but if individual values would be calculated some 
might gain sustainability status. Allowing for individual values could increase 
competition from some unusually sustainable developing country palm oil producers. 
The introduction of individual values would have potential to reduce discriminatory 
effect without lowering the level of protection achieved. Declining the possibility of 
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individual sustainability certification would therefore appear unjustifiable. This would 
suggest that the U.S. would face difficulties to justify the RFS2 if challenged. 
The pathway values under the RFS2 are not state specific. In other words, the 
calculations have not included any geography-related elements that would have 
resulted in different pathway values for similar biofuels of different origin. The U.S. 
federal government could in principle decide to change that. The chances of GATT 
compatibility would, however, not improve if state specific elements, such as emissions 
from transportation, were incorporated into the calculation of the pathway values. 
Namely, with state specific factors in the pathways the U.S. would likely enjoy better 
pathway values than similar out-of-state biofuels, in particular due to shorter transport 
distances. This would in turn mean that U.S. biofuels would be in a better position to 
comply with the GHG emissions savings thresholds. In other words, when state specific 
pathway values would apply out-of-state producers would likely benefit more from the 
possibility of individual value certification. Complementing the model with individual 
value certification would also in those circumstances be a less discriminatory 
alternative that would guarantee the same or even a higher level of protection. 
Furthermore, in a model with only state specific pathway values and no individual value 
certification the situation is bound to arise where some out-of-state producer receives a 
worse carbon score than its in-state competitor even if it in reality is more sustainable 
than the in-state plant. There is the risk of some in-state biofuels being granted the status 
of sustainable fuel, whereas more sustainable imports might be declared unsustainable. 
The situation where biofuels from some particular pathway would always be 
unsustainable if imported from some states but would always be sustainable when 
produced in-state, despite being produced in accordance with the same pathway, would 
to some degree resemble the case where country of origin is used as a proxy for 
sustainability. The difference would be that while country of origin certification, such 
as that examined in US – Shrimp,1218  restricts all imports in a product category from 
the unsustainable country regardless of the PPMs used for the individual imported 
product, the pathway value model would restrict only imports of some pathways within 
a broad product category. However, the difference might still not be decisive since 
identical sustainability would in both cases be treated differently because of country of 
                                                 
1218 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998. 
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origin. State specific pathway values without individual value certification would likely 
be declared arbitrary discriminatory. 
5.4.3. The Way Forward for the RFS2 
The RFS2 would likely be found to have discriminatory effects. There is in other words 
some tension with trade law. Under the U.S. RFS2 sustainability is conditioned upon 
two factors. First, the RFS2 classifies only certain land areas as suitable for the 
collection of feedstock for sustainable biofuels. Secondly, the estimated GHG 
emissions savings of the pathway must exceed the applicable threshold. The pathway 
forms a proxy for only one effect, i.e. the level of GHG emissions. In determining which 
pathways are unsustainable, the U.S. could have relied also on other factors. Mitigating 
GHG emissions would then not have been the only reason why some pathways were 
declared sustainable and others were not. For example, when the U.S. declared biofuel 
from palm oil ineligible for benefits,1219 it could have referred to also other negative 
effects of palm oil. By doing so the U.S. would have improved its defense against any 
future challenge under WTO law. 
The obvious solution for improving the chances of GATT compatibility of the RFS2 
would be to introduce individual value certification as a complement to the pathway 
values. Yet, the question may be raised as to whether complementing pathway values 
with individual value certification would be the only way for the U.S. government to 
reduce the risk of incompatibility with GATT?  
Instead of introducing individual value certification the U.S. could in principle abolish 
the thresholds for GHG emission savings that determine whether a fuel is sustainable 
or unsustainable. GATT compatibility might not require the elimination of the 
thresholds, as was illustrated with respect to the discussion on the use of thresholds 
under EU RED. That being said, could abolishing the threshold resolve the problems 
of GATT compatibility of the RFS2, which does not allow for individual value 
certification? A model without the sustainability thresholds could be designed so that 
fuel providers would need to sell fuel that on average do not exceed a pre-determined 
emissions limit. The level of GHG emissions for batches of biofuel could in principle 
continue to be determined by pathway values with no access to individual certification. 
                                                 
1219 Notice of data availability Concerning Renewable Fuels Produced from Palm Oil Under the RFS2 
Program, 77, Fed. Reg. 18, 4300–18 (proposed Jan. 27, 2012). 
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While it is possible that changing or even abolishing the threshold could eliminate the 
discriminatory effects of a biofuels sustainability scheme, it is also possible that 
discriminatory effects would remain. Thus, it may still be necessary to conduct a 
proportionality review if the U.S. decided to implement a scheme with pathway values 
but no individual value certification and no GHG emissions savings threshold. What 
alternative measures may then be considered under the proportionality review? The 
option of a model with individual value certification would be a reasonably available 
alternative and would improve the level of environmental protection. The test of 
whether the alternative of introducing individual value certification would be a less 
discriminatory solution would hence appear pivotal. 
It is recalled that each pathway value has been established by estimating the average 
emissions that result from the utilization of the pathway. Three groups that could benefit 
from individual values are the producers that can easily afford access to individual 
values, producers with short transport distances and producers with local conditions 
and technology that allow them to be efficient and perform better than the average 
producers. Developing country producers would likely not belong to these groups. All 
things considered, if no sustainability threshold would apply, the U.S. biofuel industry 
would likely be disadvantaged by the absence of individual values in the RFS2. The 
alternative of introducing individual values would not be less discriminatory.  
The application of the test of least restrictive measure would appear to point to the 
conclusion that abolishing the sustainability thresholds may form an alternative path to 
achieve GATT compatibility. Under a model with no thresholds and only pathway 
values there would also not appear to exist a risk that an identical situation is treated 
less favorably merely on the basis of country of origin.1220 However, it may be recalled 
that criteria on the characteristics of the PPM with discriminatory effects as a rule 
should allow for equally effective alternative PPMs.1221 A pathway value model 
without the option of individual certification may raise objections due to the fact that 
biofuel production that falls under one unsustainable pathway will be treated less 
favorably than biofuels that fall under a sustainable pathway even in circumstances 
                                                 
1220 Cf. US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 
1998. See section 4.1.3.1. and 4.3.2.2. 
1221 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 162-165; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 115-152. See section 5.1.3.1. 
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where the individual GHG emissions of the individual producers may be equal. There 
does for these reasons exist serious uncertainty as to whether simply abolishing the 
thresholds would be sufficient to ensure GATT compatibility of the RFS2. The example 
illustrates a tension between the test of least restrictive measure and the principle of 
treating PPMs with equal effects equally.  
Regardless of how the U.S. federal government would solve the problems of trade law 
compatibility that can be linked to the absence of individual value certification in the 
RFS2, some adjustments to the calculation of the pathway values may also be called 
for in order to secure compatibility with GATT. Namely, it should be noted that in the 
calculation of GHG savings the U.S. federal law relies on data from U.S. production 
for many biofuels. As an exception to this, the U.S. used data from Brazilian production 
for sugar cane ethanol. In principle, one could imagine a country with better averages 
than the U.S. for some biofuel category for which U.S. data was used. The fact that the 
RFS2 mainly relies on U.S. data could increase discrimination and would appear 
arbitrary.  
In case foreign data regarding a pathway value applicable to that foreign country’s 
producers at large can be calculated, there would appear no legitimate reason to ignore 
it. The options would be to estimate the better emission averages for biofuels in that 
country (i.e. state specific default values) or to establish pathway values for all fuel 
regardless of origin on the basis of global averages (i.e. origin neutral default values). 
The former option may be more desirable from an environmental perspective, but the 
latter could potentially be viewed as a less controversial option from the perspective of 
international trade.  
417
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Conclusions on Biofuels Sustainability Criteria and Administrative Costs 
Under WTO law states may not adopt measures with discriminatory effects in case 
there is a reasonably available less trade restrictive alternative that ensures the same 
level of protection.  Thus, for a measure to be proportional it must be the least trade 
restrictive reasonably available measure to reach a legitimate objective. Administrative 
costs matter as states cannot be expected to adopt alternatives that are economically or 
technically unreasonably burdensome even if they would be less trade restrictive.  
In case the administrative costs of the proposed alternative are too high, the original 
state measure would be upheld. The reason for this test on the reasonable availability 
of the measure under GATT is to ensure that states are not required to adopt measures 
with unreasonably high administrative costs or technical difficulties. An economically 
or technically unreasonable alternative model for sustainability criteria would not 
render the adopted measure disproportional even if the alternative would be superior 
with respect to non-discrimination and environmental protection. 
A similar approach to administrative costs could – and perhaps should –  be applied 
both under the dormant Commerce Clause under EU free movement law.1222 
Admittedly, the ECJ has proclaimed that practical difficulties in implementing a non-
discriminatory alternative would not justify discriminatory measures.1223 These cases 
have, however, related to de jure discrimination and the court does not seem to expect 
the states to go to unreasonable lengths in eliminating also potential de facto 
discriminatory effects. 
It is difficult to find any guidance as to what benchmarks should be used to assess 
reasonable availability. Solutions successfully adopted and implemented by other states 
should at least be taken into account. It is important to note that the same economical 
and technical capability should probably not be expected from developing as from 
developed countries.1224 
                                                 
1222 See Charles Poncelet, ’Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Protection in EU Law: A 
Troubled Relationship?’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 171, 196-197. 
1223 Case C-213/96 Outokumpu Oy [1998] ECR I-1777, para. 38; Case C-375/95 Commission v. Greece 
[1997] ECR I-5981, paras 46-47; Case C-345/93 Fazenda Pública and Ministério Público v. Américo 
João Nunes Tadeu [1995] ECR I-479, para. 19; Case C-327/90 Commission v. Greece [1992] ECR I-
3033, para. 24. All cases concerned the Treaty provision on non-discriminatory taxation. 
1224 This view can derive some support from the commitment of developed countries to spur progress in 
developing states as reflected in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO (1994), 
part IV of GATT and Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement, as well as in other international agreements 
such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. See 
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Proxies and simplifications to models of determining sustainability of products reduce 
administrative costs but can increase discriminatory effects of the scheme. The 
reduction of administrative costs is in itself, however, not a valid defense for 
discrimination. Moreover, there will in many cases exist a reasonably available less 
discriminatory alternative sustainability model that ensures the same level of 
environmental protection. For example, there are normally reasonably available less 
discriminatory alternatives to country certification for achieving a justifiable 
environmental objective. 
Various simplifications have been introduced to biofuels sustainability criteria in order 
to facilitate the application of the criteria and to reduce the related administrative costs. 
The proportionality of these sustainability schemes was examined closely in this 
chapter. It was noted that the EU RED as well as the U.S. RFS2 have established GHG 
emission savings thresholds. Biofuels that do not meet the threshold will be considered 
unsustainable. Opting for a model without sustainability thresholds could sometimes 
form a reasonably available less discriminatory alternative. Under an alternative model 
benefits would be granted in proportion to biofuels life-cycle GHG emissions (carbon 
intensity). The fact that this form of model, in which sustainability is viewed as a 
continuum, has already been implemented in California indicates that it is reasonably 
available. Yet, the argument could potentially be made that such an alternative would 
not necessarily ensure an equal level of protection against the risk of climate change of 
catastrophic magnitudes. 
Pathway values forms another common element of biofuels sustainability criteria. The 
sustainability of fuel will under the U.S. RFS2 always be determined with reference to 
those values. It was argued that the U.S. RFS2 would likely not be considered 
proportional under GATT because it does not allow producers the option to apply for 
individual value certification. That alternative is reasonably available as illustrated by 
the fact that companies have the option to apply for the certification of individual 
emissions values under California’s LCFS and the biofuels sustainability criteria in the 
EU RED. The pathway GHG emission values only serve as default values in those 
                                                 
also Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon, ‘Regulating Tobacco Flavors: Implications of WTO Law’ (2011) 
29 Boston University International Law J. 383, 421; Andrew D. Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, 
’Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of ”Necessity” in International Investment Law and 
WTO Law’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of International Law 93, 134; Maureen Irish, ‘Renewable Energy 
and Trade: Interpreting Against Fragmentation’ (2013) The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 
217, 239-246. 
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31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   419 31.7.2019   7.16
 420 
models. This approach will generally be easier to justify under trade law in case some 
discriminatory effects are detected. 
Furthermore, in order to improve the chances that its biofuels sustainability criteria are 
compatible with GATT, the federal U.S. government should modify the calculation of 
the pathway values. The calculations of pathway average emissions should not be based 
on pure in-state data. 
Changes to make the RFS2 resemble more the European and Californian models would 
not guarantee trade law compatibility. The EU and Californian models with individual 
value certification and default values for pathways would equally have to be examined 
in the light of a proportionality review in case they are found to cause discriminatory 
effects. It is very difficult to determine whether a model in which all biofuel producers 
should apply for individual certification of their GHG emissions is an economically 
realistic alternative to a model in which the individual value certification is 
complemented by default values for production pathways. The costs for both the 
government and private companies in implementing the certification and verification 
of individual GHG emissions values may or may not be unreasonably high.  
It was illustrated how the proportionality of the schemes may depend on the costs of 
individual value certification due to the application of the test of reasonable availability 
and the test of whether the alternative measure ensures the same level of protection as 
the adopted measure. This further highlighted how administrative costs play a part in 
the proportionality review. It is difficult to offer any exact guidelines on the 
proportionality of the European and Californian sustainability schemes. The 
proportionality of some models with default values could in the future with 
developments in the market for individual sustainability certification become more 
uncertain even if such models would be found to comply with the review today. The 
uncertainty of GATT compatibility would, first of all, concern models that combine 
default values with threshold values. This puts in particular the EU in a tough spot. On 
the one hand, there may currently be valid reasons for both emissions thresholds and 
default values. On the other hand, with a risk of that changing, there is some pressure 
to abandon the threshold values. 
A model like the one originally adopted by California, which included state-specific 
default values, may also become increasingly suspect in light of trade law provisions 
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when costs for individual certification decreases. Therefore, states that fear the risks of 
GATT proceedings may be advised to design any default values that rely on a few 
proxies, such as utilized feedstock, chemical production techniques and the chemical 
composition of the end-product as origin neutral. Hence, while it might not have been 
necessary for California to make the default values origin neutral, it was still from the 
perspective of international trade law strategically likely a good decision. From an 
environmental perspective things may of course look different. Whatever the decision, 
individual value certification may still continue to include geographically sensitive 
factors such as the impact of transport distance on emissions. 
All in all, it has in this book been argued value reconciliation in trade law can be carried 
out by interpreting both free trade and environmental protection as serving an efficiency 
ideal. It has also been explained how the interests of non-discriminatory trade and 
environmental protection may be reconciled through the proportionality review.1225 The 
analysis of the proportionality review in this chapter further highlighted how 
administrative costs form a factor in value reconciliation at least under WTO law. In 
other words, administrative costs affect the reconciliation of free trade (non-
discrimination) and the environmental objective of reducing externalities.  
The reconciled administrative costs are not directly related to either free trade or the 
elimination of environmental externalities. Yet, the need to factor in administrative 
costs does not reflect any completely new third value. Namely, taking administrative 
costs into account is in-line with the objective of cost-efficiency. This further underlines 
the strong link between trade law, proportionality and efficiency. 
Ensuring administrative costs remain at reasonable levels will, similarly to values such 
as transparency, due process and regulatory certainty, advance societal efficiency in a 
broad sense. There are, however, some differences between administrative costs and 
the other values when it comes to their relevance for trade law test. Taking into account 
the fact that some solutions to, for example, environmental problems might be 
technically and economically very burdensome strengthens the position of the state 
defending its measure. In contrast, the other values all add additional requirements on 
the design of the state measures under the proportionality review. 
  
                                                 
1225 See chapter 3. 
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Chapter 6 – Extraterritoriality 
Environmental criteria introduced by states may target environmental effects in 
different stages of the life-cycle. Some criteria aim to ensure that emissions and other 
environmental effects during the consumption phase are not too severe. For goods 
consumed in-state the harmful effects during the consumption phase would take place 
on the in-state market of the regulating state regardless of where the product was 
produced. Thus, criteria on effects of consumption can affect in-state and imported 
products in a comparable manner. 
The physical characteristics of the product will often determine whether or not it will 
have detrimental environmental effects during consumption. In fact, the physical 
characteristics may even indicate whether or not the product could be environmentally 
hazardous during processing before consumption as well as after consumption during 
end-of-life treatment. Those concerns arise regardless of where the product has been 
produced. The regulating state could address the harm linked to the physical 
characteristics of the products by adopting environmental criteria. The criteria could 
apply comparably to both in-state and imported products. 
Criteria on PPMs raise new dilemmas. At the outset, it should be pointed out that a 
PPM may or may not affect the physical characteristics of the end product. For example, 
biofuels may be produced from various resources with more or less sustainable 
methods. The difference in the process method may to some extent be reflected in the 
physical properties of the fuel. Electricity, in turn, is always an identical end product 
regardless of whether it was produced from fossil fuels through a process of high 
pollution or if it was produced from renewable resources. 
There are significant differences between criteria on PPMs and other environmental 
criteria. Criteria on PPMs are not adopted to address the effects and physical 
characteristics of the end product. Instead, the criteria relate to concerns with respect to 
the effects of the production and processing stage. Even when the PPM might impact 
the characteristics of the end product, as for example in the case of biofuels, the PPM-
criteria will usually primarily, and in any case at least in part, target effects during the 
production and processing stage. 
In some circumctances states apply PPM-criteria only for in-state production. This will 
be fairly uncontroversial from the perspective of importers. However, with heightened 
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awareness of climate change and the value of life-cycle thinking it has become 
increasingly common to extend PPM-criteria also to imports. As explained above, state 
regulations that set sustainability criteria for the PPMs target the sustainability of the 
production phase. This phase takes place out-of-state with respect to imports. Adopting 
criteria that target a phase taking place out-of-state has raised questions as to what 
extent state regulation may aim to address or have effects on extraterritorial activities. 
The question is in particular relevant in cases where a state applies PPM-criteria on 
both in-state and out-of-state production, although it could also arise in a few scenarios 
where the PPM-criteria apply only to out-of-state production.1226 
The reason for extending the application of PPM-criteria also to imports may lie in the 
cross-border effects that the choice of PPMs will have. Environmental effects and 
externalities are usually not constrained by state borders. For example, pollution from 
a factory in one state may significantly burden the environment and the people in the 
immediate vicinity but may often also with time have consequences for neighbouring 
states and eventually even the global environment. Naturally, the cross-border effects 
can be either immediate or accumulate only in the longer term. Climate change caused 
by an increase in carbon emissions have fairly immediate direct cross-border relevance. 
Similarly, the cross-border effects of pollution in a dam can occur fairly rapidly. There 
are, however, many circumstances where the cross-border externalities of a hydropower 
plant to the distant state that adopts the PPM-regulations are less significant and only 
accumulate in the longer term. 
As explained, the structure of trade law is such that states have agreed to allow imports 
on non-discriminatory terms and any exemption to this must rely on a ground of 
justification. Extraterritoriality considerations may emerge in either law of prohibition 
or law of justification. Law of prohibition covers the rules and tests that determine 
whether a measure is discriminatory, or prima facie prohibited for some other reason. 
                                                 
1226 First, in jurisdictions where even non-discriminatory measures may be prima facie prohibited the 
extraterritoriality question could arise in cases where there is no in-state production of the relevant 
product and the PPM-criteria therefore are applied only to out-of-state production. Secondly, where there 
is out-of-state production and in-state production of similar products, the application of PPM-criteria 
only on imports would often be found outright unjustifiable and there would not even be any need to 
consider the question of extraterritoriality. An exemption to this might be cases where there is some 
justifiable reason for applying stricter PPM-criteria on out-of-state production. It is unclear what such 
reason could be, whether differences in environmental risks in the states could constitute such a reason 
and if, for example, the fact that in-state producers have voluntarily stopped using the PPM that the state 
prohibits for out-of-state producers would justify the application of different PPM-criteria. 
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Law of justification covers grounds that may justify the prima facie prohibited measure 
as well as the proportionality review. The first section of this chapter will provide an 
analysis of the extraterritoriality principle in law of prohibition, whereas the second 
section offers and analysis of law of justification.1227 The third and final section will 
address extraterritoriality in public procurement law. 
In law of prohibition the question would be phrased as to whether PPM-criteria regulate 
activity outside the territory of the regulating state in a manner that makes it prima facie 
prohibited. Some parallels exist with extraterritoriality under international law more 
generally.1228 Under international law, states may rely on a broad range of tests in order 
to establish a link between the state and what is regulated.1229  For example, in criminal 
law states may declare jurisdiction over actions on their territory but exceptionally also 
over some actions of their citizens in foreign territories. In other words, the link between 
the regulating state and the crime is generally accepted when the crime takes place in-
state, but it may be sufficient also merely on the ground of the nationality of the 
perpetrator. In trade law the question is whether the importation of the good constitutes 
a sufficient link to the territory of the importing state for it to be entitled to adopt criteria 
also covering the production process outside its territory. Extraterritoriality in this 
context generally refers to regulation of production or other activities that take place 
outside the territory of the regulating state, all while there is at most a weak link between 
the regulating state and the regulated out-of-state activity. 
In law of justification the perspective on extraterritoriality is rather different. 
Environmental protection is among valid grounds of justification. The question is then 
whether the state adopting the PPM-criteria may aim to protect merely its local 
environment or to what extent it could even tackle environmental effects outside its 
territory. Extraterritoriality in this context refers to regaultions adopted with the aim of 
addressing effects outside the territory of the regulating state. It is in other words about 
extraterritorial intent. The consequence of an extraterritorial objective is that regulation 
                                                 
1227 This chapter is partly based on Max S. Jansson, ’Extraterritoriality, Externalities and Cross-Border 
Trade: Some Lessons From the United States, the European Union and the World Trade Organization’ 
(2016) 33 Pace Environmental Law Review 437. 
1228 For an analysis of the extraterritoriality principle under customary international law see Robert L. 
Muse, ‘A Public International Law Critique of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Helms-Burton Act 
(Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996)’ (1997) 31 George Washington 
Journal of International Law and Economics 207. 
1229 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 Permanent Court of International Justice (series A) No. 10, at 
18–20 (Sept. 7, 1927). 
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is extended to extraterritorial production even when the link to any in-state interest or 
benefit is weak. 
One of the theoretical premises of this book was that both free trade and environmental 
protection might advance a common objective of efficiency. The reconciliation of non-
discrimination and the reduction of externalities is assumed to follow an efficiency 
rationale. That being said, it was already argued in the previous chapters of the book 
that efficiency is in many ways ambiguous and, importantly, might not be the only 
relevant value in trade law.1230 The sections in this chapter will explore 
extraterritoriality tests, whether they reflect other values than efficiency and how those 
values could, or even should, be taken into account when reconciling the objectives of 
free trade and the elimination of environmental externalities.  
  
                                                 
1230 Similarly see Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the 
U.S. (Transnational Publishers 2006) 51. 
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6.1. Extraterritoriality in Law of Prohibition 
6.1.1. Extraterritoriality under the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause  
In international law and EU law the prohibition of extraterritorial regulation stems from 
general principles outside the scope of trade law. In the U.S. the extraterritoriality test 
has become an integral part of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, even if it could 
equally well be viewed as a separate general principle of federalism.1231 In any case, 
also the jurisdiction of U.S. states is limited to their territory and states should not 
regulate in the jurisdiction of other states.1232  
It may be recalled that one of the objectives of the dormant Commerce Clause is to 
guarantee that those without political representation are not burdened.1233 Regulation 
out-of-state would burden non-voters. Thus, while the dormant Commerce Clause 
targets protectionism in the form of discrimination, it also prohibits extraterritorial 
measures. A finding of extraterritoriality is often fatal for the state measure because it 
may result in the measure either being declared outright unconstitutional,1234 or 
becoming subject to strict scrutiny.1235  Even courts have recognized the incoherence 
with respect to the proportionality review that follows after finding a measure 
extraterritorial.1236 
6.1.2. Price Affirmation Laws, Extraterritoriality and Discrimination 
The extraterritoriality test has mostly been applied in connection with price affirmation 
laws.1237  Two typical examples of these type of laws may be provided. First, some 
                                                 
1231 Donald H. Regan, ‘Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation’ (1987) 85 Michigan L. Rev. 1865, 
1873. 
1232 Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 80. 
1233 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989) (laying out the Complete Auto test), abrogated by 
Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 136 S. Ct. 1787 (2015); South Carolina State Highway 
Department v. Barnwell Brothers Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185-186 (1938) (laying out the political 
representation test). On the application of the test when reviewing subsidies see West Lynn Creamery, 
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1994). See also Patricia Weisselberg, Comment, ‘Shaping the 
Energy Future in the American West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-
State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?’ (2007) 42 University 
of San Francisco L. Rev. 185, 207–208. 
1234 National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 1995). See also 
National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
1235 North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 910 (D. Minn. 2014). 
1236 See e.g. North Dakota v. Heydinger, cases no. 14-2156 and 14-2251 (8th Cir. 2016). 
1237 Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 332, 336-337 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New 
York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 
522 (1935). See also Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171-
1174 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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states have tried to influence the prices in its market by regulating that products cannot 
have been purchased below a certain minimum price before handed over for 
importation into the market of the state adopting the price affirmation law. Secondly, 
other states have regulated that imports are only permitted from companies that commit 
not to sell to any other states for a lower price. 
The price affirmation laws often have discriminatory effects because they deprive the 
competitive advantage of out-of-state industries and tend to reduce imports.1238 The 
extraterritoriality test in price affirmation cases could thus probably have been applied 
with reference to competitive advantages and protectionist behavior.1239  This is in fact 
what the ECJ appeared to do in the 70’s when presented with cases on both maximum 
and minimum prices.1240 A similar approach has also been adopted under the GATT.1241 
In applying the extraterritoriality test the U.S. Supreme Court has, despite the potential 
discriminatory effects of price affirmation laws, opted to emphasize the need for 
economic unity and formulated the extraterritoriality test to capture cases where states 
have directly regulated out-of-state commerce, regulated conduct wholly outside the 
state, or practically controlled commerce wholly out-of-state.1242  Finally, the Supreme 
Court could also invalidate a measure when it creates norm conflicts or could create 
such conflicts if many states adopt similar measures.1243  
                                                 
1238 Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 132-133. 
1239 At least on one occasion the Supreme Court appears to have realized the underlying protectionism. 
See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935). For discussion see Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The 
Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity 
Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 293-294. See also Energy and Environment Legal Institute 
et al v. Joshua Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171-1174 (10th Cir. 2015). The court upheld Colorado’s renewable 
energy mandate finding it neither a price control statute nor discriminatory to out-of-state consumers or 
producers; cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015).  
1240 Case 65/75 Riccardo Tasca [1976] ECR 291, para. 13; Joined cases 88/75 to 90/75 Societa SADAM 
and others v. Comitato Interministeriale de Prezzi and others [1976] ECR 323, para. 15; Case 82/77 
Openbaare Ministerie of the Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele [1978] ECR 
25, para. 18. 
1241 Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing 
Agencies, DS17, Panel Report 16 Oct. 1991 (adopted), para. 5.31. The panel found discrimination in the 
case of a minimum price law. 
1242 See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 332, 336-337 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 
(1982). 
1243 Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 336-337 (1989); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 
(1982). 
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Drawing the line between when a state is impermissibly regulating out-of-state conduct 
and when it is not, is no easy task. Some relevance might be given to where the primary 
transaction takes place. Hence, if the primary transaction is wholly out-of-state, the risk 
of finding the act unconstitutional is greater than if the primary transaction is an 
interstate transaction.1244  PPM-criteria generally target in-state production and sales as 
well as imports that have been produced out-of-state. In all those cases the products 
subject to the transaction end up in-state. Therefore, PPM-criteria would as a rule not 
fall within the scope of illegal extraterritoriality. 
6.1.3. Beyond Price Affirmation: Discriminatory and Non-Discriminatory Criteria  
It has been argued that the extraterritoriality test has applied only to price control 
schemes.1245  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit has noted, this is 
incorrect.1246  
First, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona the Supreme Court analyzed a state law that 
limited the maximum length of trains. In its decision the Court noted the importance of 
national uniformity with respect to standards in the transport sector and that it is not 
feasible for train companies to operate with different train lengths across state lines. 
Hence, in examining the Arizona law the Court concluded that the ‘practical effect of 
such regulation is to control train operations beyond the boundaries of the state’.1247 
While the Court appeared to refer to extraterritoriality, it should be noted that the law 
at hand put a significant burden on interstate transportation and consequently seriously 
disadvantaged imports. In other words, the law had discriminatory effect. 
Secondly, the test was applied by the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. The case 
concerned an Illinois decision to restrict the acquisition of shares in a target company 
for the purpose of takeover by a non-Illinois company from non-Illinois 
shareholders.1248 The restrictions applied to companies if Illinois shareholders owned 
10 % of the shares or if two out of three of the following criteria were met: the company 
had its principal office in Illinois, it was organized under Illinois law or 10 % of its 
                                                 
1244 Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: 
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law 
295, 344–345. 
1245 Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2013); Energy 
and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173-1174 (10th Cir. 2015). 
1246 North Dakota v. Heydinger, cases no. 14-2156 and 14-2251 (8th Cir. 2016). 
1247 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945). 
1248 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982).  
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stated capital and paid-in surplus was represented in Illinois. It is difficult to identify 
any discriminatory effect in the Illinois law. Yet, it was found to breach the prohibition 
of extraterritorial regulation. The ruling can be understood to mean that 10 % in-state 
shareholders is not a sufficient nexus for asserting jurisdiction over trade in shares when 
neither of the parties in the regulated transaction are from in-state. In turn, restrictions 
on transaction where at least one party is from in-state might not form extraterritorial 
regulation.1249 
What follows from the above is that the extraterritoriality test may be applied 
independently of any finding on discriminatory effect.1250 It may be recalled that under 
the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause the scope of prima facie prohibited measures has 
not extended as broadly as under EU free movement law, which captures even non-
discriminatory market access hinders.1251 With the extraterritoriality test the U.S. 
dormant Commerce Clause still appears to advance free trade to some degree beyond 
mere non-discrimination. 
6.1.4. Criteria on State Law and Policy 
6.1.4.1. End-of-Life Treatment Laws in Oklahoma and Michigan 
Some cases on extraterritoriality never reached the Supreme Court. A few cases of 
particular interest have related to waste disposal and recycling. For example, in 
Hardage v. Atkins the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined Oklahoma’s 
ban on the import of hazardous waste, which applied unless the exporting state had put 
in place for the disposal of hazardous waste standards substantially similar to those in 
force in Oklahoma. The court found that the law violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause because Oklahoma sought to force its own standards on other states.1252 
A fairly similar case emerged in Michigan. Wayne County barred the import of waste 
from regions that either had not enacted a beverage container deposit law or that did 
not have a return rate for bottles comparable to that in Michigan. A district court 
                                                 
1249 See Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation International Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2003). 
The court stated that prohibited extraterritorial regulation would not occur if at least one party of a 
regulated contract would be located in-state. 
1250 See also American Beverage Association v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 377-379 (6th Cir. 2013) (Justice 
Sutton concurring). Sutton noted that non-discriminatory state laws may still violate the extraterritoriality 
doctrine. 
1251 See section 1.3.3.2. 
1252 Hardage v. Atkins 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980). See also Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th 
Cir. 1978). 
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concluded that the law was unconstitutional because it had extraterritorial effects. The 
court also stated that the law treated out-of-state waste less favorably as in-state waste 
was not burdened by comparable restrictions.1253 In discussing potential justifications 
of the measure the court stated that strict scrutiny had to be applied. Preserving landfills 
and promoting recycling were accepted as valid grounds of justification. The court did 
not discuss the question of whether or not the requirement of bottle collection out-of-
state would advance environmental protection all the way in Wayne County, and 
whether it is a requirement under the dormant Commerce Clause that the measure has 
such cross-border environmental benefits.1254 Instead, the court simply concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence that Wayne County could not have achieved its 
objectives with less trade restrictive measures. 
The waste disposal laws in Oklahoma and Wayne County shared many characteristics. 
It would appear that neither waste disposal law required other states to adopt an exact 
copy of their waste disposal programs. Instead, adopting an equally effective program 
might have been sufficient for gaining access to their markets. Admittedly, in Hardage 
v. Atkins the court did not give much attention to this question, as the law was 
unconstitutional due to some of its other characteristics. In the Wayne County case the 
issue of equal effectiveness was somewhat complicated by the fact that while the county 
seemed to accept waste from regions with equally effective bottle collection laws, 
policies and practices, the county still rejected imports of waste from regions with 
equally or more effective waste recycling. The outcome of the case did, however, not 
appear to rely only on that observation. 
The reason that the waste disposal laws were regarded as unconstitutional 
extraterritorial regulation related to the discriminatory effects and the extraterritorial 
pressure. It is smy interpretaion that these effects stemmed from the fact that the 
requirements applied to imports did not address the safety and sustainability of the 
imported waste of the individual waste hauler and how the waste it shipped had been 
processed. Instead the requirements addressed the law and policy of the exporting state. 
In other words, Oklahoma’s and Wayne County’s regulations did not allow for waste 
generators or haulers exporting waste to Oklahoma and Wayne Country, respectively, 
                                                 
1253 National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Charter County of Wayne, 303 F. Supp 2d 835 
(E.D. Mich. 2004). 
1254 For more on this question see sections 6.2-6.3. 
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to illustrate that their waste and waste management procedures were sustainable. The 
sustainability of the imported waste or the processing by the waste haulers was not the 
focus of the regulations. This was problematic. In-state waste had access to the market 
per default, whereas waste haulers or generators delivering out-of-state waste could be 
rejected market access even if they were equally or even more sustainable with respect 
to their processes and their waste. This created a pressure on other states to change their 
laws that was problematic from the perspective of the extraterritoriality doctrine. 
6.1.4.2. End-of-Life Treatment Laws in Wisconsin 
Another set of cases on recycling emerged with respect to regulation in Wisconsin. The 
disputes related to a state regulation that first and foremost eleven different recyclable 
materials had to be recovered from waste before the waste was disposed in landfills in 
Wisconsin. Waste that was unprocessed and mixed in the sense that it still included 
some of the eleven materials could not be dumped in Wisconsin’s landfills. 
The Wisconsin law, however, included an exemption. Namely, in-state and out-of-state 
waste generators could deliver waste containing the prohibited recyclable materials 
provided that the waste had been generated in a region that had adopted a recycling 
program with a number of specific elements. For example, the local recycling program 
had to include public education about recycling, a prohibition of dumping the eleven 
recyclable materials also within the region, a requirement that residences and facilities 
recycle, access to recycling containers for occupants of various categories of buildings 
and collection of recycled waste. Some relief from these requirements was granted in 
case the waste was treated at a materials recovery facility. Naturally, the community 
also had to ensure effective enforcement of all relevant requirements.  
Importation of unprocessed mixed waste to Wisconsin was possible only if the out-of-
state recycling program covered also operators in the waste sector that did not export 
to Wisconsin.1255 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in the first 
Meyer case that such element clearly made the law extraterritorial in its nature. The 
courts noted that the law came to control conduct wholly outside Wisconsin as it 
targeted even recycling of waste that was never going to be the subject of transaction 
to Wisconsin. Hence, the court ruled against the measure, concluding that such end-of-
                                                 
1255 See National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 1995). The 
Court of Appeals discussed the district court’s finding that the statute’s notable local benefits outweighed 
its small impact on interstate commerce.  
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life treatment rule targeting the policy of other states was extraterritorial and 
unconstitutional.1256  
The Wisconsin recycling law was yet a measure that could be categorized as a 
regulation on end-of-life treatment that did not target the PPMs of individual companies 
but instead a state-wide policy. Under the Wisconsin recycling law sustainability, and 
consequently market access, of waste was linked to law and policy in the exporting 
state and not to the sustainability of the waste that was actually traded across borders. 
Rules on production methods and end-of-life treatment are similar in the sense that both 
may address aspects of sustainability that often leave no trace in the physical 
characteristics of the good.1257  Hence, the principle developed in Meyer on measures 
targeting the sustainability of state-wide policy could probably be extended to apply 
also for PPM-criteria that target state policies. 
After the first Meyer case Wisconsin amended its law. Under the amended law only the 
waste bound for Wisconsin had to be covered by the recycling program. The criteria on 
recycling were no longer to apply for waste that was designated not to be shipped to 
Wisconsin. In other words, Wisconsin opened up for the rather theoretical possibility 
that out-of-state regions or communities would differentiate between waste exported to 
Wisconsin and other waste. To some extent the amendment mitigated the 
extraterritorial nature of the law in that the recycling requirement did no longer 
explicitly, as a matter of law, extend to waste not intended for Wisconsin landfills. Yet, 
in the second Meyer case the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit again found 
the law to be both discriminatory and of unjustified extraterritorial scope.1258 The fact 
that Wisconsin’s original law had applied even to waste not intended for export to 
Wisconsin was clearly not the only factor that made the program extraterritorial and 
unconstitutional. Hence, there is reason to consider the other arguments made by the 
courts in the two Meyer cases.  
In the second case the court argued that the measure constituted prohibited 
extraterritorial for three reasons. One reasons was that there was a risk of balkanization 
in the U.S. if many states adopt different rules about recycling. A second reason was 
                                                 
1256 National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658, 661, 663 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
1257 Life Cycle Initiative, Towards a Life Cycle Sustainability Assessment (United Nations Environment 
Programme 2011) at 11. 
1258 National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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that the law made interstate commerce more costly than intrastate commerce. 
Unfortunately, the court did not provide much detail with respect to these arguments. 
States have different standards in many areas of commerce. That fact may cause some 
balkanization and make interstate commerce costlier. Yet, those factors alone will often 
not make the standards unconstitutional extraterritorial regulation. Hence, it is 
submitted that a third reason might have been crucial. Namely, the court also 
highlighted that the law even in its amended form required communities outside 
Wisconsin to adopt the Wisconsin standards.1259 
Regulation that targets the law and policy of another state appears to be captured by the 
extraterritoriality test if importers are not awarded the option of illustrating that their 
products and PPMs are sustainable. Indeed, already in the first Meyer case the court 
had stated that unprocessed mixed waste from a state without recycling programs was 
no more noxious than similar waste from an in-state region with a recycling program. 
Apart from its remarks on extraterritoriality, the court in the first Meyer case seemed to 
reason that this constituted unjustifiable discrimination. The courts in both Meyer cases 
stressed that Wisconsin could instead have adopted a law that required all wastes to be 
processed for the removal of recyclable materials before shipping it to Wisconsin 
landfills.1260 
Requirements of sustainable PPMs for domestic and imported electricity or fuel often 
directly tackle the sustainability of the individual products and do not address any 
broader general state or community policy. With the tests applied in the Meyer cases in 
mind, there is still a risk that common schemes could be caught by the extraterritoriality 
test. 
6.1.4.3. A Comparison with GATT 
In the American end-of-life treatment cases part of the problem lay in the fact that in-
state products had access to the market per default due to the laws in place, whereas 
out-of-state producers and products could not get market access regardless of their 
individual level of sustainability. None of the end-of-life treatment laws discussed 
above appeared to have allowed imports of waste from waste generators or haulers that 
could have illustrated that their waste and waste management processes were 
                                                 
1259 Ibid. 
1260 National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995); National 
Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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sustainable even if the laws of their home state or the community where the waste was 
generated did not meet the required standards.1261  
The U.S. cases on end-of-life treatment laws resemble the WTO case US – Shrimp 
discussed previously.1262  It may be recalled that US – Shrimp concerned a U.S. law 
that allowed imports of shrimp only from states that had been certified as sustainable. 
This certification was available when the state had adopted requirements similar to 
those in the U.S. on the use of turtle exclusion devices in shrimp-fishing. After the 
decision by the AB in the original proceedings the U.S. amended its policies to allow 
also imports from states that had adopted laws on shrimp-fishing methods that were 
still equally effective even if they did not include a requirement on the use of the same 
devices as in the U.S. A peculiar element of the U.S. regime was the fact that there were 
on-going federal U.S. legal proceedings on whether or not the U.S. law could be 
interpreted to allow for imports of shrimp from trawlers that themselves used 
sustainable fishing-methods but were governed by the law of states that had not banned 
unsustainable methods. The AB in the original proceedings had, however, already 
hinted that GATT would require individual certification.1263  
US – Shrimp and the U.S. waste disposal cases all appear to reject regulations that do 
not allow imports of individual sustainable products or producers and instead condition 
the imports on the adoption of similar sustainability laws in the exporting state. The 
way these cases were approached still differed to some extent. In the dormant 
Commerce Clause proceedings there was more emphasis on the extraterritorial scope 
of the regulations as the courts applied an extraterritoriality test, whereas under GATT 
the AB seemed to apply the test of unjustifiable discrimination. This is not to suggest 
that the AB ignored extraterritoriality. The law on shrimp-fishing was in part 
controversial because it put pressure on other states to change their laws and policies to 
become sustainable states in general, and not only with respect to those products 
exported to the U.S. Country certification without the option of sustainability 
                                                 
1261 There is some ambiguity in this respect in Meyer. The court stated that the law in itself prohibited 
unprocessed mixed waste unless there was a local recycling program in place where the waste had been 
generated. This would suggest that any company with processed waste could have shipped it to 
Wisconsin. However, in its reasoning the court still stated that the waste could not be exported to 
Wisconsin if no recycling law had been adopted in the region where the waste had been generated. See 
National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995). 
1262 See sections 4.1.3.1. and 4.3.2.2. 
1263 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
para. 165. 
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certification for shrimp from individual trawlers was not as much about environmental 
protection, as about exerting pressure on other states.1264 The problem was that states 
wishing to export sustainable products would also need to serve their in-state market 
exclusively with what the U.S. considered as sustainable products. The view on 
sustainable PPMs that the exporting states would need to implement across their whole 
industry would be that advocated for by the U.S.  
6.1.4.4. State-Wide Policy and the Method of Sustainability Certification 
End-of-life-treatment laws in importing states that conditioned imports of waste on the 
adoption of waste disposal or recycling laws in the exporting state were rejected by 
U.S. courts as extraterritorial regulation. In Meyer the court even explicitly stated that 
instead of such form of sustainability certification of states, Wisconsin should direct its 
criteria on the sustainability of individual waste generators that delivered waste to 
Wisconsin landfills.  
The courts in the end-of-life treatment cases did not have to consider the situation in 
which a state implements a combination of sustainability certification of states and the 
possibility for imports to seek individual sustainability certification. On the one hand 
such measure would include the type of state certification that was above concluded to 
be problematic when implemented on its own. The state certification would consist of 
a ban on certain unsustainable PPMs in-state and a procedure to grant imports a 
sustainability status per default when they originate from states that have adopted a 
similar ban or at least equally effective measures against the harm of unsustainable 
PPMs. On the other hand, the problematic state certification would this time be 
complemented by a procedure for imports from uncertified states to get individual 
sustainability certification. 
The combined measure could take various forms. In practice it would normally still 
likely mean that in-state products and imports from other countries enforcing a similar 
ban on the unsustainable PPMs would benefit from the presumption of compliance with 
the PPM-criteria and compliance would be monitored through occasional inspections. 
In contrast, imports from states that have not implemented a similar ban would need to 
present documentation of reliable certification at the time of importation.  
                                                 
1264 Ibid. 
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It was previously in this book argued that in case of differences in the levels of 
environmental risks between states some combined measures that merely differentiate 
with respect to the sustainability certification procedure can, survive the proportionality 
review under GATT if carefully calibrated to the differences in risks in respective 
states.1265 The question may arise, whether the combination of state and individual 
certification could also comply with the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause? How would 
such measure be examined under the applicable extraterritoriality test? 
With PPM criteria extraterritorial pressure would exist on out-of-state producers to 
change to more sustainable PPMs. Of greater significance in this context is, however, 
the pressure on states to change their laws. The model of a combination of state 
sustainability certification with the option of individual certification would exert less 
extraterritorial pressure as compared to models of end-of-life treatment regulation that 
only allowed imports from regions that required sustainable methods and thus in 
essence had banned unsustainable methods completely. Some pressure on states would 
still remain. The states would have an incentive to change their laws because it would 
give their industry a less burdensome process for the certification of sustainability when 
products are exported to the state that has adopted the PPM-criteria.  
It is not clear if the extraterritorial pressure from differences in the certification process 
for products from certified and uncertified states would be sufficient to trigger 
extraterritoriality under the dormant Commerce Clause. It should be noted that 
measures with a combination of state certification and individual certification could be 
viewed not to regulate or control any commerce wholly outside the regulating state. 
This would rely on the observation that under the combined measure out-of-state 
products intended for the market of the regulating state could thanks to the option of 
individual certification have access to that market without it being necessary to also 
make changes to the PPMs or the trade in out-of-state products that are not intended for 
the market of the regulating state. 
The extraterritorial pressure on the exporting state to ban the PPMs will be heightened 
under the exceptional circumstance where the PPM cannot be reliably verified after the 
product has been exported but could be verified in-state at the source of production. 
This form of circumstances could potentially arise in the electricity sector. The 
                                                 
1265 See section 4.3.3. 
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implications of the peculiarities of the electricity sector on the application of the 
extraterritoriality test under the Commerce Clause will be revisited toward the end of 
this first section of chapter 6. 
6.1.5. California’s LCFS, Creating Incentives Out-of-State and Market Access 
PPM-criteria would not appear to fall neatly into the category of what has by the 
Supreme Court been viewed as prima facie prohibited extraterritorial regulation. The 
relationship between PPM-criteria and the extraterritoriality test has already been 
explored in some cases that have not (yet) reached the Supreme Court. 
The problem with PPM-criteria is illustrated well by the case of Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union, in which the courts referred to the extraterritoriality doctrine.1266  The 
case concerned the California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). The LCFS includes 
sustainability criteria for biofuels and is designed to favour various forms of biofuels 
that are produced without emitting high levels of GHG’s.1267  Fuels with high emission 
values are not barred from entering the Californian market, but, since the fuels supplied 
by retailers on average must not exceed certain levels of carbon intensity, fuels with 
high life-cycle carbon intensity are given lower priority on the market.1268 
California had calculated default carbon intensity values for several pathways on the 
basis of emission averages. A pathway is defined with reference to the feedstock used, 
the chemical method of production and the type of biofuel (e.g. biodiesel or bioethanol) 
produced. Before amendments in 2015 production in different states were assigned 
different default values because the state averages differed.  Hence, the original version 
of the LCFS, before the amendments of 2015, awarded in-state bioethanol a lower 
default emissions value than for Midwest bioethanol.1269  As an alternative to reliance 
on default values, producers may opt to certify the emissions levels of their individual 
production process.1270 Certification of individual carbon intensity is naturally 
attractive only for producers that perform better than the average of the pathway they 
follow. 
                                                 
1266 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2011), revised 
in part, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court of Appeals 
found that LCFS regulations were neither facially discriminatory nor extraterritorial.  
1267 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079-1080 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
1268 Id. at 1082, 1086–1087. 
1269 Id. at 1087.  
1270 Id. at 1082.  
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In order to estimate the emissions of different fuel pathways California has applied a 
life-cycle analysis (LCA). The LCA incorporates emissions in particular from growing 
the feedstock, transportation and the refinery process. Emissions in the refinery process 
depend on the chemical methods, production plant efficiency and the source of the 
electricity used in operating the plant.1271   
Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
question of discrimination and discussed the doctrine of extraterritoriality. The district 
court in 2011 reached the conclusion that the LCFS was unconstitutional.1272  
Regulating the emissions of bioethanol used in California targets the production of 
bioethanol out-of-state. Hence, according to the court, the rule controlled 
extraterritorial conduct.1273  The reasoning of the district court would, for example, 
invite the conclusion that measures incentivizing the reduction of GHGs out-of-state 
are illegal extraterritorial regulation.1274 
Furthermore, in 2011 the district court pointed out that if more states adopted similar 
types of rules, producers would face conflicting norms.1275  This is true in the sense that 
producers utilizing certain feedstock and production technology might be excluded 
from benefits in one market, but not another. In order to gain access to benefits in all 
states, a producer would need to comply with the state with the strictest regulation. 
Under the broad interpretation of illegal extraterritorial effect advocated for by the 
district court, any PPM-criteria would likely be prohibited. All PPM-criteria do at least 
indirectly affect out-of-state conduct, and so do in fact rules that do not even concern 
PPMs.1276  
Several scholars have criticized the application of the extraterritoriality test by the 
District Court for the Eastern District of California.1277  Only measures having a direct 
                                                 
1271 Id. at 1081. 
1272 Id. at 1094.  
1273 Id. at 1105.  
1274 Cf. Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 171-172. Alcorn disagrees with the reasoning of the court. 
1275 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1092-1093 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
1276 Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 170; Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 342. 
1277 See e.g. Thomas Alcorn, ‘The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs’ (2013) 3 Michigan J. Environmental & 
Administrative L. 87, 172; Daniel K. Lee and Timothy P. Duane, ‘Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause 
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extraterritorial effect should be prohibited.1278  The traditional test of extraterritoriality 
has been whether or not the measure can be described as controlling of out-of-state 
conduct. A restrictive approach to the scope of extraterritorial effect would mean that 
control of conduct occurs when the state is dictating the commercial conduct in another 
state, but not when it is using its own regulations to influence out-of-state commerce 
by creating incentives.1279  The difference between controlling and creating incentives 
is obviously a fine line.  
Farber has argued that the almost per se invalidity of measures caught by the 
extraterritoriality test forms a reason for a narrow test.1280  He argues that the Pike 
balancing test, where costs and benefits of the measure are compared, is generally a 
more suitable proportionality test for PPM-criteria.1281  This is in line with the 
observation that PPM-criteria normally only create incentives for individual producers. 
However, they can become too extensive when they make importation conditioned on 
state policy, as in the Meyer cases.1282 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in 2013 the district court’s 
ruling on extraterritoriality in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union.1283  It stated that 
California had an interest in out-of-state carbon emissions due to its global effects.1284  
Therefore, California had the right to try to influence out-of-state conduct through its 
regulation of contracts in California.1285 This may be read as a reference to the principle 
confirmed in Edgar v. MITE that a regulation is extraterritorial in case it regulates 
                                                 
Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards’ (2013) 43 
Environmental Law 295. 
1278 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977). 
1279 Robert L. Molinelli, ‘Renewable Energy Development: Surviving the Dormant Commerce Clause’ 
(2012) Renewable, Alternative, & Distributed Energy Resources Committee Newsletter, American Bar 
Association, Section of Environment, Energy & Resources, 5–6. See however Margaret Tortorella, Note, 
‘Will the Commerce Clause “Pull the Plug” on Minnesota’s Quantification of Environmental 
Externalities of Electricity Production?’ (1995) 79 Minnesota L. Rev. 1547, 1574-1575. 
1280 Daniel A. Farber, ‘Climate Policy and the United States System of Divided Powers: Dealing with 
Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage’ (2014) 3 Transnational Environmental Law 31, 43.  
1281 Id. See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). The court left the impression that Pike 
balancing could apply even with findings of extraterritoriality, especially if it cannot be linked to any 
discriminatory effects. 
1282 See National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1151 (7th Cir. 1999); 
National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 652 (7th Cir. 1995).  
1283 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013). 
1284 See id. at 1098–1100. 
1285 Id. at 1098–1101. See also Pacific Merchant Shipping Association v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 
1181-1182 (9th Cir. 2011). The court found that a state regulation requiring ocean vessels sailing outside 
the shore of the state not to exceed a threshold for sulfur emissions, although putting a restraint on vessels 
from other states entering the waters of the state with imports was not deemed to be regulation controlling 
out-of-state conduct. 
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contracts between two out-of-state parties. In any event, the Court of Appeals in Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union in 2013 was of the opinion that California could adopt 
measures even if those measures created incentives for businesses out-of-state to 
change their PPMs.1286 Some judges on the court still contested the distinction between 
“providing incentives” and “establishing mandates”.1287  
In confirming that the LCFS did not constitute prohibited extraterritorial legislation the 
Court of Appeals in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union in 2013 also examined the 
measure from a variety of additional perspectives. For example, the court emphasized 
that no state had to change its law in order for its industry to get market access in 
California.1288  The case on California’s LCFS was in this respect different from the 
Meyer cases. 
The relevance and manner of application of other tests referred to by the court is more 
ambiguous. For example, the Court of Appeals in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union 
highlighted that there was no evidence of conflicting legal regimes.1289  The court also 
stated that the measure did not target production, trade, or use of ethanol in any other 
state.1290  What it meant by not targeting production in any other state is rather unclear.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the PPM-criteria did not ban imports or 
establish any thresholds.1291  Hence, it would seem that the court left open the 
possibility that PPM-criteria for market access may still breach the extraterritoriality 
principle. The case was in part remanded back to the district court, but not with respect 
to the question of extraterritoriality. The plaintiffs have still continued to assert that the 
LCFS constitutes an impermissible extraterritorial regulation, but the district court has 
in 2017 granted defendant’s motion to dismiss that claim1292 and that decision was 
affirmed in 2019.1293 
                                                 
1286 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). See also Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 12-15131 (9th Cir. 2014) (Denial of hearing en banc; Concurrence by Judge 
Gould). 
1287 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 12-15131 (9th Cir. 2014),(Denial of hearing en banc; 
Dissent by Judge Smith). 
1288 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1102-1103 (9th Cir. 2013). 
1289 Id. at 1105. 
1290 Id. at 1102. 
1291 See id. at 1102-1103. 
1292 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
1293 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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The Oregon Clean Fuels Program (OCFP) includes a biofuels sustainability scheme 
that with respect to core elements is identical to California’s LCFS. Plaintiffs in 
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers. v. O’Keeffe have also presented the 
claim that the OCFP forms unconstitutional extraterritorial regulation. Both the district 
court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit referred to the reasoning of 
the latter in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union and rejected the claim of 
extraterritoriality.1294 
The potential market access string of the extraterritoriality test would as a concept 
resemble the market access test applicable in EU free movement law, which is applied 
to determine whether a measure creates a prima facie prohibited market access hinder 
in intra-community trade.1295  The EU test covers cases of certain significant hindrances 
to market access even if there would be no discriminatory effects.1296 There has not 
been signs that the scope of prima facie prohibited measures would be equally broad in 
the U.S.1297 What the ruling on California’s LCFS might suggest is a more limited 
application of a market access test. Namely, unlike in the EU, the potential market 
access test in the U.S. would apply only in connection with findings of 
extraterritoriality. Yet, there would be potential for the U.S. to learn from the 
experiences in the EU with respect to the application of the market access test. 
A word of caution is still in order. There is a lot of uncertainty with respect to the 
application of a market access test in connection with findings of extraterritoriality, in 
particular as the Supreme Court has not yet adopted any position. The fact that the 
Supreme Court has so far not relied on it suggests that it would at least not be a test that 
always comes into play under the test of extraterritoriality. If applicable, the market 
access prong would therefore not limit but expand the scope of prohibited 
extraterritoriality. Extending the scope of prima facie prohibited measures beyond the 
                                                 
1294 American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 
5665232, at 19 (D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015); American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, 
case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
1295 See section 1.3.3.2. See also Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘De Minimis Meets “Market Access”: 
Transformations in the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU Free Movement Law?’ (2014) 51 Common 
Market Law Rev. 523, 524–526.  
1296 Ibid. 
1297 See however CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93–94 (1987). In that case the court 
examined restrictions on buying control shares of in-state companies. The court stated that the act could 
not offend the Commerce Clause because it “does not prohibit any resident or nonresident from offering 
to purchase, or from purchasing, shares in Indiana corporations, or from attempting thereby to gain 
control.” Thus, the court seemed to hint that a full purchase ban could have hindered market access and 
might have been an excessive burden on interstate trade. 
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prohibition of discrimination to certain cases of market access hinders may not be 
received well in the United States, bearing in mind the view held by some Supreme 
Court Justices that the dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine already as currently 
interpreted is too broad.1298  One should also note that defining the boundaries of the 
market access test in the EU has proved to be problematic.1299 
6.1.6. Colorado and Minnesota Schemes to Promote Renewable Energy 
The question of extraterritoriality has been addressed in at least two further recent cases 
in the field of energy. Colorado’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) was at stake in 
Energy & Environmental Legal Institute v. Epel.1300  Among other things, the claimants 
challenged the constitutionality of promoting renewables through a RPS with tradable 
renewable energy credits (RECs). The district court ruled that such system regulates 
the PPM of out-of-state electricity only when the electricity is imported to Colorado.1301  
Moreover, in applying to such inter-state trade, the system only created incentives for 
using certain PPMs and did not set any standard for market access.1302  Therefore, the 
RPS was not prohibited extraterritorial regulation. The approach in other words 
resembled that of the Court of Appeals in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision by the district 
court in E&E Legal.1303 The court linked the extraterritoriality test to cases of price 
control regulation and such regulation essentially amounts to discrimination. It justified 
the stricter approach to price regulation with references to competition law, where 
naked price-fixing is ruled per se anti-competitive. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota appeared to apply a somewhat 
broader interpretation of extraterritoriality in North Dakota v. Heydinger.1304  
Minnesota had adopted a coal moratorium by deciding not to grant permits to any new 
coal plants in-state. In addition, Minnesota prohibited imports from out-of-state new 
                                                 
1298 See Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 153 S. Ct. 1787, 1811-1812 (2015) (5–4 decision) (Justice 
Thomas dissenting). 
1299 See Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘De Minimis Meets “Market Access”: Transformations in 
the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU Free Movement Law?’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Rev. 
523. 
1300 Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Colo. 2014). 
1301 Id. 1179. 
1302 Id. 1179-1180.  
1303 Energy and Environment Legal Institute et al v. Joshua Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1177 (10th Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015). 
1304 See generally North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014). 
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coal plants as well as such long-term agreements with energy plants if the agreement 
could increase state power sector carbon emissions attributable to the electricity market 
in Minnesota.1305  North Dakota and its coal companies challenged the law.1306  The 
court observed that some electricity cooperatives out-of-state have members in 
Minnesota.1307  In accordance with the law, these residents of Minnesota could not be 
customers of electricity from coal power plants. However, electricity is generated to a 
multi-state grid. Thus, as a practical matter, operators that wanted to continue to sell 
power from coal plants to customers outside Minnesota, and that were connected to the 
grid that also covered Minnesota, were forced to end all business in Minnesota. 
Reversely, operators that wanted to keep their business in Minnesota had to end their 
reliance on coal power also in relation to distribution outside Minnesota. In sum, the 
Minnesota law directly affected transactions with no parties from Minnesota.1308  The 
court concluded that the law had extraterritorial reach.1309 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.1310  
The ruling in North Dakota v. Heydinger does not necessarily conflict with the case of 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. In North Dakota v. Heydinger the case was such that 
Minnesota targeted the trade in electricity directly, which, unlike biofuels and RECs, 
cannot be physically segregated once it has entered inter-state grids. Hence, the 
Minnesota law would have forced any party interested to do business in Minnesota to 
change their whole company policy. In contrast, the California’s LCFS applies only to 
individual batches imported to California and out-of-state producers can serve the 
markets of other states with less sustainable products.1311  
Some scholars have equally identified the difference between the cases of California 
and Minnesota, but still concluded that the special nature of electricity should not have 
justified a different outcome in the Minnesota case.1312  Such view would gain some 
support from the decision in the Colorado case, which was also on electricity trade. 
                                                 
1305 Id. 897.  
1306 Id. 908.  
1307 Id. 916.  
1308 Id. 907.  
1309 Id. 916-917.  
1310 North Dakota v. Heydinger, cases no. 14-2156 and 14-2251 (8th Cir. 2016). Justice Murphy, 
concurring, did not find the law to have prohibited extraterritorial effects on the basis of the observation 
that electrons in the transmission grids do not physically flow across state-borders. 
1311 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). 
1312 Alexandra B. Klass and Elizabeth Henley, ‘Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2014) 5 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 127, 181–182. 
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However, the Minnesota case differed from the Colorado case on one, perhaps critical, 
account. Namely, Minnesota created (absolute) conditions for market access, whereas 
Colorado (much like California’s LCFS) only created market incentives in the form of 
support schemes. 
Coleman has argued that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal in Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union in 2013 was flawed and that measures to promote renewables would need an 
exemption granted by Congress.1313  However, looking at recent cases, the arguments 
for a contrary position appear strong. The extraterritoriality test in the law of prohibition 
should only exceptionally capture state regulation on the sustainability of PPMs. This 
conclusion is of crucial importance from the perspective of tackling externalities. A 
stricter extraterritoriality test would severely restrict a state’s ability to take measures 
aimed at reducing externalities burdening its residents related to climate change or air 
pollution originating in other states. 
6.1.7. The Different Rationales of the WTO, EU and U.S. Regimes 
Law of prohibition may expand beyond the principle of non-discrimination. The 
development has taken very different paths in the WTO, the EU and the U.S. In chapter 
1 of this book it was explained how WTO law in general and GATT in particular quite 
firmly is restricted to the elimination of discrimination.1314 As an international regime, 
the WTO lacks any established legislator and therefore neoliberal pressure for 
deregulation could have very unpredictable consequences. EU free movement law, in 
turn, has moved beyond the principle of non-discrimination. By proclaiming prima 
facie prohibited also non-discriminatory measures that hinder market access the EU has 
at least incidentally flirted with neoliberal thinking. More significant, however, is the 
consequence that competence has been shifted from the national level to the EU. In 
other words, the market access test for non-discriminatory measures promotes 
unionism.  
The EU market access test has expanded the scope of potentially prima facie prohibited 
measures beyond merely discriminatory measures. The ECJ has consequently had the 
opportunity to review the justifiability of a broader scope of cases. Furthermore, a 
finding by the ECJ that some forms of national measures breach the TFEU cannot be 
                                                 
1313 Coleman is also in support of granting said exemption. See James W. Coleman, ‘Importing Energy, 
Exporting Regulation’ (2014) 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1357, 1384 (n.167), 1388–1395. 
1314 See section 1.3.3. 
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reversed by the EU legislator without changing the Treaty. Hence, when the ECJ finds 
that some forms of national measures are incompatible with free movement law, EU 
Member States might opt not to push for amendments to the Treaty, but instead enhance 
their efforts to find harmonized solutions on EU level within the limits of the Treaty. 
The expansion of law of prohibition in the U.S. regime has gone down a different road. 
The concept of extraterritoriality has been introduced by the Supreme Court in order to 
affirm that the competence of each state is limited contra other states. It was illustrated 
above that the test would capture price affirmation laws because of discriminatory 
effects. The importing state has been argued to also cross a boundary by “controlling 
out-of-state commerce” when it pressures other states into more sustainable production. 
The case was made that the extraterritoriality test still does not capture all PPM-criteria.  
It would capture primarily situations where a state, instead of regulating the 
sustainability of individual imported products, has decided to condition importation on 
the exporting state having adopted PPM-criteria in its legislation that are similar to 
those adopted in the regulating state. This is an aspect that under GATT has been 
tackled through the test of arbitrary discrimination.  
It was pointed out that the extraterritoriality test in law of prohibition of the dormant 
Commerce Clause exceptionally captures some non-discriminatory cases. In particular, 
it applies to restrictions placed on contracts with only out-of-state parties. 
Consequently, states may need to put extra care into the design of measures in a sector 
where trade takes place through interconnected systems, such as transmission networks, 
because such regulation can easily affect contracts between out-of-state parties. 
Furthermore, although highly uncertain, the extraterritoriality test could potentially 
come to apply to non-discriminatory PPM-criteria that bar market access completely. 
Courts have, however, been ambiguous on this point. This invites future research on 
lessons that could be drawn from the market access test in EU free movement law. 
The extraterritoriality test in the U.S. primarily reflects neither neoliberalism, nor 
market-oriented unionism, in the sense that power would shift to the federal 
government. Extraterritoriality in law of prohibition is a principle of sovereignty; and 
thus, political representation. It may be recalled that one of the objectives of the 
dormant Commerce Clause is to guarantee that those without political representation 
445
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are not burdened.1315 The test of political representativeness has been linked to the ideal 
of political unity and to free trade as a fundamental right in a union of solidarity.1316 
Unity and solidarity could of course also be values that would justify the EU path of 
shifting more power to the union level. 
As a side note, under the discrimination rationale, which is dominant in U.S. trade law, 
political representativeness refers to out-of-state representation. In contrast, under a 
broader test for prima facie prohibited measures a political representativeness test could 
create expectations of representation from a multitude of groups, including NGOs. This 
path would bring trade law closer to principles of good governance and the ideal of 
societal dialogue; both arguably part of modern transparent democracy. Yet, no trade 
law regime has so far pushed in that direction. 
The fact that the extraterritoriality test has in the U.S. been intertwined with trade law 
is important. It illustrates that the legal regime has identified the problems of 
economically powerful states asserting dominance over other states, which is one of the 
key elements in classic trade law criticism.1317 This form of dominance arises when the 
economically stronger states are able to couple their regulation with their economic 
power in order to change law and policy in other states. 
Regardless their differences, the tests that render non-discriminatory measures prima 
facie prohibited under all three jurisdictions further confirm that trade law is not merely 
about reconciling the efficiency objectives underlying non-discrimination and the 
elimination of externalities. Trade law is also about division of power, linking it firmly 
to the core of constitutionalism. Legal tests in trade law will influence the position of a 
state both contra other individual states of that union or community as well as in relation 
to the union or community of states as a collective. 
                                                 
1315 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989); South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell 
Brothers Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938). See also Patricia Weisselberg, Comment, ‘Shaping the Energy 
Future in the American West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-
Fired Power Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?’, (2007) 42 University of San 
Francisco L. Rev. 185, 207-208. 
1316 Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. 
(Transnational Publishers 2006) 78-86. 
1317 See Friedrich List, Das Nationale System der politischen Ökonomie (4th ed., Verlag von Gustav Fisher 
1922); Henry Clay, Life and Speeches of Henry Clay, Volume II (Greeley & M’Elrath 1843) 23-24; John 
Toye and Richard Toye, ‘The Origins and Interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer Thesis’ (2003) 35 History 
of Political Economy 437, 448. 
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6.2. Extraterritoriality in Law of Justification 
6.2.1. PPM-Criteria and the Geographical Scope of Legitimate Objectives 
Promoting renewable energy, introducing life-cycle analysis to legislative acts and 
applying PPM-criteria more generally may be justified with reference to environmental 
protection under all three trade regimes. This has either been linked to public health or 
been regarded as an important independent value.1318 More controversial is the question 
of the territorial scope of the environment for which states take measures to protect. A 
state may strive to protect is own environment, but could it also aim at tackling effects 
in neighboring states and international spaces.  Would that fall foul of a potential 
extraterritoriality principle?  
The question of the geographical scope of the grounds of justification is particularly 
relevant for rules and restrictions on PPMs since they target the sustainability of the 
production phase, which, with respect to imports, takes place out-of-state. The adoption 
of PPM-criteria has sparked a debate whether states may justify de jure and de facto 
discriminatory trade restrictions with reference to the protection of global health and 
global environmental concerns. The argument could even be made that states have a 
right to defend prima facie prohibited measures with reference to the protection of 
public health and the environment in other states. These are questions of whether or not 
grounds of justification should have extraterritorial reach. 
In the SPS Agreement it has been clearly defined that it is only the protection of life 
and health in the importing state that may justify measures.1319 In contrast, other trade 
provisions are much more ambiguous on this point. The developments in trade law on 
tests of extraterritoriality are in this second main section of chapter 6 framed against 
the idea that the reconciliation of values in trade law integrates the economic theory on 
externalities and promotes some form of efficiency. Yet, as this section will illustrate, 
the question of whose externalities and which externalities are given relevance may 
need to be determined with reference to values that extend beyond the elimination of 
externalities, and even beyond efficiency. 
                                                 
1318 See section 1.3.3.3. 
1319 See definitions in Annex A of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 493. See also Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in 
the EU and WTO’, in Joseph Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law 
of International Trade? (OUP 2000) 147. 
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6.2.2. Local and Global Objectives 
6.2.2.1. Early Developments in WTO Law 
Treaties like the TFEU, the GATT, and the TBT Agreement include the protection of 
public health as a ground of justification without any explicit limitations to the 
geographical scope of that objective.1320  In light of the purpose of those trade law 
regimes, though, some limitations may exist. Namely, with the establishment of a free 
trade area, states have given up on some of their sovereign right to decide on what 
goods to allow for import. The grounds of justification in treaties can be understood as 
a safeguard against, for example, environmental threats. Their purpose is not to offer 
states a tool to use trade policy to pressure other states to commit to policy changes, in, 
for example, the environmental field or human rights protection. 
The application of environmental PPM-criteria to imports will often generate 
environmental benefits primarily out-of-state. In some early decisions, panels appeared 
skeptical toward the compatibility of PPM-criteria with GATT. For example, US – 
Tuna (Mexico I) concerned U.S. laws on criteria for tuna marketed as dolphin-safe in 
the U.S. In order to be labelled dolphin-safe the tuna had to be caught in a sustainable 
manner without unnecessarily killing or harming dolphins in the process. In its 
controversial decision, the panel condemned unilateral measures on PPMs on the 
ground that they would endanger the multilateral trade system.1321  
In US – Tuna (Mexico I), the Europeans together with several other states argued 
against unilateral PPMs with extraterritorial environmental objectives.1322  The EU has, 
however, more recently as a union developed criteria for sustainable PPMs that apply 
globally to, for example, biofuels. The devil is probably in the detail and the position 
of the EU with respect to PPM-criteria likely relates to how the criteria have been 
designed and implemented. 
                                                 
1320 This is in contrast to the SPS Agreement under which only protection of national resources can justify 
exemptions to the main free trade principles. The SPS agreement is, however, to some degree of a 
different nature than the GATT or the TBT Agreement. For arguments of coherence with the SPS 
Agreement through a narrower interpretation of GATT and the TBT Agreement see Kyle Bagwell and 
Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trade System (MIT Press 2002).  
1321 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, Mexico I) 
(unadopted), para. 5.25-27. See also US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
DS58, Panel Report, 15 May 1998, paras 7.40–61. 
1322 See United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, 
Mexico I) (unadopted), para 4.11. The panel noted the EU’s disproval of the United States’ unilateral 
PPM-criteria under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 
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Later, in US – Tuna (EC), an amended version of the same law was scrutinized. This 
time the panel was more favourable towards extraterritorial environmental objectives.  
The panel concluded that protecting dolphins beyond U.S. borders was a legitimate 
objective,1323 even if in the end the panel found that the U.S. law due to its design did 
not pass the proportionality review and was thus incompatible with GATT.1324  
The panel in US – Tuna (EC) arrived at the conclusion that the protection of dolphins 
outside U.S. territory in principle may form a legitimate objective in part by examining 
Article XX GATT as a whole.1325  Article XX GATT includes grounds of justification 
such as the protection of public health and the conservation of natural resources. The 
panel noted that in accordance with Article XX(e) states can also justify restrictions on 
trade in products of prison labour.1326  Such restrictions would be adopted for moral 
reasons and would relate to the protection prisoners in foreign states. Hence, the panel 
reasoned that extraterritorial protection objectives could at least not categorically be 
prohibited.1327  An alternative reading of XX(e) would have been plausible. One could 
understand the permitted objective of protecting foreign prisoners to form lex specialis 
in relation to public morals, which is referred to as a ground of justification in Article 
XX(a). Consequently, XX(a) and other paragraphs under Article XX may not 
necessarily have the same geographical scope as Article XX(e). 
A note by the secretariat after US – Tuna (EC) stated that the protection of resources 
within the nation constitutes a valid ground of justification.1328 In 1996 the EU 
challenged an American boycott on Cuban goods due to the extraterritorial effects of 
the sanctions.1329 This time EU got its demands met in a settlement.1330 
                                                 
1323 See US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) 
(unadopted) paras 5.13–20. See also Canada – Measures Affecting the Exports of Unprocessed Herring 
and Salmon, L/6268, Panel Report, 20 Nov. 1987 (adopted), paras 4.2–4.7; US – Prohibition of Imports 
of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, L/5198, Panel Report, 22. Dec. 1981 (adopted), paras 4.4–
4.15. 
1324 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) 
(unadopted) paras 5.27 and 5.39. 
1325 Id. paras 5.13–20. 
1326 Id. paras 5.16-17. 
1327 See id. paras 5.16–5.17, 5.20. The U.S. also argued Article XX(c) illustrated the same point. Under 
that paragraph, states may implement restrictions on the import and export of gold and silver. See US – 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) (unadopted), para. 
3.16. 
1328 Note by the Secretariat, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article XX Paragraphs 
(b), (d) and (g) of GATT, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/53 (July 30, 1997), at 27–30. 
1329 US – Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act, Request for Consultations, DS38, Request for Consultations, 
3 May 1996. 
1330 EU-US Summit London, 18 May 1998, Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation. 
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The dispute settlement bodies had to return to the issue in US – Shrimp.1331  The case 
concerned a U.S. law that required shrimp marketed in the U.S. to have been caught 
with the use of turtle exclusion devices. The requirement applied to shrimp regardless 
of whether it had been caught by a U.S. or foreign vessel and regardless of whether the 
shrimp had been caught in U.S. waters or elsewhere. The Appellate Body discussed the 
objective of protecting turtles outside of U.S. waters by placing requirements on the 
devices used while fishing for shrimp.1332  It pointed out that the species of turtles in 
question are endangered and that they migrate.1333  The migration of turtles may be a 
crucial point. Since turtles migrate, it was no longer possible to separate domestically 
protected turtles from turtles in foreign territory. In other words, the environmental 
protection objective of the United States concerned a global resource. Although the 
Appellate Body finally concluded that specific elements of the design of the U.S. law 
rendered it arbitrary, it still accepted that measures, in principle, could be justified with 
reference to the protection of migratory species.1334  
The United States later abolished the arbitrarily discriminatory elements of the law on 
the use of turtle exclusion devices in shrimp fishing. The law was still challenged by 
Malaysia. The Appellate Body in United States – Shrimp (Article 21.5) noted that, in 
accordance with the Rio Declaration of 1992, states should, as far as possible, aim to 
address global environmental challenges through international consensus.1335  The 
Appellate Body recognized that although the declaration sets a preference for 
international action, it is non-binding and does not exclude the possibility of unilateral 
measures.1336 The AB in these compliance proceedings concluded that the amended 
measure complied with GATT. 
In conclusion, WTO law does at least not categorically prohibit unilateral decisions to 
adopt regulation with the objective of addressing environmental effects that are global 
and cross-border in nature. Many questions about extraterritoriality still remain. 
                                                 
1331 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 132–133. 
1332 Id. paras 115–134. 
1333 Id. paras 132–133.  
1334 Id. paras 133, 177–186. 
1335 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, para. 124. 
1336 Ibid. 
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6.2.2.2. State of Affairs in the EU 
The EU Commission has generally been very sceptic of unilateral PPM-criteria adopted 
by EU Member States. The disapproval of Dutch labels on sustainable forestry 
illustrates this.1337  However, recently some EU Member States have developed 
sustainability criteria for solid biomass that relies on a life-cycle assessment1338 already 
before EU-level criteria were agreed to enter into force in 2021.1339 The Commission 
appears to have encouraged such development without any notable concerns for the 
functioning of the internal market.1340 The Commission’s approach to extraterritoriality 
may appear inconsistent.1341 However, it is plausible that the different views of the 
Commission in the cases on PPM-criteria has been linked to differences in the details 
of each specific measure at hand. What is more, national schemes to promote electricity, 
heating or cooling from sustainable solid biomass may have been left untouched by the 
EU in part because the ECJ has ruled that Member States have under EU free movement 
law a lot of flexibility when it comes to the design of measures to promote renewables 
in the electricity sector.1342 
In principle, the United States and the EU could advocate for a different interpretation 
in WTO law than either applies in its own trade regime. Namely, within their own 
systems, the United States and the EU try to foster coherence and mutual trust, which 
                                                 
1337 See Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (European 
Law 2003) 360-361. Compare with the Commission’s long-standing view that environmental and social 
PPMs unrelated to the characteristics of the end product may not be applied by Member State public 
authorities as, e.g., award criteria in public procurement. This position held by the Commission was 
overruled by the ECJ. See Case C-448/01 EVN AG & Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527. 
1338 See e.g. Erin Voegele, ‘UK Sets Sustainability Standards for Solid Biomass, Biogas’ (Aug. 22, 2013) 
< http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/9363/uk-sets-sustainability-standards-for-solid-biomass-biogas> 
accessed 23 Nov. 2017. See generally U.K. Department of Energy & Climate Change, IA No: 
DECC0134, Impact Assessment: Proposals to Enhance the Sustainability Criteria for the Use of Solid 
and Gaseous Biomass Feedstocks Under the Renewables Obligation (RO) (2013) at 7-8 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415168/RO_Biomass_
Sustainability_Govt_Response_Impact_Assessment.pdf> accessed 23 Nov. 2017 (revealing that the UK 
preparatory works contained some discussion on the relation to EU free movement law); Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, NL Agency, Handbook on Sustainability Certification of Solid Biomass For Energy 
Production (2013) <http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/Module_200.pdf> accessed 23 Nov. 
2017 (discussing similar criteria developed in Belgium and the Netherlands). 
1339 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 29 as well 
as recitals 94 and 101. 
1340 Commission Staff Working Document: State of Play on the Sustainability of Solid and Gaseous 
Biomass Used for Electricity, Heating and Cooling in the EU, SWD (2014) 259 final (July 28, 2014), at 
9-11. 
1341 Similarly see Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis 
(Europa Law 2003) 363-365. 
1342 See section 1.4.3.2. 
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may provide stronger arguments against extraterritoriality than would be the case in the 
more heterogenic WTO community.1343 Thus, a reason for the Commission’s 
occasional disapproval of Member States’ unilateral national PPM-criteria might be the 
fact that the Commission has the task of protecting union interests and guards the 
principle of loyalty between Member States as reflected in Article 4(3) in the Treaty on 
European Union.1344 In principle PPM-criteria could at times be regarded to extend too 
far into activities on territories of other Member States.  
In contrast, in the context of WTO law the EU could argue for a right to adopt unilateral 
PPM-criteria because the degree of integration and loyalty is significantly lower than 
within their respective unions.1345 Interestingly, Davies has turned this argument on its 
head. He views the higher degree of integration and expectations of loyalty within the 
EU as a reason to assign Member States the right, and perhaps even duty, to establish 
PPM-criteria with extraterritorial scope.1346 The argument could rely on the observation 
that PPM-criteria of one or several EU Member States often serve an objective that is 
at least generally accepted in the union. That is, however, a case sensitive matter related 
to facts, and would not justify conclusion on the matter of law and principle. 
In line with the theory that stronger loyalty and integration creates stronger rejection of 
extraterritoriality, some scholars and Advocate Generals have in the context of EU free 
movement law argued that Member States can only justify measures with reference to 
the protection of health and environment within its national borders.1347  The rulings by 
the ECJ have been ambiguous on this point. For example, the ECJ has struck down 
                                                 
1343 Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’, 
in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade? (OUP 2000) 138. 
1344 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, 13. On the relationship 
between mutual trust and extraterritoriality see Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade 
and Environment in the EU and WTO’, in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: 
Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (OUP 2000) 138. 
1345 Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’, 
in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, The WTO and the NAFTA – Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade (OUP 2000) 125, 138. 
1346 Gareth Davies, ‘‘Process and Production Method’ – based Trade Restrictions in the EU’, in Catherine 
Barnard (ed.) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008 (Hart 2008) 77. 
1347 Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Clarendon Press 
1996) 84-90; Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, Opinion of AG 
Trabucchi, para. 5; Case C-1/96 The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte 
Compassion in World Farming Ltd. [1998] ECR I-1251, Opinion of AG Léger, paras 87, 113-120; Case 
C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd. 
[1996] ECR I-2553, Opinion of AG Léger, paras 38-40. See also Case C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries & Food ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., [1996] ECR I-2553, para. 20. 
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Member State decisions to restrict the export of waste.1348 In principle, the objective of 
these measures may have been to protect the out-of-state environment. However, in its 
ruling the court did not address this aspect. It should also be pointed out that the facts 
of the cases were quite different than in cases on PPM-criteria applicable for imports 
and analyzed in this book. The export restrictions were to their nature de jure 
discriminatory and there was no reason to expect that the environmental hazard of the 
waste was greater abroad than at home. 
Advocate-General van Gerven once took the view that when trans-frontier 
environmental effects occur, a Member State should be justified in trying to reduce 
them even if the source of the effects is located outside its jurisdiction.1349 The case van 
Gerven analyzed, referred to as Van den Burg, related to a Dutch ban on the import of 
red grouse, a bird not found in the Netherlands.1350  A directive on bird conservation 
authorized Member States to adopt stricter national protection measures. Yet, the ECJ 
found that the directive fully harmonized the objectives of such stricter national rules 
on bird conservation and that the rights of Member States to rely on grounds on 
justification in this context had thus been exhausted.1351 In summing up its answer to 
the question submitted by the national court, the ECJ still went on to state that its 
findings were based on an interpretation of Article 36 TFEU read in conjunction with 
the directive,1352 which resulted in some confusion as regards to the applied provisions 
and principles. 
The ECJ in Van den Burg found that the purpose of the directive only authorized stricter 
measures relating to domestically occurring birds, endangered birds and migratory 
birds.1353  The conclusion that the protection of migratory birds was justifiable appears 
well reasoned, since such birds could also enter the territory of the state that adopts the 
measure. Yet, as noted above, it was left somewhat unclear as to whether this 
                                                 
1348 Case C-172/82 Syndicat national des fabricants raffineurs d'huile de graissage and others v. 
Groupement d'intérêt économique "Inter-Huiles" and others [1983] ECR 555, para. 14; Case C-203/96 
Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v. Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke 
Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] ECR I-4075, paras 48-50. See also Jochem Wiers, Trade and 
Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 2003) 358-365. 
1349 Case C-169/89 Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den Burg [1990] ECR I-2151, 
Opinion of AG van Gerven, para. 7. See also Ludwig Krämer, ‘Environmental Protection and Article 30 
EEC Treaty’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 111, 136. 
1350 See Case C-169/89 Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den Burg [1990] ECR I-2160, 
para. 2. 
1351 Id. paras 8-12. 
1352 See id. para. 16. 
1353 Id., paras 11-14. 
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conclusion stemmed from the application of the Treaty or the directive. The case, 
however, gives some reason to believe that the ECJ is sympathetic to the objective of 
protecting at least global harms. The approach may thus in this respect be similar to 
that adopted under GATT. 
The legitimacy of adopting measures to protect against cross-border and global 
environmental effects is further supported by ECJ’s reasoning in a case on the 
application of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on the airline industry. More 
specifically, at stake in the case was whether it would be compatible with international 
customary law to apply the ETS on airlines either arriving from third countries and 
landing within the EU or leaving the EU with a destination in a third country.1354  Under 
the original ETS flights had to compensate even for emissions that occur during its path 
outside EU airspace. Although the case did not relate to free movement law, it is worthy 
of note that in order to support its argument that the EU had an interest to regulate flight 
emissions outside its airspace, and that the extraterritorial reach of the ETS was 
justifiable in light of international law, the court made reference to the global impacts 
of pollution emitted outside EU airspace.1355 Despite the ruling, the EU decided after 
some international pressure to reduce the extraterritorial reach of the scheme by 
changing the scope of application of the ETS so that emissions outside EU airspace are 
not covered at least for the next few years.1356  
Another case of interest with respect to the extraterritoriality principle concerned the 
decision by UK to deny the export of live sheep to Spain. The UK suspected that many 
slaughter-houses in Spain did not comply with an EU directive on the treatment of 
animals. At hand was thus a measure that tackled the PPMs applicable in another 
Member State. The UK attempted to justify the export restriction with reference to 
animal health protection. The court never came to address the question of 
extraterritoriality, however. Instead it simply noted that animal protection and the 
                                                 
1354 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America & Others v. Secretary of State for Energy & 
Climate Change [2011] ECR I-13833, paras 108, 125, 128. 
1355 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America & Others v. Secretary of State for Energy & 
Climate Change [2011] ECR I-13833, para. 129. 
1356 See Regulation (EU) No 421/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community, in view of the implementation by 2020 of an international agreement applying a 
single global market-based measure to international aviation emissions OJ L 129, 30.4.2014, 1. See also 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2003/87/EC to continue current limitations of scope for aviation activities and to prepare to implement a 
global market-based measure from 2021, COM (2017) 54. 
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slaughter process had been harmonized in the EU directive and that in accordance with 
established case law full harmonization means that the right to refer to the ground of 
justification had been exhausted.1357 
In sum, the question of whether a state may adopt measures to tackle global 
environmental harm has not been explicitly resolved by the ECJ. While certain 
hesitation has been expressed by some,1358 other scholars still accept that global 
environmental harm is a legitimate ground of justification.1359 It is submitted here that 
there are good reasons for accepting the protection against global (i.e. cross-border) 
environmental effects as legitimate objectives. States tackling those effects are 
essentially addressing effects that have an impact on their territory. 
6.2.2.3. State of Affairs in the U.S. 
It may be recalled that the United States has on multiple occasions been forced to defend 
federal PPM-criteria in the WTO.1360  The federal government has thus held the view 
that under GATT at least the protection of global environmental effects forms a valid 
ground of justification. At the same time there has been skepticism in many U.S. states 
toward PPM-criteria adopted by other U.S. states. This skepticism has been expressed 
in the form of legal challenges on the compatibility of the criteria with the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Would the legitimate objective under the dormant Commerce 
Clause also include the protection against global environmental effects, such as GHG 
emissions causing climate change? 
The issue of extraterritoriality in law of justification has been discussed in connection 
to the dormant Commerce Clause by some scholars.1361 Importantly, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has ruled that prima facie prohibited measures may be justified in case of a 
legitimate local goal.1362  This could be read to imply that states may introduce 
                                                 
1357 Case C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Hedley Lomas 
(Ireland) Ltd. [1996] I-2553, para. 19. 
1358 Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Clarendon Press 
1996) 86-88. 
1359 Ludwig Krämer, E.C. Treaty and Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 111-114; Gareth 
Davies, ‘‘Process and Production Method’ – based Trade Restrictions in the EU’, in Catherine Barnard 
(ed.) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008 (Hart 2008) 75; Damien Geradin, 
Trade and Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 66. 
1360 See section 6.2.2.1.  
1361 Damien Geradin, Trade and Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
66. See also Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 86-87 and 90. 
1362 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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measures to protect their own local environment, but not to protect the environment of 
other states. The Court has also highlighted that states have no legitimate interest in 
protecting non-residents.1363  
Lower courts have ruled that the protection of out-of-state wildlife is a legitimate 
objective.1364  Protecting wildlife would in part also protect the fauna of the state 
implementing the measure at least when the animals are migratory. What is more, at 
least on one occasion, a lower court has concluded that protecting out-of-state health 
was a legitimate objective when adopted in conjunction with the objective of protecting 
in-state reputation.1365 This would suggest that the protection of out-of-state interests 
might be thought of as acceptable at least when the measure in part also advances some 
in-state objective. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appeared in Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union in 2013 to endorse this view when, in its analysis of the 
compatibility with the dormant Commerce Clause of the sustainability requirements on 
biofuels in California’s LCFS, it concluded that GHGs emitted as a result of PPMs in 
any state would hurt California to a similar extent.1366 It must be emphasized that the 
opinions by district courts and courts of appeals do not form precedents. They however 
illustrate the difficulty of defining the concept of “local.”  
In sum, it would appear that so far neither the U.S. nor the EU regime contradict the 
WTO law praxis to include global effects, although, admittedly, undisputable precedent 
is lacking.1367  It would seem difficult to argue that a state should not have the right to 
adopt trade restricting measures that may protect global environmental resources, such 
as clean air, because even if the behaviour that is targeted takes place abroad, the 
environmental effects of the measure will at least to some degree indirectly and over 
time occur also within the territory of the state adopting the measure and each state 
should have the right to protect against harm inflicted on its territory.1368  To put it 
                                                 
1363 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). 
1364 Cresenzi Bird Importers Inc. v. New York, 658 F. Supp. 1441, 1448 (S.D.N.Y.1987), affirmed, 831 
F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987); Palladio Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affirmed, 
440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1971); A. E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 264 N.E.2d 118, 122–123 (N.Y. 1970). 
1365 Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279–1280 (7th Cir. 
1992). The case concerned a ban on export of food in a truck that had been used to import garbage. 
1366 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080–1081 (9th Cir. 2013).  
1367 See Damien Geradin, Trade and Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
32 (n.104). 
1368 Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 112-113. 
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differently, not accepting any global harm as a ground for justification would 
significantly restrict the right of states to tackle externalities. 
6.2.2.4. Global Environmental Protection, the Energy Sector and De Minimis 
Clean air and climate change concerns are global interests much like migratory turtles. 
GHGs have a global reach and their emission in any country or state will harm all 
states.1369  Thus, reducing carbon dioxide in any part of the world will create global 
environmental benefits and therefore also local benefits for the state adopting the 
measure.1370  PPM-criteria that also apply to imported energy would reduce pollution 
abroad, which in turn should improve the air both in the state where the goods are 
produced and in the importing state adopting the criteria. As explained in the previous 
subsection, this was the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union. PPM-criteria that tackle GHGs should also under EU and WTO law 
be found to serve a legitimate objective,1371 even if some authors have expressed 
reservations in this regard.1372 
A concern that states with vast market power would gain extensive influence over 
environmental policy worldwide forms the primary argument against a broad 
geographical scope for legitimate objectives.1373  When big trading powers such as the 
United States, China, or the EU implement PPM-criteria that also apply to imports, the 
exporting industry of smaller nations will experience economic (and political) pressure 
to change their production and processing methods. On some markets compliance with 
those PPM-criteria might even be the only option for companies that wish to compete 
globally, and perhaps even survive. The same concerns apply of course also to some 
extent to environmental and health regulations that target product characteristics 
                                                 
1369 Thomas R. Karl and Kevin E. Trenberth, ‘Modern Global Climate Change’ (2003) 302 Science 1719, 
1719-1720; Joseph Allan MacDougald, ‘Why Climate Law Must Be Federal: The Clash Between 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems’ (2008) 40 Connecticut L. 
Rev. 1431, 1435; Rachel Feinberg Harrison, Comment, ‘Carbon Allowances: A New Way of Seeing an 
Invisible Asset’ (2009) 62 Southern Methodist University L. Rev. 1915, 1917. 
1370 See Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 65 and 96. Zomer discusses GHG emission 
mitigation as a global/federal public good from the perspective of non-discrimination.  
1371 For discussion on WTO law and the energy sector see Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as 
a Principle of International Law Resolving Conflicts Between Climate Measures and WTO Law (Brill 
2009) 226-227. 
1372 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(CUP 2013) 619; Petros Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary (OUP 
2005) 209-213. 
1373 Petros Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary (OUP 2005) 212; 
Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 111. 
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instead of the PPMs. However, criteria for sustainable PPMs could be regarded as an 
even more aggressive form of social or environmental imperialism practiced by those 
states that throughout history have gained their economic advantages over the 
developing world in part due to lax past environmental regulation. 
Farber has argued that a balance should be struck between localism and globalism.1374  
A model of localism, where states can only justify the protection of their own 
environment, would seem insufficient, as it would turn a blind eye to the need of 
protecting against the cross-border effects of global environmental harm, whereas a 
model of globalism, where even the out-of-state share of environmental effects form 
part of the legitimate objective, may shift too much power to nations with economic 
power.1375  A model in which the legitimate objective covers local effects and global 
effects that reach the state adopting the restriction, would form a compromise between 
the two extremes. Yet, such test will be difficult to apply consistently in practice. For 
example, would a restriction with the objective of protecting endangered species in 
foreign countries serve global biodiversity to such an extent that it would have 
environmental value also for the state adopting the restriction?1376 
With respect to GHG emissions from production in other states it would be quite 
evident that the cross-border effect can be significant. It would thus not appear 
controversial to claim that importing states have a legitimate interest in reducing those 
emissions. With other emissions the situation may be more complex. It has been argued 
that other pollutants emitted in processing resources to generate energy only have a 
local reach.1377  For example, wind and hydropower stations mainly interfere with the 
local ecology, even if some GHGs are emitted.1378 Yet, soil or water pollution as well 
as biodiversity effects are not necessarily any less severe than emissions and pollution 
in the air. Moreover, even if effects are mainly local, they will in the long term become 
global. Various forms of air and water pollution cause environmental harm that will 
                                                 
1374 Daniel A. Farber, ‘Stretching the Margins: The Geographical Nexus in Environmental Law’ (1996) 
48 Stanford L. Rev. 1247, 1273.  
1375 Id. at 1270-1273. 
1376 Laura Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs (Brill 2007) 306. 
1377 Patrick Zomer, Note, ‘The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (2010) 8 U. St. Thomas L. J. 60, 65 and 72. 
1378 Joseph V. Spadaro, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Electricity Generating Chains: Assessing the 
Difference’ (2010) 42 International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin 19, 20. 
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travel from one end of the United States, the EU, or even the world, to the other end.1379 
As almost all environmental effects, sooner or later, will have a global impact and 
consequently will also reach the state adopting the restrictive measure, more or less all 
measures promoting environmental protection can be claimed to benefit also the local 
environment. Hence, Engel has argued that states do have a legitimate interest in 
mitigating all environmental harm that emerges out-of-state.1380  
Almost all environmental effects are global in the sense that they will eventually to 
some, albeit often minimal, degree impact the state that adopts the restriction on PPMs. 
The introduction of a de minimis rule would mean that some measures with primarily 
out-of-state consequences would be categorized as having a too insignificant 
environmental impact for the state adopting the measure. In other words, environmental 
effects that reach the regulating state to a level that is too low would fall outside the 
scope of legitimate objectives. It should be highlighted that such tests would, to a small 
degree, bar states from tackling externalities. 
Indeed, the difficulties associated with the distinction of global environmental effects 
from purely local effects in out-of-state territories have sparked proposals of some form 
of de minimis rule.1381  Wiers suggests that the environmental objective should be 
accepted only if the threat would have a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect on the 
domestic environment.1382 In order for the de minimis test to have force, whether a 
measure creates effects above the threshold would need to be determined from an 
international or union perspective.1383 
In the energy sector, GHG emissions belong to those environmental concerns that are 
clearly not purely foreign and would not be affected by a de minimis threshold. The de 
                                                 
1379 Anne Havemann, ‘Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable 
Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution’ (2012) 71 Maryland L. Rev. 848, 873. 
1380 Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Ecology L. Q. 243, 342–348.  
1381 See e.g. Max S. Jansson, ’Extraterritoriality, Externalities and Cross-Border Trade: Some Lessons 
From the United States, the European Union and the World Trade Organization’ (2016) 33 Pace 
Environmental Law Review 437. 
1382 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 274. See also Sanford E. Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy 
for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental L. 383, 429-
431. 
1383 The relationship between extraterritoriality and international support has equally been emphasized 
in Barbara Cooreman, Global Environmental Protection through Trade – A Systematic Approach to 
Extraterritoriality (Edward Elgar 2017). 
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minimis test would give green light to the objective of fighting global climate change. 
The test might, however, have implications for measures addressing other forms of 
pollution and environmental risks. These include noise (from wind turbines), soil 
contamination, biodiversity loss (from biofuels feedstock plantation), waste (in the 
form of solar panels) or interference with waterways (from hydropower). 
Even without a de minimis test, there is a definite possibility that when the cross-border 
environmental benefit is very minimal, the PPM-criteria implemented by the state 
might not survive some proportionality tests, such as Pike balancing or moderately 
intense versions of the suitability test and the least restrictive measure test.1384 Some 
caution is still called for with the application of tests in this sensitive context. Any de 
minimis or proportionality test would need to be applied so that it would not create a 
bias against slowly accumulating severe effects, nor against rare but severe incidents, 
such as nuclear accidents.1385 Applicable tests could take into account both the 
magnitude and the probability of cross-border harm but would need to be applied with 
a long-term perspective on the effects.  
6.2.3. Pure Out-of-State Effects and Environmental Protection 
Under a de minimis rule a state could justify a measure only if it would have positive 
in-state environmental effects above some given threshold. However, the de minimis 
rule is only a theory that has not been confirmed by courts. Potentially even protective 
measures against purely out-of-state effects could be justifiable and the theory of a de 
minimis rule would consequently be discarded. 
The possibility to justify measures with reference to the protection of purely foreign 
interests has been analyzed in EU, U.S. and WTO law. While some have argued that 
the interest protected cannot be purely foreign;1386 with respect to each of the three 
jurisdictions there have still been others who have not excluded the possibility that 
                                                 
1384 Damien Geradin, Trade and Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
66. 
1385 See section 3.1.4.2. 
1386 Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Clarendon 1996) 
84-90; Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’, 
in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade? (OUP 2000) 132; Sanford E. Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound 
Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental L. 383, 
400-402. See also Case C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food ex parte Hedley 
Lomas (Ireland) Ltd. [1996] ECR I-2553, para. 20; Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Gustave Dassonville 
[1974] ECR 837, Opinion of AG Trabucchi, para. 5. 
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states could have extraterritorial legitimate interests.1387  The issue is relevant not only 
in establishing whether, in the first instance, there are any legitimate objectives but also 
in the analysis of whether the environmental benefit is proportional in light of the 
restriction on trade. 
The theory on the exclusion of purely foreign effects from the scope of legitimate 
grounds of justification, relating to for example public health and environmental 
protection, has never really been put to test in WTO law, since appellate bodies have 
always, due to the facts of the case, been able to avoid addressing the question.1388   
There has similarly not yet been any strong view adopted by the ECJ on the protection 
against purely out-of-state effects. As explained above, in Van den Burg the Court 
relied heavily on the interpretation of a directive in its analysis of free movement law. 
Although the directive might have decisively steered the reasoning of the Court even 
with respect to extraterritoriality, it is still worthy of note that it ruled that states could 
justify stricter national rules on bird conservation only if the birds occurred 
domestically, where migratory or had been listed as endangered.1389  The ECJ thus 
rejected the protection of most birds that occur out-of-state. The court may have 
intended to indicate that the provision in the bird conservation directive awarding 
Member States some flexibility to adopt stricter national rules on bird conservation did 
not allow states to give their measure an extraterritorial dimension. Alternatively, the 
ECJ could be understood to have implied that Article 36 TFEU should cover domestic 
interests and global interest related to for example migratory species.1390  Adding the 
interest of protecting endangered species to the list of justifiable objectives could either 
be seen as a validation of purely out-of-state objectives or could be explained by the 
fact that a serious threat of extinction of some species is related to global biodiversity 
                                                 
1387 Ludwig Krämer, E.C. Treaty and Environmental Law (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 111-114; 
Howard F. Chang, ‘Toward a Greener GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and the Shrimp-Turtle 
Case’ (2000) 74 Southern California L. Rev. 31, 32; Kirsten H. Engel, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation’ (1999) 26 
Ecology L. Q. 243, 342-48; Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction: An 
Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 249, 278-279; Laurens Ankersmit, Green Trade and Fair Trade in and with the EU: 
Process-Based Measures within the EU Legal Order (CUP 2017) 127-161. 
1388 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, para. 5.173; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB 
Report, 12 Oct. 1998, para. 133. 
1389 Case C-169/89 Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den Burg [1990] ECR I-2160, paras 
11–12.  
1390 Id. para. 16. 
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and thus also a sufficient concern for states where the species do not occur. 
Unfortunately, however, the ruling by the ECJ did not explicitly lay out its reasoning 
with respect to these aspects. In line with previous research,1391 it can be concluded that 
the territorial scope of the grounds of justification in EU free movement law remains 
an unsettled issue. 
It may be recalled that the extraterritoriality doctrine applicable in law of prohibition 
under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause condemns measures that represent the 
exercise of control over out-of-state conduct.1392  This already reflects skepticism 
against the objective of states to affect activities in other territories. Extraterritoriality 
has received less attention in law of justification of the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
geographical scope of legitimate objectives is referred to in the Pike balancing test. 
According to the test states the objective must be local.1393  Thus, in the United States, 
it has also been argued that mitigating purely out-of-state environmental harm does not 
form a legitimate objective.1394  It may in this context be noted that in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union the Ninth Circuit in 2019 appeared to emphasize that it had identified 
in-state (local) environmental effects.1395 
The Supreme Court has appeared to reject the protection of out-of-state harm as a 
legitimate objective in at least two types of cases. First, the Court has determined that 
states have no legitimate interest in protecting non-resident shareholders from hostile 
takeovers.1396 Secondly, the Court has established that restrictions on exports of waste 
cannot be justified with reference to the protection of the out-of-state environment.1397 
While the Court appeared quite firm in its position also in the latter case, it is worthy to 
recall that an identical outcome in similar cases in the EU can be explained by the fact 
that restrictions on waste exports in fact do not advance environmental protection 
because the harm of waste is per default identical in-state and out-of-state. Regardless 
                                                 
1391 Laurens Ankersmit, Green Trade and Fair Trade in and with the EU: Process-Based Measures 
within the EU Legal Order (CUP 2017) 127-161. 
1392 See section 6.1.  
1393 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
1394 Damien Geradin, Trade and Environment – A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (CUP 1997) 
66. Geradin also draws the same conclusion with regards to EU law. 
1395 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
1396 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). 
1397 C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994). 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   462 31.7.2019   7.16
 463 
of that, it would appear that the U.S. doctrine is even more hostile toward globalism 
than EU free movement law,1398 not to mention WTO law.  
Curiously, the debate on the protection of extraterritorial effects mirrors the discussion 
in legal theory as to whether the goal of maximization of utility or welfare should also 
include the positions of out-of-state individuals.1399  To the extent environmental effects 
do not affect the territory of a state in any sense, states would have limited interests in 
environmental protection. A state could in principle argue that it aims to eliminate the 
externalities that burdens some out-of-state minority that has been unsuccessful to push 
for their interests in the legislative process in their own state. There are, however, 
problems with that approach. Such minority would normally have a voice and 
representation in the legislative process of their own state and interference by another 
state would at least on the global arena appear imperialistic. 
The part of the population that holds a minority view on the level of environmental 
protection to be adopted in the state where the production takes place would have a 
voice. The same is obviously not true for future generations. However, it would be 
difficult to justify why an importing state knows the preference of future generations in 
an exporting state better than that state itself. In theory, the importing state adopting the 
PPM-criteria could try and argue that on the basis of scientific evidence the polluting 
state is endangering its future existence and that it therefore is evident that it is harming 
the utility and/or welfare of its future generations.1400 
There are several pros and cons to the inclusion of purely extraterritorial interests in the 
scope of legitimate grounds of justification.1401 It is submitted here that there still exist 
fairly strong theoretical arguments for rejecting purely extraterritorial interests at least 
as an environmental ground of justification in all three jurisdictions. 
                                                 
1398 Similarly see Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the 
U.S. (Transnational Publishers 2006) 98. 
1399 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1981) 53-54. 
1400 The so-called Brundtland report emphasized that economic development should compromise neither 
present nor future generations. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common 
Future (1987) 43. Under trade law, externalities may be tackled, but, with a lack of representation, the 
interests of future generations may often be neglected.  
1401 Laurens Ankersmit, Green Trade and Fair Trade in and with the EU: Process-Based Measures 
within the EU Legal Order (CUP 2017) 127-161. 
463
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   463 31.7.2019   7.16
 464 
6.2.4. Unsustainability as a Moral Concern 
6.2.4.1. Public Morals and the Protection of Vulnerable Persons Under EU Law 
Out-of-state environmental harm was approached from a purely environmental 
perspective in the section above. The interest of any state to mitigate out-of-state 
environmental effects could alternatively be regarded as a moral concern.1402 The 
theory on moral concerns would rely on the idea that even if the environmental (or 
social) harm takes place abroad, the citizens of the importing state still experience a 
loss of utility when they know that their imports contribute to something that they view 
as a harm in a territory far away and therefore disapprove. 
The grounds of justification listed in Article 36 of the TFEU include public morality 
and policy. The concepts of public policy and morality are fairly abstract and vague. 
This would at least leave the door open for the argument that out-of-state environmental 
effects may fall within the scope of public policy or morals as legitimate objectives.  
Some ECJ case law offers a picture of what are considered moral concerns. The ECJ 
has accepted that limitations on the import of pornographic materials are justifiable on 
moral grounds, and that Member States have a wide discretion in defining their moral 
policy.1403  In Omega Spielhallen, the ECJ in turn stated that games simulating acts of 
homicide could be banned on moral grounds and referred to general principles of EU 
law stemming from internationally recognized human rights.1404  Internationally 
recognized principles were also referred to in Dynamic Medien, where the Court found 
that the protection of young children may justify limitations on the distribution of 
videos and images.1405  In contrast, the protection against the harmful effects of 
gambling are more difficult to link directly to any international treaty or principle. Yet, 
the ECJ has in several cases confirmed that limitations on gambling may also be 
                                                 
1402 Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’, 
in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade? (OUP 2000) 144; Christiane R. Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law 
– Interfacing trade and social goals (CUP 2011) 316-344. 
1403 Case 34/79 Regina v. Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby [1979] ECR 3797, 
paras 15–16. See also J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, in J. 
H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade 
(2000) 164. 
1404 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9641, paras 34–35. 
1405 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-533, paras 39–
44. 
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implemented on public policy and moral grounds.1406 I shall return to the question of 
the relevance of principles and views in the international community below in the 
discussion on WTO law. 
Some have argued that the moral concerns of people in the states adopting PPM-criteria 
could form a valid ground of justification.1407 The environmental harm may take place 
fully out-of-state but the interest of the people in the state adopting the measure would 
relate to their desire not to contribute to what they consider immoral PPMs. By keeping 
a clean conscience, they would avoid the associated utility loss. 
Even if public morality and policy as grounds of justification would cover concerns 
related to environmental harm out-of-state, the measures still need to be proportional. 
One could argue that the purpose of a restriction taken by a government on moral 
grounds is, at least in part, to protect the moral consciousness of its people. From such 
perspective most measures would easily be deemed suitable and necessary for said 
purpose. Yet, such approach has never been adopted in the application of public morals 
as a ground of justification in EU free movement law. Instead, the proportionality of 
the measure has been tested in relation to more concrete objectives such as, for example, 
child protection.1408 In other cases the ECJ has opted not to discuss alternative measures 
in any detail.1409 On the whole, the case law still invites the conclusion that the 
protection of morality as a ground of justification gains force from some underlying 
more concrete concern. 
Cases in EU law where public morality and policy have been applied have mainly 
related to the protection of the psyche of vulnerable people, like for example children 
and addicts. Some goods and services are considered immoral because of how they may 
harm the user at the stage of consumption. The prohibition of the morally corruptive 
                                                 
1406 Case C-65/05 Commission v. Greece [2006] ECR I-10344, paras 31–38; Case C-243/01 Criminal 
Proceedings Against Piergiorgio Gambelli & Others [2003] ECR I-13076, para. 63; Case C-275/92 Her 
Majesty’s Customs & Excise v. Gerhart Schindler & Jörg Schindler [1994] ECR I-1078, paras 60–61. 
1407 Case C-1/96 The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion in 
World Farming Ltd. [1998] ECR I-1251, Opinion of AG Léger, paras 90-91; Gareth Davies, ‘‘Process 
and Production Method’ – based Trade Restrictions in the EU’, in Catherine Barnard (ed.) Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008 (Hart 2008) 75. It should be noted that the World 
Farming case concerned a restriction on exports because of moral concerns in the exporting state. 
Sustainability criteria on energy would constitute restrictions on imports because of moral concerns in 
the importing state. This difference should probably not be decisive in this context. 
1408 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-533, para. 46. 
1409 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9641, para. 39. 
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goods and services may potentially have related to the effect they would have on 
vulnerable individuals in the long-term. The measures could be understood to have 
addressed the societal burden of addiction and mental health problems or how immoral 
actions might affect societal stability. In other words, the state might adopt restrictions 
on the goods or services in order to limit the social costs that would otherwise arise 
from the treatment of people whose psyche would be affected when they would use 
such goods and services themselves. The availability of the public morals exemption 
could in this context be regarded to protect the utility of the people in the state adopting 
the measure, or alternatively the total welfare1410 of the state adopting the measure. 
Transposing the public morality exemption to the context of environmental effects and 
externalities out-of-state gives a different picture. The measure does not address the 
situation of any vulnerable in-state people. Instead, utility loss may occur, for example, 
from knowledge that personal consumption contributes to out-of-state pollution and 
results in a higher total pollution. In other words, there may be a feeling that 
contributing to pollution is morally wrong due to its potential severe effects. 
Tackling the out-of-state effects of out-of-state PPMs with PPM-criteria would not 
serve in-state welfare as there would be no cross-border environmental effect. The 
PPM-criteria may still increase local utility in the regulating state. Could that be 
sufficient? A parallel may here be drawn to a decision to promote local products, which 
tackle utility loss that people with strong nationalist views would be burdened by as a 
consequence of trade with out-of-state actors. Trade law does not welcome these 
measures that merely strive to promote local production even if nationalists may prefer 
local products and the measure thus might increase utility. Approving any other purely 
emotional dimensions could consequently be regarded as incoherent.  
A broad reading of public morals may shake the foundations of free trade. First, it would 
open the possibility to put restrictions on almost any out-of-state PPMs that are different 
from those applied at home. Secondly, it may be practically difficult to separate 
nationalist emotions, which do not constitute the foundation of any valid ground of 
justification, from other emotions that could in turn create a valid moral ground of 
justification. All in all, while the legal text of the TFEU does not set out any specific 
                                                 
1410 This should not be regarded as a prohibited economic objective. Increasing welfare through the 
reduction of social costs is advances efficiency and, unlike for example promoting the creation of local 
jobs, does not have any discriminatory element and does not shift resources from out-of-state to in-state. 
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limits on public morals as a ground of justification,  there are still serious doubts as to 
whether such defence could be applicable to the protection of environmental effects 
out-of-state.  
6.2.4.2. WTO Law, International Recognition and EC – Seals  
Public morality exists as a ground of justification also in WTO Agreements. It is 
explicitly mentioned in Article XX(a) of the GATT. Although there is no explicit 
reference to morals in the TBT Agreement, the panel in EC – Seals stated that the open 
list in Article 2.2 TBT invites parties to rely on public morals as a justification 
ground.1411  
Public morals have been defined as “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained 
by or on behalf of a community or nation.”1412  What would appear uncontroversial is 
that a prima facie prohibited measure may only be justified if it tackles a concern that 
in the state adopting the measure is genuinely regarded as an issue of moral nature.1413 
Yet, the question has been left open as to whose perspective should be adopted in 
deciding what may constitute public morals.1414 Do the grounds of justification cover 
only issues that are internationally regarded as moral questions? The ambiguity with 
respect to the scope of moral grounds of justification is in this respect similar in WTO 
and EU law.  
The question has been raised as to whether some degree of international consensus 
would need to exist for a policy to be considered founded on public morals. Similarly 
to what was the case under EU law, at least limitations on gambling can in principle be 
justified with reference to public morals under GATT according to the AB in US - 
Gambling.1415 Although there are no international treaties on the risks of gambling, the 
panel in that case made reference to the fact that also other countries than the U.S. had 
                                                 
1411 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov. 2013, para. 7.418. 
1412 US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, Panel 
Report, 10 Nov. 2004, para. 6.465. 
1413 EC - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov. 2013, paras 7.383 and 7.392-411. See also EC - Measures Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 22 May 2014, paras 5.177-179. 
1414 Miguel A. Gonzalez, ‘Trade and Morality: Preserving “Public Morals” without Sacrificing the Global 
Economy’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt J. Transnational Law 939, 945; Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception 
in Trade Policy’ (1998) 38 Virginia J. International Law 689, 704; Laura Nielsen, The WTO, Animals 
and PPMs (Brill 2007) 315. 
1415 US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, AB 
Report, 7 April 2005, paras 296–299. The case concerned the application of the GATS. 
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adopted restrictions on gambling with reference to morals and discussions on similar 
restrictions had been held among governments on the international stage.1416 Similarly 
in EC – Seals the panel found that also states not part of the EU have implemented 
restrictions on seal products on moral grounds and that international recommendations 
supported the type of policy choice made by the EU. Thus, the panel concluded that 
animal welfare is linked to ethical considerations for “human beings in general”.1417 
Alongside references to international debate and policies of other countries, panels have 
simultaneously emphasized that states may to some degree define and apply the scope 
of public morals in accordance with their values.1418 In a detailed study on the matter 
Du concluded that in US – Gambling and EC – Seals the state evoking the public moral 
exception had in fact been granted quite a lot of freedom in defining the concept of 
public morals. Granting states with a broad discretion to define moral objectives as a 
defence puts the free trade system at risk of abuse. Du offers as a solution that more 
emphasis is given to international perceptions of public morals.1419 Yet, it is submitted 
here that it is equally important to ensure that the requirements for applying Article 
XX(a) GATT are not set at a level that would in practice deprive the article of its 
relevance. 
In the analysis of the relevance of international consensus with respect to public morals 
it is critical to distinguish between two related but different issues. Namely, the fact 
that something is internationally recognized as a moral question does not necessarily 
mean that it is internationally regarded as immoral. The text of Article XX(a) GATT is 
the result of international negotiations. Thus, the concept of public morals ought to refer 
to what is internationally regarded as moral questions, irrespective of whether it is a 
majority or a (small) minority of states that actually find the targeted product or process 
to be immoral. The objective itself does not need to correspond with any broad 
international consensus on immorality. 
                                                 
1416 US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, Panel 
Report, 10 Nov. 2004, paras 6.471-474. 
1417 EC - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov. 2013, paras 7.408-409 and fn 674. 
1418 US – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, Panel 
Report, 10 Nov. 2004, para. 6.461; EC - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, DS400-401, Panel Report, 25 Nov. 2013, paras 7.380-383. 
1419 Ming Du, ‘Permitting Moral Imperialism? The Public Morals Exception to Free Trade at the Bar of 
the World Trade Organization’ (2016) 50 J. World Trade 675. 
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Nielsen has argued that the morality of at least some PPMs could fall within the scope 
of public morals under GATT.1420 Could measures targeting environmentally 
unsustainable PPMs then be justified on moral grounds? The AB in US – Shrimp made 
references to other international agreements in interpreting GATT,1421 even if this is 
somewhat controversial.1422 Examining agreements in the field of international 
environmental law, it is noted that both the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Rio 
Declaration of 1992 include a commitment by the signatories not to cause 
environmental damage abroad.1423  In case a state imports products that have been 
produced in a manner that is harmful to the environment, the importing state contributes 
to the environmental damage by increasing the demand of the product. Hence, the 
commitment made by states in the declarations could even be read to indicate that there 
actually is not only a right to take restrictive actions on PPMs abroad but also an 
international moral duty.1424  Admittedly, however, the declarations are not legally 
binding. 
The boundaries of public morals as a ground for justification have been extended the 
furthest in WTO law through a recent decision in EC – Seals case. The case concerned 
an EU ban on the sale and import of seal products due to evidence that many are killed 
in an inhumane manner.1425  Only limited exceptions covering, for example, seal 
products sold by Greenlandic Inuits, were granted.1426  The panel seemed to 
acknowledge the links between health, environment and morals as it concluded that 
animal welfare could in principle be protected on moral grounds. The panel decision 
could be read to imply that the legitimate ground of protection was seal welfare and the 
                                                 
1420 Laura Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs (Brill 2007) 316. 
1421 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 130-132. 
1422 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
(CUP 2013) 57-58. 
1423 Principle 2, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.1) (Aug. 12, 1992); Principle 21, U.N. Conference 
on the Human Environment, Declaration of the U.N. Conference on Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 5 (1972). 
1424 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 296 (n.247); Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 
107 (n.39). 
1425 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov. 2013, paras 7.1, 7.4. 
1426 E.g., id. The exemptions complicate the analysis of whether the law actually represented a PPM rule 
since the ban was in part linked to the identity of the hunter and the type of the hunt. See EC – Measures 
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 22 May 2014, para. 
5.67. This aspect is, however, not crucial for the analysis here. 
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moral implications (i.e. utility loss) thereof for EU citizens.1427  The Appellate Body 
appeared to approve this interpretation, but added that it had no intention to rule on the 
territorial scope of the grounds of justification.1428  Hence, the legitimate objective 
cannot be interpreted to have been the protection of animal health out-of-state. 
By linking animal welfare to morality, the panel and the Appellate Body established a 
broad interpretation of public morals that extended the ground of justification beyond 
the protection of vulnerable people and the negative effects they may inflict on 
themselves through the consumption of goods or services that are considered morally 
questionable. The unwillingness to rule on the territorial scope of the grounds of 
justification and the subsequent proportionality analysis also reveal a broadening of the 
public morals exception in another dimension. To begin with, seals were not deemed 
migratory nor did the AB refer to any benefits for global biodiversity resulting from 
seal protection. The focus was instead on the moral feelings of EU citizens. With a ban 
on seal imports, the utility of EU citizens was presumed to increase because they would 
no longer participate through consumption in the inhumane killing of seals and the total 
number of inhumanely killed seals would globally drop.1429  Much analysis was 
devoted to verifying that the number of seals killed inhumanely could be presumed to 
fall as a result of the ban.1430  
By extending the interpretation of public morals the panel and the Appellate Body 
invited states to tackle also loss of utility among its population that would otherwise 
result from the state’s contribution to the immoral PPMs. The protection of public 
morals and the protection of the animal’s health, and thus the environment, out-of-state 
become so intertwined in EC – Seals that morals as a ground of justification in practice 
extends to the protection of purely extraterritorial health and environment, which was 
portrayed as partly problematic previously in this chapter. In any case, the most 
significant steps toward accepting moral concerns as the ground for regulating 
extraterritorial effects seemed to have been taken in WTO law. 
                                                 
1427 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, Panel 
Report, 25 Nov. 2013, paras 7.409-410, 7.637-638. 
1428 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014, para. 5.173. 
1429 Id. paras 5.198, 5.222–226. 
1430 Id. paras 5.234–254. 
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On a further note relating to EC - Seals, even if public morals were legitimate and 
applicable grounds of justification, the Appellate Body in the end concluded that the 
ban was in breach of the GATT due to the arbitrary discriminatory nature of the design 
of the law, in particular when taking into account the exemptions that had been awarded 
to, for example, Inuit communities.1431  This highlights the importance of the details of 
any state measure in ensuring compatibility with trade law. 
To what extent could the reasoning in EC – Seals then be transposed to cases on PPM-
criteria in the energy sector? In principle, a state could argue that by tackling the 
unsustainability of out-of-state PPMs it protects the moral feelings of its citizens. A ban 
or restriction on immoral PPMs would still need to survive the proportionality review. 
In its proportionality review, the Appellate Body in EC – Seals considered 
sustainability certification for humane hunts as a potential alternative to the ban but 
concluded that certification in this particular case could not achieve the same 
objective.1432  Certification for humane seals hunts was deemed difficult to enforce and 
could result in more hunts, more kills and more inhumane kills. The reason for this can 
essentially be understood to relate to the view that no hunting method guarantees 
humane kills of the seals.1433 In trying to get kills certified as humane the hunters would 
need to hunt and kill more. 
Energy is different from seal hunts in that the sustainability of the PPM is easier to 
control. Admittedly, PPM-labelling with respect to electricity presents its own 
challenges as power fed into the grid and transmitted through transmission lines cannot 
be segregated and individually labelled. Instead, the labelling system would need to be 
linked to supply contracts, which gives rise to its own technical complexities.1434 As a 
practical matter, electricity trade between WTO parties is still quite limited and cases 
on cross-border electricity trade are unlikely to become common any time soon. 
In contrast to electricity, fuel could be labelled with respect to the sustainability of the 
PPM without too much difficulty with respect to verification. The case of fuel would 
also be decisively different from seal hunts with respect to producer control over 
                                                 
1431 Id. paras 5.338–339. 
1432 Id. paras 5.270–279. 
1433 Id. para. 5.278. 
1434 This is why it has become more common to issue tradable RECs to plants generating electricity with 
sustainable PPMs and establish a quota that must be fulfilled with either sustainably generated power or 
RECs. 
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sustainability. Would labelling then guarantee an equal level of protection as for 
example a ban on the unsustainable PPMs? As discussed previously in this book,1435 
whether or not labelling guarantees an equal level of protection in terms of 
environmental protection depends on the intensity of the necessity (least restrictive 
measure) test. Under a deferential review a level of deference would be maintained with 
respect to the state measures under scrutiny and the measures would thus often be 
upheld. Under this approach it could be concluded that with the implementation of 
merely a labelling scheme there would still be some unsustainably produced products 
on the market. The labelling scheme would consequently not constitute an alternative 
that guarantees an equal level of protection. Under an intense review of the adopted ban 
it could in turn be concluded that the alternative measure in the form of a labelling 
scheme practically guarantees an equal level of protection. A full ban would therefore 
be disproportional.  
It has been submitted in this book that the intense review could be problematic.1436 It 
should in the context of regulation on environmental protection be noted that relying 
on a labelling scheme allows for some free riding. The state may have as its objective 
to address externalities to a greater extent than the population is voluntarily prepared to 
do. These aspects would generally justify the state’s decision to adopt measures that 
are firmer than labelling schemes. Might the situation be different when the legitimate 
objective is the protection of public morals and the concern would not be related to 
environmental externalities from free-riding? 
The arguments against an intense review in the context of labelling alternatives are 
perhaps less forceful when the applicable ground of justification relates to moral 
consciousness and loss of utility due to the immoral behavior of others. Consumers in 
the importing state can already with the help of labelling distance themselves from 
contributing to what they perceive as immoral. For example, even if moral concerns 
may arise with respect to fuels from polluting PPMs, states could instead of introducing 
import restrictions allow individual consumers to rely on labelling information and 
make the decision to buy or not to buy certain forms of fuels on the basis of their 
individual moral beliefs. This would allow consumers to terminate their personal 
contribution to what they feel to be immoral and to some degree cause a reduction in 
                                                 
1435 See sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.5. 
1436 Ibid. 
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the morally questionable activity worldwide. The role of the state would be narrowed 
down to ensuring that the information on the PPMs of imports is provided on the 
market.  
In sum, the proportionality review of state measures adopted with a moral purpose 
might be strict and intense when the proposed alternative measure is labelling because 
labelling could often deal with many of the moral concerns equally well.  
The difficulties to establish a reliable certification scheme for sustainable seal hunting 
would mean that consumers would not be able to distinguish between sustainable and 
unsustainable products and make informed decisions. The state would possess a 
stronger argument for banning all products under such circumstances than with respect 
to markets where certification is available. On markets where labelling is possible a full 
ban could be argued to constitute a form of moral policing of in-state buyers and moral 
imperialism toward other states. 
The above discussion on labelling schemes as an equally effective alternative to protect 
public morals relied on the presumption that the objective would be to eliminate the 
loss of utility of a consumer that would arise from the knowledge that he himself or she 
herself might unwillingly through purchases contribute to unsustainable and immoral 
PPMs. However, if this is what in EC – Seals was regarded as the moral objective, the 
AB could have stated that the moral choice can be left to the consumers regardless of 
whether labelling is available. Namely, seal products are not basic necessities and a 
product is a seal product is generally easily detectable. Consumers could thus keep a 
clean consciousness and avoid loss of utility simply by refraining from buying any seal 
products. This would without further analysis have led to the conclusion that a full ban 
would have been disproportional. The fact that the AB did not go down this path 
suggests that the protection of public morals and utility was viewed differently by the 
AB. 
PPM-regulations adopted on moral grounds could have broader objectives than 
eliminating the loss of utility in cases where consumers unknowingly and unwillingly 
contribute to the unsustainable and immoral PPMs. The objective might be to stop the 
loss of utility that would otherwise arise among some of its citizens from the knowledge 
that immorally produced goods are imported to and consumed in their territory. The 
AB in EC – Seals might have reasoned along those lines. This would mean that the 
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importing state can adopt PPM-criteria to address utility loss of some of its citizens 
even when the measure undoubtedly reduces the utility of other citizens. The utility of 
those in favor of the ban would increase, while it would decrease among those that 
would want to buy the products for the reason that they do not view them unsustainable 
or immoral.  
Comparably, in more traditional cases on the application of public morals as a ground 
of justification states have justified restrictions on the behavior of all consumers in 
order to protect the physical health of the population generally. Yet, such cases can be 
linked to the protection against negative social externalities that burden all citizens 
indirectly. It is perhaps more controversial for the state to justify restrictions on the 
behavior of all consumers with the objective to deal with the feelings and utility of only 
some of its citizens. 
In sum, EC – Seals would give reason to believe that public morals could be relied on 
as a ground of justification in adopting at least some environmental PPM-criteria. 
Namely, the case would invite the controversial argument that the protection of feelings 
and the loss of utility forms a legitimate objective under Article XX GATT. The 
consequences of this are partly restricted by the proportionality review. While it was 
concluded in EC – Seals that the alternative of adopting a certification and labelling 
scheme was not available, it likely had to do with the particularities of seal hunts.  
In cases on PPM-criteria other than seal hunts, sustainability labelling will likely often 
be a reasonably available alternative. The intensity of the proportionality review, in 
particular with respect to the alternative of relying on consumer labelling to address 
moral concerns, is difficult to predict. An intense or strict test could significantly restrict 
the possibility to tackle purely out-of-state environmental effects with other PPM-
regulations than consumer information labelling schemes. It was noted, however, that 
public morals as a ground of justification might well refer to the protection of not 
individual morality, but state defined morality. Even available and effective labelling 
might thus often not form an alternative measure that would render a ban 
disproportional. In other words, the proportionality review might be no more intense 
than otherwise, even when the justification relies on moral arguments. It is submitted 
that while this may in light of legal texts and case law form a well reasoned legal 
argument, it is still receptible of criticism, as it would allow states broad discretion at 
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the expense of both free trade and those of its own residents who disagree with the state 
moral policy. 
6.2.4.3. Public Morals as a Rare Argument in Dormant Commerce Clause Cases 
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, public morality has rarely been discussed as a 
legitimate objective. For example, in 2014 a case was filed relating to the 
constitutionality of a California regulation1437 that prohibited selling eggs from hens 
that were kept in cages below a minimum size. The minimum size for cages in 
California was larger than the federal standard.1438  Among other things, the complaint 
argued that the law breached the dormant Commerce Clause.1439   
The emphasis in the arguments defending California’s regulation was mostly on the 
potential reduction of salmonella risks stemming from the well-being of the hens and 
the contribution that would have for local public health in California.1440  However, 
some NGOs claimed in their amici curiae that protection against animal cruelty is a 
valid local objective as it links to both health and morality.1441  This argument could 
gain support from the view that the U.S. Constitution is regarded as leaving questions 
of morality largely to the states.1442  However, the case seems to have hit a dead end 
due to the lack of standing of the plaintiffs.1443 Hence, there is still much uncertainty 
around the question of whether morality would be accepted as a ground of justification 
as there are no strong precedents on pure moral concerns as legitimate local objectives 
under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
6.2.5. Global Fairness and the Relevance of Regional Integration 
The grounds of justification in trade law leave a sphere of sovereignty for regulating 
states to tackle, among other things, environmental harm despite potential 
discriminatory effects of the measure. States may rely on grounds of justification to 
defend new strict environmental criteria. It should, however, be acknowledged that 
developed countries have gained an edge on the global market by emitting GHGs, 
                                                 
1437 California Code of Regulations, title 3, § 1350 (2013). 
1438 Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1062 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
1439 Complaint 8, Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN). 
1440 Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
1441 See e.g. Brief for Animal Legal Defense, Fund, Compassion Over Killing, Inc. & Farm Sanctuary, 
Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (No. 2:14-cv-
00341-KJM-KJN). 
1442 Robert J. Pushaw Jr., ‘The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?’ 
(2005) 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 879, 886–887.  
1443 Missouri v. Harris, case no. 14-17111 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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depleting their forests, polluting nature and reducing biodiversity for decades. 
Developed countries might further cement their position by incorporating PPM-criteria 
that they apply also to imports. Companies in developing countries will face economic 
pressure to comply with the criteria. This brings to the fore questions of global fairness 
or social justice. 
In developing states, there is in the name of global fairness an interest among both 
businesses and the government to push against the economic dominance of developed 
states that have gained an advantage by utilizing unsustainable PPMs in the past. The 
need for protecting global fairness is not as obvious within the EU and the U.S. as in 
the context of WTO law. In other words, global fairness would need to be reconciled 
primarily in the application of WTO law. 
The vulnerable status of developing countries is recognized in the WTO agreements 
through, for example, exemptions for developing countries.1444 In the WTO developed 
countries are also under the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement expected to take 
positive efforts to ensure that developing countries get a share in the growth in 
international trade.1445 This is in order to ensure a fair balance of rights. The WTO in 
other words would appear to recognize global fairness as a value. 
The broad interpretation of public morals in EC – Seals invites states to adopt PPM-
criteria that target out-of-state harm to animals. The same might apply to the protection 
against harm on out-of-state humans and the out-of-state environment more broadly. 
On the one hand, the broad interpretation of public morals under GATT could be 
explained by the fact that the WTO is such a large heterogeneous community of states 
that flexibility with regards to moral conceptions must be maintained. On the other 
hand, the possibility to justify prima facie prohibited measures with reference to moral 
concerns relating to the environmental effects of PPMs out-of-state invites some eco-
imperialism that may be particularly harmful on the global arena due to the whole 
history of imperialism as practiced by current western developed states, together with 
the fact that their environmentally harmful actions throughout history has laid the 
foundations for the global economic divide.  
                                                 
1444 See e.g. GATT part IV and Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement.  
1445 Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO (1994). 
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There is a tension between the respect of heterogeneous morals in a large international 
organization and the risks of eco-imperialism. Consequently, the values will have to be 
reconciled. These values may be relevant in cases on environmental PPM-criteria even 
if they do not fall under the objectives of non-discrimination (free trade) and the 
elimination of environmental externalities. 
The reasoning in EC – Seals is striking from the perspective of global fairness. It would 
appear that even in WTO law there is not significant emphasis on global fairness. The 
value would still reinforce the argument that the proportionality review of state 
measures should be intense when labelling constitutes a realistic option for tackling 
moral concerns. If so, state measures would often be struck down when the labelling 
alternative is available. One should also keep in mind the political reality and the fact 
that an interpretation of the WTO agreements too open to eco-imperialism may estrange 
developing countries from the organization. 
Concerns related to global fairness should not be significant in more homogenous 
unions such as the EU and the U.S. Therefore, in the context of EU and U.S. law it 
would appear less controversial to conclude that no extraterritoriality test in law of 
justification should apply and that states thus may target out-of-state effects with PPM-
criteria. The consequences of regional integration in the EU and the U.S. for 
extraterritoriality is, however, not straight-forward. 
The United States and the EU have created not only a free trade regime but also an area 
of free movement of persons. Citizens of each state may move easily in the common 
territory of the union. The emergence of a close union or even federal state could create 
a heightened interest for the people of one state in the (environmental) policies of other 
states within the union. Yet, they lack political representation in other states. 
Representation through union or federal institutions may only partially compensate. 
These observations on the functions of unions and federal states could provide at least 
some argument for why globalism – defined by Farber as the acceptance of pure foreign 
out-of-state environmental protection as a legitimate objective1446 – could get an even 
stronger foothold in trade law of closer unions like the EU and the United States.  
                                                 
1446 Daniel A. Farber, ‘Stretching the Margins: The Geographical Nexus in Environmental Law’ (1996) 
48 Stanford L. Rev. 1247, 1272. 
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In a close union with free movement of persons, the interest of citizens and residents of 
one state in the environmentally detrimental policies of other states will be heightened. 
At the same time, it should be noted that it is far from obvious that PPM-criteria with 
an extraterritorial dimension should be easier to justify in a closer free trade union. 
Namely, in a close union the expectations of loyalty and mutual trust will be higher. An 
argument for the rejection of extraterritorial protection objectives as valid grounds of 
justifications would be that in a close union states should show respect toward the 
sovereign decisions of other states within the union. In other words, dealing with out-
of-state environmental and social problems should be left to out-of-state legislation. In 
sum, examining how close of a union the free trade area does not provide one-
directional arguments for how to approach extraterritoriality. 
The position on extraterritoriality in law of justification may be read as strengthening 
either mutual trust and loyalty between the states or the idea of a common union 
territory. It must be emphasized that there is still much uncertainty with respect to 
which path the EU and the U.S. will take. Some initial observations and thoughts may 
still be offered here. 
The language used by U.S. courts in the application of the Pike balancing test would 
suggest that it is only local in-state environmental benefits that may constitute a 
legitimate objective in law of justification. Furthermore, the extraterritoriality test in 
law of prohibition reflects scepticism directed against extraterritorial measures in the 
U.S. This approach by the Supreme Court makes it likely that it would apply an 
extraterritoriality test also in law of justification. In other words, states will struggle to 
justify discriminatory measures that merely target environmental effects out-of-state.  
If an extraterritoriality test applies also in law of justification, it would suggest that the 
U.S. system puts significant emphasis on loyalty and mutual trust between states. This 
union value of loyalty would weigh more heavily than the union value that stems from 
the interest residents moving freely across state borders have in the environment of 
other states. Indeed, in outlining the reasons for the prohibition of extraterritorial 
regulation under law of prohibition, courts have referred to national solidarity and 
structural federalism.1447 
                                                 
1447 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); American Fuel & Petrochemical 
Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 5665232, at *9 (D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015). 
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Moreover, it may be recalled that the protection of public morals has rarely been 
discussed as a legitimate objective in the context the dormant Commerce Clause. An 
explanation could be that the federal system of the United States creates a union that, 
at least in theory, should rely on common fundamental values. There may exist a 
presumption that federal or union legislation will not allow immoral activities. As a 
consequence, states would have no independent morals to protect. Strong forms of 
unionism, like U.S. federalism, might thus weaken morality arguments and also that 
way strengthen the arguments for an extraterritoriality test in law of justifications. 
Are there then similar reasons to believe that also in the EU, a close union, an 
extraterritoriality test might be applied in law of justification? The ECJ has not adopted 
any final position. However, it shall be illustrated below, in a section on 
extraterritoriality and public procurement, that EU law might be going down a different 
path.1448 If that indeed is the case, it would imply that EU free movement law advances 
the idea of a common territory where EU citizens more freely and less emphasis is 
given to loyalty, even if that principle is referred to in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU). 
6.2.6. State Interests and the Reconciliation of Values 
When a state adopts environmental regulation with discriminatory effects two interests 
will collide. On one side there is the interest of the regulating state to protect the 
environment and on the other side there is the interest of the other state in a free market 
without discrimination. This latter interest is also an interest of the free trade area as a 
whole. These same interests are relevant also for cases on PPM-criteria. 
The interest of the regulating state can also be depicted as a sovereign right to protect 
against, for example, the importation of products harmful to public health or the 
environment. When the state adopts PPM-criteria, this takes a slightly different form as 
the sovereign importing state now protects against effects that are not part of the 
physical products that the exporting state is offering. Simultaneously, the exporting 
state where production takes place might oppose the PPM-criteria with reference to its 
sovereign right regulate production within its territory. However, PPM-regulation of 
                                                 
1448 See section 6.3. 
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the importing state generally does not hinder the right of the exporting state to regulate 
production. As Howse and Regan have pointed out, there is no sovereignty conflict.1449 
The discussion on the interests involved in shaping the geographical scope of grounds 
of justification should distinguish between different theories. It should be emphasized 
that the reconciliation of values discussed here is not about proportionality, but simply 
about defining the geographical scope of grounds of justification. 
According to one theory, states could justify discriminatory measures with reference to 
the protection of purely out-of-state environment. It was pointed out that the underlying 
interest would not directly be held by the state adopting the PPM-criteria. Instead, the 
measure would protect the interest of future generations and people in the state of 
production who have not been successful in getting their views on PPM-criteria made 
into law. These interests might not be strong enough to out-weigh the interest of the 
state of production in non-discriminatory trade.  In the context of WTO law, the interest 
of the state of production is further strengthened by the value of global fairness. 
Furthermore, the principle of representation would support the argument that the effects 
and externalities targeted should be those experienced on in-state territory. 
Environmental effects and externalities experienced purely by out-of-state individuals 
would be for them to tackle through the in-state legislative process. 
Another theory on the scope of legitimate objectives put an emphasis on the utility loss 
linked to a feeling of immorality experienced in the importing state adopting the PPM-
criteria. The interest held in the importing state could be the protection of the utility of 
its in-state consumers, which do not want to contribute the unsustainable and immoral 
PPMs. In this case it could be difficult to justify any more restrictive measure than a 
consumer information labelling scheme. However, the regulating state might have an 
interest to advance a broader state-wide moral policy. It might strive to protect its 
population against the feelings of disgust that arises from the knowledge that immorally 
produced goods are imported to and consumed in their territory even if that would mean 
that the utility of the citizens that are not PPM-sensitive would be reduce due to the 
lack of access to the products. While many would likely discard the highly controversial 
                                                 
1449 Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction: An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 249, 274-
275. 
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theory on the protection against utility loss, it has gained some ground in the application 
of GATT and might trump non-discrimination and global fairness. 
A third theory would invite states to adopt PPM-criteria that address only cross-border 
and global environmental effects. The interest of the state adopting the measure would 
be the protection of environmental effects. In other words, the interest would be the 
reduction of in-state environmental externalities. Under one application of this theory 
cross-border environmental harm could be targeted no matter how minimal it is. It is 
not clear whether this interest would be sufficient to override the non-discrimination 
and potential global fairness interests of the state of production. In contrast, when the 
cross-border environmental effects exceed some (yet undefined) de minimis threshold, 
the interests of the regulating state might be more likely to out-weigh the non-
discrimination and potential global fairness interest of the state of production. It must 
be emphasized that this would only mean that there is a legitimate ground of 
justification in the case. Whether or not the measure would be justifiable would still 
depend on the reconciliation values, including the discriminatory effects, under the 
proportionality review. 
A de minimis rule in WTO law would place restraints on what could otherwise be 
perceived as eco-imperialism. At the same time, such test would also to some, albeit 
arguably small, degree limit the potential to address externalities through sovereign 
interests of the importing state. It would represent a compromise. Yet, in case the PPM-
criteria are designed in some way not only to pressure the out-of-state industry to 
change to sustainable PPMs, but also to pressure other governments to adopt stricter 
PPM-criteria in its laws, the measure would likely be more difficult to justify.1450 While 
the measure does not entrench on sovereignty, the objective challenges the idea of 
sovereignty. Striving to get other states to adopt similar criteria, even if only with the 
intent of furthering the interests of its own population, perhaps along the interests of a 
group of PPM-sensitive out-of-state individuals, the state adopting the PPM-criteria to 
both in-state production and imports might tilt the outcome of the out-of-state 
legislative process, which may otherwise have resulted in the optimal level of 
externalities for maximizing utility in that state. 
                                                 
1450 On the difficulty to justify one type of such criteria see section 4.1.3.1 and 4.3.2.2. 
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What would the significance of a de minimis test be for the energy transition? States 
should, under all three jurisdictions, have a right to defend limitations extending also 
to the PPMs of imported energy at least when there are significant cross-border 
environmental effects. This would apply certainly for GHG emissions and in some 
cases also other air pollution. Measures to promote renewable energy at the expense of 
fossil fuels would in other words further a legitimate objective. Thus, while 
extraterritoriality tests could potentially set limits on state competence to impose PPM-
criteria in some sectors, it would still not appear to seriously restrict measures intended 
for promoting renewables. However, arguing for the justifiability of restrictions on 
activities that would primarily affect biodiversity or local soil and water pollution 
would be tougher. Equally, restrictions on imports of energy from nuclear fission would 
also face more hurdles. There is the possibility that the risk of accidents is so low that 
it would fall below the de minimis threshold despite the severity of an accident. In that 
case such measures would be dependent on the strength and relevance of the moral 
argument in trade law. 
Importantly, the discussion on extraterritoriality has revealed that the balancing 
exercise in trade law can no longer be painted as two-dimensional, with only free trade 
pitted against the environment. To phrase if it differently, value reconciliation in the 
application of trade law on environmental regulation is not merely about efficiency 
through non-discrimination and the elimination of environmental externalities. 
6.2.7. Multilateralism, Negotiations and Proportionality 
There has existed much reluctance to accept PPM-criteria as compliant with trade 
law.1451 The most in-depth jurisprudential analysis of the status of PPM-criteria has 
taken place within the framework of WTO law. In its first cases on PPM-criteria that 
were also applied to imports, the panels almost outright rejected the arguments of 
justification. For example, we may recall US – Tuna (Mexico I), which concerned U.S. 
measures to restrict the sales of tuna with dolphin-safe labels, unless the tuna had been 
caught with certain methods determined to be dolphin-safe by the U.S. in its 
regulations. The panel rejected the U.S. PPM-criteria adopted unilaterally by the U.S. 
with the argument that accepting them would pose a threat to GATT as a multilateral 
                                                 
1451 Report of Ambassador Ukawa, Chairman of the Group on Environmental Measures and International 
Trade, 49th Session of the Contracting Parties, GATT (2 Feb. 1994) at 19, 25, 53, 55, and 72-74; Report 
of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WTO, WT/CTE/1 (12 Nov. 1996) 171, 185. 
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framework for trade.1452 Later in US – Tuna (EC) the panel noted that GATT recognizes 
the objectives of sustainable development and environmental protection.1453 However, 
it argued that the unilateral and extraterritorial nature of the PPM-criteria, when 
designed to force other states to change their in-state policies, still undermined the 
multilateralism that the GATT represented and would therefore not be justifiable.1454 
There is in other words a difference between PPM-criteria that target out-of-state 
producers and those that target out-of-state laws, regulations and policy. 
In the 90’s the U.S. had adopted restrictions on market access and sale of shrimp not 
caught with the use of turtle exclusion devices. Thus, a few years after US – Tuna (EC) 
discussed above, an AB would examine the U.S. requirements on the use of devices 
that protect turtles when catching shrimp. The AB in US – Shrimp recognized the 
existence of international agreements on sustainability1455 and rejected any categorical 
prohibition of PPM-criteria on imports by concluding that states should try to avoid 
unilateral PPM-criteria.1456 They are in other words not prohibited per se.1457 The AB 
still noted that their unilateral and extraterritorial nature created tensions with the 
multilateral trade framework.1458 
It is today clear that state measures to promote sustainable PPMs may be justifiable 
despite containing discriminatory elements. Yet, even in cases where a valid ground of 
justification is determined to exist, the adoption of PPM-criteria that apply both for in-
state production and imports will still create some economic pressure on out-of-state 
producers to comply with the criteria. PPM-criteria that apply also to imports might 
                                                 
1452 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21, Panel Report, 3 Sept. 1991 (US – Tuna, Mexico I) 
(unadopted), para. 5.25-27. In its interpretation of Article XX GATT the panel also relies on the history 
of negotiating the agreement. 
1453 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29, Panel Report, 16 June 1994 (US – Tuna, EC) 
(unadopted), para. 5.42. 
1454 Id. para. 5.26. 
1455 See e.g. Art 39.3(d), UN Sustainable Development, UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro (1992), Agenda 21; Principle 12, U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.1) 
(Aug. 12, 1992). 
1456 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 133, 165-172. 
1457 Paul O’Brien, ‘Unilateral Environmental Measures After WTO Appellate Body’s Shrimp-Turtle 
Decision’, in Edith Brown Weiss and John H. Jackson, Reconciling Environment and Trade 
(Transnational 2001) 468-469; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, 
Panel Report, 15 May 1998, para. 7.61. 
1458 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 161-175. See also US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 115-134. 
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even create strong incentives for exporters to change their behavior. The criteria could 
reinforce the market power of large and wealthy states.1459 Through the implementation 
of PPM-criteria developed states may in practice dictate the policy in exporting 
developing states. In a worst case scenario, the PPM-criteria of developed states would 
even push developing states to over-exploit other PPMs.1460 To some extent the 
concerns relating to the reliance on market power to influence global policy are of 
course true for any standards, not just PPM-criteria. However, PPM-criteria have often 
been viewed as more controversial since a state targets the out-of-state process and not 
the characteristics of the good that the state will consider for importation. 
The state adopting PPM-criteria will likely face criticism based on the fact that the 
measure has extraterritorial scope and shifts power to countries with stricter criteria; 
often those countries that became industrialized earlier and therefore reaped the benefits 
of the lax regulations of that time. Any potential de minimis test for the definition of 
legitimate objectives would only in part address those concerns. Therefore, it is here 
examined whether the proportionality review might include tests that further reconcile 
the interests of the exporting and importing the state, including the environmental 
interests. 
The principle of proportionality has taken different forms in EU free movement law, 
WTO law and under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause. However, tests such as 
rational relationship, suitability, least restrictive measure, consistency with 
international science as well as the balancing of burden and benefits under the Pike test 
have things in common. First, they are suitable for reconciling the objective of non-
discrimination with the objective of reducing externalities. Secondly, each test 
functions as a tool to assess the substantive elements of state measures. The assessment 
of the substantive elements primarily focuses on the discriminatory effects of the 
measures and the level of protection that the measures offer for the environment or 
some other legitimate objective. 
As the discussion in this book has revealed, measures that include PPM-criteria can 
survive proportionality tests that focus on the substantive elements of the measure, such 
as the suitability test, the test of least restrictive measure, the test of consistency with 
                                                 
1459 Unilateral Trade Measures by States – Communication from India, WT/GC/W/123 (1998). 
1460 Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on use of 
PPM- based Trade Measures’ (OCDE/GD(97)137, 1997) 32. 
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international science and the Pike balancing test. For example, measures designed to 
promote renewable energy or certain forms of sustainable biofuels could very well 
survive the different tests part of the proportionality review in respective jurisdiction 
when they do not include de jure discriminatory elements. 
The question then arises whether there might exist some further tests under the 
proportionality review? In this context it can be noted that while the preamble of the 
Marrakesh Agreement requires positive efforts to ensure developing countries and the 
least developed countries get a share in the growth of international trade,1461 no panel 
or AB has so far gone as far as to require that strict PPM-criteria or other environmental 
criteria should be accompanied with technology transfer1462 to less developed countries 
in order to facilitate the process in those countries to build a sustainable industry that 
could compete under the new conditions of the international market. 
An attempt has been made to incorporate mitigation of extraterritoriality into 
proportionality in WTO law. In particular, US – Shrimp, which concerned U.S. 
legislation on the use of turtle exclusion devices when catching shrimp, sparked debate 
on whether a state, before adopting a measure, would need to carry out some form of 
negotiation process with other states. In other words, could a procedural dimension be 
read into the proportionality review? The process of negotations could potentially ease 
the tension between states eager to adopt PPM-criteria and the states where the 
production takes place. 
Before enacting its law on sustainable methods for catching shrimp, the U.S. had 
negotiated with some countries on how they should modify their policies in order to 
maintain access to the U.S. market. These negotiations included deals on phase-in 
periods and technology transfer. The fact that similar negotiations were not initiated for 
all exporting states was clearly contrary to the rationale of GATT Article I, which 
requires that states do not award more favorable treatment to any state as compared to 
any other state. The AB in US – Shrimp concluded that not having engaged in 
negotiations with some states constituted unjustifiable discrimination under Article XX 
                                                 
1461 Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO (1994). 
1462 With respect to the U.S. law on the use of turtle exclusion devices technology transfer was offered 
to some state. The AB, however, stated that it formed arbitrary discrimination to only offer the 
technology transfer to some states. See US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
DS58, AB Report, 12. Oct. 1998, para. 175. 
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GATT.1463 The U.S. had an obligation to negotiate equally with all states since it was a 
reasonable alternative that would have eliminated the de jure discriminatory elements 
of the legislative process. The AB thus interpreted the proportionality tests under 
Article XX GATT to include both substantive and procedural requirements.1464 Here it 
must be emphasized that the obligation to negotiate equally with each state should not 
be interpreted too strictly. Namely, the fear of breaching such requirement could 
discourage states from entering into negotiations with any states to begin with. 
The obligation to negotiate equally is obviously quite a different thing than an 
obligation to negotiate with anyone in the first place. The AB in US – Shrimp did not 
explicitly state that the proportionality review would reach so far as to require 
negotiations when the state would prefer to not to initiate them with any state. Instead, 
it pointed out that the chapeau of Article XX GATT required an overall assessment and 
that the difference in negotiation engagement formed one element of unjustifiable 
discrimination.1465 Later in the compliance proceedings of the same case, when the U.S. 
had eliminated other arbitrary and unjustifiable elements of the law, the AB added that 
states are not required to conclude agreements with all parties but must negotiate in 
good faith.1466 Yet, no clarification was made with regards to the distinction between 
the case of unequal negotiation in US – Shrimp and the hypothetical case where neither 
bilateral nor multilateral negotiations have taken place with any states.1467  
There was some ambiguity after US – Shrimp as to whether there existed only an 
obligation to negotiate equally with all states when negotiations are initiated or if there 
was a stricter obligation to always negotiate before adopting PPM-criteria.1468 
Negotiation and cooperation could potentially develop into principles of proportionality 
under the chapeau of Article XX GATT. For example, in the literature it has been 
                                                 
1463 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 166-172; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 122-130. 
1464 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
para. 160. See also EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-
401, AB Report, 22 May 2014, para. 5.304. 
1465 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct. 1998, 
paras 172, 176. 
1466 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, paras 122-123, 131-132. 
1467 Robert Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy (Cameron May 2007) 172-173; US 
– Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Malaysia, DS58, AB Report, 22 Oct. 2001, para. 122. 
1468 See Christiane R. Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law – Interfacing trade 
and social goals (CUP 2011) 362-363. 
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suggested that the legislative process for drafting EU sustainability criteria for biofuels 
did not sufficiently allow for input from exporting non-EU states and may therefore not 
be aligned with the principles of WTO law.1469 This position would imply that a strict 
obligation to negotiate should be applied. An argument could be made for such 
approach also under EU free movement law. A strict negotiation obligation could 
perhaps be derived from the principle of loyalty as expressed in Article 4(3) TEU.1470 
Member States would under such view have an obligation to at least make an effort to 
agree on PPM-criteria on EU level.1471 For example, with respect to nuclear safety EU 
Member States have already agreed on some necessary measures.1472  
The argument that there should exist a strict negotiation obligation under GATT might 
have gained support from US – Gasoline. It was an earlier case that concerned a U.S. 
law on fuel quality. Different parties, such as refiners and importers, had to provide fuel 
of quality that did not fall short of their assigned benchmark. For domestic parties this 
benchmark was linked to their individual historical quality if data was available. The 
AB condemned the U.S. for not granting importers the same variety of options of using 
historical individual data for determining the benchmark that applied to them. While 
the law was arbitrarily discriminatory because of that de jure discriminatory element, it 
is worthy of note that the AB also pointed out that the U.S. should have tried to secure 
access to historical data not only from foreign refiners but also through cooperation 
with foreign governments.1473 This reflected an expectation of cooperation. 
A far-reaching interpretation of the negotiation obligation might create more problems 
than it would solve.1474 It is difficult to determine when a state has genuinely negotiated 
or negotiated to a sufficient degree. Even with a legal obligation to negotiate states 
could claim they made an effort but failed to reach any common ground. When states 
                                                 
1469 Fredrik Erixon, ‘Biofuels Reform in the European Union: Why New ILUC Rules Will Reinforce the 
WTO Inconsistency of EU Biofuels Policy’ (2013) ECIPE Occasional Paper (issue 3) 14-15. 
1470 Jochem Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and the WTO – A Legal Analysis (Europa Law 
2003) 358-359. 
1471 Harmonization of PPM-criteria would solve much of the problem. See Harri Kalimo, E-Cycling – 
Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. (Transnational 2006) 276. 
1472 Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the 
nuclear safety of nuclear installations, OJ L 172, 2.7.2009, 18. The directive was amended by Council 
Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a 
Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, OJ L 219, 25.7.2014, 42. 
1473 US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, DS2, AB Report, 29 April 1996, p. 
27-28. 
1474 See Laurens Ankersmit, Green Trade and Fair Trade in and with the EU: Process-Based Measures 
within the EU Legal Order (CUP 2017) 162-193. 
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explore the option to reach agreement on stricter PPM-criteria there will be a significant 
risk that neighboring states oppose. The effectiveness of a strict negotiation obligation 
is thus questionable. This is even more so in situations where a state originally has 
neglected it and only initiates them after a legal dispute.1475  
The dispute on requirements for dolphin-safe labelling in the U.S. with respect to the 
methods of fishing tuna got a further sequel in US – Tuna (Mexico II) after the U.S. 
once again had made some amendments to its laws. In compliance proceedings the AB 
in 2015 did not make any reference to an obligation to negotiate when it considered the 
proportionality of the amended measure.1476 In fact, in further compliance proceedings 
in the same case a panel analyzing the application of Article 2.1 TBT to the case even 
stated in 2017 that there is no separate or distinct obligation related to the process of 
adopting a measure, although the adoption process might give indications of whether 
the measure is even-handed.1477 This appears to support the view that no strict 
negotiation obligation shall apply in WTO law.  
The scope of measures that can have an influence on PPMs utilized in other states is 
still somewhat limited. Aside from combined restrictions on in-state production and 
imports of unsustainably produced products, states could bilaterally or multilaterally 
negotiate PPM-criteria. Negotiations offer other states a voice in matters that also 
directly concern them and can help to prevent deep conflicts. Naturally, negotiating 
would not as such provide the same level of protection against environmental harm and 
the state would be free to adopt its own criteria even if negotiations fail. However, an 
effort to negotiate could help to reconcile views and on a political level mitigate the 
negative effects of extraterritoriality. For example, negotiations could lead to deals on 
strict PPM-criteria and technological transfer offered to less developed states. Such 
solutions would serve both the interests of reducing externalities and global fairness. 
                                                 
1475 For some critical remarks see also Paul O’Brien, ‘Unilateral Environmental Measures After WTO 
Appellate Body’s Shrimp-Turtle Decision’, in Edith Brown Weiss and John H. Jackson, Reconciling 
Environment and Trade (Transnational 2001) 465-466. 
1476 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, AB Report, 20 Nov. 2015. 
1477 US –  Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – 
Tuna, Mexico II): Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States and second recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, DS381, Panel Report, 26 Oct. 2017, para. 7.105. 
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Negotiations provide a form of political benefit.1478 While a strict negotiation obligation 
should not be read into the proportionality principle, the recognition of the value of 
negotiation is still of value. The emphasis put on negotiation in panel and AB decisions 
underlines the political expectations and even puts some pressure on states to discuss 
and make a genuine effort to reach mutually beneficial solutions. Of course, an 
environmental threat might be immediate, whereas negotiations may take time.1479 It 
has therefore been suggested that the level and intensity of negotiations should be 
proportional to the trade effects.1480 It is submitted here that the level and intensity of 
the negotiations should be proportional to the environmental harm. 
6.2.8. Renegotiating Trade Law Provisions? 
Trade law regimes offer tests to reconcile free trade or non-discrimination on the one 
hand and legitimate objectives such as environmental protection on the other hand. This 
value reconciliation may be seen as following an efficiency rationale. In this second 
section of the chapter it was illustrated how determining the geographical scope of 
grounds of justification necessitates the reconciliation of also values that are not directly 
linked to non-discrimination or the elimination of externalities of the regulating states. 
In particular, it was highlighted how a broad geographical scope may create risks of 
eco-imperialism and that limitations on the scope promotes the value of global fairness. 
The interest of one state to tackle the environmental or even moral harm experienced 
by its population will clash on a fundamental level with the interest of other states to 
reap the benefits of free trade, catch up in development contra more developed states 
and to develop through its national legislative procedures its own policies on 
sustainable production methods free from out-of-state economic pressure and in line 
with the environmental preferences its own population. It is difficult to find legal tests 
that would reconcile these interests of sovereign states and would deal with 
extraterritoriality objections in a fully satisfactory manner.  
                                                 
1478 Rafael Leal-Arcas and Andrew Filis, ‘Legal Aspects of the Promotion of Renewable Energy within 
the EU and in Relation to the EU’s Obligation in the WTO’ (2014) 5 Renewable Energy Law and Policy 
Rev. 3, 24-25. 
1479 Hannah Gillelan, ‘Considering the Biology of Sea Turtles in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process’, 
in Edith Brown Weiss and John H. Jackson, Reconciling Environment and Trade (Transnational 2001) 
491-492. 
1480 Lewis Briggs, ‘Conserving “Exhaustible Natural Resources”: The Role of Precedent in the GATT 
Article XX(g)’, in Edith Brown Weiss and John H. Jackson, Reconciling Environment and Trade 
(Transnational 2001) 290. 
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Taking all relevant values into acocunt, it was in this section submitted that current 
trade law provisions could potentially be interpreted to invite states to justify measures 
that target environmental effects above some de minimis threshold. Unfortunately, 
there would exist much uncertainty as to how high that threshold ought to be. 
Establishing such threshold would be a task more suitable for state representatives 
during negotiations than for courts. What is more, the potential of such de minimis test 
will be put into question in the third and final section of this chapter. 
Due to the difficulties of deriving proper tests on extraterritoriality from current law, it 
would seem important that this aspect would be included in future negotiations on free 
trade provisions, be that under the WTO, in union or federal primary law, or in bilateral 
free trade agreements.1481 Admittedly, such negotiations will not be politically easy. 
6.3. Extraterritoriality and Public Procurement 
6.3.1. The Objectives of Public Procurement Law  
In previous sections of this chapter it was portrayed how the tests of extraterritoriality 
may affect the reconciliation of trade and environment in trade law. It was concluded 
that measures tackling global environmental effects and other effects that have a more 
than minimal cross-border impact can be justifiable. In contrast, measures aimed at 
purely out-of-state environmental effects can likely not be justifiable on environmental 
grounds.  Instead, such measures could potentially rely on the protection of public 
morals as a ground of justification. However, even if the moral argument would be 
accepted for PPM-criteria, measures may struggle to survive the proportionality review. 
In this third section the observations on the geographical scope of legitimate objectives 
will be re-examined in the context of public procurement decisions. 
Public procurement law defines the rules on purchases of public authorities. The GATT 
does not apply to procurement. Instead, the EU, the U.S. and a number of other states 
have entered into a plurilateral international agreement called the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA).1482  Up until today decisions on the GPA by panels or 
appellate bodies have been very scarce in general, not to mention disputes on PPM-
                                                 
1481 Similarly see Sanford E Gaines, ‘Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy 
for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia J. Environmental L. 383, 408-
409. 
1482 See section 4.2.2.2. 
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criteria. 1483 The lack of cases could be interpreted to indicate that current regimes of 
sustainable public procurement generally comply with the agreement.1484 That is, 
however, not necessarily true. The WTO litigation system is expensive and the process 
normally takes several years. This has discouraged countries to initiate proceeding 
generally in international trade law. In the context of public procurement, the problem 
might be even more severe than in trade law. Namely, the public procurement process 
often constitutes a single isolated measure. An international dispute resulting in a 
decision that the procurement design infringed the GPA often leaves the winning party 
with no effective remedy as the contract has already been fulfilled. Therefore, an 
interest to initiate proceedings will mainly exist when some country or some authority 
has implemented a consistent practice that breaches the GPA.  
Furthermore, the EU has developed its own procurement law under the realms of the 
GPA. Public procurement in the EU is governed by procurement directives but also by 
the free movement law provisions of the TFEU.1485 In turn, the U.S. has no federal 
procurement laws applicable to state-level procurement.1486 Moreover, it is unclear to 
what extent the dormant Commerce Clause is applicable to public procurement state 
laws and decisions.1487 The focus of this section is thus on public procurement under 
the GPA and under EU procurement directives. 
The objective of public procurement rules on a national level has been to minimize the 
risk of corruption and to ensure that authorities adhere to the principle of best value for 
money. The purpose is in other words to guard the interests of taxpayers who both 
finance and benefit from public purchases. This aim should not be neglected in the 
development of procurement regimes on an international level.1488 That being said, a 
                                                 
1483 For disputes relating to the GPA see US – Procurement of a Sonar Mapping System, GPR, DS1, 
Panel Report, 23 April 1992 (unadopted); Japan – Procurement of a Navigation Satellite, DS73, Request 
for Consultations 26 March 1997 (mutually agreed solution 3 March 1998); Korea – Measures Affecting 
Government Procurement, DS163, Panel Report, 1 May 2000. 
1484 Harro van Asselt, Nicolien van der Grijp and Fran Oosterhuis, ‘Greener Public Purchasing: 
Opportunities for Climate-Friendly Government Procurement under WTO and EU Rules’ (2006) 6 
Climate Policy 217, 226-227; Thomas L. Brewer, ‘The WTO and the Kyoto Protocol: Interaction Issues’ 
(2004) 4 Climate Policy 3. 
1485 On potential exemptions to the application of free movement law in this context see section 2.3.4. 
1486 See section 4.2.2.2. 
1487 See section 2.3.2.4. 
1488 See recitals of Agreement on Government Procurement, 1869 U.N.T.S. 508 (Text available at 1915 
U.N.T.S. 103), with Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government Procurement, Geneva 30.3.2012 
(amendments entered into force 2014). The recitals refer to both anti-corruption and efficient 
management of resources. 
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key objective of international procurement law is still market liberalization.1489 In this 
respect it resembles trade law. 
Trade law and public procurement law are both fields of law that govern measures 
adopted by the public sector that affect cross-border trade. As in the case of trade law, 
both the GPA and EU procurement directives prohibit discrimination. Through non-
discrimination the public sector may improve efficiency through better competition. 
More international competition can in turn result in better value for money. The 
objectives are thus linked. 
6.3.2. Sustainable Procurement 
6.3.2.1. Defining What to Buy and Technical Specifications 
Public authorities will begin the design of procurement with the decision on what to 
purchase. The goods, services or works needed can be described in the form of technical 
specifications. Environmental PPM-criteria may be adopted as technical specifications 
under Article X GPA. Technical specifications may cover also PPMs.1490  This includes 
even criteria that do not affect the physical properties of the supply goods.1491 
With respect to the interpretation of the scope of technical specifications under the EU 
directives there is some relevant case law. An authority of a Dutch province planned to 
purchase automatic coffee machines in 2008. In its procurement process the authority 
implemented, among other things, technical specifications for coffee and tea. Those 
two products had to carry the EKO-label, which was a guarantee of organic farming, 
and the Max Havelaar label, which was a fair trade label. The European Commission 
took the Netherlands to court. As a matter of principle the ECJ confirmed in Max 
Havelaar that technical specifications can relate to PPMs with environmental 
significance, such as organic farming.1492 The ECJ did not appear to condemn the fact 
                                                 
1489 Luca Tosoni, ‘The Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU 
Procurement Rules from a Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Rev. 41, 42. 
1490 Article I(u) GPA. 
1491 Steven Bernstein and Erin Hannah, ‘Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy 
and the Need for Regulatory Space’ (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 575, 592. See also 
Harro van Asselt, Nicolien van der Grijp and Frans Oosterhuis, ‘Greener Public Purchasing: 
Opportunities for Climate-Friendly Government Procurement under WTO and EU Rules’ (2006) 6 
Climate Policy 217, 223. The authors of the latter article are more careful to draw this conclusion. 
1492 Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, para. 61. See 
also Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC 
Treaty, on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s common position regarding the 
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procedures for 
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that the required fair trade label was awarded only to democratically governed small 
farmer organizations. However, as pointed out by Martens, it is from an equal treatment 
perspective controversial to adopt criteria on the size of the farms and on their 
governance structure.1493  
It has now also been confirmed in the new procurement directives that considerations 
of sustainability may be included in the technical specification.1494 They may cover the 
PPMs or any other stage of the life-cycle even if those phases would not affect the 
material substance. The PPM-criteria should also be complied with when production 
takes place out-of-state. 
Some scholars have argued that social criteria could also form technical specifications, 
whereas others have regarded the question unsettled.1495 The provisions in the GPA1496 
and the EU directives refer to environmental but not to social criteria. Moreover, only 
criteria that either lay down the characteristics of goods or services, or the PPMs for 
the production of goods or the provision of services, can be implemented as technical 
specifications. Therefore, at least criteria on wider social implications of price changes 
on energy or food as well as many other social criteria that do not relate to the 
characteristics or the PPMs of the products or the services are likely not legal as 
technical specifications. 
                                                 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, COM (2003) 
503 final; Peter Kunzlik, ’The Procurement of ‘Green’ Energy’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik 
(eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions 
(CUP 2009) 391-399. 
1493 Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green 
and Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 8, 15-
16. 
1494 Art. 42 and recital 74, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; 
Art. 60 and recitals 83-85, Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Art. 36(1), Directive 2014/23/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, 
OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. See also Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental 
Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009); Roberto Caranta 
and Martin Trybus (eds.), The Law of Green and Social Procurement in Europe (Djøf 2010). 
1495 Compare Christopher McCrudden, ‘International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: 
A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement’ (1999) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 3, 36-37, with 
Luca Tosoni, ‘The Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU 
Procurement Rules from a Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Rev. 41, 47; and Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer 2003) 
314. 
1496 Article X.6 GPA. 
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The Max Havelaar fair trade label referred to above was only granted under the 
condition that the importer had concluded long-term contracts with organisations of 
small-scale developing country producers and that the producers were paid a fair price. 
When the decision by a Dutch authority to require the Max Havelaar label was 
challenged, the ECJ concluded that the fair trade label established terms of purchase 
for the bidder and that these were not technical specifications because they did not relate 
to manufacture or any other relevant phase.1497  
Building on the decision in Max Havelaar, would working conditions of the producer 
then have a sufficient link to the manufacture? Could they be categorized as part of the 
PPMs of a stage in the life-cycle? The Commission has taken the view that in contrast 
to criteria on environmental PPMs, social conditions for workers may not be 
categorized as technical specifications under the directives.1498 This position has 
generally been accepted in the academic literature, but there has simultaneously also 
been some discussion on whether not the provisions should be more open to social 
criteria.1499  
6.3.2.2. Conditions for Participation and Exclusion Criteria 
After having defined what it intends to purchase, the public authority may add 
participation criteria. These criteria limit who can place bids. Under Article VIII GPA 
conditions for participation must be essential to ensure the legal and financial capacity 
or the commercial and technical ability of the bidder to undertake the procurement. 
Similarly, under EU directives the conditions for participation (referred to as selection 
criteria in the directives) may relate to the technical and professional ability to carry out 
                                                 
1497 Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, para. 74. 
1498 Buying Social – A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement 
(European Commission 2010) 29-32. See also Interpretative Communication of the Commission on the 
Community law applicable to public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social 
considerations into public procurement COM (2001) 566 final, 8 (fn 26); Green Paper on the 
modernisation of EU public procurement policy – Towards a more efficient European Procurement 
Market, COM (2011) 15 final, 38. 
1499 Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green 
and Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 8, 12; 
N. François, ‘La place des considerations d’ordre non strictement économique dans l’attribution des 
marches publics – Essai sur la prise en compte de considerations d’ordre environnemental, social, éthique 
et de genre dans les critères de selection et d’attribution des marches publics’ (2009) Chroniques de Droit 
Public 652; Peter Kunzlik, ‘From Suspect Practice to Market-Based Instrument: Policy Alignment and 
the Evolution of EU Law’s Approach to “Green” Public Procurement’ (2013) 22 Public Procurement 
Law Rev. 97, 102; Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement 
and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 538-543. 
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the duties under the public contract.1500 Tosoni has argued that sustainability criteria do 
not relate to the limited scopes of the concepts ‘ability’ and ‘capacity’.1501 In contrast, 
the European Commission has stated that technical and professional ability could relate 
to environmental aspects under EU law and does not appear to exclude that these could 
even include PPM-criteria.1502 
A contracting authority may exclude bidders on grounds mentioned in Article VIII.4 
GPA. The list of exclusion criteria includes factors such as significant or persistent 
deficiency in the performance under prior contracts, professional misconduct, acts or 
omissions that affects the commercial integrity as well as a final judgment on a serious 
offense or crime. These may relate to the environmental effects of PPMs or labour 
conditions.1503 Comparably, the EU directives include the right to exclude on the basis 
of, for example, violations of social or environmental laws, significant and persistent 
deficiencies in prior public contracts or grave professional misconduct.1504 These 
discretionary grounds could relate to past compliance with environmental or social 
norms,1505 even with respect to PPMs or working conditions. The EU directive also 
includes some compulsory exclusion grounds. For example, a bidder convicted of using 
child labor must be excluded.1506  
6.3.2.3. Evaluation Criteria and Contract Performance Clauses 
Bids that are not excluded on any ground and comply with technical specifications and 
conditions for participation shall be compared on the basis of evaluation criteria, also 
                                                 
1500 Art. 58-62, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 80, 
Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing 
Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Art. 38, Directive 2014/23/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 
28.3.2014, 1.  
1501 Luca Tosoni, ‘The Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU 
Procurement Rules from a Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Rev. 41, 47-48. 
1502 Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to public 
procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public 
procurement, COM (2001) 274 final; Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., 
European Commission 2011) 34. 
1503 Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer 2003) 339-341. 
1504 Art. 57(4), Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65.  
1505 Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 2011) 33. 
See also Joel Arnould, ‘Secondary Policies in Public Procurement: The Innovations of the New 
Directives’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Review 187, 193-195. 
1506 Art. 57(1), Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
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frequently referred to as award criteria in an EU law context. The contracting authority 
shall rely on these criteria in order to define which bid is most advantageous and then 
calculate the winning bid on the basis of the criteria. The authorities may apply price 
as the only criterion and choose the cheapest bid. Alternatively, the evaluation criteria 
can be more nuanced and include factors such as quality and sustainability. 
Under Article X.9 GPA at least price, other cost factors, quality, technical merit, 
environmental characteristics and terms of delivery are all valid evaluation criteria. 
Sustainability criteria relating to the PPM would at least to the extent they reflect 
externalities be covered by the concept of ‘other cost factors’. Hence, environmental 
PPM-criteria could as a rule be incorporated into the evaluation of bids. 
Environmental PPM-criteria under EU directives were dealt with in Wienstrom. The 
case concerned an Austrian authority that had purchased electricity. The award criteria 
were designed to favour the delivery of electricity generated from renewable resources. 
The ECJ saw no reason why such criteria could not in principle be legal as long as they 
were linked to the subject-matter of the contract, did not confer an unrestricted freedom 
of choice on the authority, are expressly mentioned in the contract and the tender notice, 
and comply with the fundamental principles of EU law, including non-
discrimination.1507  
The legality of PPM-criteria has now been confirmed in the EU directives. The award 
criteria may relate to the delivery process or any other stage of the life-cycle, such as 
the process of production, provision or trading.1508 The criteria may even relate to 
disposal and recycling.1509 In order to promote the use of life-cycle costing (LCC) as a 
model for designing award criteria, articles on this solution have been included in the 
                                                 
1507 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, paras 30-34. 
1508 Art. 67, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 82, Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Art. 41, Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1.  
1509 European Commission, EU GPP Criteria for Transport (2012) 10-13; Marc Martens and Stanislas de 
Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green and Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 
European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 8, 14. See also Opinion of the Commission 
pursuant to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament’s 
amendments to the Council’s common position regarding the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts, COM (2003) 503 final. 
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directives.1510 The article on LCC refers to costs of GHG emissions, other pollution and 
climate change mitigation. The EU has recognized that public procurement may be an 
important tool to encourage sustainable development and tackle climate change.1511 
The articles on award criteria do not refer to social externalities even if such a reference 
was proposed during the negotiations.1512 However, the recitals of the procurement 
directive confirm that social criteria can be applied even if their value may be difficult 
to quantify.1513 The ECJ has also ruled that social criteria can be in compliance with the 
directive.1514 
At the end of the procurement process a contract is signed with the winning bidder. In 
the contract the public authority may in accordance with Article X.7 GPA and equally 
under EU directives1515 insert other conditions than the technical specifications 
                                                 
1510 Art. 68 and recitals 95-97, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; 
Art. 83 and recitals 100-102, Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Recital 64, Directive 2014/23/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, 
OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. See also Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., 
European Commission 2011) 42-45. For an analysis of the provisions see Dacian Dragos and Bogdana 
Neamtu, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement: Life-Cycle Costing in the New EU Directive Proposal’ (2013) 
8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 19. 
1511 Commission Communication, Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
COM (2010) 2020 final, 15-16. See also Jörgen Hettne, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement and the Single 
Market – Is There a Conflict of Interest?’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership 
Law Review 31, 34. 
1512 Marta Franch and Mireia Grau, ‘Contract Award Criteria’, in Roberto Caranta, Gunilla Edelstam and 
Martin Trybus (eds.), EU Public Contract Law – Public Procurement and Beyond (Bruylant 2014) 152. 
1513 Recitals 96-99, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. See also Sue 
Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical Review’, in 
Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (ed.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – 
New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 240-242; Dacian Dragos and Bogdana Neamtu, 
‘Sustainable Public Procurement: Life-Cycle Costing in the New EU Directive Proposal’ (2013) 8 
European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 19, 24-30; Thomas Swarr, ‘Societal Life 
Cycle Assessment – Could You Repeat the Question?’ (2009) 14 International Journal of Life Cycle 
Assessment 285. 
1514 Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, para. 85; Case 
C-225/98 Commission v. France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) [2000] ECR I-7445, paras 50-52. See also Marc 
Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green and Social 
Procurement’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 8, 9. In Nord-Pas-
de-Calais the ECJ stated that the principle was already established in Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes 
BV v. Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, since those criteria concerned the award of contract. However, the 
Court fails to recognize that criteria on the award of contract in the form implemented in Beentjes 
represented a broader category (criteria for the award of contract) that covers stages related to conditions 
of participation and technical specifications. It is thus not the same as award criteria. 
1515 Art. 70, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 87, Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
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provided that thee contract conditions have been mentioned in the tender 
documentation. The type of criteria suitable in contracts do not appear to be limited in 
any respect. Hence, social, environmental and any other sustainability criteria could be 
included as contract performance clauses.1516 The sustainability criteria could even take 
the form of PPM-criteria under both the GPA1517 and the EU directives.1518 Thus, the 
position under EU directives has been that environmental criteria implemented as 
contract conditions could include for example requirements on environmental and 
energy efficiency, delivering methods and transport emissions, recycling and more 
generally control of emission levels and staff training.1519 In turn, social criteria in 
contract performance clauses could include requirements on employing disabled or 
long-term unemployed.1520 Moreover, contract clauses could include criteria on labour 
rights and conditions (e.g. on health and safety), pay for workers and fair trade (e.g. pay 
for farmers).1521  
                                                 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243. 
1516 Luca Tosoni, ‘The Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU 
Procurement Rules from a Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Rev. 41, 47; Christopher McCrudden, ‘International Economic Law and the Pursuit of 
Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement’ (1999) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 3, 30-31. 
1517 Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer 2003) 339. 
1518 Art. 70 as well as recitals 97 and 104, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 
28.3.2014, 65; Art. 87, Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243. See also Buying Social – A Guide 
to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement (European Commission 2010) 32; 
Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 2011) 52; 
Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green and 
Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership L. Rev. 8, 15; Marta 
Franch and Mireia Grau, ‘Contract Award Criteria’, in Roberto Caranta, Gunilla Edelstam and Martin 
Trybus (eds.), EU Public Contract Law – Public Procurement and Beyond (Bruylant 2014) 153; Robert 
Caranta, ‘General Report’, in Ulla Neergaard, Catherine Jacqueson and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke (eds.), 
Public Procurement Law: Limitations, Opportunities and Paradoxes, The XXVI FIDE Congress in 
Copenhagen, 2014 Congress Publications Vol. 3, 156; Joel Arnould, ‘Secondary Policies in Public 
Procurement: The Innovations of the New Directives’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Rev. 187, 192. 
1519 Recital 97, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Buying Green! 
A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 2011) 46-48. See also 
generally Marta Franch and Mireia Grau, ‘Contract Award Criteria’, in Roberto Caranta, Gunilla 
Edelstam and Martin Trybus (eds.), EU Public Contract Law – Public Procurement and Beyond 
(Bruylant 2014) 153. 
1520 Buying Social – A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement 
(European Commission 2010) 32, 44-45. 
1521 Recital 97, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Case C-368/10 
Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, paras 75-76; Buying Social – A 
Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement (European Commission 2010) 
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6.3.2.4. Limits to the Use of Sustainability Criteria 
As discussed above, at each stage of the procurement process the public authority may 
include at least some sustainability criteria, which may even relate to PPMs. There are 
of course important limitations to the design of those criteria. Detailed tests that put 
limits to the use of sustainability criteria have been developed by the ECJ. There is 
more uncertainty with respect to applicable tests under the GPA. 
Under EU directives criteria implemented at most stages of the procurement process 
must be related to the subject matter of the contract.1522 Criteria on the general corporate 
policy of the supplier are not linked to the subject matter of a specific contract.1523 In 
Wienstrom the Austrian public authority had through award criteria granted extra points 
if the supplier generated a share of all of its annual electricity output from renewable 
resources. The requirement thus covered more than merely the share of electricity 
delivered under the procured contract. Hence, the requirement was not linked to the 
subject matter of the contract.1524 
The ECJ has also stated that sustainability criteria cannot be designed so as to leave the 
public authority with an unrestricted freedom of discretion.1525 The requirement has 
                                                 
32, 44-45; Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 
2011) 52; Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in 
Green and Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 
8, 15-16. 
1522 Art. 42(1) (technical specifications), Art. 58 (selection criteria or conditions of participation), Art. 
67(2) (award criteria) and Art. 70 (contract performance clauses), as well as recitals 75 and 92, Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 60(1), 80(2) and 82(2), Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Art. 36(1), 38(1) and 41(2), Directive 2014/23/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 
28.3.2014,1. See also Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy 
Ab v. Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, paras 57-59; Case C-448/01 EVN 
AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, para. 66. 
1523 Recitals 97 and 104, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
See also Buying Social – A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement 
(European Commission 2010) 29; Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., 
European Commission 2011) 25, 31; European Commission, EU GPP Criteria for Electricity (2012) at 
5; European Commission, EU GPP Criteria for Transport (2012) at 13; Abby Semple, ‘A Link to the 
Subject-Matter: A Glass Ceiling for Sustainable Public Contracts?’, in Beate Sjåfell and Anja Wiesbrock, 
Sustainable Public Procurement under EU Law – New Perspectives on the State as Stakeholder (CUP 
2015). 
1524 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, paras 60-71. 
1525 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, para. 26; Case C-513/99 
Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-
Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 61; Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria 
[2003] ECR I-14527, para. 37; Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction Ltd v. County Council of the County of 
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now been explicitly included in the directives.1526 It means, among other things, that 
environmental and other criteria must be objectively quantifiable.1527 
Furthermore, the criteria must be sufficiently precise.1528 Precision means that all 
bidders should be able to interpret the criteria in the same way.1529 In Max Havelaar 
the Dutch authority had included criteria to ensure that the supplier of coffee machines 
complied with a policy of sustainable purchases and conducted socially responsible 
business. The ECJ rejected such criteria as they might not even be linked to the subject 
matter. What is more, the criteria would not comply with the requirements of clarity 
and precision and would not be unequivocal.1530 The conclusion would have been the 
same under the GPA, even if the test of precision is not necessarily equally strict. 
Under both the GPA1531 and EU directives1532 criteria must be such that compliance 
with them can be verified. The test of verifiability is especially relevant for criteria on 
process and production methods. Verification can be challenging due to the fact that 
the PPMs are sometimes not reflected in the final characteristics of the product or 
service that is delivered. Similar challenges exist regarding criteria on end-of-life 
treatment. In the seminal Wienstrom case the Austrian authority purchasing electricity 
                                                 
Mayo [2001] ECR I-7725, paras 36-37. See also Christopher Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (2nd 
ed., Edward Elgar 2012) 414-415. 
1526 See Art. 67(4), Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1527 C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin kaupunki 
and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 66. See also Katriina Alhola, Environmental Criteria 
in Public Procurement – Focus on Tender Documents (Edita 2012) 23; Interpretative communication of 
the Commission on the Community law applicable to public procurement and the possibilities for 
integrating environmental considerations into public procurement, COM (2001) 274 final, section 3.1. 
1528 On explicit reference to the requirement of precision of technical specifications see Art. 42(3), 
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. See also Art. 26(4)(a)(iv), 
29(1) and 31(1). With reference to precision of award criteria see Peter Kunzlik, ‘Making the Market 
Work for the Environment - The Acceptance of (Some) Environmental Award Criteria in Public 
Procurement’ (2003) 15 Journal of Environmental Law 175, 198. 
1529 Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction Ltd v. County Council of the County of Mayo [2001] ECR I-7725, 
para. 42; Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, para. 88; 
Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 2011) 38. 
1530 Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, paras 109-110. 
1531 Luca Tosoni, ‘The Impact of the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement on the EU 
Procurement Rules from a Sustainability Perspective’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Rev. 41, 45. See also Peter Kunzlik, ‘International Procurement Regimes and the Scope 
for Inclusion of Environmental Factors in Public Procurement’ (2004) OECD Journal on Budgeting 109. 
1532 Buying Green! A Handbook on Green Public Procurement (2nd ed., European Commission 2011) 25, 
32; Peter Kunzlik, ‘From Suspect Practice to Market-Based Instrument: Policy Alignment and the 
Evolution of EU Law’s Approach to “Green” Public Procurement’ (2013) Public Procurement Law 
Review 97, 112; Antti Palmujoki, Katriina Parikka-Alhola, and Ari Ekroos, ‘Green Public Procurement: 
Analysis on the Use of Environmental Criteria in Contracts’ (2010) 19 Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 250, 253. 
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set criteria for the award of the contract favouring companies using renewable 
resources. However, no mechanism of verifying compliance with such criteria had been 
put in place by the authority. Consequently, the procurement process breached the 
principles of equal treatment and transparency.1533 In order to comply with the 
verifiability test the authority could perhaps have specified in the call for tenders that 
the chosen supplier of electricity would on an annual basis need to illustrate compliance 
with the renewable energy requirement by submitting Guarantees of Origin.1534 Under 
the Renewable Energy Directive1535 each Member State must have in place a system of 
GOs. The certificates would verify that the generated electricity comes from renewable 
resources. 
The principle of proportionality also governs procurement law. Under Article 18(1) of 
the EU procurement directive economic operators must be treated in a proportionate 
manner.1536 Moreover, conditions for participation (selection criteria) shall be 
proportionate to the subject matter.1537 In turn, PPM-criteria in technical specifications 
must be proportionate to their value and objectives.1538 Finally, the weight on for 
example environmental aspects in award criteria must be such that the economically 
most advantageous bid can be identified.1539 It is not fully evident how the principle of 
proportionality should be interpreted in this context. One could potentially argue that 
contracting authorities would not be justified in pushing criteria that go beyond the 
                                                 
1533 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, paras 44-52. 
1534 See European Commission, EU GPP for Electricity (2012) at 3-5; Peter Kunzlik, ‘The Procurement 
of ‘Green’ Energy’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in 
EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 379. 
1535 Article 15, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, 16; Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, 82, Article 19(2). 
1536 Art. 18(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1537 Art. 58, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 80(2), Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243; Art. 38(1), Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. 
1538 Art. 42(1) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1539 See e.g. Art. 67, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65.  
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internalization of externalities.1540 Yet, it must at the same time be acknowledged that 
sometimes criteria that go beyond current externalities may be necessary in order to 
spur new innovative solutions that improve the rate of reducing externalities in the 
future. 
All in all, like in trade law, also under public procurement law PPM-criteria are not 
categorically prohibited. On the contrary, they are in fact encouraged. That being said, 
the design of such criteria is subject to a number of legal tests.  
6.3.2.5. Implications of Extraterritoriality for Sustainable Procurement 
Both public procurement decisions and other forms of state measures, which fall under 
trade law, may target environmental effects. As is the case with PPM-criteria under 
trade law, the opportunity to include in tenders social and environmental criteria that 
address externalities will raise the question of how those externalities are evaluated by 
the public authorities. This covers also the question of the geographical scope of the 
effects addressed by the criteria.  
The geographical scope of the effects addressed by PPM-criteria in public procurement 
may become relevant in various ways. For example, could a public authority in 
technical specifications cap emissions also for out-of-state production or require a 
certain PPM also out-of-state even when out-of-state unsustainable PPMs will have 
minimal or no cross-border effects? May emission level criteria included in the 
evaluation criteria take into account out-of-state emissions to the same extent as in-state 
emissions even if the emissions have no, or at least less, effect on the in-state 
environment? Could a public authority integrate criteria on PPMs or emission levels in 
evaluation criteria, reduce points for unsustainable PPMs in proportion to estimated 
externalities and in the estimation of those externalities also calculate for externalities 
out-of-state? Could the public authority in its evaluation criteria take into account that 
even to the extent PPMs out-of-state, unlike PPMs in-state, might not have the same 
effects on its in-state environment, unsustainable PPMs out-of-state may still have 
effects on the utility of the people in the state of the procuring entity? 
                                                 
1540 See Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, para. 42. See 
however Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical 
Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 243. 
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Against the background of sustainable public procurement provided above, the 
remaining sections of this chapter are set to determine whether extraterritoriality is 
approached differently or perhaps should be approached differently in public 
procurement law than in trade law. 
6.3.3. Costs of the Authority, the Public Sector or the Society? 
Trade law applies to measures that can be contributed to the state or in other words the 
public sector.1541 A measure can be contributed to the state regardless of which 
authority adopted it. Discriminatory state measures may be justified at least with 
reference to the objective of tackling in-state environmental harm. The harm might 
either burden the public sector, for example in terms of public health care costs caused 
by pollution, or the population and society more broadly through externalities. In trade 
law the perspective is that of the state adopting the measure, or its people. The 
difference between these two perspectives has not been given relevance in trade law. 
In comparison, public procurement law covers only procurement decisions adopted by 
contracting authorities. Contracting authorities include state authorities and other 
public authorities. The focus of the legislation is thus on the actions contributed to one 
authority instead of on actions contributed to the state as a whole. From whose 
perspective ought then the environmental or social effects be evaluated when the 
contracting authority adopts PPM-criteria or some other criteria? There has been debate 
in public procurement law on whether environmental effects should be approached 
from the perspective of the public authority, the state (public sector as a whole) or the 
people (the society as a whole). May the contracting authority tackle its own costs or 
the societal costs more broadly? This issue must be clarified before addressing the 
question of the territorial scope of the environmental or social effects. 
The GPA and the EU procurement directives do not specify whether the externalities 
that may be addressed would be limited to the costs that burden the authority or whether 
the society as a whole can be taken into account. However, in the EU provisions on 
award criteria an indirect reference to this issue can be found. In accordance with the 
directives the economically most advantageous offer from the point of view of the 
contracting authority should be chosen.1542 This could be understood to indicate that 
                                                 
1541 See section 2.1. 
1542 Art. 67, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 82(2), Directive 
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the authority can only apply social and environmental criteria with the intention of 
addressing externalities that it would otherwise experience itself. In fact, the 
Commission for a time seemed to argue along these lines. It held the view that the 
benefit created through the application of any sustainability criteria should only be 
accounted for to the extent that it serves the authority directly.1543 This would lead to, 
for example, the conclusion that the award criteria cannot be designed to tackle 
externalities that burden the society more in general.1544 
The ECJ appears to have rejected the position originally adopted by the Commission. 
Concordia concerned a tender by the city of Helsinki to purchase a bus service that 
caused limited pollution and noise when using the buses. The ECJ ruled that the added 
value of the criteria did not need to be of a purely economic nature and that also 
environmental criteria could increase the economic value from the point of view of the 
contracting authority.1545 Thus, tackling externalities was surely acceptable. It is 
noteworthy that the measure reduced both costs for the state in the form of lower public 
health costs and lower health costs with respect to the part that citizens would bear 
themselves. A reduction in the health costs in other words benefitted the city directly 
but was by no means restricted to costs borne by the city. 
The ruling in Wienstrom followed a similar logic. In that case the award criteria that 
gave preference for electricity coming from renewable resources was not regarded to 
                                                 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243. A different wording can be found in Art. 41(1), Directive 
2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of 
concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. Under that provision the award criteria must be designed to 
identify the “overall economic advantage for the contracting authority or the contracting entity.” A literal 
interpretation of this phrase would suggest that the benefit that the criteria ensure must go specifically to 
the authority and not the society in general. 
1543 Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to public 
procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public 
procurement, COM (2001) 274 final, section 3; Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly 
Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, Opinion 
of AG Mischo, para. 29. See also Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government 
Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 551; Christopher H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law 
(2nd ed., Edward Elgar 2012) 414-415. 
1544 Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to public 
procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public 
procurement, COM (2001) 274 final, section 3. See also Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty 
and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), 
Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 
2009) 236. 
1545 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin 
kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, paras 55-57. 
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be categorically unlawful.1546 The costs in the form of externalities from electricity 
generated from fossil fuels would have clearly burdened the society as a whole as well 
as the public sector as a whole. The ECJ did not consider whether the externalities 
would have also burdened the purchasing authority. Hence, many scholars have 
concluded that the authority does at least not have to gain any immediate benefit.1547 
Even a contracting authority that has no obligation in health care should have the right 
to adopt environmental criteria. 
Some uncertainties as regards the scope of costs that can be addressed with 
sustainability criteria remain. In particular, it is not clear whether the focus should be 
on the burden of the public sector as a whole or the burden on the society as a whole. 
In many cases it will not make a difference since there will be a burden on both. In 
Wienstrom the measure likely benefitted the state population (the society as a whole) 
as well as the public sector generally. Similarly, in Concordia the city of Helsinki and 
the Finnish government made a dual argument. First, they emphasized that 
sustainability criteria would be in the interest of the residents. Secondly, they pointed 
out that the externalities of pollution would in the end to a high degree be borne by the 
city in the form of public health care spending.1548  
The difference between targeting total societal costs or merely public sector costs might 
make a difference when the contracting authority adopts evaluation criteria with points 
awarded according to performance. In calibrating a proportional weight for the criteria, 
the contracting authority will need to make a decision on whether it considers the effects 
from the perspective of the public sector or the society more broadly. Unfortunately, no 
clear answer has been provided by the case law as to which costs may be included in 
award criteria calculations. Some scholars have argued that the costs that arise due to 
                                                 
1546 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527, paras 30-34. 
1547 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical 
Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 236; Antti Palmujoki, Katriina 
Parikka-Alhola, and Ari Ekroos, ‘Green Public Procurement: Analysis on the Use of Environmental 
Criteria in Contracts’ (2010) 19 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
250, 252; Dacian Dragos and Bogdana Neamtu, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement: Life-Cycle Costing in 
the New EU Directive Proposal’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership L. Rev. 
19, 27; Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change (OUP 2007) 549. 
1548 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin 
kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 46. 
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externalities on the society as a whole can be taken into account.1549 This would seem 
justifiable for two reasons. First, public authorities represent the people and should 
therefore be able to account for full costs for the population. The point of view of the 
public authority may for this reason include the full costs of the population. Secondly, 
it would be in line with the structure of current public procurement law to include all 
societal costs. Namely, technical specifications could not separate costs on the public 
sector from costs on the society as a whole. For example, an absolute requirement that 
energy comes from renewables will address externalities that burden the society even 
to the extent that the public sector as such might not be burdened by the costs. It would 
perhaps be incoherent if the externalities born by private citizens in the society could 
be addressed through such criteria but could never be given weight when bids are 
evaluated on the basis of costs, including externalities.  
6.3.4. Cross-Border Effects 
The conclusion that sustainability criteria applied in public procurement may target 
externalities from the perspective of the whole society heightens the importance of 
determining the geographical scope of the effects that may be tackled under public 
procurement law. As was the case in trade law,1550 also in public procurement law there 
are no clear-cut answers to how extraterritoriality should be approached. 
As was explained already above, the case law of the ECJ has confirmed that 
sustainability criteria may be introduced to target PPMs. The criteria can be adopted in 
public procurement for example as part of technical specifications or award criteria. 
Could PPM-criteria adopted by a public authority then apply also to production outside 
the territory of the state of the contracting authority? The argumemt might be presented 
that that the procurement law principle of equal treatment even requires that PPM-
criteria, when adopted, must apply also to out-of-state production. 
Sustainability criteria in the form of requirements of some specific PPMs or criteria on 
emission levels in the production phase could capture both cross-border environmental 
effects that burden the society where the purchasing authority is located and costs that 
would otherwise fall upon foreign societies. For example, when purchasing electricity, 
                                                 
1549 Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, ‘The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green 
and Social Procurement’ (2013) 8 European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Rev. 8, 13; 
Marc Martens, ‘Milieuoverwegingen in Overheidsopdrachten’ (2004) 13 Tijdschrift voor Milieurecht 
301, 311-313. 
1550 See section 6.2. 
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the requirement that the energy is generated from renewable resources would reduce 
carbon emissions on a global scale. This approach was, as a matter of principle, deemed 
to comply with the directive in Wienstrom.1551 It is not legally problematic that some 
costs of climate change would also be reduced outside the territory of the home state of 
the contracting authority. The conclusion can be made that it is in accordance with 
public procurement law to at least adopt criteria that target cross-border effects even 
when the criteria in part also unavoidably address out-of-state effects.  
6.3.5. The Pure Out-of-State Share of Environmental Effects 
6.3.5.1. Framing the Problem of Extraterritorial Criteria 
It is legal to adopt criteria that address some cross-border effects. The conclusion that 
public authorities may tackle cross-border environmental effects raises the question of 
whether it would actually be a condition for PPM-criteria to comply with procurement 
law that the criteria address effects that reach the territory of the purchasing public 
authority when production takes place out-of-state. Alternatively, could public 
authorities under procurement law even be justified in tackling the out-of-state share of 
cross-border effects and purely out-of-state effects? 
Criteria on the use of a specific PPM could reduce cross-border effects. The primary 
objective may often be to tackle the externalities of the pollution that reaches the 
domestic territory of the public authority. Yet, the criteria will also incidentally reduce 
harmful effects that burden the society out-of-state. Targeting PPMs out-of-state that 
do not have any cross-border effects or including out-of-state effects explicitly in the 
award criteria calculations may on its face seem more intrusive as compared to when 
the extraterritorial effect is more incidental or an unavoidable side-effect.  
The status of purely out-of-state effects under the GPA and the EU procurement 
directives is relevant for some environmental PPM-criteria. For example, in case the 
authority applies evaluation criteria that include emission levels or externality costs 
(including e.g. health costs), it is of interest whether or not pollution or costs abroad 
could be taken into account. In other words, could the emissions or costs be estimated 
to their full global value or only to the extent they would burden the society of the state 
of the contracting authority? 
                                                 
1551 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14527. 
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As a preliminary point, contracting authorities will often be part of the state or local 
government. Although their interest can at times diverge from the interest of the state 
and local government, the contracting authority would still normally not have any 
broader economic concerns on the health of people, the climate and the ecosystem than 
the whole state and local government to which the authority belongs. The state and local 
governments in turn derive their legitimacy from the will of the people, who contribute 
to procurement through taxation. A public authority thus has the competence to tackle 
harm that affects the taxpayers it has been created to serve. When it comes to pollution 
that arise abroad, public authorities would be concerned when there are cross-border 
effects on the people they represent in-state. The interest in out-of-state effects would 
be based on moral grounds or an interest to tackle externalities that are purely foreign. 
It could be argued that neither moral policy nor purely extraterritorial objectives should 
be adopted by contracting authorities since the authorities may be categorized as market 
participants. In accordance with this view moral and extraterritorial policy would in 
order to be democratically justifiable at least need to go through the ordinary legislative 
procedure of the state win which the criteria tackling pure out-of-state effects are 
planned to be adopted for public procurement. Consequently, such criteria would need 
to be backed by state law. Regardless of whether or not this approach is accepted, it 
would not provide any answer on the question of whether such criteria could comply 
with the GPA or EU directives. 
The value of value global fairness could affect the interpretation of international 
procurement law. With the option of implementing very ambitious sustainability 
criteria that cover even out-of-state emissions, effects or externalities, the public 
authorities in one state would have the tools to exert stronger pressure on producers in 
other states to adhere with the sustainability perception held in the home state of the 
contracting authority. The situation becomes particularly problematic when the 
pressure comes from authorities of developed countries with a modern sustainability 
agenda but with a bad historical track record. Although not directly regulating 
sustainability criteria, Article V GPA still acknowledges the imbalance of power 
between developed and developing states as it generally offers the possibility to favor 
developing countries. The article thus confirms global fairness as one of the values of 
the agreement. 
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The texts on technical specifications in the GPA and the EU directives do not reveal 
any limit with respect to the geographical scope of effects or externalities that may be 
covered. The legal texts on evaluation criteria in the GPA is equally ambiguous on this 
point. Under Article XV.5 GPA the contracting authority shall award the contract to 
the most advantageous tender, or the lowest price if price is the sole criterion. The 
concept ‘most advantageous’ does not give much guidance as to whether the reduction 
of environmental harm out-of-state may be taken into account; either for environmental, 
social or moral reasons.  
Under EU directives, in turn, the contracting authority shall choose the economically 
most advantageous tender from the point of view of the contracting authority.1552 This 
could be read to indicate that the criteria must at least indirectly add economic value 
from an in-state point of view. As previously explained, the economic advantage is 
interpreted quite broadly, as it captures also environmental externalities. However, it 
would require an even broader reading of the legal text to accept reduction of out-of-
state environmentally harmful effects or externalities as adding economic value to the 
society of the home state of the contracting authority. The added value from the 
perspective of the home state of the authority would relate to a moral objective and 
could be expressed in terms of utility. There would arguably be no contribution to 
economic welfare of that state. In other words, it is highly disputable as to whether 
tackling out-of-state effects or externalities would actually increase the economic value 
of a bid from the point of view of a public authority. It is interesting to note that it is 
the wording of the EU directives that express most doubt with respect to tackling 
extraterritorial effects, given that the global fairness argument should be stronger under 
the GPA.  
Could the approach to extraterritoriality then be different for technical specifications 
and for award criteria? If extraterritorial criteria cannot be adopted as award criteria, it 
would seem illogical to accept them as technical specifications. Reversely, if 
extraterritorial criteria may be adopted as technical specifications, they should likely 
                                                 
1552 Art. 67, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65; Art. 82(2), Directive 
2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 243. A different wording can be found in Art. 41(1), Directive 
2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of 
concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 1. Under that provision the award criteria must be designed to 
identify the “overall economic advantage for the contracting authority or the contracting entity.” 
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also be legal as award criteria. There is an argument in favor of internal procurement 
law coherence. Namely, technical specifications are more absolute requirements than 
award criteria and it would be illogical if pushing for extraterritoriality would only be 
possible with more absolute requirements.  
6.3.5.2. The Arguments for Extraterritorial Procurement Criteria 
As is evident from the above discussion, there exist some doubts as to whether public 
authorities may target even extraterritorial effects. However, McCrudden appears to 
argue that a state could justify its measures with the protection of life and health of 
humans, animals and plants on foreign territory.1553 It may be that the GPA does not 
prohibit measures with an extraterritorial scope as long as the criteria are related to the 
contract.1554 This would extend legitimate objectives of the criteria beyond the cross-
border effects on environment and health.  
There are strong arguments as to why an authority may target pure out-of-state effects 
and value the externalities at their value for the global community. Take the example 
of a contracting authority that under evaluation criteria awards points directly in 
proportion to either emission levels or externality costs. The authority has decided to 
take into account the environmental effects of PPMs in evaluation criteria. However, if 
it restricts the evaluation to effects that reach its local territory, it would create more 
favorable bidding conditions for bidders with production far away in other countries. 
Out-of-state producers would be rewarded as they could often be assigned zero or at 
least low emissions or externality costs from production. A similar dilemma would 
emerge when the contracting authority decides to require as a technical specification 
that a certain PPM is used, but the effects of less sustainable PPMs used out-of-state 
have no or only minimal cross-border environmental effects. A de minimis test would 
bar the authority from applying the PPM-criteria to out-of-state production. These 
forms of reverse discrimination could be problematic in light of the strict equal 
treatment principle in procurement law.  
A complete rejection of the possibility to take into account out-of-state effects would 
create tensions with the principle of equal treatment due to the reverse discrimination 
                                                 
1553 Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change (OUP 2007) 493. 
1554 See Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Application of the EC Treaty and Directives to Horizontal Policies: A Critical 
Review’, in Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law– New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 175-182. 
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that would arise when bids are scored on the basis of the level of emissions or 
externality costs. In case a public authority cannot, and hence does not, take into 
account the global effects, it would mean that out-of-state companies with poor 
environmental performance would be awarded a competitive advantage. Such an 
outcome could be argued to contradict fair competition on the global market. Hence, 
authorities might very well have the right to implement criteria that target also pure out-
of-state effects. The principle of equal treatment does not apply under trade law and the 
status of reverse discrimination is contested.1555 Therefore, it would in principle be 
possible to argue for a more permissive approach to extraterritoriality under 
procurement law.  
Yet another example can be offered. The contracting authority might award points to 
bidders that use a specific PPM. In some circumstances the use of that sustainable PPM 
out-of-state instead of less sustainable PPMs could have significant environmental 
benefits in the state of production but only minimal benefits for the home state of the 
contracting authority. Not awarding bidders with out-of-state sustainable production 
any points for the use of the preferred PPM would clearly be discriminatory and illegal. 
This would further support the argument that out-of-state environmental effects may be 
considered in the design of PPM-criteria. 
Furthermore, there may also exist a practical reason for allowing contracting authorities 
to tackle out-of-state effects. Namely, a narrow approach to the geographical scope of 
included externalities will face difficulties of practical implementation in evaluation 
criteria. The value of externalities is subjective, and it may therefore be hard to 
determine whether an authority has exceeded its competence in this respect. For 
example, the contracting authority might award points for the adopted PPM or related 
emission levels and give this element a significant weight. The intention of the 
contracting authority might well be to not only enhance the internalization of the 
environmental externalities of cross-border pollution, but also to indirectly address out-
of-state environmental effects for either moral reasons or extraterritorial environmental 
reasons. The contracting authority might still claim that the criteria are designed to 
address only in-state externalities and it will often be difficult to prove the contrary. It 
                                                 
1555 Elisa Ambrosini, ‘Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: An Internal Market Perspective’, in Lucia 
Serena Rossi and Federico Casolari (eds.), The Principle of Equality in EU Law (Springer 2017) 255; 
Dominik Hanf, ‘‘Reverse Discrimination’ in EU Law: Constitutional Aberration, Constitutional 
Necessity, or Judicial Choice?’ (2011) 18 Maastricht J. European and Comparative L. 29. 
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would arguably be more transparent if the contracting authority could openly show how 
it has taken into account out-of-state effects in its design of PPM-criteria. 
There are good reasons to believe that authorities may extend PPM-criteria also to out-
of-state production so that they address out-of-state effects with no environmental or 
social cross-border impact. At the same time, it should be recalled that whereas the 
legal texts of technical specification and the GPA text on evaluation criteria are silent 
on the issue, the text on evaluation criteria in EU directives would not appear favorable 
to criteria targeting out-of-state effects. Would there exist some room for the 
interpretation that the text of the EU directives on award criteria allows for the inclusion 
of the purely out-of-state share of the effects in the evaluation?  
In accordance with EU directives the economically most advantageous bid from the 
point of view of the public authority should be chosen. It could be argued that the 
wording of the EU directives should be given a broad meaning. That is in fact what has 
already happened. Namely, a narrow reading of economic advantage from the 
perspective of the contracting authority would lead to the conclusion that authorities 
could, for example, not award points for the taste of food. Taste is a subjective 
experience that increases utility but that does not have economic value in the strict 
sense. Clearly such a narrow reading has not been intended by the legislator and taste 
criteria for food have regularly been applied. Instead, ‘economic advantage’ should 
likely be understood as anything that consumers find value in, including factors that 
increase utility but not economic welfare in a strict sense. This also gains support from 
Max Havelaar,1556 where the ECJ did not seem to pay attention to the fact that the fair 
trade label that the contracting authority referred to in its tender included criteria on 
out-of-state governance structures and compensation received by farmers out-of-state. 
Such factors might add utility but not economic value in the strict sense for the 
contracting authority. In future cases the ECJ will hopefully confirm the broad 
interpretation of ‘economic advantage’ more explicitly. 
All in all, when legal texts are ambiguous, key principles, such as equal treatment, 
might guide the interpretation. Reading EU directives in light of this principle leads to 
the conclusion that public authorities shall apply the same technical specifications on 
out-of-state producers even when there are no cross-border effects. Equally, authorities 
                                                 
1556 Case C-368/10 Commission v Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284. 
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may in award criteria take into account the full out-of-state effects and are not restrained 
to calculate only cross-border effects. There are no strong reasons to believe that the 
GPA could not be interpreted similarly. The provisions of the international procurement 
agreement are silent on the question of extraterritoriality. Hence, opposing interests, 
values and principles have to be reconciled. In WTO law the value of global fairness 
would support the rejection of criteria that tackle pure out-of-state effects either on 
environmental or moral grounds. However, the value of global fairness must be 
reconciled with sustainability interests such as environmental protection, the internal 
coherence of public procurement law, as well as equal treatment and fair competition. 
6.3.6. Lessons from the Case of Social Sustainability Criteria 
6.3.6.1. Working Conditions and EU Public Procurement Law 
The legal status of certain social sustainability criteria in general and criteria on terms 
and conditions of doing work in particular, may shed additional light on the strength of 
the competing arguments in relation to extraterritoriality and the geographical scope of 
effects that may be addressed with PPM-criteria. In order to avoid confusion, it should 
at the outset be emphasized that the test of extraterritoriality may be relevant in a variety 
of legal contexts relating to criteria on working conditions. For example, the EU 
directive on posted workers1557 has been adopted to address cases where a foreign 
bidder intends to send its workers to the Member State of the public authority to carry 
out work or provide the service. The directive specifies what provisions on working 
terms and conditions may be applied under such circumstances. These types of cases 
have been interpreted by the ECJ in the context of public procurement.1558 The situation 
is, however, different when the social criteria apply to work that is carried out by the 
workers of the foreign bidder on foreign territory. The principles applicable to this 
situation must in turn be found in WTO Agreements, the EU procurement directives 
and the TFEU. 
                                                 
1557 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L18, 21.1.1994, 1. 
1558 For interpretation of the directive see Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert, in his 
capacity as liquidator of the assets of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG v. Land Niedersachsen 
[2008] ECR I-1989. On the scope of application of national labor legislation on temporary foreign 
workers see also Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Ld v. Office national d'immigration [1990] ECR I-
1417, para. 18. 
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The EU Commission has argued that compliance with ILO provisions would be suitable 
as contract performance conditions.1559 It has also emphasized that these criteria could 
be applied even for subcontractors.1560 Despite these statements on working conditions 
criteria, the Commission does not explicitly take any stance on whether the public 
authority could apply criteria on working conditions that go beyond the obligations that 
are already applicable under the law applied in the state of production (manufacture). 
It, however, does note, that criteria on working conditions in supply contracts (i.e. 
procurement of goods) may be more problematic than in service or works contracts 
because the criteria in supply contracts would normally affect activities within the 
territory of another state and could in the view of the Commission be regarded as 
discriminatory or unjustifiable restrictions on trade.1561 This would suggest that the 
Commission is rather hesitant to accept working conditions criteria with extraterritorial 
scope. However, in the same document the Commission also states that criteria on 
wages and labor conditions as well as child labor restrictions would be particularly 
relevant in trade with countries outside the EU.1562 This in turn would suggest that 
criteria may target pure out-of-state social effects. 
The EU public procurement directive requires that bidders that utilize child labor are 
excluded from the competition.1563 This provision would apply to any foreign bidder 
regardless of whether the use of child labor would take place in the country of the 
authority, another Member State or any non-EU country. This confirms that some 
criteria on working conditions abroad may be justifiable. However, it does not provide 
any definite answer to the question of extraterritoriality, as the provision could in 
principle have been included as a case where that type of condition may exceptionally 
be applied.1564 
                                                 
1559 Buying Social – A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement 
(European Commission 2010) 44-45. See also recital 98, Art. 18(2) and Annex X, Directive 2014/24/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing 
Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1560 Buying Social – A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement 
(European Commission 2010) 47-48. 
1561 Id. 45. 
1562 Id. 47. 
1563 See Art. 57, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65.  
1564 Cf. interpretation of the relationship between the different grounds of justification in Article XX 
GATT. See section 6.2.2.1. 
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6.3.6.2. The Objectives of Criteria on Working Terms and Conditions 
Howse and Regan argue that most labor provisions are redistributive and unlike 
environmental PPM-criteria do not tackle externalities.1565 This argument seems 
controversial as such because labor conditions could mitigate social harm and problems 
in the state where the work takes place. But would it have any relevance for externalities 
in the regulating state? 
A public authority might decide to require that also work conducted out-of-state must 
comply with the labor laws in force in the home state of the purchasing authority. What 
effects would such procurement provisions address? In comparison to environmental 
effects and externalities, social effects and externalities often have less of a cross-border 
character. For example, human rights violations or poor working conditions in one state 
may cause social problems within that state. These in-state social problems, however, 
will often not have any effects on other states. By extending the application of criteria 
on working conditions to work conducted out-of-state, the public authority will likely 
not create any additional benefit for the social conditions in its home state. The 
application of the criteria on working conditions out-of-state will likely only have out-
of-state effects in terms of improved social conditions. The question on whether 
targeting pure out-of-state effects is compatible with procurement law or not will thus 
arise with respect to social criteria. 
Admittedly, bad social conditions in one state may trigger migration. There are, 
however, other laws that restrict migration. Moreover, there is even uncertainty as to 
whether the effect of legal migration would be positive or negative on other states. 
Thus, negative social effects and externalities may be regarded as primarily local and 
negative cross-border effects of out-of-state working conditions would likely be 
minimal. 
In case it is legal for authorities to include social criteria on working conditions in other 
states, then it would suggest that criteria can be implemented to address very minimal 
cross-border effects and probably even purely out-of-state effects. There would be no 
obligation to assess only the costs that would be borne by the in-state society as 
externalities could in that case be estimated to their full global value. 
                                                 
1565 Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European J. International L. 249, 283-284. 
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Adopting criteria on working conditions that apply also to work conducted out-of-state 
could potentially rely on an objective to address either in-state moral concerns or purely 
out-of-state social externalities. Hence, in case criteria on out-of-state working 
conditions are compatible with procurement law, it would likely mean that it is either 
justifiable to address out-of-state social externalities or to target out-of-state social 
effects because such measure contributes to in-state utility. An authority that applies 
criteria on environmental or labor standards may argue that while such standards protect 
public health and certain moral values on foreign territory where work would be carried 
out, those same standards also guarantee that the authority does not import goods that 
have been produced with methods that the domestic population consider immoral and 
that results in utility loss. Domestic taxpayers have an interest not to contribute to such 
immoral activities and even if the criteria have extraterritorial effects it could be argued 
that there is also a domestic interest protected. 
It was previously argued that the theory of protecting against out-of-state effects for 
reasons relating to out-of-state environmental or social externalities might be difficult 
to square with the wording on award criteria in EU directives. The theory on morals 
and utility could from this perspective have more force. There would, however, exist a 
significant limitation to the application of the moral justification theory. Namely, it 
might well be that the international community does not view the question of, for 
example, minimum wages as a moral question. Other labor questions, such as a ban on 
child labor and forced labor would in turn clearly be moral questions. 
6.3.6.3. ECJ Case Law on Monetary Compensation for Work Abroad 
ECJ case law confirms that criteria on the level of pay, compensation for work as well 
as other working conditions could be applied as award criteria. These cases provide 
further insight into the geographical scope of legal criteria. 
In Max Havelaar the Dutch authority had introduced the requirement of a fair trade 
label for ingredients in coffee machines, such as milk, sugar and cocoa. The label was 
granted if the importer had long-term contracts with small developing country farmer 
organizations with a democratic governance structure provided that the farmers 
received an adequate level of compensation for the products, or in other words for the 
fruits of their labor. Many ingredients had to be imported as they are not grown in the 
Netherlands. The criteria on fair trade and a certain level of compensation for farmers 
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were consequently relevant for the levels of pay to farmers in other countries than the 
Netherlands. Yet, the ECJ did not seem to discuss or condemn this element of 
extraterritoriality at any point in the judgment.1566 The use of the labels in the award 
criteria in that case was prohibited primarily because of other reasons, such as the fact 
that the public authority had not in the call published the requirements included in the 
labels.1567 On the one hand, the ruling in Max Havelaar could be read to support to the 
view that criteria targeting purely out-of-state effects may as a matter of principle be 
justifiable. On the other hand, it may well be that the ECJ never saw a reason to reflect 
on extraterritoriality because the criteria did not comply with procurement law for other 
reasons. 
Parallels can be drawn with Bundesdruckerei, which was a case that concerned the 
decision by German authorities to require that bidders committed to pay workers in 
Poland a level of pay that corresponded with German minimum wage legislation. The 
wage requirement was a minimum requirement applicable to bids and thus not an award 
criterion. The ECJ applied free movement law to the case and stated that a requirement 
on minimum wages could in principle advance the legitimate objective of protecting 
against social dumping.1568  In the end it, however, struck down the requirement 
because the required level of pay did not relate to the costs of living out-of-state and 
was therefore disproportionally high.1569 Of interest here is again that the Court opted 
in its analysis not to explicitly refer to the extraterritorial nature of the requirement. 
Although the proportionality review introduced a limit to the application of 
extraterritorial criteria in the case, the ECJ did not outright and categorically reject the 
implementation of criteria that address extraterritorial externalities or in-state utility 
loss stemming from moral views.  
There are many questions surrounding Max Havelaar and Bundesdruckerei. In 
principle, the ECJ might not have applied an extraterritoriality test because it found the 
criteria illegal for other reasons. Yet, it should be recalled that there would be valid 
reasons for rejecting the extraterritoriality test in EU public procurement law. The fact 
that the ECJ in both cases did not apply any extraterritoriality test could be read to 
suggest that no such test applies. It should be emphasized that as the ECJ applied free 
                                                 
1566 Case C-368/10 Commission v Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284, paras 80-97. 
1567 Id., paras 93-97. 
1568 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235, para. 31. 
1569 Id., paras 31-36. 
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movement law in Bundesdruckerei, the lack of extraterritoriality test might even extend 
to free movement law, contrary to what was suggested in section 6.2.  Alternatively, 
since the case concerned public procurement, it could be that public procurement enjoys 
an exemption under free movement law with respect to the application of an 
extraterritoriality test. The issue of coherence between procurement law and trade law 
will be examined more in detail below. 
All in all, although the ECJ has not explicitly addressed the issue, the case law on 
working conditions criteria in public procurement would appear to at least support the 
idea of PPM-criteria with a far-reaching extraterritorial dimension. Curiously, the 
decisions by the ECJ not to apply any extraterritoriality test or de minimis threshold in 
Max Havelaar and Bundesdruckerei can perhaps not be explained simply with 
reference to the requirement of equal treatment. For example, Bundesdruckerei 
concerned the act of extending national minimum wage laws to out-of-state production. 
There may not exist any strong equal treatment argument for such criteria because the 
minimum wage applicable to in-state production stemmed from national law and was 
thus not for in-state producers a criterion developed by the contracting authority. 
Moreover, low labor costs are a legitimate competitive advantage. 
There are other reasons why the ECJ rulings appear to reflect the view that contracting 
authorities can address pure out-of-state social effects. First, if reconciling equal 
treatment with other values results in the rejection of a de minimis test in some public 
procurement cases, that rejection of extraterritoriality tests is in the name of coherence 
merely extended to all public procurement cases. Secondly, it may be that other values, 
such as pragmatism, strengthen the argument for a rejection of a de minimis test in the 
context of procurement cases.  
6.3.6.4. Out-of-State Externalities Versus Utility Loss from Moral Concerns 
It is unclear whether the justifiability of the extraterritorial dimension of measures in 
public procurement should rely on moral aspects or on social (and in other cases 
environmental) externalities purely out-of-state. It may be recalled that the EU 
directives require that award criteria add value from the perspective of the contracting 
authority. It would seem difficult to square with the text of the directives the argument 
that contracting authorities have the right to tackle out-of-state externalities for social 
or environmental reasons since it would likely not add any such value from the 
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perspective of the contracting authority. Instead, the added value could be the increased 
utility in the home state of the contracting authority. This way the theory on moral 
objectives as legitimate grounds for tackling out-of-state environmental effects could 
be reconciled with the legal text. In other words, like WTO law in EC – Seals, also EU 
law might find itself advancing the theory on morality and utility. 
In Max Havelaar the ECJ found that requirements of fair trade could in principle be 
incorporated in award criteria. Fair trade might be viewed as a moral question. Hence, 
the case for the compatibility with EU law of fair trade criteria could in Max Havelaar 
have relied on the theory on morality and utility. This line of reasoning would allow for 
the approach in Max Havelaar to be reconciled with the wording of the directive on 
award criteria. Furthermore, the approach giving relevance to moral concerns would 
award the public authority a high degree of freedom. It is difficult to show that utility 
loss from out-of-state immoral activities has been disproportionally weighted and 
therefore, if the approach is adopted, public authorities could in practice award moral 
concerns a fairly high weight. A more crucial limitation to this approach would however 
be that the moral concerns referred to would need to be internationally recognized 
genuine moral concerns. 
Bundesdruckerei concerned criteria on minimum wages. In other ords, it was a case on 
working conditions and the objective of avoiding social dumping. The Court could in 
principle have stated that there was no genuine risk of social dumping that would have 
socially harmful consequences burdening the German moral beliefs and reducing their 
utility. It, however, did at least not explicitly link social dumping to the protection of 
public morals. The level of wages might not necessarily be a moral question. The fact 
that the Court went on to consider the proportionality of the criteria could imply that it 
viewed social dumping as a justifiable objective on the basis of the theory of tackling 
out-of-state social externalities. 
The criteria in Bundesdruckerei were implemented as technical specifications and not 
as award criteria. Hence, the permissibility of the criteria was not directly constrained 
by the wording of the article on award criteria. That being said, it would appear 
problematic for the internal coherence of EU public procurement law if absolute 
requirements in the form of technical specification could be justified with reference to 
purely out-of-state social or environmental externalities, but similar criteria could not 
be implemented as award criteria. Consequently, there would be room for the argument 
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that the possibility to incorporate extraterritorial criteria either as technical 
specifications or award criteria should rely on the same theory or theories. On the one 
hand, given the text of the EU directive on award criteria, reliance on the theory on 
morality and utility benefits in the state of the purchasing authority would appear more 
natural. On the other hand, public authorities addressing in-state externalities should 
extend the criteria to production out-of-state when necessary to ensure equal treatment 
even if the criteria would be unrelated to moral concerns. It would be important for the 
Court to clarify its position on this point. 
Even if no extraterritoriality test would apply, the criteria still need to survive the 
proportionality review. As explained above, in Bundesdruckerei the ECJ examined the 
trade law proportionality of a requirement that also those employees of the winning 
bidder who do not work in the state of the contracting authority are paid at least a salary 
corresponding to the minimum wage in the home state of the contracting authority. The 
ECJ stated that a requirement on minimum wages could in principle advance the 
legitimate objective of protecting against social dumping.1570 The requirement of 
payment of German minimum wages in Poland was disproportionate because the costs 
of living are lower in Poland.1571 While the conclusion as such is reasonable, it still 
remains unclear how exactly the Court arrived at it. The Court perhaps viewed tackling 
pure out-of-state externalities in Poland as a valid objective without any need to 
consider the effects on German in-state utility. The Court’s reasoning could then be 
understood to mean that although social dumping as a phenomenon may cause 
externalities in Poland, the minimum wage requirement went beyond what was 
necessary for tackling any potential externalities in Poland stemming from low wages.  
The decision in Bundesdruckerei does not necessarily mean that all social sustainability 
criteria that address out-of-state social effects would be problematic. Admittedly, in 
Max Havelaar the ECJ also found that reference to a fair trade label in the award criteria 
was not in accordance with the EU procurement directive applicable at that time.1572 
Yet, the ECJ did not exclude the possibility that it could had found the fair trade criteria 
proportional had the Dutch authority only specified in the call the individual criteria 
that had to be fulfilled.  Hence, while criteria on minimum wages out-of-state will face 
                                                 
1570 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235, para. 31. 
1571 Id. para. 34. 
1572 See Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284. 
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difficulties under the proportionality review, it may well be that more generally social 
and environmental PPM-criteria applicable to both in-state and out-of-state production 
could survive the proportionality review. 
All in all, there are good arguments for accepting PPM-criteria in public procurement 
that address pure out-of-state effects. Whether this relies on a theory of moral concerns 
and utility protection or on the recognition of a right to address extraterritorial social or 
environmental effects for social and environmental reasons is to some extent a 
theoretical discussion. Under either approach PPM-criteria would need to be integrated 
through verifiable and objectively quantifiable criteria, such as criteria on emission 
levels.  
6.3.7. Coherence within Economic Law? 
6.3.7.1. The Prospects of Incoherence 
There are strong links between trade law and procurement law. Diverging approaches 
in the two fields of law would risk creating tensions, as states would have incentives to 
use public procurement to exert extraterritorial objectives that would not be possible 
through other governmental programs or measures. There is in other words some value 
in coherence between procurement law and trade law. This creates expectations that 
extraterritoriality would be approached in a similar fashion in both fields of law. 
It may be recalled that under trade law global environmental effects that have at least 
more than minimal cross-border implications have generally been regarded as valid 
grounds of justification. In contrast, purely foreign environmental effects and moral 
concerns can raise harsher objections. It is plausible that under trade law PPM-criteria 
may only be justifiable if they address a cross-border effect that exceeds a de minimis 
threshold.1573 This formed a hypothesis for trade law that here is tested against a broader 
analysis of economic law. 
The values to be reconciled are to a great extent identical in trade law and procurement 
law and a de minimis threshold would offer a compromise also in procurement law. 
However, there may exist reasons to accept measures with far-reaching extraterritorial 
effects in public procurement law. Namely, in procurement law it is crucial to factor in 
also at least the principle of impartial and equal treatment of tenders. This principle has 
                                                 
1573 See section 6.2. 
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been more explicitly referred to in procurement law than global fairness. Hence, it will 
likely be given more weight. What follows is that the argument for a de minimis 
threshold will be weaker in procurement law. In public procurement law it is likely 
possible to justify an approach where utility loss from moral concerns, cross-border 
effects under a de minimis threshold and perhaps even pure out-of-state effects could 
be targeted. 
The consequences of potential divergent approaches to extraterritoriality in trade law 
and procurement law will be examined in the subsequent subsections. 
6.3.7.2. Extraterritoriality in the GATT and the GPA 
The fact that the GATT and the GPA do not have overlapping scope offers significant 
room for diverging approaches. Thus, even if a de minimis threshold would apply under 
the GATT, rejecting a de minimis threshold under the GPA would not stand in direct 
conflict with the GATT. There is still some value in a uniform approach to 
extraterritoriality under the GATT and the GPA. That value might simply be 
outweighed by other considerations. It may be reasonable to treat trade law and public 
procurement law as separate cases under WTO law given that the values that are to be 
reconciled are not fully identical. Therefore, a de minimis threshold can apply under 
the GATT even if it would perhaps not apply under the GPA. 
One path to coherence would be for the de minimis test to be rejected both in 
procurement law and in trade law. The idea of a de minimis threshold under the GATT 
has never been confirmed.  It is possible that under both the GPA and the GATT 
measures addressing minimal or even non-existent cross-border environmental effects 
could be justifiable. 
It may be recalled that the decision in EC – Seals on the interpretation of the GATT the 
AB seemed to invite the reference to moral arguments in defense of PPM-criteria.1574  
This implied a possibility to rely on public morals as a ground of justification when 
adopting criteria that target purely out-of-state environmental effects. In other words, 
PPM-criteria might be justifiable when they protect against the loss of utility that would 
result from knowing that immoral PPMs may have been used in the production of the 
goods out-of-state. Under the logic of EC – Seals PPM-criteria would likely not face 
any significant restrictions on addressing purely out-of-state environmental effects. The 
                                                 
1574 See section 6.2.4.2. 
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moral argument could be applied also under the GPA. McCrudden has even argued that 
public authorities would have an obligation to require from bidders that human rights 
are respected also in countries of manufacture.1575  
There has been one case that related to morals and the GPA. In 1997 the EU together 
with Japan decided to challenge Massachusetts’ Burma Law, which in practice hindered 
companies doing business in Burma from receiving a public contract.1576 The law laid 
out that bids from such companies would be successful only if they were significantly 
more advantageous. The law was challenged by the EU despite opposition from both 
the European Parliament1577 and EU trade unions.1578 The Burma Law targeted human 
rights conditions far away from Massachusetts. It is difficult to identify any social 
externalities of the Massachusetts society that would be reduced. The law appears to 
have been adopted on moral grounds. Massachusetts in other words seemed to have 
thought it justifiable either to tackle purely foreign social effects or at least to tackle 
out-of-state activity due to the loss of in-state utility. Unfortunately, no decision on the 
compatibility of the law with the GPA was ever issued as the law was repealed after a 
finding that it did not comply with the U.S. Constitution.1579 
Was the challenge by the EU then a sign that it found it incompatible with the GPA to 
adopt criteria with a moral objective? Not necessarily. The concerns of the EU in the 
case of the Burma Law might have related more to the specific design of the law. For 
example, it is submitted here that it may have been problematic that the law penalized 
all companies present in Burma regardless of whether they were in any way, directly or 
indirectly, involved in human rights abuses. 
There are currently no cases on the relevance of the moral argument in the context of 
PPM-criteria under the GPA. It would seem likely that it would as far as possible be 
approached in a similar way as under the GATT. It may be recalled that it was 
previously in the context of trade law argued that the moral argument as a defense for 
                                                 
1575 Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal 
Change (OUP 2007) 90-91. 
1576 US – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, DS88, Request for Consultations by the 
European Communities, 20 June 1997. See also US – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 
DS95, Request for Consultations by Japan, 18 July 1997. 
1577 Minutes of Proceedings of the Sitting of 12 June 1997, OJ C/200, 30 June 1997, 174-175. 
1578 ‘EU Accused of Condoning “Pariah” Burma with WTO Action’, L’Agence France-Presse (21 
September 1998). 
1579 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 (2000); Christopher McCrudden, 
Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007) 295-296. 
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PPM-criteria will survive the proportionality review only if labelling does not form a 
reasonable alternative that ensures the same level of protection.1580 In the context of 
public procurement, sustainability criteria with extraterritorial effects would represent 
the only alternative to reflect consumer (moral) preferences. In contrast, in trade among 
private parties the moral choice related to the out-of-state environmental harm could 
potentially be left with the individual consumer on the market. Instead of prohibitive 
legislation it could perhaps be sufficient to require clear labelling, although EC – Seals 
was not clear on whether or not such a view should be adopted. Be that as it may, the 
difference between public procurement and other public measures could justify a state 
of affairs in which the public authority in practice can go a bit further with 
extraterritorial criteria in procurement decisions than the regulator perhaps may under 
trade law. 
6.3.7.3. Exemptions to EU Free Movement Law? 
In ECJ case law on social sustainability criteria in public procurement the court has not 
forcefully condemned extraterritoriality. This appears highly favorable for ambitions to 
tackle out-of-state effects. The complex value reconciliation that takes place under 
public procurement law appears to have led to the rejection of extraterritoriality tests 
under EU procurement law.  
In the EU all public procurement laws and decisions fall under the scope of EU free 
movement law. This means that public procurement law may only allow for 
extraterritoriality to the degree that it is accepted under EU free movement law. A more 
favorable approach to extraterritorial criteria in the procurement context could survive 
free movement law only if a specific exemption would be introduced under free 
movement law. There are thus two potential explanations to why it is possible that no 
extraterritoriality test applies to procurement decisions in the EU. One possibility is that 
an exemption applies under free movement law for public procurement and the other 
possibility is that under EU free movement law no de minimis test or other 
extraterritoriality test applies. 
Introducing exemptions to EU free movement law is bound to be controversial. Hence, 
the rejection of extraterritoriality in procurement law will create pressure to adopt a 
more favorable view on measures that tackle purely out-of-state effects also under EU 
                                                 
1580 See section 6.2.4.2. 
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free movement law. Indeed, there is much uncertainty with respect to extraterritoriality 
under EU free movement law. Like in the case of GATT, the theory on a de minmis 
test in EU free movement law has never been confirmed. It is plausible that no 
extraterritoriality tests would apply in EU economic law generally and that coherence 
between trade and procurement law prevails. Rejecting de minimis tests in EU law 
would of course become problematic in case GATT would be interpreted to include a 
de minimis test, since it would result in a situation where a trade restriction is prohibited 
under GATT, at the same time as it would have been interpreted as a legal trade 
restriction between EU Member States under EU law. Hence, even from the perspective 
of EU law it would be important for clarification on WTO law. 
Although the application of a de minimis threshold in EU free movement law is 
uncertain, it was still argued previously in this book that it would represent a good 
compromise after reconciling all relevant values in EU free movement law.1581 At the 
same time, adding equal treatment to the equation would support the conclusion that no 
de minimis threshold or extraterritoriality test would apply in a public procurement 
context. Tackling pure out-of-state effects may be justifiable with reference to the 
protection of moral values and related utility or perhaps even with reference to the 
protection of out-of-state social and environmental externalities. A divergence in 
approach to extraterritoriality for cases on public procurement would necessitate an 
exemption from EU free movement law. Hence, an exemption for the extraterritoriality 
test might potentially apply to public procurement under EU free movement law.  
Exemptions for public procurement cases under EU free movement law could be 
limited to the extraterritoriality test. However, it should be recalled that several scholars 
have argued for a more general exemption under EU free movement law for public 
procurement decisions on ‘what to buy’. Criteria on PPMs could potentially fall under 
the scope of ‘excluded buying decisions’. It was, however, submitted earlier in this 
book that the idea of such general exemption should be viewed with caution.1582 And 
even if there would exist a general exemption for decisions by procuring authorities on 
‘what to buy’ because the authorities act as market participant, it should still on its own 
not to lead to the conclusion that extraterritorial criteria are legal. Namely, it can be 
                                                 
1581 See sections 6.2.2.4. and 6.2.6. 
1582 See section 2.3.4. 
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argued that extraterritorial criteria have a strong regulatory element.1583 Contracting 
authorities that adopt criteria with a strong extraterritorial element act more like a 
market regulator than as a purchaser comparable to private market participants. 
Extraterritorial criteria do not serve the purpose of adding economic value sensu stricto 
for the authority. Instead, they establish requirements that are more of a value choice 
reflecting a moral view. The element of value choice could be regarded to increase the 
regulatory, as oppose to the market participant, nature of adopting the criteria. The 
argument could be made that public authorities need to abstain from regulatory 
activities since they do not possess the same strong democratic legitimacy as the 
legislature. What follows from all of the above, is that any potential exemption for 
public procurement from a potentially applicable extraterritoriality test under free 
movement law could not simply rely on the idea of procuring authorities as market 
participants that have freedom to decide what to buy but would instead need to form a 
separate exemption that relies on independent principles and theory. 
6.3.8. Negotiations and Public Procurement Criteria 
In US – Shrimp the Appellate Body indicated that unjustifiable discrimination under 
Article XX GATT may occur when PPM-criteria have been designed without 
negotiations with other states.1584 It was in the discussion on trade law argued that it 
was not fully evident whether the AB viewed only the fact that the U.S. had not 
negotiated equally with all states as constituting unjustifiable discrimination, or if the 
AB expected that states always negotiate with other states before adopting PPM-
criteria.1585 It was submitted that even if there should be no obligation to always 
negotiate before adopting PPM-criteria, such negotiations would still have political 
value.1586 Considering that it was illustrated in this chapter that public procurement 
cases may invite measures with an extraterritorial dimension, it should be examined 
                                                 
1583 This view appears to have been adopted in the U.S. Under dormant Commerce Clause market 
participants are exempted from the non-discrimination principle. Procuring agencies have been regarded 
as market participants, as opposed to market regulators. See sections 2.3.2.4. and 2.3.4. The status as 
non-regulators does generally provide agencies with more discretion. Courts have ruled that the 
prohibition of extraterritorial measures overrides the market participant exemption. See e.g. Air 
Transport Association of America v. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998). Hence 
neither procurement laws nor purchasing decisions shall breach it. Extraterritorial criteria are in other 
words in some sense likened with regulation. 
1584 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58, AB Report, 12 Oct., 1998, 
paras 166-172. 
1585 See section 6.2.7. 
1586 Ibid. 
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what role negotiations could have in the context of designing PPM-criteria for 
procurement. 
In public procurement, any decision of involving stakeholders must be carefully 
designed. According to Article X.5 GPA a contracting authority shall not seek advice 
for technical specifications in a specific procurement from persons with a commercial 
interest in the procurement if doing so would preclude competition. Yet Article III GPA 
allows for exemptions to Article X GPA on grounds of protection of for example public 
morals and public health. The GPA does not fully preclude the possibility of 
nconsultation even with respect to the design of specific tenders. Hence, it has been 
possible to allow for market consultations under EU directives.1587 The public authority 
may conduct market research and can even invite potential bidders to comment draft 
criteria.1588 This invitation should, however, likely be published in order to offer all 
potential bidders an equal opportunity. In any case, the public authority cannot freely 
negotiate with some of the potential bidders on what PPM-criteria a specific call should 
include.  
In-depth stakeholder involvement in the form of negotiations on PPM-criteria in public 
procurement would need to relate to what type of criteria authorities should apply in 
procurement in general. For example, in-state and out-of-state stakeholders may be 
invited by the (national or local) government to discuss what PPM-criteria should be 
encouraged in (national or local) procurement strategies or even in procurement 
legislation. In sum, there is in this respect no major difference between trade law and 
procurement law. The pressure for inviting out-of-state stakeholders to negotiations on 
PPM-criteria is directed at the phase when laws and policies are prepared also when the 
criteria do not relate to public procurement.  
                                                 
1587 Art. 40 and 41, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, 65. 
1588 Kirsi-Maria Halonen and Johanna Sammalmaa, ‘Hankintayksikön ja potentiaalisten tarjoajien 
välinen vuoropuhelu julkista hankintaa valmisteltaessa’ (2017) 98 Defensor Legis 34. 
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Conclusions on Extraterritoriality 
The reconciliation of free trade on the one hand and environmental protection through 
reducing externalities on the other hand can be made against an efficiency rationale. In 
previous chapters of this book it was already illustrated how the reconciliation of free 
trade and the elimination of externalities through environmental protection may be 
affected by other values. This sixth chapter built on those observations by identifying 
values related to extraterritoriality that may be of relevance for the value reconciliation 
process. Moreover, the discussion on extraterritoriality also contributed to the 
discussion on the nature of the efficiency theory underlying trade law. 
As a starting point, it was noted that states may require that their own industry complies 
with strict rules on sustainable process and production methods. For example, 
generating energy from fossil fuels can be limited and renewables can be encouraged. 
The focus in this book has been on the fact that this system can be expanded to concern 
also imports. Consequently, the state aims to affect how the products are produced in 
other states. Whether the product has been produced sustainably or not may not be 
visible in the end product. With PPM-criteria the importing state thus adopts a measure 
that does not aim to protect its in-state environment from products that are 
environmentally hazardous when consumed. Instead, the objective is to lower pollution 
at home as well as abroad, depending on where production takes place.  
A challenge against criteria that also tackle unsustainable production abroad may be 
framed as a conflict between the importing state’s interest in environmental protection, 
on the one hand, and the exporting state’s interest in free trade, on the other hand. The 
interest in environmental protection could either relate to the reduction of externalities 
or to morality and utility maximization. Several values have to be taken into 
consideration when reconciling the opposing interests. For example, in the EU and the 
U.S. the exporting state might refer to mutual trust and loyalty, whereas the importing 
state might refer to the interests of all residents of the union in the whole common 
territory. In turn, in WTO law there could in principle be more emphasis on the 
exporting state’s interest in global fairness. Economic law in all three jurisdictions has 
struggled to solve the equation. 
The reason for adopting PPM-criteria with an extraterritorial reach may relate to 
concerns that the pollution in the producing state will sooner or later also affect the 
environment in the importing state. Balancing all different interests and values requires 
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a compromise. Hence, it could for example be argued that PPM-criteria should only be 
justifiable in case the cross-border effect exceeds a de minimis threshold. Although that 
theory has gained scholarly support, it was shown in this chapter that such a limitation 
on valid grounds of justification may be difficult to uphold. This applies to both the 
GATT, where the interpretation of morality as a ground of justification in EC – Seals 
has put the relevance of any geographical limitation into question, and to EU law, where 
there is pressure for coherence between trade law and public procurement law. 
Importantly, the legal text in the TFEU and the GATT do not set out any limit on the 
geographical scope of the grounds of justification. 
Apart from environmental protection, also moral concerns may be behind the 
introduction of PPM-criteria. In other words, the state adopting the PPM-criteria, and 
more specifically its people, may wish to eliminate the economic contribution of their 
own consumption to unsustainable producers. The WTO regime has been open toward 
the moral argument in the context of PPM-criteria. As a matter of principle, recognizing 
the relevance of a moral argument in defence of environmental PPM-criteria is of 
course of significance as it may suggest that global fairness has not been given much 
weight even in WTO law. However, it was submitted that environmental PPM-criteria 
with a moral objective could perhaps struggle to survive the proportionality review due 
to the option of labelling. 
An analysis of public procurement decisions and public procurement law revealed that 
even in EU law there has in recent years been a tendency to at the very least ignore the 
controversial topic of extraterritoriality. In other words, also EU law appears not to 
establish strict limitations on measures that address purely out-of-state social or 
environmental effects. 
What can then be said about the nature of efficiency promoted under economic law? A 
cohesive efficiency theory could be structured if states would be deemed to only have 
the right to adopt criteria addressing cross-border out-of-state environmental and social 
effects. Those criteria would reduce in-state externalities and efficiency could be 
expressed in terms of welfare. Yet, the results of this study indicate that criteria may 
tackle pure out-of-state social and environmental effects at least in some cirucmstances. 
This casted doubt on the prevelance of any cohesive and holistic efficiency theory that 
would cut across economic law. 
529
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   529 31.7.2019   7.16
 530 
The moral defence of PPM-criteria with an extraterritorial dimension has emerged in 
EC – Seals. Moreover, the defence could explain some parts of the ruling in Max 
Havelaar. However, the moral defence is problematic for a cohesive theory on 
efficiency under economic law. The protection of public morals may strive to increase 
utility. Maximizing utility is, however, clearly not the rationale that trade law is built 
on since even discrimination might increase utility. Utility in the context of morality 
could potentially form an exemption to a general theory on welfare in economic law. 
This exemption would, however, seem insufficient for public procurement law, where 
the principle of equal treatment would necessitate that criteria can address also out-of-
state effects unrelated to morality. 
An alternative theory for extending the geographical scope of valid sustainability 
objectives is available. States could have the right to address even purely out-of-state 
environmental and social effects because of a right to tackle those effects simply for 
environmental and social reasons. Without reverting back to the idea of protecting 
utility, it could perhaps be argued that the PPM-criteria would address externalities 
experienced by out-of-state people and in particular out-of-state future generations. 
This approach would be within the realm of welfare efficiency. However, two important 
points should be made. First, even under this alternative theory the justifiability of 
criteria on the flavor of food in public procurement still illustrates how aspects of utility 
cannot be escaped completely in economic law. Secondly, questions of democratic 
legitimacy will arise because the theory would mean that grounds of justification would 
expand from the protection of in-state externalities to out-of-state externalities. The 
importing state would essentially make the claim that it has the ability and right to 
correct what it regards as insufficient protection of out-of-state people and future 
generations. Democratic legitimacy consequently forms a value that has to be 
reconciled. 
This sixth chapter of the book also made some contributions to comparative economic 
law. Legal tests on extraterritoriality in law of justification may exist in any of the three 
jurisdictions. There has, however, under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause, been 
fairly limited debate so far. The wording of the test developed through case law would 
suggest that purely out-of-state effects cannot form a ground of justification. The 
strictest approach to extraterritoriality could be thus found in the U.S. This conclusion 
is not surprising in light of the fact that in the application of the dormant Commerce 
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Clause an extraterritoriality test has been introduced in law of prohibition. What follows 
from that test is that even non-discriminatory measures can be in conflict with the 
constitution in case they are deemed extraterritorial. It was submitted that adopting 
PPM-criteria to create incentives on out-of-state businesses does not as such constitute 
prohibited extraterritorial regulation. However, a case law analysis lead to the 
conclusion that laws conditioning importation on the adoption of similar laws on PPM-
criteria also in the exporting state would likely be illegal. Moreover, criteria that in 
essence regulate also contracts between two parties that are fully out-of-state would be 
prohibited extraterritorial regulation because the measure would have been adopted 
without out-of-state representation. In other words, the U.S. appears to have integrated 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
In this book some observations were presented on the dynamics of legal tests in trade 
law and related branches of economic law. The objective was to provide answers to two 
main questions. The first question concerned the structure and design of value 
reconciliation tests in trade law and the potential challenges that arise in the application 
of the tests when examining state sustainability criteria and in particular PPM-criteria. 
The second question in turn related to the values that are reconciled in the process of 
designing and applying the different tests. The focus was in particular on whether the 
tests follow some form of efficiency rationale and what other values than efficiency 
may be given weight under the applicable value reconciliation tests. 
The study explored the main research questions in the context of EU, U.S. and WTO 
law. Hence, the study did not only provide insight into legal tests and reconciled values, 
but also lay out the foundations for mutual learning. Furthermore, the analysis of value 
reconciliation tests in cases on PPM-criteria offered thoughts on the compatibility of 
such criteria with the different trade law regimes. 
This final chapter of the book offers conclusions with respect to the research questions 
set forth in the introductory chapter of the book. With this objective in mind the various 
observations made in the previous chapters will be summarized in five separate 
sections. Each section represents a different perspective on the results of the research. 
As the perspectives are closely intertwined, there will inevitably be some overlap 
between the points made in the different sections.  
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7.1. Trade Law and Efficiency Theories 
7.1.1. Efficiency as an Underlying Value in Law of Prohibition 
Efficiency is a core value in economic law reflected in the free trade principle of non-
discrimination. Discrimination and nationalism may in some cases increase utility but 
would on the whole decrease welfare of states. Thus, the efficiency promoted through 
the non-discrimination principle is that of welfare and not utility.  
The scope of prima facie prohibited restrictions on trade has been shaped through the 
legal tests of law of prohibition. The scope might to some extent, in particular in EU 
free movement law, go beyond non-discrimination. The non-discrimination principle 
still forms the core of law of prohibition. In order to establish whether or not there is 
discrimination it is necessary to define like products. Discrimination occurs when like 
in-state and out-of-state products are treated unlike to the disadvantage of the latter. 
While there has been some ambiguity with respect to how the test of like products is 
applied in each of the three jurisdictions, the focus tends to be on whether the products 
are substitutes and in competition. This approach to likeness means that there is no 
room for discrimination through an artificial division of markets. A broad 
understanding of likeness ensures efficiency. 
The broad interpretation of the scope of prima facie prohibited discriminatory measures 
also concerns other tests than the test of likeness. For example, measures that may be 
prima facie prohibited include not only laws and administrative praxis but also state 
recommendations. It was argued that even non-discriminatory labelling schemes set up 
by states could be prima facie prohibited if they enable in-state consumers to engage in 
discriminatory behavior. Although labels increase market information and thus in 
principle advance efficiency, they might still endanger the efficiency of free trade if 
they are utilized for protectionist purposes. For this reason, it is better to scrutinize such 
labels under law of justification. Labelling schemes for the marking of PPMs will still 
survive the proportionality review if properly designed. 
Further, with respect to the scope of prima facie prohibited measures, it should be noted 
that a state decision not to act may have similar discriminatory effects as a decision to 
adopt a measure. EU free movement law has been applied to a failure by a state to act 
in a couple of cases. Yet, it is not clear how the applicability of trade law on state 
inaction would be approached more generally under the different jurisdictions. For 
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example, would the decision by a state not to restrict its industry from relying on high-
pollution PPMs constitute a state measure that may be scrutinized under trade law? In 
case the concept of measures is interpreted not to cover inaction generally, states will 
be able to continue to favor their high-pollution industries by taking a passive approach 
to environmental protection and climate change. If law of prohibition does not capture 
state inaction, there will be the risk that trade law regimes cement some degree of bias 
against, for example, environmental protection. Leaving such inaction outside the scope 
of trade law would mean that trade law reinforces an idea of free trade and open 
competition, and not an idea of an efficient markets without externalities. In other 
words, the decision on whether or not to include inaction under the scope of law of 
prohibition has implications for what type of efficiency doctrine trade law advances. If 
state inaction would fall under scrutiny in trade law, and it is submitted it should, the 
consequence could be that a state is found to not have complied with trade law when 
there is overwhelming scientific evidence to support the need for action and the 
decision not to act works to the benefit of the in-state industry. 
Finally, trade law covers only state measures and as a rule not private party action. The 
exclusion of private party action from the scope of trade law does reflect certain values 
relating to the freedom of the private sector to choose its contracting parties. Feedback 
will be provided by markets to private actors for their business decisions. Importantly, 
the rules of competition law will guard efficiency with respect to measures by private 
parties. Different fields of economic law complement each other. 
7.1.2. Diversions from the Efficiency Rationale in Law of Prohibition 
There are some exemptions to the prohibition of discriminatory state measures under 
the U.S. dormanr Commerce Clause. Two exemptions are particularly significant. First, 
states may as a rule adopt discriminatory subsidies. Secondly, states may discriminate 
when they act as market participants. These represent sidesteps from the traditional 
efficiency rationale of law of prohibition. 
The exemptions give states more power to adopt measures at the expense of the free 
trade regime. In principle states may rely on the exemptions for the purposes of 
environmental protection.  However, as a rule even de jure discriminatory state 
measures will be justifiable when the exemptions apply. Implementing de jure 
discrimination would benefit sustainable in-state solutions when out-of-state solutions 
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could achieve better environmental protection at a lower cost. The exemptions may in 
other words be detrimental to efficient environmental protection. 
A state acts as a market participant when it does not regulate the market but engages in 
transactions on the market. The Supreme Court has occasionally in its application of 
the exemptions emphasized that the discriminatory measure taken by the state entity 
participating on the market addressed a market failure. It is not clear whether the market 
participant exemption can be evoked only if the measure addresses a market failure. 
There would be a stronger economic rationale behind an exemption when it is linked to 
the existence of market failures. At the same time, an exemption for cases of market 
failures would blur the line between law of prohibition and law of justification. 
Introducing a test on market failure to the market participant exemption would mean 
that values similar to those that form grounds of justification would be taken into 
account already in law of prohibition. Importantly, even a test on market failure would 
not change the fact that the market participant exemption, much like the subsidy 
exemption, invites states to adopt measures of de jure discriminatory when the same 
objective could be reached without the de jure discriminatory elements. A market 
failure prong to the market participant exemption would not align the exemption with 
an efficiency rationale.  
The application of a market participant exemption has sparked some discussion on 
whether also state measures that create markets should be exempted from the dormant 
Commerce Clause. A market creation test could be of relevance for emissions trading 
systems (ETS) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). Emission trading systems 
typically set out a quota for pollution and producers who pollute more than their share 
have to buy credits from those who pollute less. In turn, a renewable portfolio standard 
creates a quota for renewable energy and credits are awarded for generating such 
renewable energy that is perceived as sustainable. Retailers who sell renewable energy 
in excess of the quota can also sell credits to those retail companies who would 
otherwise not comply with their quota for renewables. 
In some sense the state that introduces an ETS or a RPS creates a credit market through 
which it aims to create a market for more sustainably produced products. To date the 
U.S. Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to adopt a position on the applicability 
of a market creation exemption. From the perspective of efficiency, it would suffer from 
many of the same flaws as the market participant exemption. Courts should offer a more 
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detailed account of the underlying reasons when they deviate from an economic ratio 
in economic law. Clarifications on the reasons behind the market participation 
exemptions would make it possible to better assess the value of applying a market 
creation exemption. 
Interestingly, a market creation exemption has been introduced under the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The situation under that 
agreement is, however, not fully comparable to the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
SCM Agreement does regrettably not include any grounds of justification. The decision 
to introduce a market creation exemption ensures that states are not deprived of the 
right to adopt subsidies that tackle externalities. At the same time a market creation 
exemption would of course open the door for some inefficient de jure discrimination. 
However, no fully satisfactory solution exists due to the design of the SCM Agreement.  
Seriously restricting the possibility of subsidies for renewable energy would arguably 
not have been any better from the perspective of efficiency. 
Diversions from the efficiency rationale could also be creeping into EU free movement 
law. Many scholars have argued that decisions on what to buy by procuring authorities 
should be exempted from free movement law. As a rule, EU free movement law applies 
only to general and consistent administrative practice. However, in the context of public 
procurement it has been extended to apply also to individual tenders. Thus, the 
proposed exemption migh be less problematic if it applies exclusively when public 
authorities make decisions on single tenders. The exemption becomes more 
controversial if it applies even to national procurement laws or general and consistent 
procurement practices defining what to buy. Laws and practices might occasionally 
have been designed with the intent of favoring in-state products or bidders. For 
example, the decision might be taken in a state to direct that public authorities should 
buy certain products that are commonly available among in-state companies, all while 
products that on the market are perceived as good substitutes would not be accepted by 
the public authorities. Similarly, a public authority could itself decide on such a general 
policy if it is given the freedom to determine what to buy. Allowing states and public 
authorities to re-define the relevant market and what is to be considered like products 
would undermine the principle of non-discrimination and would create tension with the 
objectives of free trade and efficiency. 
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Exemptions to the non-discrimination principle result in diversions from the efficiency 
rationale. There would arguably also be a diversion from the efficiency rationale if 
some non-trade values would be given significance independent of the test of 
substitutability and competition in the application of the test on the likeness of products.  
In all cases discussed above the diversion from the efficiency rationale was the result 
of the application of the non-discrimination principle being narrowed down. There 
have, at least in EU and U.S. trade law, been tests applied to expand the scope of law 
of justification beyond the non-discrimination principle. The prohibition of some non-
discriminatory market access hinders in the EU does not stand in conflict with an 
efficiency rationale as states may still rely on grounds of justifications in order to 
address local externalities. In contrast, the expansion of law of prohibition beyond the 
non-discrimination principle might have created some tension with the efficiency 
rationale in the U.S. Under the extraterritoriality test of the dormant Commerce Clause 
states may not regulate conduct wholly outside their territory. The electricity sector is 
a peculiar market since the product – electricity – is delivered through a transmission 
grid. The introduction of a state ban on some PPMs in the electricity sector could 
potentially be seen as a measure that regulates wholly out-of-state conduct because the 
access of electricity generating companies to the regulating state’s market would in 
practice, due to the inter-state grid, be conditioned on the companies also not selling 
electricity generated with the controversial PPM in-state. In other words, under the ban 
power plants that deliver electricity onto the local grid and intend to export some power 
to the regulating state would need to comply with the PPM-criteria for all their 
production. There would not exist any possibility to sell less sustainably generated 
electricity to customers in states that have not adopted the PPM-criteria as electricity 
sold to different states cannot be separated. Thus, the ban on unsustainable PPMs would 
control conduct wholly outside the regulating state in the sense that it would affect trade 
in electricity between parties that are located outside the regulating state. Due to the 
strict scrutiny that applies under the dormant Commerce Clause to findings of 
extraterritoriality, there would likely not be much room for justification even with 
reference to the protection against externalities. This could be seen as a conflict between 
the U.S. extraterritoriality test and the efficiency rationale. 
537
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7.1.3. Efficiency and Law of Justification 
Under law of justification a state may put forward the case that the discriminatory 
measure is necessary for a legitimate objective. For example, the state may argue that 
the measure is necessary for the protection of public health or the environment. 
Pursuing the non-trade objectives that have been accepted as valid grounds of 
justification in trade law can as a rule reduce negative externalities. The grounds of 
justification can under such conditions be reconciled with an efficiency ideal.  
States may adopt measures to protect the in-state environment. Whether states have the 
right to adopt discriminatory measures with the objective of tackling externalities 
experienced out-of-state is less clear. The protection against cross-border 
environmental effects will in any event form a valid ground of justification. There has, 
however, been some discussion as to whether the cross-border effects would have to 
exceed a de minimis threshold. Such threshold could weaken the rights of states to 
address in-state externalities and would be at odds with advancing efficiency. 
A discriminatory state measure that advances a legitimate objective, perhaps linked to 
a reduction of externalities, must also be proportional to its objective. Even if the 
applicable proportionality test will vary between the different jurisdictions, 
proportionality has still generally meant that there should as a bare minimum exist no 
less discriminatory measure that would guarantee at least the same level of protection. 
Measures that are more discriminatory than necessary for the objective would be 
inefficient. 
The reconciliation of non-discrimination and grounds of justification under the 
proportionality review takes into account efficiency from a broad societal perspective. 
For example, when states adopt a discriminatory measure, there might in principle exist 
some less discriminatory alternative that would ensure the same level of protection but 
would be unreasonably expensive or technically difficult. If the less discriminatory 
measure that could guarantee at least the same level of protection is unreasonable from 
an economic or technical perspective, the measure adopted by the state will stand. The 
proportionality review is not blind to administrative costs and burden. Taking into 
account the risk of unreasonable administrative costs ensures that states do not end up 
in a situation where they would be forced to settle for a less efficient alternative. There 
is in other words an element of cost-efficiency in the proportionality review. 
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The test on whether an alternative less discriminatory measure for tackling, for 
example, environmental problems might be technically and economically very 
burdensome works to the benefit of the state trying to defend its measure. In addition, 
the test serves societal efficiency in a broad sense. Interestingly, the objective of 
societal efficiency has also shaped the proportionality review in trade law to include 
requirements on how states design their trade restrictive measures. For example, when 
adopting new environmental criteria states should make the criteria clear and precise. 
Moreover, new criteria should be applied only after a reasonable transition period. 
Furthermore, companies that have been found not to comply with the criteria should be 
given a decision in writing, have the right to appeal and be granted due process. 
Transparency, transition periods and due process rights improve predictability for all 
companies and therefore contribute to societal efficiency. 
7.1.4. Whose Estimate on Externalities? 
States often adopt measures for tackling negative externalities that in their view 
otherwise would arise. Although such measures may have discriminatory effects, the 
state might have estimated that the externalities reduced with the measure carry more 
weight than the downsides of the measure. It may be that the state therefore views the 
measure suitable and necessary for a legitimate objective. However, the proportionality 
review sets out limits to the right of states to adopt discriminatory measures that it 
perceives and estimates as beneficial. 
States will not be able to defend measures that can hardly find any support in 
international science. In turn, when there is scientific uncertainty, with respect to for 
example an environmental threat, states can rely on its evaluation of externalities and 
have more freedom to adopt measures they view necessary. It can be argued that 
limiting the scope of grounds of justifications to those at least supported by some 
international science does not restrain the right of states to tackle externalities. When 
there is no scientific support of, for example, environmental harm, there is no 
externality to tackle. In other words, the state has adopted a measure without rational 
grounds. The driving force may potentially have been irrational fear or hidden 
protectionist intent. While adopting measures to address irrational fear might increase 
utility, it would not increase welfare. 
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The requirement of some support from international – or in the case of the dormant 
Commerce Clause perhaps federal – science is a key element in the proportionality 
review as it gives it some force. The proportionality review is otherwise normally quite 
deferential for measures that are de facto but not de jure discriminatory. Courts rarely 
deny states the right to adopt de facto discriminatory measures if the measure at least 
to some degree advances a legitimate objective more than any alternative measure. 
However, a scenario where the proportionality review may be unusually intense is when 
the state has adopted a ban or some other very restrictive measure while there would 
have existed the option of implementing a consumer information labelling scheme. 
Information on the market increases through the labelling of products. Labelling will 
thus improve efficiency. However, it should be noted that if states under trade law must 
label some harmful products instead of banning them, they would be unable to hinder 
free-riders who decide to purchase the products anyway. Labelling does not necessarily 
reduce genuine externalities to the extent the states are striving for. It would hence be 
controversial to apply an intense review even in cases where labelling schemes form an 
alternative. 
Trade law generally allows states to tackle all negative externalities that they 
themselves genuinely have determined to occur. Cases where courts have appeared to 
limit this right have been rare and controversial. It is only exceptionally that a state 
objective backed by some credible – albeit perhaps disputed – international science has 
been rejected by courts through the application of an intense necessity review or tests 
with the characteristics of proportionality sensu stricto. The application of these types 
of tests essentially mean that the state’s estimate of how much the measure would 
reduce the level of externalities is reassessed by the courts. The courts can through the 
application of these tests conclude that the measure does not advance the objective of 
reducing externalities despite some international evidence to the contrary. In other 
words, the state estimate would be replaced by a union, a federal or an international 
estimate. Similarly, the courts could conclude that the value of the reduction of 
externalities in the view of the court does not exceed the costs that stems from the 
effects the measure has on free trade. 
It was submitted that even if an intense or strict proportionality review could be applied 
sometimes in special circumstances, there may even in that case exist reasons to find 
measures proportional when there, first of all, is some international support for the 
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conclusion that the measure reduces externalities and, secondly, the measure has been 
designed in accordance with a transparent process of identifying the genuine 
environmental preferences of the in-state population. The transparency of the process 
would enable the state to provide evidence that it has assessed that the measure reduces 
externalities and maximizing utility without giving way to protectionist ambitions. 
On a final note, under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause de jure discriminatory 
measures and exceptionally also some de facto discriminatory measures fall under the 
so called strict scrutiny test. Although it is not fully clear whether or not the test should 
be understood to have the characteristics of a test of proportionality sensu stricto, it is 
widely accepted that the test could enable a very strict or intense review when applied 
in cases of de facto discrimination. There is in particular a risk for strict scrutiny to 
apply to de facto discrimination when the criteria implemented by the state includes 
some geography-related component. For example, California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard risked being subject to strict scrutiny because the calculations of the carbon 
intensity of biofuels took into account transport emissions and emissions from 
generating the local electricity. Yet, despite its link to geographic origin, transport 
emissions have real implications for the environment and therefore should not be 
scrutinized too strictly. Equally, emissions that come from generating the electricity, 
which is later used in the biofuels plant, have environmental effects that states may 
address in order to eliminate externalities.  
The increasing societal emphasis on sustainable PPMs can be expected to lead to states 
more frequently adopting criteria on transport emissions and other emissions closely 
related to geographical factors. These criteria will often work to the disadvantage of 
imports. Yet, they are highly important for reducing externalities and for efficiency. 
Thus, they ought to be justifiable even if they will weaken the objectives of trade law 
and fragment markets. That being said, schemes to tackle emissions that in part depend 
on geographical factors must still be designed with care. For example, the average 
emissions associated with transport or electricity on the local grid can be used as a 
default value when calculating the sustainability of the fuel produced at a biofuel plant, 
but each retailer or producer should be given the right to submit documentation proving 
that its fuel is actually more sustainable as a consequence of the biofuel plant running 
on electricity from renewables, the transport distances for the feedstock and fuel being 
short or the means of transport being more sustainable. 
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7.1.5. The Relationship Between Trade Law and Utility 
The non-discrimination principle in trade law is not of such nature that it would 
maximize utility. Namely, protectionist measures are prohibited even if they would 
increase utility. The non-discrimination principle instead promotes efficiency in terms 
of welfare. In turn, the existence of grounds of justification can be understood to ensure 
that discriminatory measures comply with trade law when they are necessary for 
tackling externalities and thus advance welfare. The fact that public morals have been 
included as a valid ground of justification does not necessarily stand in conflict with 
this interpretation of trade law. Measures adopted to protect public morals will in many 
cases reduce social costs and thus also externalities. 
The idea of viewing trade law in light of a theory on welfare maximization could be 
challenged. The grounds of justification could in principle be given value that is 
independent of any elimination of externalities. For example, the protection of the 
environment is essential for the fulfillment of the fundamental right to life. Moreover, 
measures for the protection of public morals might be regarded as legitimate 
irrespective of the effects on externalities. The value of the protection of morals could 
potentially lie in the increase of utility.  There is to date a lot of uncertainty surrounding 
the approach to this theory in the different trade law regimes analyzed in this book. 
The application of public morality as a ground of justification under Article XX GATT 
in EC – Seals1589 could be interpreted to have advanced the idea that the protection of 
public morals covers even the protection against loss of utility. This would suggest that 
trade law is not purely about welfare maximization. If trade law endorses the protection 
against utility loss in some cases but condemns nationalistic and protectionist motives, 
it would advance both welfare and utility, although neither to a full degree. Welfare 
maximization could be the rule over which utility maximization prevails when the 
objective pursued by the state goes to the core of what is perceived as wrong or right 
by the population of the state. Under an alternative interpretation, the rule would be 
utility mazimization to which the non-discrimination principle forms an exemption 
more for reasons of political unity than for reasons of welfare maximization. This latter 
perception does, however, not fit well with the nature of the WTO, but could better suit 
                                                 
1589 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014. 
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closer unions. Either way there would not seem to exist any coherent efficiency theory 
underlying trade law. 
In public procurement award criteria are designed for selecting the economically most 
advantageous bid. However, points may be awarded, for example, for the taste of food. 
This could imply that the objective to maximize utility instead of welfare has been 
accepted in the context of public procurement decisions at least to some extent. Public 
procurement falls under the scope of free movement law in the EU. Consequently, the 
idea of utility maximization creeps into free movement law perhaps a bit unexpectedly. 
Public authorities can still not discriminate on the basis of nationality or treat companies 
unequally even if that would be the desire of the people. 
Finally, even if utility would be given weight in trade law, advancing it might not 
necessarily justify full bans. A state might not have a similar freedom to address 
concerns related to utility as it has to address externalities. Utility is personal for each 
individual.  For tackling the loss of utility consumer information labelling is sufficient 
for cleaning the consciousness of those whose consciousness has been burdened by the 
consumption of the unsustainably produced goods. Naturally, people may also 
experience loss of utility when they see other people purchasing unsustainable goods. 
Other in-state consumers would in turn experience a loss of utility in case of a ban. It 
is conceivable that states seeking to justify their PPM-schemes with reference to the 
protection public morals could have a right to maximize the utility of a majority of its 
citizens. Labelling schemes that enable individual consumers to distance themselves 
from products they regard as having been produced with immoral (unsustainable) PPMs 
could then be insufficient from the perspective of the state and taking more dractic 
measure could be regarded as proportional. It would be very difficult to show that a ban 
would not guarantee a higher level of protection in terms of utility than a labelling 
scheme. 
In order to avoid misconception, it should be pointed out that a ban on moral grounds 
can in many circumstances reduce in-state externalities. The ban would in these cases 
not rest on a theory of maximizing utility. 
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7.2. The Reconciled Values 
7.2.1. Sovereignty, Unionism and Political Unity 
When entering into a trade union or an international free trade agreement the states 
agree to give up some competence on regulating trade. The states may not discriminate 
unless it is necessary to achieve the targeted level of protection with respect to a 
legitimate objective. The non-discrimination principle at the core of law of prohibiton 
represents an important community interest. It is not merely about economic efficiency, 
but also about strengthening the economic ties between the states, interdependence and 
political unity. 
Expanding the scope of prima facie prohibited measures also advances unionism. In 
particular, under EU free movement law non-discriminatory measures may be prima 
facie prohibited in case they create a market access hinder. While it is not entirely clear 
what should be understood as a prima facie prohibited non-discriminatory market 
access hinder, it has been submitted that it would include measures that restrict trade in 
some product or service to a high degree, such as for example a full ban. With a broader 
scope of measures running the risk of not complying with EU free movement law, it 
may be expected that more issues are left to be legislated on a union level. The 
prohibition of both discrimination and market access obstacles reflect values of 
unionism that are reconciled with the values reflected in the grounds of justification 
together with the sovereignty of the regulating state. 
Under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause non-discriminatory measures are covered 
when they regulate or control either conduct or commerce wholly outside the regulating 
state. The regulating state’s competence to protect values reflected in the grounds of 
justification are pitted against the interests of the state in which the conduct or 
commercial transaction takes place. The test does not reflect unionism in the same way 
as the market access test under EU law. The fact that strict scrutiny applies to findings 
of extraterritorial regulation suggests that sovereignty of the state where the conduct 
takes place is valued highly. 
The scope of prima facie prohibited measures under EU free movement law, the U.S. 
dormant Commerce Clause and WTO law does not narrow the competence of states 
too drastically. The regulating state has a sovereign interest to protect its territory with 
respect to values reflected in the grounds of justification. There are several grounds of 
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justifications that support the adoption of PPM-criteria and, importantly, the 
proportionality review has in cases of de facto discrimination generally been quite 
deferential. While there in the U.S. is on-going litigation on the applicability of strict 
scrutiny on a case of de facto discrimination,1590 such approach is exceptional. The 
same applies to the application of tests with the characteristics of proportionality sensu 
stricto in the EU or the WTO. 
7.2.2. Efficiency, Externalities and Good Governance  
The dynamics and principles of trade law can generally, although not perfectly, be 
aligned with theories on efficiency. However, the proportionality review is not merely 
about reconciling non-discrimination with the interests underlying the relevant ground 
of justification. For example, for discriminatory PPM-criteria to survive the review they 
will likely need to incorporate due process rights. Companies that seek certification of 
compliance with the criteria should be given a decision in writing, have the right to 
appeal and the right to be heard. 
Regulatory certainty is another interest of private market participants that may need to 
be respected when designing measures that will have discriminatory effects. Regulatory 
certainty is strengthened by allowing for a reasonable transition period between the date 
of adopting new PPM-criteria and the date from which onwards the new criteria apply. 
This will give old producers enough time to adjust.  Transition periods protect prior 
investments and ensure that investor confidence in the state is not hampered. It should, 
however, be noted that there are risks with long transition periods that only apply to 
production plants that were in operation before the new criteria were adopted. For 
example, a state might decide to apply the new criteria on new facilities and grandfather 
old facilities. A very long grandfathering period would endanger the environmental 
objective of the measure. Furthermore, such an approach becomes a trade law problem 
when grandfathering has discriminatory effect. A careful balance must be struck 
between regulatory certainty, free trade and environmental protection. 
Taking into account administrative costs as well as the values of due process and 
regulatory certainty promote efficiency from a broad societal perspective. These values 
introduce requirements that do not limit the right of the state to adopt measures to tackle 
externalities. Giving weight to administrative costs in fact increases flexibility for the 
                                                 
1590 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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state, whereas regulatory certainty and due process shape the requirements of how a 
measure is designed without restricting the underlying level of protection that the state 
seeks to achieve. Yet, putting emphasis on due process rights and regulatory certainty 
might not be all about efficiency. Due process and regulatory certainty build up fair and 
just treatment in administrative proceedings. Moreover, they are often perceived as 
necessary parts of good governance. Efficiency from a broad societal perspective and 
other core societal values are closely intertwined. 
Distinguishing efficiency values and other values is equally complex in procurement 
law. In public procurement non-discrimination is required, but it is insufficient. Public 
authorities are obliged to treat all companies equally on an individual basis and 
regardless of home state or origin. The principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination ensure efficiency in public procurement law through both competition 
and predictability.  At the same time, equal treatment from state authorities may be 
about more than efficiency. Keeping in mind that the state is tasked with serving all 
members of society, the principle perhaps equally reflects a more fundamental idea of 
fairness. 
7.2.3. Transparency 
Transparency is a value that in various ways has been given relevance in trade law. It 
is particularly important that criteria applicable to imports are clear and precise and that 
they are applied in a consistent manner. In trade law these requirements of transparency 
have gradually through case law become part of the proportionality review. In turn, in 
public procurement law the transparency principle has been explicitly referred to in the 
legal texts. It is evident that transparency and non-discrimination complement each 
other well. The requirement that criteria are precise and verifiable decreases the risks 
of disguised discrimination. 
Like with the requirements of due process and regulatory certainty, the requirement of 
transparency does not limit the discretion of the state on what criteria it may introduce. 
Instead, the requirement of transparency creates expectations on how the criteria are 
communicated through legislative and administrative acts. 
While transparency with respect to the applicable criteria is likely required under the 
proportionality review, there would normally exist no requirement for states to be 
transparent with respect to the reasons for adopting certain criteria or for designing 
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them in a certain way. Transparency with respect to the reasons underlying some PPM-
criteria would still mitigate suspicions that the measure is disguised protectionism and 
not a genuine effort to address externalities. It was submitted that a state that is 
transparent about how it in the process of designing PPM-criteria determined the 
environmental preferences of its people or estimated effects and externalities would 
likely be in a better position to defend such criteria even when they form an 
internationally unusual model and have substantial discriminatory effects.  
Like due process rights and regulatory certainty, also transparency generally advances 
efficiency from a broad societal perspective. Moreover, also transparency is at least in 
part about other objectives than efficiency, including good governance. Constitutional 
legitimacy may be strengthened through transparency, fully separate from any 
economic rationale.1591  
All in all, due process, regulatory certainty and transparency were identified as three 
ideals that may affect the reconciliation of free trade (non-discrimination) and 
environmental protection. Admittedly, so far there are only fragmented indications of 
these values being reconciled, and most of these elements were only identified in 
limited contexts, but they are there nevertheless. The reconciliation of these ideals and 
values in trade law will be particularly important in the wake of increasing efforts to 
establish PPM-criteria. 
On a final note, it has been argued that through transparency the legislator may 
sometimes even uphold legitimacy of sidesteps from an efficiency rationale.1592 This 
idea can be identified in the way in which transparency has been given weight in U.S. 
law. The dormant Commerce Clause has been interpreted to incorporate an exemption 
for discriminatory subsidies. A reason for this could be that granting a discriminatory 
subsidy is viewed as more transparent than implementing more complex trade 
restrictive norms. The reasoning appears to be that transparency with respect to how 
funds are directed by the state allows voters to identify how the subsidy policies affect 
the economy and can then decide through the act of voting in subsequent elections 
whther or not the state had acted in their best interest. There are at least two problems 
                                                 
1591 Stefan Voigt, ‘A Constitution Like Any Other? Comparing the European Constitution with Nation 
State Constitutions’, in Thomas Eger and Hans-Bernd Schäfer (eds.), Research Handbook on the 
Economics of European Union Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 15. 
1592 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (Harvard University Press 2002) 
471. 
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with this. First, despite subsidies perhaps being transparent, it will still be difficult for 
voters to identify cause and effect. Secondly, the burden of the discriminatory subsidies 
on out-of-state economies would seem to be ignored. The subsidy exemption invites 
states to circumvent the non-discrimination principle and allows them even to 
implement de jure discriminatory measures. Nonetheless, this goes to illustrate how 
much weight transparency as a value might carry in trade law. 
7.2.4. Constitutionalization 
The need to consider non-efficiency values described above feeds into the theory of 
constitutionalization of union as well as international economic law. Previous academic 
work on constitutionalization can be divided into two separate schools of thought. I 
refer to these two schools of thoughts as ‘pillars’. The two pillars are not necessarily 
mutually supportive or linked in any significant way. 
The first pillar relates to the primacy of constitutional law and the institutional design, 
whereas the second relates to reasonableness and fairness.1593 More specifically, the 
second pillar relates to the fact that the constitution limits the powers of the state and 
guarantees rights to individuals both in the form of basic fundamental rights and 
procedural rights, such as standing in the court.1594 The second pillar thus rests on 
fundamental social and societal values and on the rights of the individual. The 
conclusions of this the book are linked to this second pillar of constitutionalization.   
Ehlermann has proclaimed that the EU has established a free market-oriented 
constitution.1595 However, in previous research Spaventa has observed that EU 
economic law does not represent an economic constitution, but a constitution that 
protects also citizen rights and is thus a constitution with both economic and non-
economic character.1596 Parallells can be drawn with the argument by Maduro that the 
tendency of the market integration logics to infiltrate into all areas of law in the EU has 
                                                 
1593 Deborah Z. Cass, ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation 
as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 European J. International 
Law 39, 71; Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini (eds.), Reasonableness and Law 
(Springer 2009) (preface). 
1594 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law: Constitutional Responsibility and 
the Court of Justice (OUP 2013) 12 ff; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System (Brill 1997); Julio Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement – The Economic 
Constitutional Law of the European Community (Hart 2002) 2-8. 
1595 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘The Contribution of EC Competition Policy to the Single Market’ (1992) 
29 Common Market L. Rev. 257, 273. 
1596 Eleanor Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non-)Economic European Constitution’ 
(2004) 41 Common Market L. Rev. 743. 
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necessitated the strengthening of individual rights in order to preserve legitimacy.1597 
Furthermore, it is even possible that EU free movement law gives consideration to 
behavioral theories.1598 
Building on the idea of strengthening rights beyond the scope of free trade and the 
grounds of justification, this work illustrated how due process, regulatory certainty and 
transparency have already in some hard cases been recognized in trade law. On the one 
hand, incorporating these rights into trade law strengthen in particular the position of 
private corporations, and not natural persons, against the state. On the other hand, in 
particular due process rights and regulatory certainty can be viewed as fundamental for 
the entrepreneur. Constitutionalized economic law in the EU – and in the U.S. and 
under the WTO also for that matter – could gradually develop a free market 
constitution, instead of a free market constitution. 
Finally, it is not uncommon that constitutions rely on legal principles and tests to 
balance opposing interests instead of hard cut rules. The constitutional character of 
trade law discussed in this book is not only linked to the primacy of the law supported 
by institutions, or to the substance in the form of substantive and procedural rights, but 
also a technique evolving around principles.1599 The free trade and non-trade 
dimensions of trade law and procurement law are in part established in the form of 
principles and tests.  For example, the proportionality principle, in the form of a legal 
test, provides a structured effort to reconcile competing values. 
7.2.5. Democratic Values 
7.2.5.1. Proximity to Power and Accountability 
Rodrik has claimed that there is a tension between the economically justifiable market 
integration and elements of political democracy.1600 Under free trade regimes some 
                                                 
1597 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We, the Court – The European Court of Justice & the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart 1998) 2. 
1598 Max S. Jansson and Harri Kalimo, ‘De Minimis Meets “Market Access”: Transformations in 
the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU Free Movement Law?’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Rev. 
523, 552-554. 
1599 Deborah Z. Cass, ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation 
as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 European J. International 
Law 39, 51. 
1600 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (W.W. 
Norton 2011). 
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state and local decisions are scrutinized on a union, federal or international level. In 
other words, some decision-making is indeed moved further away from the people.  
It is important to keep in mind that states still retain the right to adopt decisions that 
may favor the in-state population as long as the measure serves a legitimate objective 
and is proportional in relation to that objective. The deferential approach to de facto 
discrimination gives states freedom to experiment in their approaches to tackle 
externalities. In the context of the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause this may be linked 
to the idea that states function as laboratories of democracy.1601 
Furthermore, even with some potential tensions between free trade and democratic 
ideals, democratic values may still complement the economic rationale in trade law. 
For example, previous research has pointed out that the central pillar of European 
economic law, free movement, is a fundamental freedom guaranteeing open 
markets.1602 It is, however, not a pure economic right, but a political right built on 
European democratic values.1603 
As described above, weight has at least in WTO law and EU free movement law been 
given to due process rights. These rights ensure effective access to justice. Moreover, 
transparency has been given some weight in trade law. Both transparency and due 
process rights strengthen accountability, which is a key component of democracy. In 
sum, some democratic theory can be identified in trade law. It is no doubt interesting 
that these values can be identified even in WTO law, where democratic ideals are bound 
to be more contentious.  
7.2.5.2. Political Representation and Discrimination 
Democratic theory may form a method of interpretation in U.S. law.1604 Political 
representation is one democratic principle. This principle invites the argument that no 
measures should be adopted burdening those without representation.  
                                                 
1601 Anthony L. Moffa and Stephanie L. Safdi, ’Freedom From the Costs of Trade: A Principled 
Argument Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Goods Movement Policies’ (2014) 21 N.Y.U. 
Environmental Law J. 344, 398. 
1602 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, ‘On the Legitimacy of European Law’ (1994) 58 Rabels Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 631. 
1603 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We, the Court – The European Court of Justice & the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart 1998) 168. 
1604 Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1999) 108 The Yale Law 
Journal 1225, 1236-1237. 
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It is prima facie prohibited under the dormant Commerce Clause to adopt measures that 
control conduct wholly outside the state. In other words, measures that affect contracts 
with only out-of-state parties form prima facie prohibited extraterritorial measures that 
are subject to strict scrutiny. Extraterritorial measures are strictly scrutinized because 
they intervene in contracts between parties belonging to out-of-state groups that have 
no representation and voice in the legislative process of the state adopting the measure. 
In North Dakota v. Heydinger1605 the Eight Circuit adopted the view that a ban on 
electricity from coal was prohibited extraterritorial regulation. It is worthy of note that 
while in the case of a ban on electricity from coal power the out-of-state interests were 
indirectly represented by in-state proponents of coal power, the measure was still 
declared unconstitutional. 
The problem with a test on political representation in law of prohibition would be that 
it would not set any clear limits on discrimination. Unsurprisingly, the test has received 
harsh criticism and has in practice so far rarely been applied.1606 However, the 
prohibition of discrimination could in principle be linked to insufficient representation. 
Discriminatory measures may burden both the discriminated out-of-state industries and 
the in-state consumers that have to pay more for the products due to protectionism. In 
cases of discrimination the burdened out-of-state interest is in some respect indirectly 
represented in the political process. Partial and indirect representation is normally 
insufficient and discrimininatory measures will be prima facie prohibited. 
It should be recalled that the Supreme Court has carved out exemptions to the dormant 
Commerce Clause. For example, states may grant discriminatory subsidies. The idea is 
that the state representatives will be accountable for inefficient subsidy policy. This 
would in turn imply that the idea of in-state indirect political representation of out-of-
state interests has been given some weight by the Court. All in all, framing the dormant 
Commerce Clause in terms of a theory on political representation does not appear to 
form a coherent whole. 
                                                 
1605 North Dakota v. Heydinger, Cases no. 14-2156 and 14-2251 (8th Cir. 2016). 
1606 Robert Verchick, ‘The Commerce Clause, Environmental Justice, and the Interstate Garbage Wars’ 
(1997) 70 Southern California L. Rev. 1239, 1250-1266; Anthony L. Moffa and Stephanie L. Safdi, 
’Freedom From the Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny 
of Goods Movement Policies’ (2014) 21 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 344, 378. 
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7.2.5.3. Environmental Harm, Representation and Participation 
Emphasis on political representation could be of relevance for the geographical scope 
of valid grounds of justification regardless of whether or not theories on political 
representation shape the scope of law of prohibition. A state that adopts measures in 
order to address pure out-of-state externalities will tackle externalities that do not have 
relevance for the health and environment of those that the state represents. Putting an 
emphasis on representation would mean that there would have to exist some cross-
border effects or that there is a legitimate moral concern with respect to pure out-of-
state effects. Hence, legitimate objectives might not include the elimination of pure out-
of-state environmental effects for environmental reasons. This approach has, however, 
not been confirmed in any trade law regime and it remains to be seen how much 
emphasis will be put on representation in this context. 
Representation may also be given relevance in the application of the proportionality 
review. States may facilitate the reconciliation of free trade and environmental 
protection by ensuring representation of a broad range of interests. Indeed, some 
discussion has emerged on the value of representation of stakeholders during the 
process of adopting PPM-criteria. In particular, states could participate in the discussion 
on affairs in other states.1607 An unjust decision could be one where interests without 
representation have been affected. Scott provides as an example the neglect of foreign 
interests in state decisions to implement rules on PPMs.1608 
In order to understand why representation and participation have become of particular 
interest in the context of PPM-criteria a few preliminary observations are necessary. 
First, any form of environmental criteria with discriminatory effect adopted by a state 
could burden out-of-state economic interests and serve in-state environmental interests. 
PPM-criteria are no different in this respect. Indeed, there are valid arguments for 
approaching PPM-criteria similarly as any other criteria that restrict trade. However, 
the fact that PPM-criteria restrict trade in products for reasons unrelated to the physical 
properties of the products have made the criteria particularly controversial. The reasons 
that the state has for adopting the restrictions are not found in the physical properties 
                                                 
1607 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We, the Court – The European Court of Justice & the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart 1998) 168. 
1608 Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kane (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’, 
in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade (2000) 167. 
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of the goods that enter its territory. There is no environmental threat coming from the 
international transaction of goods. Instead, the objective with the restrictions may be to 
reduce pollution or other effects that stem from the PPMs because the effects may cross 
borders.  Alternatively, the restrictions may be grounded in the moral condemnation of 
the out-of-state PPMs. Is the extraterritorial dimension of PPM-criteria stronger in 
comparison with other criteria? The answer is far from obvious, but it could perhaps be 
argued that PPM-criteria go deeper into the core of the business model of the out-of-
state producers. PPM-criteria are not only about what is produced but also about how 
it is produced. Another reason might be that in comparison with restrictions on the 
physical properties of products for environmental reasons, environmental PPM-criteria 
address environmental interests that are typically more indirect and less significant in 
the short-term. 
There would not appear to exist any absolute requirement to allow out-of-state 
representation and participation in the design of PPM-criteria. Yet, in WTO law 
emphasis has been put on the value of such out-of-state participation. The expectation 
of negotiations with other states before adopting PPM-criteria could be viewed as a 
political representation test of soft law nature; or in other words a strong political 
encouragement. States adopting PPM-criteria will increase the legitimacy of the 
measure in case they involve other states in the process of designing those criteria for 
imports. 
The recognition of the value of participation in trade law can be linked to the ideas of 
discursive justice and democracy by Habermas. According to Habermas political and 
moral legitimacy arises from a reasonable discursive process.1609 Communication and 
participation are part of good governance and a fundamental element of what is often 
understood as democracy.1610 Justice and democracy can be linked to a system that 
                                                 
1609 Jürgen Habermas, Between Fact and Norms (MIT Press 1996) (translation by William Rehg) 110, 
304. 
1610 Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist’, Part I: The Role of 
Public and Private Order Institutions’ (1994) 30 Journal of Development Studies 533; Jean-Philippe 
Platteau, ‘Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist, Part II: The Role of Moral Norms’ (1994) 
30 J. Development Studies 753; Joyeeta Gupta and Nadia Sanchez, ‘Global Green Governance: 
Embedding the Green Economy in a Global Green and Equitable Rule of Law Polity’ (2012) Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 12 19; Robert Howse, ‘Adjudicative 
Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law’, in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the 
WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (2000) 42. 
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establishes equality of opportunity.1611 Participation rights may serve equality by giving 
actors voice. Alexy has added that public discourse will provide the weights on different 
economic, social and environmental interests in order to achieve a reasonable 
balance.1612 Participation as a societal value forms part of a reasonableness ideal that 
counter balances rational science,1613 including efficiency.  
Admittedly, theories on representation and discursive justice have generally been 
developed for democracy within states. How well do such theories then fit the 
relationship between states? The interests of participation are held by states and not 
groups of individuals within a state. The interest of the state within a community of 
states still bears some resemblance with the interests of people within a nation state. 
The community of states that makes up the WTO operates under rules of international 
law that can be compared with democratic principles on decision-making even if some 
WTO member states are not democracies. For example, the practices of a majority of 
states may amount to customary law even if all states do not follow the practice.1614 
Moreover, under the doctrine of Westphalian sovereignty, each state is equal no matter 
size and power. Sovereign states that become parties to the WTO have equal rights and 
voice within the international community and are expected to respect decisions that are 
delivered through dispute settlement. Rubini has even declared that WTO law is not 
merely founded on a contract but has become a community.1615 This implies that there 
is some expectation of loyalty and co-operation.  
7.2.6. Global Fairness 
The regulating state might adopt PPM-criteria on both in-state productions and on 
imports. The question will arise whether those criteria may be justifiable in case out-
of-state PPMs have minimal or no cross-border effects on the regulating state. The 
                                                 
1611 Klaus Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice (Springer 2009) (translation by Deborah Shannon) 183-
203. 
1612 Robert Alexy, ‘The Reasonableness of Law’, in Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara 
Valentini (eds.), Reasonableness and Law (Springer 2009) 11. 
1613 Joanne Scott, ‘On Kith and Kane (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’, 
in J. H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade (2000) 148-158. 
1614 Stephen Hall, ‘Researching International Law’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds.), 
Research Methods of Law (Edinburgh University 2007) 188-193; North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany 
v. Denmark and Germany v. The Netherlands [1969] ICJ Reports 3, para. 74; Permanent International 
Court of Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee 
(1920) 335. 
1615 Luca Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wasting Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, 
Policy Space, and Law Reform’ (2012) 15 J. International Economic Law 525, 574. 
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sovereign interests of the regulating state, including the interest in protecting the 
environment, are pitted against the general community interest in non-discrimination. 
This is no different from trade law cases on criteria unrelated to PPMs. However, when 
the environmental effects addressed through the implementation of the PPM-criteria 
burden the regulating state minimally or not even at all, some exporting states may 
present the argument that apart from the community value of non-discrimination also 
aspects of global fairness speak against the measure. Strict PPM-criteria that target out-
of-state production and out-of-state environmental effects are problematic from the 
perspective of global fairness in particular when adopted by developed states that have 
throughout history gained an advantage on the common market by relying on 
unsustainable PPMs but have now developed more sustainable PPMs themselves. The 
strict criteria will restrict imports from less developed states that have historically not 
caused the same level of environmental harm by using unsustainable PPMs but could 
now catch up economically through international trade had developed states not 
decided to introduce the PPM-criteria. 
Global fairness is a value closely linked to advancing social justice and restricting eco-
imperialism. Global fairness should likely not be a prominent value in the EU and U.S. 
where the differences in level of development between states is relatively modest. In 
contrast, the argument for an extraterritoriality test would be stronger in the context of 
WTO law. Yet, in WTO law the recognition of the protection of public morals as a 
valid ground of justification in cases on PPM-criteria for imports might result in the 
justifiability of PPM-criteria with pure out-of-state environmental effects. This could 
in turn mean that the value of global fairness would remain rather weak even under 
WTO law.  
Yet, the WTO cannot ignore global fairness and social justice. Reccognizing those 
values and taking note of the discussion on extraterritoriality and on the geographical 
scope of grounds of justification is crucial for the credibility of the system and for 
ensuring continued commitment by states to the system of international trade. This is 
all the more important in current times of tensions in the fields of international relations 
and threats of trade war between major powers. While global fairness might not have 
decisive impact on what is legal today, it certainly carries some political weight. States 
planning to adopt PPM-criteria may recognize the pressure to enter into dialogue with 
other states and be more open toward technology transfer. In addition, the discussion 
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on global fairness may spur talks in the WTO on how to better incorporate it into the 
legal rules on international trade.  
7.2.7. Coherence 
Coherence is a complex concept that has been linked to mutual supportiveness, 
cohesion and completeness. Coherence at least entails that the law should follow some 
inner logic. Contradictions within a legal system would be irrational.1616 In other words, 
consistency and a lack of contradictions advance coherence. These values are important 
for legal certainty and arguably the legitimacy of the legal system.1617 It must at the 
same time be acknowledged that there will always exist tensions and some incoherence. 
The reliance on coherence as a rule of interpretation of norms usually suggests that the 
value has been given significant weight.1618 Yet, regardless of whether courts rely on it 
as a rule of interpretation, coherence might still form a core value. Does coherence then 
form a value that is given some weight in trade law? Might the objective of coherence 
have affected the structure of trade law, the applicable tests and subsequently also the 
reconciliation of free trade and environmental protection? 
A system that allows actors to rely on a legal rule in order to circumvent other rules is 
incoherent.1619 Similarly, incoherence occurs when some rules prohibit an act, but the 
prohibition can be circumvented so that the same end result is achieved simply by 
reconstructing the originally planned act into a different form. Under the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause some incoherence has emerged with the introduction of subsidy and 
market participant exemptions. Namely, as a consequence of those exemptions it would 
appear that some discriminatory measures are constitutional when other measures are 
unconstitutional even if they from an economic perspective are essentially identical and 
                                                 
1616 Stefano Bertea, ‘Looking For Coherence Within the European Community’ (2005) 11 European Law 
Journal 154, 156-159 and 170. See also Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (1988) 
11; Andrea Morrone, ‘Constitutional Adjudication and the Principle of Reasonableness’ in Giorgio 
Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini (eds.), Reasonableness and Law (Springer 2009) 
222-224. 
1617 Sean Coyle, From Positivism to Idealism (Ashgate 2007) 125; Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law 
(translated by Max Knight from Reine, Rechtslehre, 2nd ed. 1960) (University of California Press, 1970); 
Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002) 276; Neil McCormick, ‘Ethical Positivism and 
the Practical Force of Rules’, in Tom D. Campbell and Jeffrey Goldsworthy (eds.), Judicial Power, 
Democracy and Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2000) 52-55. 
1618 Stefano Bertea, ‘Looking For Coherence Within the European Community’ (2005) 11 European Law 
Journal 154, 166. 
1619 Id. 162. 
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lead to the same outcome. The exemptions are irrational from an economic perspective 
and may therefore be argued to create incoherence. 
Apart from the subsidy and market participant exemptions applicable under the U.S. 
dormant Commerce Clause, there would not appear to exist significant incoherence in 
trade law. Under EU free movement law discriminatory measures are prima facie 
prohibited regardless of whether they take the form of a law, an administrative practice 
or a recommendation. With respect to administrative practice there is, however, some 
incoherence as individual public procurement decisions, unlike other nonrecurring 
measures, have been scrutinized under free movement law. 
Could there exist coherence even across fields of economic law? It has been argued that 
trade and competition law in the EU form a coherent whole.1620 This book also offered 
a few observations on coherence between fields of economic law. Coherence in this 
context could be understood as mutual supportiveness. First, in the U.S. the market 
participant exemption might create incoherence within trade law, but at the same time 
advance the idea of competition on equal terms for both private and public market 
participants. Secondly, a requirement of coherence between public procurement law 
and legislation on subsidies lends support to the principle in public procurement law 
that criteria shall not be established for things that fall outside of the subject matter of 
the procured contract. Thirdly, the interpretation of the geographical scope of the 
environmental and social effects that a state may address with criteria it implements 
could be different under trade law and public procurement law due to the different 
nature of the two fields of economic law. Yet, in particular in EU law where the two 
fields are closely intertwined with overlapping scope, the apparent broad interpretation 
of the geographical scope under procurement law might influence the interpretation 
under trade law. The close links between the two fields of economic law could on this 
issue lead to convergence, coherence and uniformity. All in all, there are signs of 
coherence between fields of economic law and it may sometimes even be stronger than 
coherence within a single field of economic law. 
There is certainly room for more research on coherence across fields of economic law. 
It was concluded in this book that the reconciliation of trade and environment has 
already been influenced by a number of other values. It may be explored in future 
                                                 
1620 Laurence Gormley, Prohibiting Restrictions on Trade Within the EEC (North-Holland 1985) 233. 
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research whether several of the values reconciled under trade law could be relevant in 
competition law, investment law, intellectual property law, procurement law and 
legislation on subsidies. Transparency is at least a value that is given even greater 
weight in procurement law than in trade law. 
Another aspect on coherence across fields of economic law relates to the application of 
similar legal tests. It was, for example, noted that the test of market creation might be 
applied both in U.S. trade law and in WTO law on subsidies. Previous research has 
analysed other tests. For example, the necessity test exists in both trade and investment 
law. That fact invites mutual learning between the different fields of economic law.1621 
Moreover, tests related to the definition of like products and the relevant market are 
applied in competition law and legislation on subsidies.1622 This type of test also applied 
under trade law. While a closer comparison was not carried out in this book, the tests 
on likeness and relevant markets in the different fields of economic law would appear 
to have quite different characteristics. More in-depth analysis of the comparability of 
the legal tests is left for future research. 
7.3. Aspects of Comparative Law 
7.3.1. Similarities in Value Reconciliation Across Trade Law of Three Jurisdictions 
There are many similarities between WTO law and trade law in the EU and the U.S. 
Importantly, the fundamental structure of trade law is the same across jurisdictions. The 
tests applicable under trade law may be divided into two phases. In the first phase, 
referred to as law of prohibition, it is determined whether or not the measure under 
scrutiny is prima facie prohibited. In all three jurisdictions the non-discrimination 
principle forms the core of law of prohibition. In turn, in the second phase it is examined 
whether or not a measure that is prima facie prohibited may be justifiable. This can be 
referred to as law of justification and entails an analysis of whether the discriminatory 
measure serves a legitimate objective and is proportional in relation to that objective. 
The structure of trade law with law of prohibition and law of justification is beneficial 
for the clarity within trade law and for transparency in value reconciliation. Law of 
                                                 
1621 Andrew D. Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, ‘Variations of a Theme: Comparing the Concept of 
“Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of International 
Law 93, 93-94. 
1622 Harri Kalimo, Filip Sedefov and Max S. Jansson, ‘Market Definition as Value Reconciliation: The 
Case of Renewable Energy Promotion Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures’ (2017) 17 International Environmental Agreements: Politics Law and Economics 427. 
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prohibition defines the scope of measures which prima facie form a threat to free trade. 
The forming of the tests for law of prohibition by both those drafting the provisions of 
trade law and the courts interpreting the texts unavoidably entails some reconciliation 
of values.  Yet, the in casu reconciliation of values is primarily carried out in law of 
justification. The line between law of prohibition and law of justification risks being 
blurred when non-trade values that form valid grounds of justification affect the 
identification of prima facie prohibited discriminatory measures in law of prohibition. 
There is little point in reconciling the same values twice. That being said, in each of the 
three jurisdictions such tendencies have on rare occasions occurred in the context of 
difficult cases on environmental protection. 
Trade and non-trade values are reconciled in trade law through a number of legal tests. 
It is in particular the different tests within the proportionality review that become 
pivotal in the reconciliation of, on the one hand, free trade and non-discrimination and, 
on the other hand, values underlying the grounds of justification, such as public health, 
environmental protection and moral values. The legal tests that are part of the 
proportionality review have been designed to reconcile free trade and non-trade values 
in accordance with a clear logic. While the proportionality review is shaped differently 
under EU free movement law, the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause and the GATT, they 
all still as a rule either explicitly or implicitly revolve around the idea that a state should 
choose the least discriminatory reasonably available measure that enables the state to 
achieve its environmental, or other legitimate, objective. It is rare that a case will be 
decided contrary to this idea of a value reconciliation methodology. This holds even for 
U.S. and WTO law, where the language will at times suggest a more holistic approach 
to value balancing. The core of value reconciliation is in other words similar across the 
jurisdictions.  
In each of the three jurisdictions the proportionality review has usually not evolved into 
a test of proportionality sensu stricto. However, there have been isolated instances in 
all three jurisdictions where the judiciary has struck down measures as disproportionate 
despite there being room for the argument that the adopted measure strictly speaking 
was the least discriminatory option for achieving the targeted high level of protection. 
Unfortunately, the nature of any such stricter proportionality tests and the conditions 
under which they apply have been too ambiguous for a meaningful comparison. 
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Despite fundamental similarities, trade law in each of the three jurisdictions still have 
their own particular characteristics. A number of legal tests have only been applied as 
part of the proportionality review in one or two of the jurisdictions. Some of those tests 
would likely be endorsed in all jurisdictions should the need arise, while other tests 
reflect the peculiarities of the jurisdiction. A comparative analysis revealed which tests 
could be common for trade law across jurisdictions. In addition, the analysis of 
differences provided some insight into how the objective of free trade is perceived in 
each jurisdiction. Such insight may be important for understanding potential for future 
developments in trade law. 
7.3.2. Lessons from Value Reconciliation in WTO Law 
There has up until today only been a few cases related to PPM-criteria litigated under 
GATT. One reasons might be that states refrain from initiating proceedings in the WTO 
because disputes tend to get lengthy and expensive. Cases on PPM-criteria may still 
become more common in the future as the sustainability of PPMs has received 
increased attention in recent years among consumers and governments. To illustrate the 
point, after the EU adopted biofuels sustainability criteria the compatibility of those 
criteria with WTO law has been put into question. 
Discriminatory measures, including PPM-criteria, are prima facie prohibited under 
GATT. Different treatment of like products resulting in less favorable market 
conditions for the industry of another state would constitute discrimination. In a way, 
the likeness test determines the relevant market. Admittedly, markets are complex and 
the analysis of relevant market is often challenging. Likeness is in WTO law assessed 
with reference to physical similarities of the products, tariff classifications, end use as 
well as consumer tastes and habits. These factors generally function as supporting 
indicators of substitutability and competition. The ECJ and the U.S. Supreme have not 
relied on these types of factors and have in comparison to WTO panels and appellate 
bodies been very minimalistic in their assessment of likeness. It is submitted that also 
the ECJ and U.S. courts could shed some light on how they assess likeness by 
introducing a similar detailed evaluation of different factors to the one that has already 
been applied in WTO law. The analysis could be further developed in order to establish 
how much substitutability is required for likeness. 
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Courts should also be aware of the risks of considering similarity in light of multiple 
factors. The language in some decisions under GATT could be read to suggest that 
values related to public health protection would have been reconciled already in the 
definition of like products. In other words, the line between law of prohibition as the 
phase of identifying a threat to free trade, and law of justification as a phase of 
reconciling the values of free trade with non-trade values, has been somewhat blurred. 
Generally, however, the functions of law of prohibition and law of justification have 
still been kept apart. That is critical as the assessment of different factors in the likeness 
test should not go beyond what is necessary for determining substitutability and 
competition between products. Giving relevance to similarities or differences that do 
not affect substitutability would, for example, make it possible to conclude that two 
products are unlike due to differences in PPMs despite the products being substitutes 
on the relevant market. The consequence of such narrow concept of likeness would be 
that less favorable treatment of out-of-state substitutes could be declared to be 
compatible with trade law even when the measure due to its design would be far from 
proportional. 
Measures that are discriminatory due to differential treatment of like products may be 
justifiable with reference to grounds of justification. For example, prima facie 
prohibited discriminatory criteria for sustainable PPMs can be justified in case they 
advance the protection of the environment or public health. It is not clear as to whether 
PPM-criteria could be applied to imports with the objective to address environmental 
and other effects that occur fully outside the geographical territory of the state adopting 
the criteria. The extraterritorial dimension of PPM-criteria is particularly controversial 
on the global arena. Developed states that have for decades achieved economic growth 
through unsustainable PPMs may implement restrictions in order to cement their 
dominance in a global economy. 
Some unsustainable PPMs can be viewed as immoral. WTO law has been receptive of 
the argument that the application of PPM-criteria to both in-state production and 
imports is necessary for the protection of public morals. Hence, environmental PPM-
criteria might be justifiable even if they do not have any in-state environmental benefits 
to human or animal health. The broad interpretation of public morals could perhaps be 
explained by the respect of heterogeneous moral views across the WTO community. 
Yet, due to the uncertainty of the applicable approach in the other jurisdictions, it would 
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be too early to claim that there is some divergence between the jurisdictions. In fact, 
there are reasons to believe that PPM-criteria may be applied for tackling out-of-state 
environmental effects under EU free movement law at the very least in the context of 
public procurement. The approach to extraterritoriality might be similar under EU and 
WTO law, albeit from different reasons. 
The application of the proportionality review under GATT often includes solutions that 
can be expected to be embraced also in the application of EU and U.S. law. For 
example, the review under GATT regularly includes a test on whether there is available 
a technically and economically reasonable less discriminatory measure that would 
achieve the same objective. The adopted measure would as a rule be declared 
disproportional in case such an alternative measure exists.  
Furthermore, EU and U.S. law could follow the same approach as GATT when it comes 
to measures with multiple objectives. Under the proportionality review the adopted 
measure as a whole should be necessary for achieving a legitimate objective. In other 
words, measures are disproportional if they include elements that increase 
discrimination and do not advance the legitimate objective. In order to achieve the 
legitimate objective of environmental protection states might have adopted complex 
regulation constiting of many elements. The measures may include elements that 
advance also other objectives than environmental protection, such as regulatory 
certainty. It has under WTO law been confirmed that all elements of the measure do 
not need to advance the same legitimate objective. States may rely on secondary 
objectives to justify elements of their measures that would not enhance the primary 
objective.  
What about instances where states adopt trade restrictions for environmental reasons in 
some sectors but do not apply similar restrictions in other sectors? This would constitute 
policy inconsistency.  The WTO has quite firmly rejected any requirement of policy 
consistency. This approach could easily be aligned with the idea developed in the U.S. 
that states are laboratories of democracy that should have the flexibility to experiment 
with different solutions. There has also been no clear indication of the application of a 
policy consistency test under EU free movement law. It should, however, be noted that 
the test has not been rejected as firmly as under GATT. 
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All in all, non-discrimination lies at the core of GATT, but at the same time much 
flexibility is granted to states for adopting measures to protect the environment. Legal 
tests that have been developed under WTO law rarely reflect some unique characteristic 
of the system and could often be transposed to EU and U.S. trade law.  
7.3.3. A Comparison with EU Law 
The parallel analysis of legal tests revealed far-reaching similarities between EU and 
WTO law. This is true, first of all, in public procurement law. The GPA contains many 
of the same tests as the EU procurement directives, although rich EU case law has 
provided more detailed tests. The interpretation of the GPA and the future development 
of the agreement could no doubt in part build on the experiences of EU procurement 
law in the application of, for example, the verifiability test and at least to some extent 
the subject-matter test.  
Equally, strong similarities were identified in trade law. The core dynamics of the 
proportionality review under GATT and EU free movement law are the same. This is 
hardly surprising since EU law needs to be in compliance with WTO law. Hence, for 
example, EU law should not develop so that it would allow for PPM-criteria prohibited 
under WTO law.1623 Naturally, EU law could be stricter and not allow for the same 
defense of PPM-criteria as WTO law. 
The fact that the EU is a closer more homogeneous free trade area has undoubtedly 
contributed to EU free movement law having some characteristics that differentiate it 
from WTO law. Unionism has been advanced by the ECJ when expanding the scope of 
prima facie prohibited measures even to some non-discriminatory measures that hinder 
market access. That being said, the energy union of the EU is still a work in progress. 
This is evident from the fact that states may adopt even de jure discriminatory support 
schemes in the electricity sector. This, in turn, deters challenges on more complicated 
issues of de facto discrimination. The PPM-regulation in the energy sector is treated as 
a highly national issue. While the EU strives for a high degree of integration, and while 
that is generally reflected in the market access test in law of prohibition, integration in 
the electricity sector has not yet come very far. 
                                                 
1623 Gareth Davies, ‘‘Process and Production Method’ – based Trade Restrictions in the EU’, in Catherine 
Barnard (ed.) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008 (Hart 2008) 93-96. 
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The legal tests under law of prohibition shape the scope of prima facie prohibited state 
measures. Despite the occasional application of a market access test, the non-
discrimination principle still forms the core of law of prohibition in EU free movement 
law, much like it forms the core in WTO law. In both EU and WTO law the non-
discrimination principle applies broadly to state measures. In EU law the principle 
extends even to some cases where the discriminatory effects stem from state inaction 
or recommendations. In cases of state inaction or recommendations the discriminatory 
effects are in part also attributable to private party action. The application of EU free 
movement law in this type of circumstances places a strong responsibility on Member 
States for the actions of their citizens or residents. In addition, the fact that the failure 
of states to intervene in private party measures can constitute a breach of EU law 
reflects the principle of loyalty between Member States and an expectation that EU 
citizens have an obligation to refrain from disloyal behavior. 
Both EU and WTO law cover measures by private parties to some extent. In the EU the 
application of the non-discrimination principle to private parties with significant 
regulatory powers complements EU competition law. Under WTO law the application 
of trade law to such powerful regulating private parties might in turn compensate for 
the fact that there are no international competition law treaties. There are still 
differences with respect to the parties that need to comply with the non-discrimination 
principle. In particular, EU free movement law would appear to capture measures by 
private parties to a greater extent than WTO law. With respect to free movement of 
workers and persons, the stricter review of discrimination by private parties can be 
linked to the weight given to union citizenship. In general, however, the similarities of 
the structure of the EU and WTO tests would facilitate the transposal of tests on the 
type of measures covered from one regime to the other. 
There has been some academic discussion on potential exemptions to the general 
application of non-discrimination tests.  Some schlars have proposed that the right of 
EU public purchasing authorities to define what to buy should not be subject to free 
movement law. This is a controversial proposal. Awarding authorities flexibility in 
defining what to buy would undermine the efficiency objective of the non-
discrimination principle. The approach would also need to be compatible with WTO 
law. Public procurement does not fall under GATT but is instead governed by the GPA. 
While non-discrimination is also a principle of the GPA, the argument might be that 
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when the public authority defines what to buy it also defines the relevant market. Hence, 
regardless of what path is chosen with respect to decisions on what to buy, there would 
not automatically emerge any divergence between EU and WTO law. Yet, granting 
authorities the power to define relevant markets in procurement law would represent a 
significant deviation from the interpretation of likeness and relevant market under 
GATT. 
The similarities and the potential for mutual learning extend to law of justification and 
the proportionality review. Under both EU and WTO law reconciling the efficiency 
objectives of non-discrimination and the elimination of externalities will be affected by 
other values. For example, discriminatory measures that serve a legitimate objective 
should be designed so that the criteria are transparent, their applicaton is transparent 
and due process rights are guaranteed. In addition, under the proportionality test in EU 
free movement law it is also examined whether the state adopting the discriminatory 
measure has ensured sufficient regulatory certainty. A similar approach would seem 
reasonable also under WTO law. 
In law of justification there is ambiguity with respect to extraterritoriality under all three 
jurisdictions. No explicit position has been taken on whether states may justify 
discriminatory measures with out-of-state social or environmental objectives. The 
geographical scope of legitimate objectives relates to such values as sovereignty, global 
fairness and loyalty. The need for protecting global fairness is less acute in the EU than 
in the WTO, where the differences in development between states is more significant. 
Therefore, in an EU law context it would be even less controversial to conclude that no 
extraterritoriality test in law of justification should apply and that states thus may target 
out-of-state effects with PPM-criteria. Indeed, recent cases on public procurement hint 
that an extraterritorial objective might be permissible under EU free movement law. It 
is still uncertain to what extent the approbatory approach to criteria that target out-of-
state effects would apply more generally in EU free movement law outside the context 
of cases on public procurement.  
The potential validity under EU law of the objective to tackle extraterritorial 
environmental effects could be linked to the fact that the EU is a close union with free 
movement of persons. Citizens and residents of each Member State could be seen as 
having an interest in environmental protection across the union. This would be yet 
another illustration of the relationship between free movement of persons and free 
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movement of goods. However, there also exist arguments for why PPM-criteria with 
an extraterritorial dimension should be more difficult to justify in a closer free trade 
union. In a close union states are expected to be loyal, show mutual trust and respect 
the sovereign decisions of other states within the union. In conclusion, examining how 
close of a union the free trade area does not provide clear arguments for how to 
approach extraterritoriality. 
In sum, many aspects of EU free movement law and WTO law are difficult to compare 
because there are aspects of applicable tests that are rarely addressed as those aspects 
may not be crucial for the cases at hand. The nature of PPM-criteria might force 
clarifications on some details of the applicable tests. At this point in time it is merely 
possible to conclude that the features of the tests under EU and WTO law are 
surpringsly similar.  
There are some differences in nuances between tests in EU and WTO law, but those 
might not necessarily affect the outcomes. WTO law is characterized by the 
heterogeneity of the international community. It would on a general level appear that 
free movement of goods in the EU, in turn, is influenced by its close ties to free 
movement of people and EU citizenship. The influence may stem from both the rights 
and the obligations that come with such citizenship. Furthermore, the broad scope of 
EU free movement law, extending to for example public procurement, together with an 
abundance of secondary legislation creates more aspects to consider when striving to 
ensure coherence. 
7.3.4. Peculiarities of the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause 
In the U.S. several cases have already emerged on the compatibility with the dormant 
Commerce Clause of PPM-criteria adopted to promote renewable energy. For example, 
there are cases on state-level biofuels sustainability criteria that can be compared to 
Argentina’s challenge against EU biofuels sustainability criteria under WTO law. 
Similar cases have not been initiated in the EU due to the high degree of harmonization 
of union legislation on biofuels sustainability, leaving almost no room for national 
sustainability criteria.  
There have, in addition, been litigation in the U.S. cases on schemes implemented in 
the electricity sector. The number of disputes on PPM-criteria in the electricity sector 
has been significantly higher in the U.S. than in the EU. Frequent U.S. litigation may 
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in part be a consequence of well-connected interstate power grids. Good 
interconnections enable interstate trade and conflicts on state regulation of those 
markets become more likely. Furthermore, the fact that disputes arise more frequently 
could also indicate that the fossil fuel industry is powerful and there is less societal 
consensus on the need for a transition toward renewables. It could also be argued that 
the U.S. harbors a culture where litigation is viewed as less drastic and more quotidian, 
partly nurtured by the fact that there in common law countries is more of an in casu 
evaluation and less of a tradition to develop general rules. Importantly, unlike in EU 
free movement law, under the dormant Commerce Clause de jure discriminatory 
schemes promoting electricity from renewables have so far not been declared 
justifiable. As de jure discriminatory schemes might be unconstitutional, so might also 
de facto discriminatory schemes. 
The legal tests under the dormant Commerce Clause are in many aspects similar to 
those applicable in WTO law and EU free movement law. Still, the dormant Commerce 
Clause includes some unique structures. The exemptions to the non-discrimination 
principle forms the most significant difference. It is as a rule not prima facie prohibited 
under the dormant Commerce Clause for states to discriminate in favor of their own 
public entities or to adopt discriminatory subsidies. What is more, when doing business 
on the market and acting as a market participant the state is also free to discriminate on 
the basis state origin. The market participant doctrine has even sparked debates on 
whether the category of exemptions even could entail a market creation exemption.  
Law of prohibition under the dormant Commerce Clause normally serves to define the 
scope of measures that form a threat to interstate commerce. When acting as market 
participants or when granting subsidies states are not bound by the non-discrimination 
principle and may even adopt de jure discriminatory measures. Yet, discrimiminatory 
regulation with identical economic effects may be incompatible with the dormant 
Commerce Clause. It is thus difficult to identify any economically coherent theory 
underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. The U.S. system is less aligned with the 
efficiency rationale than the other two jurisdictions. A reason for the lack of coherent 
theory may be a consequence of the fact that the dormant Commerce Clause has largely 
been formed through case law. 
The market participant and market creation tests might not be unique to the dormant 
Commerce Clause. In particular, a market creation exemption has been applied in the 
567
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   567 31.7.2019   7.16
 568 
context of the SCM Agreement. What is more, a market participant exemption, 
although perhaps slighltly less profound in comparision to the one under U.S. law, has 
in the literature been argued to apply for public procurement decisions within the scope 
of EU free movement law. Thus, despite differences between trade law regimes, similar 
trends still evolve within economic law across the jurisdictions. In other words, similar 
value reconciliation tests have emerged in various areas of economic law, and there is 
potential for mutual learning. 
The introduction of the exemptions to the non-discrimination principle by the U.S. 
Supreme Court suggests that the objective of efficiency through non-discrimination is 
outweighed by other values. The idea behind allowing states to grant even de jure 
discriminatory subsidies is that subsidies are transparent enough for in-state voters to 
become informed out them and vote out of office the legislators that implement an 
inefficient subsidy policy. In turn, the market participant exemption enables states to 
compete with private companies on equal terms. This reflects a positive view of the 
state as an entity doing business on the market and stands in stark contrast to the 
rationale of regulation on competitive neutrality. 
The exemptions to the dormant Commerce Clause mean that sovereignty of states to 
drive in-state policy as market participants trumps the values underlying non-
discrimination. The market integration in the U.S. would thus not seem to reach the 
same level as in the EU. That being said, it interesting to note that under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, unlike under EU free movement law, de jure discriminatory 
Renewable Portfolio Standards will likely be declared disproportional. Hence, while 
general market integration might go further in the EU, the level of integration in the 
electricity sector is higher in the U.S. 
Differences between the tests applicable in the U.S. and under the two other 
jurisdictions can also be found in law of justification. Most notably, the U.S. courts 
have developed two proportionality reviews that neither fully corresponds with the tests 
applicable in EU and WTO law. The Pike balancing test, more commonly applied to 
cases of de facto discrimination than strict scrutiny, is a test of holistic balancing. In 
contrast, the EU and the WTO proportionality tests put more emphasis on identifying 
the least restrictive measure for achieving a given level of protection. Differences in the 
structure of proportionality tests might contribute to the difficulty in reaching consensus 
on how to construct new value reconciliation mechanisms in new multilateral and 
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bilateral agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerhsip 
(TTIP). This is why it is important to paint a comprehensive picture of differences 
between the regimes.  
Moreover, I have in previous research on de jure discriminatory provisions in schemes 
to promote renewable resources in the electricity sector pointed out how proportionality 
in the EU could benefit from U.S. experiences and ideas.1624 Differences in the 
proportionality review does in other words not hinder mutual learning. The different 
jurisdictions are presented with similar challenges in the application of the 
proportionality review despite the differences in the structure of the reviews. For 
example, each jurisdiction will have to be careful not to shape the review so that the 
legality of measures could depend on the size and market power of the state. 
It was concluded that the proportionality reviews in EU and WTO law reconcile 
transparency, due process rights and regulatory certainty. Discriminatory measures that 
serve a legitimate objective must be designed in line with those three values. Similar 
requirements on regulating states were not be identified in the application of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. Future research will have to show whether all of those 
objectives are taken into account more implicitly also under the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause. One of the three values, transparency, has already been given 
weight, but in completely different manner. Namely, as mentioned above, instead of 
establishing expectations on the design of discriminatory measures, transparency has 
in the U.S. formed an argument for exempting discriminatory measures, more 
specifically discriminatory subsidies, from the scope of prima facie prohibited 
measures. 
Finally, the approach to extraterritoriality has been somewhat different under the U.S. 
dormant Commerce Clause as compared to the other two jurisdictions. Measures that 
control conduct wholly outside the regulating state are prima facie prohibited. In many 
cases where the test has been applied the court could equally well have ruled that the 
measure constituted a burden on interstate commerce due to de facto discriminatory 
effects. In turn, non-discriminatory measures captured by the extraterritoriality test in 
                                                 
1624 Max S. Jansson, ‘Free Movement of Electricity and the Revival of System Stability Justifications’ 
(2017) 18 German Law Journal 595. 
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U.S. law of prohibition could under EU and international law be found to breach general 
legal principles on the territorial scope of jurisdiction.  
The extraterritoriality test applied in law of prohibition of the dormant Commerce 
Clause might in exceptional cases lead to outcomes that would have been different than 
under EU and international law. In particular, in the U.S. it would appear that states do 
not have the right to adopt a ban on a chosen set of PPMs in the electricity sector due 
to interconnected grids and the ‘network’ nature of the market. Could PPM-criteria be 
extraterritorial also in other circumstances? The scope of the extraterritoriality test in 
law of prohibition is uncertain. In particular, it is not clear whether non-discriminatory 
PPM-criteria could be declared to constitute prohibited extraterritorial regulation when 
they hinder market access. U.S. courts have in the recent application of the 
extraterritoriality test in law of prohibition made reference to the concept of market 
access but have not clarified the meaning or the relevance of this concept.  
A market access test has already been applied in EU free movement law. The 
prohibition of market access hinders in the EU has expanded the scope of law of 
prohibition beyond the prohibition of discrimination. Under the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause any potential market access test would apply only in the context of 
the extraterritoriality test and would therefore not expand the scope of non-
discriminatory prima facie prohibited measures to the same extent as it has in the EU. 
Despite such difference, the difficulties in the application of a coherent and consistent 
market access test under EU law could still form valuable lessons for U.S. courts when 
assessing whether to develop such a test in the application of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
Regardless of specific scope, the extraterritoriality test in law of prohibition illustrates 
how extraterritorial measures are viewed with scepticism in the U.S. It is hence highly 
plausible that the protection of out-of-state environmental interests does not form a 
legitimate ground of justification. Indeed, unlike under EU and WTO law, the language 
used by U.S. courts would suggest that it is only local (i.e. in-state) environmental 
benefits that may constitute a legitimate objective in law of justification. 
In the context of EU and WTO law some arguments were presented in favour of 
allowing measures to target pure out-of-state effects. Under U.S. law those arguments 
may not have similar force. First, under WTO law PPM-criteria that tackle out-of-state 
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environmental effects can potentially be justified with reference to the protection of 
public morals. In the U.S. the perception of morals is more homogenous and state 
morals have not been recognized as a ground of justification to a similar extent. 
Secondly, in EU law there are arguments for a firm link between the interpretation of 
the geographical scope of legitimate objectives in trade law and procurement law. In 
other words, the pressure for coherence with public procurememt law may result in 
extraterritorial objectives forming a valid ground of justification in free movement law. 
In the U.S. there is no federal law on state-level procurement. 
Procurement might be exempted from the dormant Commerce Clause under the market 
participant doctrine. The lack of federal rules on the design of state procurement 
together with the application of the market participant exemption would allow for states 
to adopt discriminatory PPM-criteria through public procurement in order to address 
out-of-state environmental effects. Hence, there will inevitably also be some pressure 
to legitimize extraterritorial objectives under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause. Yet, 
it might still not be sufficient for broadening the geographical scope of legitimate 
grounds of justification. 
The potential rejection of measures with only extraterritorial objectives could likely not 
be explained by concerns that developed states would otherwise gain an unfair 
advantage. Instead, the rejection could perhaps be explained by the view that states 
should trust the ability of other states to protect their environment. This perception of 
loyalty and mutual trust between U.S. states might outweigh other values of a close 
union, such as the interest states may have in protecting the environment in all states of 
the union as their residents have the right to move freely across state borders. 
In conclusion, some tests are applied under the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause that 
represent an approach fundamentally different from that adopted under EU and WTO 
law. Interestingly, the peculiarities of U.S. law do not appear to take the development 
in any particular direction. For example, while the market participant exemption awards 
the state adopting the measure more flexibility, the disapproval of extraterritorial 
regulation in turn restricts the room for maneuver of states adopting measures. 
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7.4. Legal PPM-Criteria 
7.4.1. PPM-Criteria and Trade Law 
The primary focus in this book was on legal tests for value reconciliation. The 
compatibility of PPM-criteria with trade law is assessed through the application of such 
tests. The tests focus on whether the criteria constitute a state measure, whether the 
measure could be exempted from the scope of trade law, whether the measure is 
discriminatory, whether there is a valid ground of justification and whether the measure 
is proportional to its objective. Since the study on legal tests was conducted in the 
context of PPM-criteria adopted by states, some conclusions on the compatibility of 
such measures with trade law may be offered. 
Social sustainability criteria, in for example the biofuels sector, could comply with 
WTO law.1625 Yet, for example in the biofuels sector the EU has not been active in 
adopting such criteria.1626 This study did, however, not explore social sustainability 
criteria in much detail. The focus has instead been on environmental PPM-criteria and 
reference to cases on social criteria were only made when it provided insight into the 
interpretation of environmental criteria. 
Environmental PPM-criteria have in this book been studied generally. However, 
criteria in the energy sector have been given particular attention. More specifically, it 
was examined to what extent criteria on the sustainability of PPMs could be 
implemented for fuels and electricity. The outcome of many trade law cases concerning 
the energy sector would be fairly similar across jurisdictions. Trade law is of course not 
the only field of law that governs PPM-criteria in the energy sector. Some models of 
PPM-criteria in the energy sector are prohibited under other legal norms.  
The conclusions on PPM-criteria are divided into three parts. The first part will give an 
overview of de jure and de facto discriminatory PPM-criteria applied specifically in the 
energy sector. The objective is to differentiate between criteria that would not be legal 
                                                 
1625 See Steve Charnovitz, Jane Earley and Robert Howse, ‘An examination of social standards in biofuels 
sustainability criteria’, IPC Discussion Paper (2008).  
1626 For discussion see Emily Barrett Lydgate, ‘Biofuels, Sustainability, and Trade-Related Regulatory 
Chill’ (2012) 15 J. International Economic L. 157, 160 and 163-164; Alan Swinbank, ‘EU Support for 
Biofuels and Bioenergy, Environmental Sustainability Criteria, and Trade Policy’, ICTSD Programme 
on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, (2009) Issue Paper No. 17 (Geneva: International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development); Alan Swinbank and Carsten Daugbjerg, ‘Improving EU 
Biofuels Policy? Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Policy Efficiency and WTO Compatibility’ (2013) 47 J. 
World Trade 813, 817-818. 
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   572 31.7.2019   7.16
 573 
under any circumstances, criteria that would be legal under essentially all circumstances 
and criteria that could be legal depending on the more specific design. In the second 
part conclusions will be presented on the effects that can be addressed with PPM-
criteria. Finally, the last part will summarize the requirements that follow from the 
proportionality review with respect to the more detailed design of PPM-criteria. 
7.4.2. Criteria in the Energy Sector 
7.4.2.1. De Jure Discriminatory Criteria 
There is normally no reason to treat products differently on the basis of origin. De jure 
discrimination is therefore rarely justifiable in any of the three jurisdictions. For 
example, de jure discriminatory criteria on energy plant equipment or services would 
not be compatible with trade law. Likewise, treating imported fuel differently from in-
state fuel or imported electricity differently from imported electricity directly on the 
basis of state of origin would as a rule not be justifiable.  
The analysis of justifiability of de jure discrimination is complex when it comes to 
support schemes for electricity generated with sustainable PPMs. The ECJ has 
concluded that under EU free movement law feed-in-tariffs and renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS) with de jure discriminatory elements can be justifiable in the electricity 
sector. This unusual situation where de jure discrimination has been justifiable can 
perhaps be explained by the risk that a fully non-discriminatory scheme would endanger 
the system stability of the support schemes.1627 For example, the market of a state with 
a RPS could be flooded with renewable energy credits if they would have to be granted 
to all plants without any limitation on the geographical scope of the origin of the power. 
Namely, in other states where no similar quotas have been introduced plants would 
have strong incetives to apply for credits in states that award credits. The influx of 
credits would mean the quotas would be fulfilled easily and there would be no pressure 
for an increase in renewable energy. That would endanger the objective with the RPS.  
Interestingly, so far litigation and jurisprudence on the application of the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause on schemes to promote renewables would seem to suggest that a de 
jure discriminatory RPS for the electricity sector would be unconstitutional. Courts 
might not – and at least should not – develop a market creation exemption to allow such 
                                                 
1627 Max S. Jansson, ‘Free Movement of Electricity and the Revival of System Stability Justifications’ 
(2017) 18 German Law Journal 595. 
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schemes to escape strict scrutiny. Comparably, the implementation of a de jure 
discriminatory RPS for the fuel sector would likely be found to be incompatible with 
trade law. With respect to the fuel sector an oversupply of RECs could be avoided, and 
the stability of the scheme could be ensured, already by restricting access to credits to 
fuel that actually enter the market of the state that grants the credits. With respect to the 
electricity sector the dormant Commerce Clause may, however, leave room for states 
to introduce some limitations to the geographical scope of plants granted access to 
credits under their RPS. It is submitted that states in the U.S. could likely implement 
their RPS so that renewable energy credits are awarded only to electricity on the 
condition that the plant is connected to the same regional grid as the state granting 
credits. It may even be justifiable to require that the electricity is delivered to or 
consumed in the state that grants the credits. 
It is unclear why requirements of interconnection, delivery or consumption have not 
been considered by the ECJ as alternative measures when assessing the proportionality 
of de jure discriminatory schemes that award credits only to in-state plants in order to 
promote electricity from renewable resources. It is submitted that the Court should in 
future cases consider these solutions more carefully, and whether they would be 
sufficient for ensuring system stability.  
7.4.2.2. De Facto Discrimination in the Electricity Sector 
Cross-border trade in electricity remains fairly limited globally. Hence, disputes on the 
de facto discriminatory effects of PPM-criteria in the electricity sector are unlikely to 
emerge under WTO law. There is some cross-border trade between EU Member States. 
Similarly, there is trade between states in the U.S as interconnections have been built. 
There are, however, factors that significantly reduce the risks of litigation on PPM-
criteria with the de facto discriminatory effects.  
U.S. federal law largely prohibits state-level feed-in-tariffs. Disputes that have already 
emerged under the dormant Commerce Clause have therefore concerned only 
Renewable Portfolio Standards and full bans on certain unsustainable PPMs. In turn, in 
the EU even de jure discriminatory FIT-schemes and RPSs have been declared 
compatible with EU free movement law, as explained above. The fact that de jure 
discriminatory schemes are currently regarded as justifiable means that a challenge 
against any de facto discriminatory effects of such schemes would likely also not be 
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successful. That being said, in the EU cases could still emerge on more radical trade 
restrictive measures, such as a complete ban on some PPMs. 
Under the extraterritoriality test in law of prohibition of the dormant Commerce Clause 
measures that wholly control out-of-state commerce are prima facie prohibited. PPM-
criteria applicable for imported products would create incentives for out-of-state 
producers to comply with the criteria in their out-of-state production. The 
extraterritoriality test should, however, not engulf measures that merely create 
incentives for out-of-state actors. The extraterritoriality test, which is unique to the 
U.S., could still render the implementation of full bans on some PPMs in the electricity 
sector illegal. As a consequence, states would be well-advice to continue to implement 
RPSs instead of fully banning electricity generated with some specific PPM. The 
scheme may of course be drafted so that the quotas and credits are not just for 
renewables, but for all low-GHG PPMs, including both renewables and nuclear fission. 
The analysis of the compatibility with the dormant Commerce Clause of a RPS would 
follow a traditional path with assessment of discrimination and justification. The same 
approach applies to the analysis of the compatibility with EU free movement law of 
bans on some PPMs. In case the scheme is not de jure discriminatory, the analysis 
would turn to the question of whether the scheme is de facto discriminatory. 
Discrimination can occur only in case products treated differently are like. It was 
submitted that differences in PPMs do not as such make products unlike. This will hold 
until people become so sensitive to the sustainability of the PPMs, or the full life-cycle, 
that they do not regard products with poor environmental life-cycle performance as 
substitutes to products with a less heavy environmental footprint. Apart from the 
attitudes of consumers, also technical development might gradually affect future 
substitutability. 
The finding that electricity generated with different PPMs currently constitute like 
products leads to the conclusion that different treatment on the basis of different PPMs 
could, depending on market shares, result in discrimination. In case of discriminatory 
effects, the measure would need to serve a justifiable objective. Under EU free 
movement law the objective cannot be inconsistent with international science. States 
could with reference to the precautionary principle likely justify restrictions on most 
PPMs due to the fact that there with respect to the sustainability of different PPMs in 
the electricity sector exist significant scientific uncertainty. A comparably broad 
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discretion is left to states under the Pike balancing test applied under the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The flexibility under scientific certainty would suggest that both a 
de facto discriminatory RPS by a U.S. state and a de facto discriminatory ban on some 
PPM for generating eletricity in a EU Member State could be legal if designed with 
care. 
There are some measures with respect to PPM-criteria that would not be proportional.  
For example, it would likely not be justifiable to treat electricity from some renewables 
less favorably than electricity from fossil fuels because it would contradict with 
international science. Under Pike balancing this would translate into a finding that the 
burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive of the benefits. It is still worthy of 
note that as different energy resources, such as coal, natural gas and biomass, are 
probably not considered like products, there could exist a possibility for states to favor 
an energy resource over another. Trade restrictions or taxation applied directly on the 
resource instead of on the generated power could lead to electricity from unsustainable 
PPMs receiving benefits in contradiction with international scientific consensus. This 
study did, however, not examine the issue in more depth. 
The idea of a ban on electricity from nuclear fission forms a peculiar and difficult case 
for the proportionality review under EU free movement law. The EU Commission 
signaled its opposition toward full bans of products using unsustainable PPMs in the 
electricity sector when Austria designed its anti-nuclear regulations. A ban on power 
from nuclear fission might not have any expected effect and the measure could 
therefore struggle to survive the EU tests of suitability and necessity. It is still submitted 
that a ban would perhaps be suitable and necessary for advancing a legitimate objective. 
A ban could be suitable and necessary for an environmental objective even if it would 
not in itself yet be sufficient to create any effect. Another difficult question is whether 
or not international science would provide some support for a decision to ban power 
from nuclear fission while not restricting coal power to any significant extent. Many 
questions thus remain open with respect to the legality of a ban on power from nuclear 
fission under EU free movement law. 
In conclusion, most schemes that to date have been implemented or planned with 
respect to PPMs in the electricity sector could comply with trade law if carefully 
designed. In the U.S. it is mostly full bans on some PPMs that could be unconstitutional 
regardless of design. In contrast, in the EU even some contemplated bans on PPMs 
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seem possible. There is, however, much uncertainty with respect to the approach to 
bans on power from nuclear fission. 
7.4.2.3. De Facto Discrimination in the Fuel Sector 
States might treat fuels differently for example on the basis of PPMs or life-cycle 
emissions. Determining the compatibility of such measures with trade law will require 
an analysis of like products. Fuels that may be used interchangeably in the same engines 
would most likely be considered like products as long as consumers largely continue to 
view the fuels as substitutes regardless of differences in how sustainable the fuels are.  
Various ratios of biodiesel and petrodiesel can be used in diesel-engines. In turn, 
various ratios of gasoline and bioethanol can be used in flex-fuel engines. However, 
many engines run optimally with some specific ratio of the mix between bio-based fuel 
and petroleum-based fuel because the properties of the fuels differ slightly. Moreover, 
some engines still run only on specific ratios, which means that there is no 
substitutability at the stage when the driver fills up the fuel tank. That fact does not 
eliminate all competition between the two types of fuel and the degree of 
substitutability might well be high enough for petroleum-based and bio-based fuels to 
be like products. The fact that diesel engines are less sensitive with respect to the ratio 
of biofuel in the mix would indicate that the probability of likeness between biodiesel 
and petrodiesel is somewhat higher than for bioethanol and gasoline. 
Different treatment of two fuels that are like products could amount to discrimination. 
In the case of discriminatory effects there has to be some scientific support for the 
different treatment. There certainly is support for treating many biofuels more favorably 
than fossil fuels. Scientific uncertainty with respect to some controversial first 
generation biofuels means that states would have much discretion in deciding whether 
to treat them more or less favorably than fossil fuels.  
Trade disputes in the fuel sector will likely center around the treatment of various 
biofuels contra other biofuels from different feedstock. The EU Renewable Energy 
Directive prohibits states from developing additional national biofuels sustainability 
criteria. In other words, the sustainability criteria for biofuels have been fully 
harmonized in the directive. As national criteria would already breach the directive, 
disputes on the compatibility of national criteria with free movement law should rarely 
arise. The situation is somewhat comparable in the U.S. as federal sustainability criteria 
577
31177316_Vaitoskirja_Max_Jansson_Oikeustiet_sisus_B5_3007.indd   577 31.7.2019   7.16
 578 
have been adopted in the RFS2. However, states have the right to opt out of the federal 
model and instead implement a scheme based on California’s LCFS. The compatibility 
of these schemes with the dormant Commerce Clause has already been challenged.1628 
What is more, all EU and U.S. biofuels sustainability criteria must also comply with 
WTO law. 
What biofuels could be considered like products? Biodiesel fuels from various 
feedstock should be considered like products. Namely, most biodiesel can be used in 
the same engines regardless of what feedstock has been used. Similarly, all bioethanol 
products are like products even if produced from different feedstock. Unequal treament 
of different biofuels on the basis of life-cycle emission should still be justifiable 
provided that the scheme is carefully designed. 
Could even bioethanol and biodiesel be like products? On the one hand diesel fuels and 
on the other hand gasoline and ethanol fuels cannot be used in the same engines. The 
level of competition is lower between fuels that cannot be used to run the same engines. 
However, some competition still exists between diesel and other fuels. On the retail 
market for cars both consumers and transportation companies pick between vehicles 
with various engines. The fuel that go into the engine will likely affect the decision to 
some degree. Similarly, in the process of designing vehicle models, car manufacturers 
make decisions on the type of engine that will be used in the model and this decision 
will be affected in part by the fuel that is used in the engine. For these reasons fuel 
producers have incentives to lobby consumers and producers to favor the type of 
engines that run on their fuel. Whether the degree of substitutability between different 
vehicles and engines is sufficient for the fuels to be like under trade law must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. There are many factors that impact the purchasing 
decision when comparing vehicles and the type of fuel engine is perhaps not of 
sufficient importance to lead to sufficient substitutability between diesel and ethanol.  
On a side note, cars with fuel engines face increasing competition from electric cars. 
Even intense competition on that market will likely not lead to electricity and fuels 
being like products. Namely, electricity is to a great extent used for many purposes for 
which fuels are not suitable.  
                                                 
1628 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, case no. 17-16881 (9th Cir. 2019); American Fuel & 
Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, case no. 15-35834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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All in all, differential treatment of some biodiesel contra some other biodiesel or some 
bioethanol contra another bioethanol forms the cases most susceptive of a trade law 
challenge. The differentiation is commonly implemented in biofuels sustainability 
criteria with reference to the protection of biodiversity and the reduction of GHG 
emissions. The sustainability criteria can be supported by scientific evidence and their 
benefits for environmental protection can be so significant that they should outweigh 
the burden on free trade if carefully designed. In other words, the criteria may well be 
compatible with trade law. What effects the criteria may address and how they ought 
to be designed is elaborated in subsequent sections. 
7.4.3. The Effects Addressed with PPM-Criteria 
7.4.3.1. Type of Effects 
Davies has argued that PPM-criteria in the context of taxation may comply with EU 
law.1629 This study, in turn, illustrated how PPM-criteria more generally can comply 
with trade law across three jurisdictions provided that they are carefully designed. How 
should the criteria then be designed? Some conclusions and recommendations can be 
offered with respect to the effects that may be addressed with the PPM-criteria. 
In designing of PPM-criteria states need to consider the effects that are targeted. It has 
been emphasized that PPM-criteria should not be implemented in contradiction with 
international science. It is less clear whether it would be justifiable to adopt PPM-
criteria that take into account effects that are outside the scope of what the producer 
can influence. For example, a biofuels producer has no control over indirect land-use 
change. Therefore, it is uncertain whether it would be proportional to include such an 
element in biofuels sustainability criteria that have discriminatory effects.   
Sustainability criteria commonly make reference to the transportation part of the life-
cycle. For example, the effects of differences in transport distance have been included 
in California’s biofuels sustainability criteria.1630 Could such an approach be justified? 
A couple of decades ago the ECJ went so far as to suggest that there was no proof of 
                                                 
1629 Gareth Davies, ‘‘Process and Production Method’ – based Trade Restrictions in the EU’, in Catherine 
Barnard (ed.) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007-2008 (Hart 2008) 69. See also case 
140/79 Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v. DAF SpA [1981] ECR 1, para. 14. 
1630 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, Memorandum Decision and Order Re Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, Lead Case: 1:09-cv-2234-LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
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environmental harm from transport.1631 However, the emissions from transport distance 
are part of the equation of life-cycle impact and states should be justified in taking the 
estimated emissions into account. Under the dormant Commerce Clause the potential 
application of strict scrutiny to criteria that include an estimate of emissions from 
transportation could in principle make it more difficult to uphold the criteria. Yet, it is 
submitted that it would not be sound legal policy to restrict the right of states to tackle 
the genuine environmental harm that transport emission causes.  
Transport distance could not be relied on as an alone direct proxy for emissions. States 
may, however, include emissions from factors sensitive to geographic location, such as 
transportation, into their life-cycle models. Local production will with respect to 
transport emissions often get an advantage over imports. The relevance of that 
advantage will perhaps not too often become decisive as transport emissions commonly 
make up just a small part of lice-cycle emissions. Yet, the advantage is undeniable. An 
increase in the use of life-cycle criteria with a component for transportation emissions 
has the potential of disrupting and restructuring international trade as we know it today. 
In other words, implementing PPM-criteria and life-cycle models has the potential of 
decreasing international trade. 
A question that to date has not received much attention in trade law is whether 
sustainability criteria that apply to both in-state production and to imports may, with 
respect to imports, address only the effects associated with the products actually 
imported or whether the importing state could require that all products produced by the 
out-of-state producer for all markets around the world are sustainable. In other words, 
could the importing state apply criteria on general corporate policy and require that the 
producer’s only produce sustainable products? Extending criteria on the properties of 
products also to the producer’s products that are not imported would often not address 
any public health interest of the importing state. However, the situation is different with 
PPM-criteria. Namely, addressing general corporate policy could arguably increase the 
level of protection against the cross-border environmental harm of unsustainable PPMs. 
Under EU public procurement law criteria addressing general corporate policy are 
prohibited because they do not relate to the subject matter of the contract. It might, 
                                                 
1631 Case C-203/96 Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v. Minister van Volkshuisvesting, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] ECR I-4075, paras 46-47. 
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however, be that EU procurement law in this respect is more restrictive than trade law. 
A more detailed analysis of this question was left to future research. 
7.4.3.2. The Geographical Scope 
In their design of PPM-criteria, states may certainly tackle global environmental effects 
as well as effects that reach their territory to an extent that exceeds some de minimis 
threshold. The legality of criteria addressing minimal cross-border effects and pure 
foreign environmental effects on either environmental or moral grounds is less clear. 
In public procurement all companies must be treated equally. The pollution of an in-
state plant should be assessed in the same way as pollution of an out-of-state plant. 
Therefore, tackling out-of-state effects should in principle be legal in public 
procurement. However, even if no extraterritoriality test would apply, the criteria must 
still survive the proportionality review of trade law. For example, in Bundesdruckerei 
the ECJ concluded that the requirement of payment of German minimum wages also 
for work done in Poland (i.e. out-of-state) was disproportionate because the costs of 
living are lower in Poland.1632 In turn, in Max Havelaar the ECJ ruled that the reliance 
by the public authority on a fair trade label in the award criteria had not been done in 
the manner set out by the directive.1633 There was hence no need for the court to 
examine whether the fair trade criteria, which evidently extended to trade out-of-state, 
were in accordance with the principle of proportionality applicable in public 
procurement law. Similarly, the court did in its judgement not have to adopt any 
position on the relationship between the fair trade criteria and free movement law. It is 
thus still possible that while criteria adopted in public procurement on minimum wages 
out-of-state will often likely face difficulties under the proportionality review, other 
social and environmental PPM-criteria on out-of-state effects could, when adopted in 
public procurement, potentially survive the proportionality review. 
The review of criteria that tackle minimal cross-border effects or pure foreign 
environmental effects is more complex under trade law outside the context of public 
procurement. It is in each of the three jurisdictions unclear whether an extraterritoriality 
test should apply in law of justification.  
                                                 
1632 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v. Stadt Dortmund, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235, para. 34. 
1633 See Case C-368/10 Commission v. Netherlands (Max Havelaar), ECLI:EU:C:2012:284. 
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In the application of GATT in EC – Seals there were indications that PPM-criteria on 
animal welfare could be justifiable with reference to in-state morals.1634 As is evident 
from the reasoning in the decisions on the case, even a ban on unsustainably produced 
products could in principle survive the proportionality review of GATT when its is 
unreasonable difficult to implement an effective labelling scheme. Hence, the 
proportionality review does not form a categorical obstacle for PPM-criteria that tackle 
activities with very limited, or even no, cross-border effects related to animal or human 
health. Normally, however, the alternative of a labelling scheme for the sustainability 
of PPMs can be implemented without unreasonable burden.  
States relying on moral grounds of justification may struggle to justify PPM-criteria 
that are not implemented as labelling schemes because sustainability labels would allow 
each consumer with strict moral views to receive the necessary product information in 
order to avoid contribution to the immoral PPMs. Hence, even without an 
extraterritoriality test, the proportionality test could be argued to limit the use of PPM-
criteria tackling out-of-state effects to labelling schemes. Labelling schemes are 
therefore strongly recommended. It is still in principle possible that a full ban on 
unsustainable PPMs would be legal. Namely, the utility of citizens condemning 
unsustainable PPMs can decrease even if the imported unsustainably produced products 
are consumed by other citizens and the state might consequently argue that the 
maximization of utility requires a ban. Whether such argument would be successful 
remains to be seen. 
It is not fully clear what limits the proportionality review sets on extending PPM-
criteria to imports when doing so will address minimal, or even no, environmental 
effects in the regulating state. Under the approach relating to the protection of public 
morals it would appear that labelling schemes could in principle be justifiable in WTO 
law, but it is not clear whether more restrictive measures could be proportional under 
circumstances where labelling forms a realistic alternative. In any event, the moral 
approach has in practice put pressure for a broad geographical scope for environmental 
protection under GATT. 
It is unclear whether environmental PPM-criteria may be justifiable at all with reference 
to the protection of public morals under EU free movement law, and in particular under 
                                                 
1634 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, DS400-401, AB Report, 
22 May 2014. 
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U.S. law. Be that as it may, the regulating states can decide to rely on environmental 
protection instead of the protection of public morals as a ground of justification. The 
need to rely on a ground of justification may emerge when some criteria that apply to 
in-state production are introduced also for imported products and that results in 
discriminatory effects. Extending the scope of application of some criteria to imported 
products might address out-of-state environmental effects and have minimal to no 
effects for the in-state environment of the state adopting the measure due to the limited 
cross-border flow of the pollution or some other harmful effect. There is uncertainty as 
to whether the protection of pure out-of-state environmental interests would form a 
legitimate objective.  
A requirement that the cross-border effect the state strives to address with its measure 
would have an impact on the in-state environment to a degree that exceeds a de minimis 
threshold would form a good compromise between different interests. However, 
coherence with public procurement law – in particularly in the EU –  constitutes a strong 
argument for rejecting the extraterritoriality test and for granting states the right to 
adopt PPM-criteria also for imports even when the effects of out-of-state PPMs do not 
reach the territory of the regulating state. Thus, it is conceivable that under EU law 
carefully designed PPM-criteria applicable to both in-state production and imports, 
even if implemented in some more trade restrictive form than labelling schemes that 
merely provide consumers information about PPMs, could survive the proportionality 
review even when out-of-state production has little to no negative implications for the 
environment of the state adopting the measure. In turn, under the U.S. dormant 
Commerce Clause there seems to be less room for measures that only strive to address 
extraterritorial environmental harm. 
In conclusion, many aspects of the justifiability of PPM-criteria that tackle minimal 
cross-border effects or pure out-of-state effects remain unsettled. There are, however, 
strategies for states designing PPM-criteria to mitigate the risk that other states suspect 
discriminatory intent. It is recommended that when states decide to implement PPM-
criteria also to imported products, they strive to minimize the concerns related to such 
an approach. States could take out-of-state interests better into account by first of all 
providing a forum for foreign parties with an interest in the matter to give input before 
the PPM-criteria are adopted. Secondly, in particular developed states adopting PPM-
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criteria for imports should consider compensating developing countries through 
technology transfer. 
7.4.4. Designing PPM-Criteria 
7.4.4.1. Elements to be Included in PPM-Criteria 
States do not only need to reflect over what effects they may address with PPM-criteria. 
It is also necessary to consider how the criteria are drafted and how schemes with PPM-
criteria are designed. For example, compliance with the PPM-criteria need to be 
verifiable. Moreover, the criteria should be clear and precise. This applies both to the 
drafted legal statutes as well as the administrative practice of applying the criteria. 
Furthermore, parties that apply for certification of compliance with PPM-criteria but 
get their request rejected should be given a decision in writing, should have access to 
an appeal process and should be heard. 
When implementing new criteria states should allow for a sufficient transition period 
between the date when the law is approved and enter into force and the date from which 
the new criteria apply. It is submitted that states could even allow for a longer transition 
period for old facilities with so called grandfathering clauses. The transition period for 
old facilities to prepare for new stricter requirements may not be unreasonably long. 
Transparency with respect to the content of applicable criteria, regulatory certainty 
through transition periods as well as the guarantee of due process rights may be 
necessary for proportionality. In turn, it is not clear how situations where sustainability 
criteria and PPM-criteria in one sector deviate substantially and more than temporarily 
from criteria applied in another sector should be approached under trade law. States are 
still strongly encouraged to only temporarily apply substantially different approaches 
in different sectors. Equally, states are encouraged to be transparent with respect to how 
they calculate externalities and on what grounds they design their sustainability criteria. 
These steps should help to eliminate concerns of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination. 
7.4.4.2. Threshold Values 
States often adopt threshold values for harmful effects such as GHG emissions in their 
legislation. Products that exceed the emissions threshold value might be denied market 
access by the state. The choice of threshold could in some circumstances have 
discriminatory effects. Would the measure then survive the proportionality review? A 
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lower threshold for the maximum level of emissions would ensure a higher level of 
protection. Could such a lower threshold also form a less discriminatory alternative? 
When the originally adopted threshold has discriminatory effects, it will be rare that 
requiring producers to emit even less emissions has less discriminatory effects. This 
example on emission thresholds illustrates the likely reason why there has not been any 
abundance of cases on the trade law compatibility of market access thresholds. 
The case of banning products that exceed the maximum threshold values for emissions 
resembles the case of awarding beneficial treatment to products that are within the 
limits of the threshold. For example, biofuels with life-cycle GHG emissions below a 
threshold value – i.e. an emission savings percentage above a threshold value – are 
promoted under the U.S. RFS2 and EU sustainability criteria. It has been argued that 
the choice of GHG savings thresholds in the U.S. and the EU has had discriminatory 
effects. With respect to these sustainability schemes it could perhaps be illustrated that 
stricter thresholds – i.e. requirement of lower emissions and thus higher emission 
savings – would be less discriminatory. However, unlike in the case of banning all 
products that do not meet the threshold, it is in the case of promoting those that meet 
the threshold uncertain whether making the threshold stricter by requiring higher GHG 
emissions savings would improve the level of environmental protection. Without a ban 
on products with high emissions the decision to make the condition for beneficial 
treatment stricter could result in the least sustainable fuels gaining market share as 
compared to the situation under current schemes. 
A model, such as California’s LCFS, in which sustainability is not defined through 
thresholds, but as a sliding scale, would form an alternative to GHG emission 
thresholds. Under the LCFS biofuels are considered to have a level of sustainability 
corresponding to the level of estimated GHG emissions. There is no threshold for 
sustainability in the LCFS but a low threshold could be integrated in a model of that 
type. It was argued that the existence of the sliding scale alternative would not 
necessarily render a discriminatory GHG emission model with thresholds separating 
sustainable from unsustainable incompatible with trade law. The reason for that would 
be that a sliding scale model could increase biofuels and the higher degree of 
uncertainty with respect to the emissions calculations for biofuels could increase the 
probability that a critical level of emissions is surpassed. Be that as it may, the sliding 
scale model is attractive because it would enable states to award the most sustainable 
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alternatives more benefits. The sliding scale could be coupled with a fairly modest 
minimum threshold in order to protect against the risk that incorrect estimations of 
emissions associated with biofuels lead to the development of biofuels that later prove 
to be less sustainable than fossil fuels. 
7.4.4.3. The Method of Certification and Verification of Compliance 
The certification of compliance with PPM-criteria is an important element of the design 
of the scheme. There are countless different models. States could decide to assess the 
sustainability of in-state products or producers on an individual basis. In such case 
imports cannot be automatically assigned a sustainability value on the basis of the 
average sustainability of similar products but should also be given the opportunity to 
illustrate individual level of sustainability. Under another model the state implementing 
PPM-criteria would ban unsustainable PPMs and treat imported products as sustainable 
when they come from states that have implemented a similar ban. Again, states would 
have to allow importers the opportunity to illustrate individual sustainability and 
compliance with PPM-criteria regardless of the laws applied in the state of origin. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that unfavorable natural conditions or traditions of 
unsustainable PPMs in the state-of-origin should not render all products from that state 
unsustainable. Individual imports from any state should be allowed the opportunity of 
individual certification of the level of sustainability or the compatibility with PPM-
criteria.  
The requirement that individual certification must be available does not mean that each 
and every individual imported product would have to be certified. A full ban on 
unsustainable PPMs could be adopted in-state. Some risk of occasional in-state non-
compliance with the PPM-criteria would still exist. The requirements on certification 
of imports should not be disproportionally high in comparison to the treatment of in-
state production. It would often likely be disproportional to require evidence that every 
individual imported product has been sustainably produced. Instead, it would seem 
sufficient to require that imports come from facilities, such as plants or factories, or 
from events, such as fishing or hunting trips, that can be certified as having complied 
with the PPM-criteria. 
Models of individual sustainability certification were in this book discussed with 
reference to the examples of sustainability schemes developed in the biofuels sector. 
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The sustainability schemes applicable in the EU and the U.S. have introduced pathway 
values. These pathway values are average GHG emissions estimated for a pathway that 
is defined with reference to, for example, the feedstock, the chemical production 
method and the type of fuel that forms the end product. The authorities only require 
verification of a few factors in order to determine the applicable pathway value and 
consequently also whether the biofuel is sustainable. The adoption of pathway values 
simplifies the verification of compliance with the PPM-criteria. There are, however, 
risks with proxies for unsustainable environmental effects. The trade law compatibility 
of models with pathway values must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Some general 
recommendations may still be put forward. 
The U.S. RFS2 relies only pathway values and there is no possibility to apply for 
certification of individual values for production at a specific plant. Biofuel is assigned 
the same pathway value regardless of geographical location. There is still some risk of 
incompatibility with trade law. The pathway values for biofuel from palm oil do not 
meet the GHG emission savings threshold. Without any process for individual value 
certification palm oil biofuels will categorically be unsustainable. This is to the 
disadvantage of Indonesia and Malaysia, where palm oil is common. When the U.S. 
and others adopt pathway values, even if origin neutral, it would be advisable to also 
allow for individual value certification.  
California’s LCFS originally awarded different pathway values to pathways that were 
otherwise similar but differed with respect to a couple of factors linked to the 
geographical origin of the feedstock and the location of the biofuel plant. More 
specifically, the difference in transport emissions and emissions from local electricity 
generation were given relevance in the calculations of life-cycle emissions. Under the 
LCFS the pathway values function as default values and producers may certify 
individual GHG emission values. The possibility to apply for individual value 
certification is a crucial complement to the pathway values. 
The analysis of the federal and the Californian schemes underlined the importance of 
individual value certification. The emergence of biofuels sustainability criteria has 
raised also new questions on how the process of certifying the sustainability of PPMs 
may be designed. In particular, could circumstances be such that pathway values are no 
longer justifiable? The idea was put forward that states could already consider models 
without pathway values. Relying only on individual values could in some 
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circumstances reduce discrimination and increase the level of protection against GHG 
emissions. It was, however, submitted that the economic costs for the state 
implementing the model and for the producers applying for certification may be so high 
in a model without pathway values that it currently would not form a reasonably 
available alternative that under the proportionality review would force states to give up 
on pathway values. The costs for individual value certification could of course decrease 
in the future. Were that to happen, both the EU model of combining pathway values 
with thresholds and the original Californian model with state specific pathway values 
would become more difficult to uphold. In light of potential long-term developments, 
states could already consider models like the current Californian LCFS that relies on 
origin neutral default values. Such a model could be implemented with a low GHG 
threshold and the sliding scale could be applied above the threshold. The benefits would 
be awarded in proportion to GHG emissions. 
In sum, many types of sustainability schemes should be designed so that individual 
certification of compliance is possible. For example, it is recommended that states 
complement pathway values with the possibility to apply for the certification of 
individual GHG emission values. Factors sensitive of geographic location, such as 
emissions from transportation, can arguably be included both in the calculations of 
individual values and pathway values. There is, notably, still on-going litigation in the 
U.S. on whether such factors are justifiable components of pathway values. Perhaps 
equally contentious is the position, adopted in this book, that pathway values for any 
given feedstock should not be calculated on the basis of merely in-state data. 
Finally, while it is often problematic to establish either environmental effects or the 
level of sustainability on the basis of proxies, geographical factors may still form 
proxies that determine the applicable method of sustainability certification. In 
particular, while natural conditions cannot function as an irreversible indicator of the 
sustainability of the PPMs, they can indicate that the risk of unsustainability is greater. 
Hence, the importing state may require that the sustainability certification process is 
more rigorous for imports from areas where the PPMs are generally unsustainable due 
to natural conditions. The same applies for difference in risk due to traditional 
production methods and perhaps even differences in risks that stem from differences in 
local laws. The difference in the certification process must still be proportional to the 
level of risk. For example, more favorable in-state natural conditions would rarely 
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justify automatic sustainability certification of all in-state products, if at the same time 
imports would be subject to a burdensome certification process. 
7.5. Value Reconciliation Tests 
7.5.1. Future Research on Applicable Tests 
The analysis of value reconciliation tests in trade law identified several uncertainties 
with respect to the application of those tests. Uncertainties remain in part because 
questions regarding some details of the tests have not been relevant for cases that so far 
have been litigated. There have also been times when details with respect to the 
application of several tests could have been of relevance for the case at hand but the 
superficial reasoning in the decision has left uncertainty as to the decisive factors in the 
tests. Finally, it has not been uncommon that tests have been applied inconsistently over 
time. 
Future jurisprudence and research will have to bring clarification on, among other 
things, a number of issues brought to the fore in this study. 
The Scope of Prima Facie Prohibited Measures 
• What is a non-discriminatory market access hinder prima facie prohibited under 
EU free movement law? Does WTO law also prohibit such measures? 
• What non-discriminatory measures are prohibited under the extraterritoriality 
test of the dormant Commerce Clause? Could it cover bans on PPMs outside 
the electricity sector? Could it cover less trade restrictive measures than 
complete bans? 
• Does trade law in all three jurisdictions cover state decisions of inaction if 
inaction has discriminatory effects? 
• What rationale does the market participant exemption under the dormant 
Commerce Clause follow? 
• To what extent does the market participation exemption cover public 
procurement decisions and regulation? 
• Does the dormant Commerce Clause include an exemption for market creation? 
What is the scope of the exemption? 
• Does EU free movement law include an exemption for public procurement 
decisions on what to buy? Does such an exemption apply even for a state policy 
or consistent practice on what to buy? 
589
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Tests on the Identification of Discrimination 
• How high should the degree of substitutability or competition be for two 
products to be like? How is substitutability estimated? Is high substitutability 
between cars that run on diesel and cars that run on a mix of gasoline and 
bioethanol sufficient to make the different fuels like? 
• How is discrimination assessed in a complex case such as the following: A 
broad category of like products consists of three or more subcategories that are 
different with respect to PPMs or some other properties. In-state products are 
overrepresented in some subcategories and underrepresented in other 
categories. 
• What are the limits of the most favored nation principle under Article I GATT 
given that any state measure will have effects that favor the industry of some 
state over the industry in another state? 
Grounds of Justification and Extraterritoriality 
• What is the geographical scope of legitimate objectives? Does the same 
approach apply under trade law and procurement law? 
• Can environmental PPM-criteria be justified on the grounds of public morals? 
Proportionality 
• How inconsistent can a state be in its application of environmental criteria 
across different sectors? 
• How much support from international science is required for proportionality? 
• Can a measure be suitable for a legitimate objective only if it can be expected 
to have the desired effect or is it sufficient that it logically advances the 
objective but for expected effect is dependent on behavioral changes in other 
states? 
• How intense is the necessity test under EU free movement law, the necessity 
test under Article XX GATT and the necessity test under the chapeau of Article 
XX GATT? How close in the offered level of protection must the less trade 
restrictive alternative come in order to be virtually equal in effect and thus 
render the measure disproportional?  
• Is the intensity of the necessity test higher when labelling is an option? Would 
the high intensity with labelling options apply in particular when the grounds of 
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justification is the protection of public morals or would the high intensity apply 
generally for labelling options? 
• Under what circumstances does proportionality sensu stricto apply under WTO 
and EU law? Is there a meaningful difference between such a test and a high 
intensity necessity test? 
• How is trade restrictiveness assessed in the test of least trade restrictive 
measure? Is it in terms of trade volumes or in terms of discrimination? Is the 
burden on interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test assessed in a 
similar way? Are measures considered less trade restrictive under the 
proportionality review in case they are less discriminatory but more restrictive 
in terms of trade volumes? 
• Under Pike balancing, what is the relationship between value balancing and the 
test of least restrictive measure? 
• How is the benefit calculated under Pike balancing? Is it a measure of net 
benefit? Should the benefit be estimated per capita? 
• When does strict scrutiny instead of the Pike balancing test apply to cases of de 
facto discrimination? 
• Is a measure unconstitutional under strict scrutiny already when there is no other 
less trade restrictive measure that adequately serves the desired objective or is 
the measure only disproportional when the alternative measures do not ensure 
that the objective is served as well? 
7.5.2. Dealing with Legal Uncertainty in an Everchanging World 
This study offered some insights into the functionality of legal tests in economic law. 
The tests are normally shaped by courts through jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis. 
In developing tests courts often rely on rules in written statues as well as legal 
principles. Trade law is no longer a new field of law and fundamental tests can therefore 
be expected to already have gained quite well-defined contours. The expectation of 
maturity does, however, not fully correspond with reality. Several tests have regularly 
been applied without precise definition of the core elements of the test.  
Tests that evolve out of the application of rules and principles against a specific set of 
facts in the cases at hand are often not designed with a holistic and coherent idea in 
mind. Tests might function as mere tools for judges to facilitate their tasks of broad and 
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holistic balancing. Courts might not even have an interest in limiting their own 
discretion by developing more exact tests. Partly vague tests with undefined 
components allow the courts to conduct a holistic case-sensitive evaluation also in 
future cases. Yet, this does not come cheap. First, there will exist more legal 
uncertainty. Secondly, the risk of incoherent and even contradictory case law grows. 
The alternative would be to view tests as rules shaped by judges for logical value 
reconciliation. Tests of this nature would be more rigid in that a certain input would 
automatically deliver a specific outcome and there would be little to no room for case 
specific value balancing. 
In a rapidly changing world courts are presented with cases where the sets of facts are 
new. Hence, the tests still today evolve through court interpretation. Stronger 
interaction between legislators, courts and academia is of importance for correcting and 
avoiding structural flaws. Courts could devote more attention to detail and precision in 
the design and formulation of tests. More precision in the definition of the concepts that 
are part of the legal tests would not mean that courts could not introduce new tests and 
concepts. New problems may raise a need for problem-solving and new tests for value 
reconciliation. 
This study took as a starting point the increased emphasis on the sustainability of 
process and production methods. One of the main research questions concerned the 
values reconciled in trade law cases on PPM-criteria through the application of legal 
tests. It was concluded that apart from efficiency, also other values have been 
reconciled. The other main research question related to the challenges that the 
implementation of PPM-criteria creates for the application of trade law test and the 
potential solutions to those challenges. It was argued that courts should generally resist 
the temptation of creating new exemptions to trade law. Moreover, it was illustrated 
that while traditional trade law tests will also work in dealing with PPM-criteria, many 
details of their application will require clarification. Finally, less frequently applied 
tests, such as the test on whether inaction constitutes a state measure and the test on 
whether the measure includes sufficient due process rights, may be given a more 
prominent status in the era of sustainable PPMs. 
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